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Abstract	  
Within	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order,	  gender	  identity	  recognition	  and	  the	  legal	  implications	  
of	  trans	  identities	  have,	  in	  recent	  times,	  increasingly	  become	  the	  subjects	  of	  
legislation	  and	  legal	  analysis.	  Nonetheless,	  in	  this	  newly	  emerging	  debate,	  context-­‐
specificity	  and	  historicity	  are	  often	  side-­‐stepped.	  In	  this	  vein,	  the	  present	  thesis	  
asks:	  How	  did	  issues	  of	  gender	  variance	  emerge	  in	  the	  national	  legal	  order	  during	  
the	  previous	  century	  and	  how	  were	  they	  discussed	  and	  regulated	  before	  the	  
existence	  of	  LGBTI+	  rights?	  Starting	  from	  the	  premise	  that	  the	  legal	  management	  of	  
gender	  identity	  adheres	  to	  different	  large-­‐scale	  political	  projects	  on	  a	  macro	  level	  
while,	  on	  a	  ground	  level,	  it	  is	  materialised	  through	  bureaucratic	  informality	  and	  
individual	  survival	  strategies,	  the	  thesis	  proceeds	  to	  explore	  the	  following	  queries:	  
To	  which	  processes	  and	  projects	  does	  recent	  trans-­‐related	  legislation	  relate	  and	  
how	  can	  it	  be	  comprehended	  within	  them?	  How	  does	  such	  legislation	  translate	  into	  
legal	  reality	  as	  a	  lived	  experience	  in	  Greece	  and	  how	  can	  it	  be	  appraised	  on	  a	  
symbolic	  and	  material	  level?	  	  
With	  these	  questions	  in	  mind,	  the	  thesis	  analyses	  texts	  that	  were	  compiled	  through	  
archival	  research	  to	  create	  a	  genealogy	  of	  the	  legal	  management	  of	  gender	  identity	  
during	  the	  previous	  century.	  It	  unearths	  categorical	  conflations,	  interpretative	  
workings	  and	  other	  dominant	  epistemic	  gestures	  that	  created	  a	  chaotic	  nexus	  
within	  the	  supposedly	  self-­‐evident	  process	  of	  registering	  and	  categorising	  legible	  
citizens.	  Multiple	  contemporary	  legal	  sources	  and	  a	  set	  of	  semi-­‐structured	  
interviews	  are	  then	  used	  to	  appraise	  the	  main	  pieces	  of	  legislation	  relating	  to	  
gender	  identity	  issues	  at	  state	  and	  ground	  level.	  Exploring	  the	  way	  in	  which	  trans	  
rights	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  a	  national	  context	  of	  traditional	  ethno-­‐sexual	  values,	  
the	  thesis	  makes	  an	  argument	  for	  complex	  in	  concreto	  readings	  of	  such	  legislation	  
that	  go	  beyond	  its	  mere	  understanding	  as	  a	  linear	  and	  universal	  narrative	  of	  
progress	  or	  assimilation.	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  support	  
but	  offered	  so	  much	  more.	  To	  Kelly	  Dannielle	  for	  taking	  me	  by	  the	  hand	  and	  
showing	  me	  the	  ropes.	  And,	  of	  course,	  to	  Shyamenda	  Purslow	  for	  being	  my	  rock	  
and	  literally	  submitting	  this	  thesis	  in	  my	  absence.	  Finally,	  to	  Rebecca	  Jackson	  for	  
working	  hard,	  under	  so	  much	  pressure,	  to	  polish	  the	  final	  text	  in	  the	  nick	  of	  time.	  	  
	   Further,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  acknowledge	  some	  of	  the	  unique	  people	  that	  I	  
encountered	  during	  my	  time	  in	  Manchester.	  Ελισάβετ	  and	  Λύο	  who	  made	  the	  UK	  a	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  The	  title	  borrows	  from	  Leslie	  Feinberg’s	  alleged	  quote	  ‘I	  reserve	  my	  right	  to	  be	  complex.’	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warmer	  place	  for	  me	  and	  radically	  softened	  the	  experience	  of	  being	  away	  from	  
Athens.	  Susan,	  Lisah	  and	  Denise,	  who	  took	  me	  under	  their	  wing	  in	  the	  most	  
graceful,	  effortless	  and	  generous	  of	  ways.	  Last,	  Cecilia	  for	  reading	  my	  methodology	  
chapter	  and	  for	  always	  thinking	  I	  am	  better	  than	  I	  am,	  despite	  proving	  her	  wrong	  
every	  time.	  	  
I	  also	  want	  to	  express	  my	  deepest	  gratitude	  to	  my	  own	  people	  back	  home.	  Firstly,	  
to	  my	  mother	  Χιονία	  for	  the	  unconditional	  love,	  the	  unfathomable	  support	  and	  for	  
consistently	  providing,	  together	  with	  my	  sister	  Μέλπω,	  a	  place	  for	  me	  to	  return	  and	  
slow	  down.	  To	  my	  grandmother	  Ρούσα	  for	  my	  name	  and	  all	  that	  comes	  with	  it.	  To	  
Ερωφίλη	  for	  walking	  together	  with	  me,	  since	  high-­‐school,	  down	  the	  winding	  path	  
that	  is	  our	  life.	  To	  Κωσταντής	  for	  constantly	  surprising	  me,	  encouraging	  me	  and,	  
even	  unknowingly,	  inspiring	  me.	  To	  Άσπα	  for	  discussing	  many	  of	  my	  impasses	  and	  
insecurities	  during	  this	  process	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  for	  being	  a	  partner	  in	  crime	  
during	  the	  last	  few	  years.	  To	  Βίλυ	  for	  being	  so	  loving	  and	  for	  always	  laughing	  
wholeheartedly	  with	  my	  jokes.	  To	  Μιμή	  for	  having	  carried	  me	  repeatedly	  through	  
the	  trenches	  of	  social	  interaction.	  To	  Πέρσα	  for	  all	  the	  help	  during	  the	  last	  years	  
and	  for	  consistently	  trying	  hard	  to	  find	  the	  soft	  in	  me.	  And,	  of	  course,	  to	  Χρήστος	  
for	  being	  more	  than	  a	  housemate	  and	  a	  friend,	  a	  true	  companion	  in	  a	  world	  that	  
often	  feels	  like	  a	  desert.	  
	   Moreover,	  I	  want	  to	  convey	  my	  most	  heartfelt	  appreciation	  to	  the	  non-­‐human	  
companions	  in	  my	  life,	  the	  most	  significant	  of	  which	  passed	  away	  unexpectedly	  
during	  the	  first	  year	  of	  this	  effort	  and	  broke	  my	  heart.	  Βουτάκο,	  ten	  years	  with	  you	  
were	  not	  enough.	  	  
	   Last,	  since	  I	  have	  not	  yet	  found	  my	  own	  words	  to	  relate	  these	  texts,	  which	  I	  
write	  for	  you,	  to	  you,	  I	  will	  use	  once	  more	  a	  lover’s	  discourse:	  	  
When	  I	  write,	  I	  must	  acknowledge	  this	  fact	  (which,	  according	  to	  my	  Image-­‐
repertoire,	  lacerates	  me):	  there	  is	  no	  benevolence	  within	  writing,	  rather	  a	  
terror:	  it	  smothers	  the	  other,	  who,	  far	  from	  perceiving	  the	  gift	  in	  it,	  reads	  there	  
instead	  an	  assertion	  of	  mastery,	  of	  power,	  of	  pleasure,	  of	  solitude.	  Whence	  the	  
cruel	  paradox	  of	  the	  dedication:	  I	  seek	  at	  all	  costs	  to	  give	  you	  what	  smothers	  
you.	  (…)	  Hence	  I	  cannot	  give	  you	  what	  I	  thought	  I	  was	  writing	  for	  you	  that	  is	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what	  I	  must	  acknowledge:	  the	  amorous	  dedication	  is	  impossible	  (I	  shall	  not	  be	  
satisfied	  with	  a	  worldly	  or	  mundane	  signature,	  pretending	  to	  dedicate	  to	  you	  a	  
work	  which	  escapes	  us	  both).	  The	  operation	  in	  which	  the	  other	  is	  to	  be	  engaged	  
is	  not	  a	  signature.	  It	  is,	  more	  profoundly,	  an	  inscription:	  the	  other	  is	  inscribed,	  
he	  inscribes	  himself	  within	  the	  text,	  he	  leaves	  there	  his	  (multiple)	  traces.	  If	  you	  
were	  only	  the	  dedicatee	  of	  this	  book,	  you	  would	  not	  escape	  your	  harsh	  
condition	  as	  (loved)	  object	  –	  as	  god;	  but	  your	  presence	  within	  the	  text,	  whereby	  
you	  are	  unrecognizable	  there,	  is	  not	  that	  of	  an	  analogical	  figure,	  of	  a	  fetish,	  but	  
that	  of	  a	  force	  which	  is	  not,	  thereby,	  absolutely	  reliable.	  	  
-­‐Roland	  Barthes	  1978,	  A	  lover’s	  Discourse:	  Fragments,	  pp.	  78-­‐79.	  
	  
	  










Dedicated	  to	  my	  Dad.	  
He	  would	  never	  have	  approved	  any	  of	  this.	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Chapter	  1. Introduction	  
1.1. Having	  Questions	  
Recent	  years	  have	  brought	  accelerated	  visibility	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  gender	  identity	  legal	  
recognition	  in	  Greece,	  especially	  since	  the	  discussion	  around	  and	  vote	  regarding	  the	  
related	  legislation	  in	  2017	  (Law	  4491/2017).	  The	  present	  study,	  unfolded	  in	  the	  
midst	  of	  this	  unprecedented	  intensification	  in	  the	  debate	  about	  trans	  identities	  and	  
the	  law,	  and	  was	  led	  by	  a	  need	  to	  create	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  legal	  management	  
of	  gender	  variance	  beyond	  a	  generic	  tale	  of	  legal	  progress	  and	  to	  critically	  
conceptualise	  its	  effects	  within	  the	  Greek	  context.	  The	  research	  was	  formulated	  
under	  the	  main	  premise	  that	  the	  legal	  management	  of	  gender	  identity	  by	  the	  state	  
adheres,	  on	  a	  macro	  level,	  to	  different	  state-­‐level	  or	  larger	  transnational	  political	  
projects	  while,	  at	  the	  ground	  level,	  it	  materialises	  through	  patterns	  of	  bureaucratic	  
informality,	  improvised	  protocols	  and	  individual	  survival	  strategies.	  	  
Departing	  from	  this	  main	  argument,	  this	  thesis	  offers	  a	  context-­‐specific	  reading	  of	  
judicial	  practice,	  legislation	  and	  everyday	  legal	  practices	  regarding	  gender	  identity	  
along	  those	  lines.	  Its	  contribution	  is	  twofold	  and	  can	  be	  summarised	  as	  such:	  	  
• Firstly,	  by	  constructing	  a	  critical	  genealogy	  of	  the	  legal	  management	  of	  
gender	  variance	  since	  the	  previous	  century	  in	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order,	  the	  
thesis	  takes	  forward	  and,	  to	  some	  extent,	  amends	  the	  currently	  emerging	  
legal	  literature	  on	  the	  issue	  by	  providing	  it	  with	  much-­‐needed	  
historiographical	  depth.	  	  
• Secondly,	  by	  analysing	  the	  legal	  framework	  for	  trans	  issues	  in	  Greece,	  the	  
thesis	  offers	  a	  critical	  appraisal	  of	  these	  laws	  and	  their	  conflicting	  effects	  in	  
relation	  to	  the	  specific	  political	  work	  they	  have	  performed	  and	  in	  
conjunction	  with	  the	  experience	  of	  trans	  legal	  reality	  in	  Greece.	  	  
In	  a	  nutshell,	  the	  main	  research	  aim	  is	  to	  interrogate	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  Greek	  
state	  has	  regulated	  legal	  issues	  of	  gender	  variance	  (and	  more	  specifically	  trans	  legal	  
issues)	  and	  to	  comprehend	  its	  complex	  implications	  beyond	  the	  existing	  (accepted)	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narratives.	  That	  is,	  to	  produce	  a	  critical	  analysis	  of	  contemporary	  trans-­‐related	  
legislation	  that	  is	  historically	  sound,	  politically	  informed	  and	  empirically	  meaningful.	  
This	  introductory	  section	  explains	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  main	  research	  questions	  of	  
the	  thesis	  came	  about	  and	  hints	  at	  some	  of	  the	  conclusions	  that	  were	  reached	  in	  
my	  research	  and	  analysis.	  	  
Exploring	  trans	  legal	  issues	  might	  have	  a	  rich	  theoretical	  legacy	  in	  European	  and	  N.	  
American	  academic	  fields	  but,	  within	  Greek	  legal	  theory,	  it	  constitutes	  an	  utterly	  
recent	  endeavour	  (Whittle	  2002;	  Sharpe	  2002;	  Currah	  et	  al	  2006;	  Spade	  [2009]	  
2015).	  To	  be	  precise,	  when	  I	  started	  researching	  trans	  legal	  issues	  in	  2013	  as	  a	  
Masters	  student	  at	  the	  University	  of	  the	  Aegean,	  I	  quickly	  found	  myself	  struggling	  
with	  an	  almost	  complete	  lack	  of	  literature	  and	  engagement	  with	  the	  issue	  within	  
contemporary	  Greek	  legal	  theory	  and	  other	  academic	  fields.	  Surprisingly,	  due	  to	  
recent	  developments,	  by	  the	  time	  I	  concluded	  my	  dissertation	  and	  moved	  on	  to	  
extend	  my	  research	  on	  a	  PhD	  level,	  it	  was	  hard	  to	  keep	  up	  with	  the	  over-­‐production	  
of	  trans-­‐related	  material	  in	  the	  media	  and	  the	  terrain	  of	  legal	  theory	  (Chamtzoudis	  
2015;	  Theofilopoulos	  2016;	  Kotzabasi	  2017;	  Kounougeri-­‐Manoledaki	  2017a;	  2017b;	  
Leleki	  2017;	  Pantelidou	  2018;	  Papadopoulou	  2017;	  2018;	  Peraki	  2017;	  Fountedaki	  
2017;	  	  Kaiafa-­‐Gbadi	  et	  al	  (eds.)	  2018;	  Tsirou	  2019).	  Nonetheless,	  the	  current	  
debates	  in	  Greece	  have	  adopted	  the	  international	  language	  of	  gender	  identity	  
recognition	  and	  trans	  rights	  with	  a	  distinctive	  lack	  of	  reflection	  on	  the	  historicity	  
and	  the	  various	  specificities	  of	  gender	  variance	  and	  its	  legal	  regulation	  in	  the	  
national	  context.	  	  It	  is	  as	  if,	  before	  the	  very	  recently	  granted	  rights,	  there	  was	  
simply	  a	  void	  or	  a	  series	  of	  irrelevant	  tales	  of	  anachronistic	  taxonomies	  that	  no	  one	  
wants	  to	  remember	  or	  lay	  claim	  to.	  
The	  lack	  of	  relevant	  systematic	  studies	  in	  the	  Greek	  context	  and	  the	  broader	  
tendency	  to	  adhere	  to	  a	  universalised	  progressivist	  narrative	  concerning	  LGBTI+	  
rights	  and	  recognition	  have	  left	  contemporary	  Greek	  legal	  engagement	  with	  trans	  
issues	  floating	  without	  a	  historical	  anchor.	  As	  in	  other	  national	  contexts,	  the	  
narrative	  of	  Greece	  as	  a	  European	  semi-­‐periphery	  that	  has	  been	  “lagging”	  behind	  
and	  that	  is	  now	  “catching	  up”	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  Europe	  often	  results	  in	  a	  simplified	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and	  distorted	  version	  of	  its	  legal	  history	  (Mizielińska	  &	  Kulpa	  [2011]	  2016).	  Such	  a	  
narrative	  might	  have	  strategic	  value	  in	  lobbying	  arenas	  but	  it	  also	  flattens	  a	  
complex	  socio-­‐legal	  reality	  in	  order	  to	  fit	  a	  vision	  of	  linear	  progress	  (Kahlina	  2015).	  
Local	  presents	  become	  imaginary	  pasts	  of	  other	  (Euro-­‐N.	  American)	  geo-­‐political	  
presents,	  while	  local	  legal	  historicity	  recedes	  from	  view.	  Nonetheless,	  historical	  and	  
socio-­‐political	  specificity	  proves	  to	  be	  a	  crucial	  aspect	  in	  the	  study	  of	  gender	  and	  
sexual	  variance	  and	  the	  law.	  Without	  a	  critical	  legal	  historiography	  of	  gender	  and	  
sexual	  non-­‐normative	  articulations	  and	  its	  connection	  with	  the	  influence	  of	  
international	  debates	  and	  transnational	  networks,	  it	  seemed	  impossible	  to	  account	  
for	  the	  complex	  present	  entanglement	  of	  trans	  identities	  and	  the	  law	  in	  Greece.	  
Therefore,	  the	  commitment	  to	  historical	  and	  geo-­‐political	  specificity	  became	  a	  
central	  axis	  of	  the	  thesis,	  allowing	  it	  to	  converse	  with	  the	  past	  not	  as	  a	  mere	  
chronological	  precedence	  within	  a	  series	  of	  succeeding	  frameworks	  but	  as	  an	  
essential	  layer	  of	  meaning	  in	  order	  to	  critically	  discuss	  an	  “extended	  present”	  
simultaneously	  composed	  by	  a	  “haunting”	  past	  and	  a	  “suspended	  future”	  
(Tsilimpounidi	  2016;	  Papanikolaou	  2018c;	  Vradis	  2018).	  
In	  this	  vein,	  the	  first	  research	  questions	  that	  I	  chose	  to	  attend	  to	  were	  those	  that	  
would	  provide	  a	  much-­‐needed	  historical	  thread	  in	  the	  legal	  regulation	  of	  gender	  
variance.	  That	  is:	  How	  did	  issues	  of	  gender	  variance	  emerge	  in	  the	  national	  legal	  
order	  during	  the	  previous	  century	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  how	  were	  they	  discussed	  
and	  regulated	  before	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  LGBTI+	  rights	  framework?	  From	  this	  angle,	  
one	  of	  the	  main	  aims	  of	  the	  thesis	  became	  to	  construct	  a	  historically	  informed	  
genealogy	  of	  the	  legal	  management	  of	  gender	  variance	  in	  Greece	  beyond	  a	  linear	  
presentation	  of	  legal	  frameworks	  that	  neatly	  succeed	  one	  another.	  The	  outcome	  
consists	  of	  a	  fragmented	  and	  partial	  archive	  that	  is	  created	  through	  and	  along	  the	  
epistemological	  complexities	  that	  underpin	  the	  management	  of	  gender	  variance	  by	  
legal	  apparatuses	  during	  the	  previous	  century.	  Its	  main	  findings	  connect	  sex	  
(re)classification	  processes	  with	  governance	  techniques	  of	  population	  
standardisation	  and	  legibility,	  which	  are	  materialised	  through	  the	  categorical	  
instrumentalisation	  of	  “hermaphroditism”	  and	  the	  persistent	  erasure	  of	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transsexuality.	  By	  undertaking	  this	  historiographical	  task,	  the	  thesis	  complements	  
the	  scarce	  Greek	  literature	  on	  the	  issue	  by	  recuperating	  a	  lot	  that	  has	  been	  lost	  in	  
the	  quest	  to	  present	  a	  coherent	  lineage	  of	  legal	  concepts.	  	  
With	  a	  solid	  historical	  ground	  to	  stand	  on,	  it	  is	  then	  possible	  to	  turn	  to	  
contemporary	  legislation	  on	  trans	  issues	  and,	  as	  the	  main	  premise	  of	  the	  research	  
dictates,	  interrogate	  the	  actual,	  which	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  same	  as	  the	  declared,	  
workings	  of	  this	  legislation	  within	  the	  context	  of	  its	  introduction.	  If	  the	  legal	  
management	  of	  gender	  variance	  during	  the	  previous	  century	  was	  organised	  around	  
the	  projects	  of	  citizen-­‐legibility	  and	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  gender	  and	  sexual	  
status	  quo	  through	  the	  erasure	  of	  transsexuality,	  then	  the	  question	  regarding	  
contemporary	  legislation	  on	  gender	  identity	  becomes:	  To	  which	  processes	  and	  
projects	  does	  this	  legislation	  relate	  and	  how	  can	  it	  be	  comprehended	  within	  them?	  
Tracing	  the	  effects	  of	  all	  contemporary	  trans-­‐related	  legislation,	  the	  thesis	  unearths	  
the	  tacit	  connections	  between	  those	  laws	  and	  state-­‐level	  projects	  that	  were	  
unfolding	  in	  the	  era	  of	  their	  introduction,	  such	  as	  Europeanisation	  processes	  or	  
attempts	  at	  the	  (re)legitimisation	  of	  governing	  actors.	  As	  a	  result,	  this	  legislation	  is	  
linked	  with	  processes	  that	  can,	  to	  varying	  degrees,	  contradict	  its	  declared	  
imperatives.	  The	  connections	  that	  are	  made	  constitute	  a	  crucial	  contribution	  to	  the	  
critical	  appraisal	  of	  the	  existing	  legislation.	  By	  reworking	  the	  understanding	  of	  
gender	  identity	  legislation,	  the	  present	  thesis	  creates	  a	  framework	  within	  which	  
trans	  legal	  issues	  are	  discussed	  in	  close	  proximity	  with	  old	  and	  new	  hostile	  political	  
apparatuses,	  such	  as	  traditional	  ethno-­‐sexual	  values,	  crisis	  management	  and	  
austerity	  politics,	  and	  racialised,	  as	  well	  as	  gendered,	  violence	  as	  a	  legitimate	  means	  
of	  European	  governance.	  
Clearly	  then,	  context-­‐specificity	  becomes	  an	  essential	  condition	  in	  order	  to	  
interrogate	  the	  precise	  purposes	  served	  by	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  trans-­‐related	  
legislative	  piece	  in	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order.	  Moreover,	  the	  focus	  on	  historical	  and	  
socio-­‐political	  specificity	  allows	  the	  interrogation	  of	  the	  tensions	  between	  
contemporary	  LGBTI+	  legislation	  introduced	  from	  the	  European	  into	  the	  national	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legal	  order,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  is	  built	  upon	  specific	  ethno-­‐sexual	  values.2	  Nonetheless,	  
as	  feminist	  legal	  scholar	  Giwta	  Kravaritou	  notes,	  the	  gender	  imperative	  of	  the	  law	  is	  
not	  necessarily	  expressed	  in	  the	  provisions	  about	  gender	  but	  “even	  more	  so	  in	  what	  
the	  law	  ‘thinks’	  on	  a	  deeper	  level”	  (Kravaritou	  1996:	  144,	  my	  translation).	  The	  
weaving	  of	  gender	  and	  sexual	  norms	  in	  the	  core	  of	  law,	  implicitly	  genders	  the	  body	  
of	  the	  law	  and	  is	  distilled	  within	  state	  apparatuses	  and	  carried	  through	  all	  aspects	  of	  
institutional	  life	  up	  to	  the	  last	  tentacle	  of	  administrative	  authority.	  	  
Following	  this,	  the	  research	  question	  that	  emerges	  is	  how	  might	  the	  introduction	  of	  
trans	  -­‐among	  other	  minorities	  -­‐	  rights	  be	  understood	  in	  a	  national	  context	  of	  
traditional	  ethno-­‐sexual	  values?	  What	  kind	  of	  discourses	  are	  mobilised	  on	  a	  legal	  
and	  a	  socio-­‐political	  terrain	  against	  such	  introduced	  legislation,	  which	  contradicts	  
the	  very	  fabric	  of	  the	  national	  legal	  order?	  An	  analysis	  of	  the	  parliamentary	  debates	  
shows	  that	  the	  opposition	  to	  recent	  trans-­‐related	  legislation	  was	  organised	  around	  
religio-­‐nationalist	  collusions,	  heterosexual	  reproductive	  futurity	  and	  xenophobic	  
(both	  anti-­‐migrant	  and	  anti-­‐European)	  sentiment.	  Accordingly,	  trans	  identities	  and	  
their	  legitimisation	  in	  the	  law	  were	  depicted	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  familial	  values,	  national	  
sovereignty	  and	  ethno-­‐religious	  homogeneity.3	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2
	  Throughout	  the	  core	  texts	  of	  Greek	  Civil	  and	  Penal	  Law,	  gender	  variance	  and	  sexuality	  as	  a	  whole	  
(especially	  practices	  that	  are	  not	  included	  in	  reproductive	  heterosexuality),	  have	  been	  traditionally	  
faced	  with	  an	  inherent	  “negativism”	  (Vitoros	  2008).	  This	  has	  provided	  a	  historical	  legal	  basis	  for	  the	  
deep	  interconnection	  between	  moral,	  natural	  and	  legal	  “deviation”	  within	  the	  Greek	  legal	  tradition	  
(Vitoros	  2008).	  Moreover,	  gender	  and	  sexual	  norms	  are	  reflected	  and	  reproduced	  from	  judicial	  
discourses	  on	  every	  level	  even	  when,	  or	  especially	  when,	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  are	  not	  the	  subject	  in	  
hand.	  For	  that	  matter,	  even	  the	  silences	  and	  “gaps”	  regarding	  these	  issues	  should	  not	  be	  
conceptualised	  as	  mere	  absence	  of	  framework	  but	  as	  silences	  dense	  with	  meaning	  and	  normative	  
power,	  “an	  evident	  presence	  of	  institutional	  homophobia”	  and	  transphobia	  (Kantsa	  &	  Chalkidou	  
2014:	  97;	  Chalkidou	  2018).	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  gendered	  norms	  that	  underlie	  the	  Greek	  legal	  system	  
are	  present	  even	  if	  not	  explicitly	  invoked.	  
3
	  In	  this	  complicated	  discursive	  landscape,	  the	  issue	  of	  LGBTQI+	  political	  organisation	  and	  activism	  
and	  their	  relation	  to	  their	  Euro-­‐N.	  American	  counterparts	  emerges	  as	  significant	  fiend	  of	  negotiation.	  
Although	  political	  networks	  and	  activism	  evade	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  present	  thesis,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  
that	  there	  exists	  a	  body	  of	  literature	  that	  recognises	  the	  role	  of	  Euro-­‐N.	  American	  models	  of	  in	  the	  
formulation	  of	  local	  movements	  in	  the	  European	  peripheries	  but	  also	  interrogates	  the	  political	  
hierarchies	  reproduced	  by	  progressivist	  narratives	  (Kulpa	  &	  Mizielińska	  (eds.)	  [2011]	  2016;	  
Mesquita,	  Wiedlack	  &	  Lasthofer	  (eds.)	  2012;	  Bilić	  &	  Kajinić	  (eds.)	  2016;	  Bilić	  (ed.)	  2016).	  Indeed,	  
critical	  studies	  of	  LGBTQI+	  political	  articulations	  in	  the	  “less”	  European	  regions	  reveal	  that	  neither	  
the	  schema	  of	  local	  “backwardness”	  resolved	  by	  European	  “civilising”	  processes	  nor	  the	  view	  of	  
Europeanisation	  as	  a	  solely	  neo-­‐colonialist	  project	  are	  adequate	  to	  do	  justice	  to	  such	  complex	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Last,	  the	  focus	  on	  context-­‐specificity	  also	  served	  the	  discussion	  for	  the	  second	  part	  
of	  the	  thesis’	  main	  premise,	  which	  suggests	  that	  the	  materialisation	  of	  the	  legal	  
imperative	  at	  a	  ground	  level	  vastly	  differs	  from	  the	  letter	  of	  the	  law.	  Indeed,	  within	  
fields	  such	  as	  critical	  legal	  studies,	  socio-­‐legal	  studies,	  and	  feminist	  and	  queer	  legal	  
studies,	  several	  writers	  have	  established	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  trans	  people	  
and	  the	  law	  is	  a	  complex	  and	  multifaceted.	  It	  is	  one	  that	  goes	  beyond	  the	  official	  
canons	  of	  gender	  recognition	  or	  regulation	  (Namaste	  [2005]	  2011;	  Ochoa	  2008;	  
Taşcioğlu	  2011;	  West	  2013;	  Spade	  [2009]	  2015).	  In	  this	  vein,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  engage	  
with	  questions	  that	  would	  take	  into	  account	  a	  context-­‐specific	  empirical	  
understanding	  of	  trans-­‐related	  legislation,	  such	  as:	  How	  does	  such	  legislation	  
translate	  into	  legal	  reality	  as	  a	  lived	  experience	  in	  Greece?	  How	  do	  trans	  individuals	  
appraise	  trans-­‐related	  legislation?	  How	  do	  they	  engage	  with	  this	  legislation	  on	  a	  
symbolic	  and	  material	  level?	  	  
These	  questions	  work	  towards	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  effects	  (or	  the	  lack	  thereof)	  of	  the	  
law	  at	  a	  ground	  level	  and	  its	  negotiation	  within	  a	  specific	  socio-­‐legal	  context	  by	  the	  
individuals	  under	  its	  purview.	  A	  common	  thread	  throughout	  the	  thesis	  is	  the	  
suggestion	  that,	  from	  the	  manipulation	  of	  the	  categorical	  conflations	  during	  the	  
previous	  century	  to	  the	  present-­‐day	  improvised	  protocols,	  the	  law	  should	  not	  be	  
taken	  at	  face	  value.	  Not	  taking	  the	  legal	  text	  at	  face	  value	  means	  to	  avoid	  
“mistaking	  public	  transcript	  for	  reality	  and	  obscuring	  the	  most	  complex,	  dialectical	  
negotiation	  of	  dynamic	  discursive	  networks”	  (West	  2013:	  43).	  Indeed,	  the	  intimate	  
knowledge	  of	  navigating	  recognition	  systems,	  public	  authorities	  and	  other	  services,	  
as	  was	  discussed	  during	  a	  set	  of	  interviews	  I	  conducted,	  unearths	  such	  negotiations	  
and	  also	  accounts	  for	  part	  of	  my	  interlocutors’	  scepticism	  towards	  declaratory	  
provisions	  regarding	  the	  legal	  protection	  of	  trans	  identities.	  Overall,	  every	  chapter	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
articulations	  (Binnie	  2004,	  2016;	  Navickaite	  2014;	  Kahlina	  2015;	  Rexhepi	  2016).	  Whether	  embraced	  
politically	  or	  used	  strategically,	  the	  progressivist	  logic	  has	  been	  utilised	  (or	  even	  manipulated)	  by	  
local	  activists	  in	  different	  and	  complex	  ways.	  Blending	  discursive	  and	  legal	  elements	  from	  different	  
scales	  (the	  European,	  the	  national,	  the	  local	  etc.),	  such	  political	  mobilisations	  employ	  these	  tools	  in	  
ways	  that	  lay	  down	  surprising	  pathways	  (Mizielińska	  [2011]	  2016).	  To	  that	  end,	  context-­‐specific	  
analyses	  are	  crucial	  to	  critically	  appraise	  the	  workings	  of	  sexual	  and	  gender	  politics	  as	  they	  
materialise	  in	  specific	  local	  settings.	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on	  its	  own,	  and	  all	  of	  them	  combined,	  conclude	  that	  the	  management	  of	  gender	  
variance	  in	  Greece	  does	  not	  adhere	  to	  state-­‐imposed	  coherency	  and	  bureaucratic	  
pristine	  protocols	  but	  is	  largely	  formulated	  by	  informal	  practices	  (whether	  low-­‐level	  
employees’	  discretion	  or	  individual	  survival	  strategies)	  and	  deeply	  rooted	  socio-­‐
political	  hierarchies.	  	  
Closing,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  Greek	  literature	  on	  trans	  issues	  made	  
harder	  the,	  already	  difficult	  task	  of	  delimiting	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  research.	  In	  every	  
chapter	  of	  this	  thesis	  and	  in	  every	  section	  of	  each	  chapter,	  there	  were	  Sirens	  that	  
presented	  me	  with	  various	  intriguing	  paths,	  each	  of	  which	  could	  have	  lead	  to	  
valuable	  and	  significant	  discussions	  and	  research.	  Some	  of	  the	  paths	  I	  did	  not	  take	  
are	  the	  philosophical	  discussions	  of	  gender	  ontologies,	  the	  emergence	  of	  social	  and	  
political	  movements	  and	  their	  interconnection	  with	  issues	  discussed	  in	  the	  thesis,	  
the	  debates	  concerning	  the	  pathologisation	  and	  medicalisation	  of	  gender	  variance,	  
the	  debates	  about	  trans	  sex-­‐work	  and	  its	  legal	  management,	  the	  legal	  claims	  of	  
newly	  emerging	  identities4,	  as	  well	  as	  many	  others.	  Most	  importantly,	  although	  
there	  are	  issues	  of	  nationalism,	  racism	  and	  anti-­‐migrant	  politics	  discussed	  in	  parts	  
of	  the	  following	  analysis,	  my	  initial	  intention	  to	  include	  a	  section	  discussing	  issues	  of	  
gender	  variant	  migrants	  in	  Greece	  was	  abandoned	  in	  the	  process.	  	  
Specifically,	  after	  some	  preliminary	  research	  including	  legal	  and	  media	  articles,	  
press	  releases	  and	  after	  conducting	  interviews	  with	  two	  legal	  professionals	  that	  had	  
held	  various	  positions	  in	  refugee-­‐related	  NGOs	  and	  in	  the	  Greek	  Asylum	  Services,	  I	  
decided	  not	  include	  such	  a	  section.	  From	  my	  understanding,	  the	  issues	  that	  I	  saw	  
arising	  are	  vastly	  different	  from	  the	  ones	  concerning	  naturalised	  or	  long-­‐term	  
residing	  citizens,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  immensely	  complex.5	  Although	  it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4
	  For	  example,	  in	  2017	  the	  first	  case	  of	  a	  non-­‐binary	  claim,	  as	  such,	  was	  discussed	  in	  court.	  The	  court	  
granted	  the	  claimant	  request	  to	  add	  a	  female	  name	  along	  the	  side	  of	  their	  male	  name	  but	  rejected	  
the	  claim	  for	  an	  overall	  erasure	  of	  the	  person’s	  gender	  status	  from	  their	  identification	  documents	  
(Decision	  67/2018	  of	  Marousi	  District	  Court).	  This	  emerging	  theoretical	  terrain	  is	  currently	  also	  being	  
picked	  up	  by	  international	  scholarship	  (Clucas	  &	  Whittle	  2017).	  
5
	  For	  example	  such	  issues	  concern	  “proving”	  gender	  identity	  in	  front	  of	  asylum	  committees,	  
negotiating	  the	  cultural	  distances	  between	  people’s	  sense	  of	  self	  and	  the	  European	  concepts	  that	  
need	  to	  be	  employed,	  NGOs	  conceptualisations	  of	  “vulnerability”	  as	  part	  of	  their	  toolkit	  and,	  of	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was	  a	  difficult	  decision,	  I	  concluded	  that	  there	  was	  a	  risk	  of	  not	  doing	  justice	  to	  
these	  issues,	  which	  demand	  careful	  separate	  consideration	  such	  as	  offered	  by	  
relevant	  international	  literature	  (Aizura	  2012b;	  Bhanji	  2012;	  Cotten	  (ed.)	  2012;	  
Binnie	  &	  Klesse	  2013;	  Shakhsari	  2014a,	  2014b;	  Camminga	  2017).	  All	  the	  above-­‐
mentioned	  topics	  could	  be	  directions	  for	  future	  research	  that	  would	  hopefully	  
contribute	  to	  creating	  a	  significant	  body	  of	  work	  on	  trans	  issues	  in	  Greece.	  	  
As	  I	  have	  explained	  in	  this	  section,	  the	  main	  aim	  of	  the	  thesis	  is	  to	  offer	  a	  critical	  
appraisal	  of	  the	  legal	  framework	  concerning	  gender	  variance	  and	  specifically	  trans	  
issues	  in	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order.	  This	  quest	  unfolds	  into	  several	  research	  questions.	  
Some	  of	  these	  are	  state-­‐level	  queries	  and	  the	  other	  ground,	  or	  molecular,	  level	  
questions.	  Accordingly,	  the	  present	  research	  focuses	  partly	  on	  a	  macro	  view	  of	  
gender	  identity	  regulation	  by	  the	  state	  and	  partly	  on	  the	  molecular	  experience	  of	  
transness	  as	  it	  is	  affected	  by	  its	  legal	  regulation.	  Along	  these	  lines,	  the	  outcome	  
contributes	  to	  the	  current	  debate	  on	  gender	  identity	  and	  the	  law	  in	  Greece	  by	  
providing	  both	  a	  historiographical	  depth	  and	  a	  set	  of	  critical	  connections	  between	  
trans	  legal	  reality,	  specific	  legal	  provisions	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  state-­‐level	  projects.	  The	  
next	  section	  gives	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  way	  the	  thesis	  is	  structured	  and	  a	  brief	  outline	  
of	  the	  chapters.	  
1.2. Thesis	  Structure	  and	  Chapter	  outline	  
Having	  established	  the	  main	  premises	  of	  the	  research,	  this	  section	  breaks	  down	  the	  
structure	  of	  the	  thesis	  and	  its	  different	  parts.	  The	  main	  body	  of	  the	  thesis	  consists	  
of	  three	  parts,	  each	  of	  which	  contains	  two	  to	  three	  chapters.	  The	  division	  into	  parts	  
facilitates	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  text	  works	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  of	  what	  
role	  different	  chapters	  play	  in	  approaching	  the	  issues	  at	  hand.	  The	  chapters	  that	  are	  
grouped	  in	  each	  part	  have	  a	  common	  aim,	  a	  common	  methodological	  approach	  
and,	  thus,	  in	  a	  sense,	  they	  share	  a	  similar	  tempo.	  The	  different	  tempos	  within	  the	  
thesis	  not	  only	  align	  with	  the	  intention	  for	  epistemological	  openness	  and	  
methodological	  creativity	  but	  also	  provide	  breathing	  space	  for	  different	  sources,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
course,	  the	  complex	  interweaving	  of	  (state)	  racism,	  Islamophobia	  and	  homonationalist	  discourses	  
and	  its	  influence	  on	  asylum	  processes.	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arguments	  and	  frameworks.	  Within	  such	  a	  structure,	  different	  temporal	  and	  
conceptual	  modalities	  (past	  and	  present,	  archival	  research	  and	  interviews,	  historical	  
“inverts”	  and	  contemporary	  trans	  voices)	  co-­‐exist	  in	  the	  thesis	  without	  being	  
merged	  into	  a	  formless	  whole.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  modular	  structure	  mirrors	  the	  
nuanced	  and	  multi-­‐level	  discussions	  the	  thesis	  attempts	  to	  participate	  in	  or	  even	  
instigate.	  	  
Part	  A	  (chapters	  two,	  three	  and	  four)	  presents	  the	  disciplinary,	  theoretical	  and	  
epistemological	  environment	  within	  which	  the	  research	  unfolds.	  By	  critically	  
reviewing	  a	  variety	  of	  international	  and	  Greek	  literature,	  it	  builds	  the	  conceptual	  
backbone	  of	  the	  text	  and	  presents	  its	  methodological	  path.	  Part	  B	  (chapters	  five	  
and	  six)	  creates	  a	  critical	  genealogy	  of	  the	  legal	  management	  of	  gender	  variance	  in	  
the	  twentieth	  century	  within	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order	  through	  a	  detailed,	  quasi	  
archaeological,	  re-­‐reading	  of	  mainly	  archival	  material	  and	  legal	  texts	  from	  the	  
previous	  century.	  Lastly,	  Part	  C	  (chapters	  seven,	  eight	  and	  nine)	  brings	  together	  
legal	  texts,	  parliamentary	  debates,	  interviews	  and	  other	  material	  in	  order	  to	  
appraise	  the	  three	  legislative	  pieces	  (one	  in	  each	  chapter)	  that	  constitute	  the	  
contemporary	  legal	  framework	  on	  trans	  identity.	  The	  different	  sources	  offer	  
different	  insights	  and	  facilitate	  the	  move	  from	  the	  macro	  to	  the	  micro	  and	  vice	  
versa.	  Overall,	  the	  division	  into	  parts	  makes	  the	  access	  to	  the	  text’s	  meanings	  easier	  
without	  sacrificing	  their	  complexity,	  which,	  as	  noted,	  constitutes	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  
the	  thesis’	  argument	  and	  its	  original	  contribution.	  The	  chapters	  that	  make	  up	  the	  
main	  body	  of	  the	  thesis	  (other	  than	  the	  introduction	  and	  final	  chapter,	  that	  is)	  
unfold	  as	  follows.	  
Chapter	  two	  gives	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  trans	  studies	  as	  an	  area	  of	  
theorising	  mainly	  within	  Anglophone	  scholarship	  and	  in	  close	  proximity	  with	  
feminist	  and	  queer	  thought	  (Stryker	  &	  Whittle	  (eds.)	  2006;	  Bettcher	  2009;	  Stryker	  &	  
Aizura	  (eds.)	  2013;	  Kunzel	  2014).	  Moreover,	  it	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  
epistemological	  tensions	  between	  trans	  and	  queer	  conceptualisations	  of	  gender	  
and	  the	  personal,	  political	  and	  theoretical	  impasses	  they	  produced	  (Currah	  1997,	  
2009,	  2017;	  Prosser	  1998a;	  Halberstam	  1998a,	  1998b;	  Namaste	  [2005]	  2011;	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Serano	  2007).	  It	  suggests	  that	  the	  present	  study	  is	  situated	  in	  the	  theoretical	  space	  
that	  has	  been	  crafted	  by	  authors,	  who	  call	  for	  polyvocality	  and	  complexity	  in	  the	  
study	  of	  trans	  issues	  and	  suggest	  the	  necessity	  for	  multiple	  frameworks	  in	  order	  to	  
conceptualise	  the	  vast	  variety	  of	  trans	  experiences	  (Rubin	  [1996]	  2006;	  Hale	  1998;	  
Currah	  2006;	  Hines	  2006;	  Bettcher	  2014).	  A	  multiplicity	  of	  frameworks	  can	  also	  
enable	  analyses	  that	  respond	  to	  context	  specificity	  in	  historico-­‐political	  and	  geo-­‐
temporal	  terms.	  Accordingly,	  the	  last	  section	  of	  the	  chapter	  converses	  with	  authors	  
who	  strive	  to	  prioritise	  alternative	  “geo-­‐temporal	  modalities”	  in	  the	  study	  of	  gender	  
and	  sexual	  politics	  and	  practices	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  flattening	  their	  diverse	  
historicities	  (Mizielińska	  &	  Kulpa[2011]	  2016:	  14).	  This	  way,	  the	  chapter	  establishes	  
the	  disciplinary	  backbone	  of	  the	  thesis	  by	  utilising	  trans	  studies	  tools	  only	  to	  the	  
extent	  that	  they	  can	  be	  yielded	  to	  context-­‐specific	  past	  and	  present	  modes	  of	  
gender	  variance	  in	  Greece.	  	  
Having	  set	  the	  broader	  theoretical	  and	  disciplinary	  environment	  of	  the	  thesis,	  
chapter	  three	  narrows	  in	  on	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  present	  study	  that	  is	  the	  realm	  of	  trans	  
engagement	  with	  the	  law.	  Initially,	  the	  chapter	  presents	  the	  emergence	  of	  trans	  
rights	  scholarship	  and	  discusses	  critical	  approaches	  to	  rights	  politics	  within	  the	  
modern	  neoliberal	  Euro-­‐American	  states	  (Currah,	  Juang	  &	  Minter	  2006;	  Whittle	  &	  
Turner	  2007;	  Currah	  &	  Moore	  2009;	  Currah	  2009;	  Beger	  [2004]	  2009;	  Aizura	  2012a,	  
2017;	  West	  2013;	  Spade	  [2009]	  2015).	  The	  following	  section	  moves	  away	  from	  this	  
debate	  towards	  a	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  management	  of	  gender	  variance	  
preceding	  a	  trans	  rights	  framework.	  That	  is,	  within	  a	  series	  of	  modern	  techniques	  of	  
state	  governance	  that	  utilise	  sex	  classification	  and	  civil	  registration	  as	  part	  of	  
standardisation	  processes	  that	  amount	  to	  citizen	  legibility	  (Scott	  1998;	  Spade	  2008;	  
Currah	  &	  Moore	  2009;	  Meadow	  2010;	  Moore	  &	  Currah	  2015).	  Within	  legal	  sex	  
classification,	  the	  function	  of	  interpretation	  emerges	  as	  central	  in	  the	  process	  of	  
enforcing	  and	  naturalising	  the	  gender	  imperatives	  of	  the	  legal	  order	  as	  they	  are	  
materialised	  on	  ambiguously	  sexed/gendered	  subjectivities,	  such	  as	  the	  historical	  
category	  of	  the	  “hermaphrodite”	  and	  its	  legal	  treatment	  (Cover	  1986;	  Whittle	  
2002).	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Chapter	  four,	  which	  concludes	  Part	  A,	  presents	  in	  detail	  the	  way	  in	  which	  this	  
research	  was	  conducted,	  the	  sources	  used,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  reasons	  behind	  these	  
methodological	  choices	  and	  the	  challenges	  they	  presented.	  In	  terms	  of	  
epistemology,	  the	  feminist	  call	  for	  accountable	  epistemologies	  has	  transferred	  into	  
trans	  studies	  as	  a	  field	  de	  facto	  concerning	  “the	  subjugated”	  (Haraway	  1998;	  
Stryker	  2006;	  Haritaworn	  2007).	  Following	  this	  debate,	  chapter	  four	  accounts	  for	  
issues	  of	  positionality,	  reflexivity	  and	  ethics	  in	  knowledge-­‐production	  about	  trans	  
issues	  and	  in	  the	  present	  research	  more	  specifically.	  Continuing,	  the	  
methodological	  route	  of	  the	  research	  is	  presented.	  The	  sources	  and	  the	  way	  they	  
were	  used	  are	  discussed,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  challenges	  encountered	  in	  the	  research	  
process.	  	  	  
Moving	  on	  to	  Part	  B,	  chapter	  five	  examines	  the	  role	  of	  sex	  as	  a	  legal	  category	  within	  
the	  establishment	  of	  civil	  registration	  processes	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  modern	  
Greek	  state	  (Skiadas	  2005).	  Focusing	  on	  sex	  classification	  in	  Civil	  law,	  it	  unearths	  
and	  connects	  various	  texts,	  collected	  mainly	  through	  archival	  research,	  concerning	  
the	  management	  of	  “doubtful	  sex”,	  under	  the	  label	  of	  “hermaphroditism”,	  during	  
that	  era	  (Dreger	  1998;	  Mak	  2012).	  Based	  on	  the	  analysis	  of	  these	  texts,	  it	  makes	  the	  
argument	  that	  Civil	  law	  scholars,	  through	  a	  series	  of	  interpretative	  gestures,	  
perpetuated	  the	  naturalisation	  of	  the	  gender	  status	  quo	  and	  insisted	  on	  a	  simplified	  
depiction	  of	  an	  evenly	  sexed,	  according	  to	  a	  natural	  taxonomy,	  population.	  Their	  
approach,	  departing	  from	  the	  Legal	  Medicine	  canon	  of	  detailed	  taxonomies,	  served	  
the	  project	  of	  simplification,	  standardisation	  and	  catholic	  citizen	  legibility	  (Scott	  
1998;	  Spade	  2008;	  Currah	  &	  Moore	  2009;	  Meadow	  2010).	  
Chapter	  six	  follows	  the	  debate	  on	  sex	  (re)classification	  into	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  
twentieth	  century.	  Although	  trans	  identities,	  under	  different	  nomenclature,	  were	  
increasingly	  emerging	  in	  the	  social	  terrain	  of	  that	  era,	  the	  “hermaphrodite”	  
remained	  a	  key	  category	  for	  the	  management	  of	  gender	  variance	  in	  the	  law	  (Dreger	  
1998;	  Mak	  2012;	  Kritsotaki	  2013;	  Tzanaki	  2018).	  Through	  a	  parallel	  reading	  of	  this	  
debate	  with	  texts	  from	  Criminal	  and	  Medical	  law	  (such	  as	  criminal	  cases	  found	  in	  
the	  Hellenic	  Police	  journals),	  the	  chapter	  establishes	  the	  intentionality	  and	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insistence	  behind	  the	  refusal	  of	  Civil	  law	  scholars	  to	  acknowledge	  transsexuality	  as	  
a	  social	  and	  legal	  reality.	  The	  notion	  of	  the	  “person	  who	  had	  a	  sex	  change”	  is	  
mobilised	  in	  the	  legal	  debate	  in	  order	  to	  function	  as	  a	  subject	  placeholder	  that	  
allows	  the	  hostile	  regulation	  of	  transsexuality	  without	  commanding	  its	  legal	  
acknowledgement.	  Last,	  the	  analysis	  of	  two	  Greek	  legal	  scholars	  (Dokoumetzidis	  
1995;	  Papazisi	  2000)	  are	  discussed,	  as	  they	  were	  the	  only	  alternative	  framework	  
offered	  in	  that	  era.	  Although,	  their	  analyses	  were	  marginalised	  and	  not	  
acknowledged	  by	  the	  dominant	  debate,	  a	  variety	  of	  valuable	  conclusions	  is	  drawn	  
through	  their	  overview	  concerning	  the	  ideological	  and	  epistemological	  premises	  of	  
this	  debate.	  	  
Moving	  onto	  current	  issues	  of	  gender	  variance	  in	  the	  law,	  Part	  C	  opens	  with	  chapter	  
seven,	  which	  comments	  on	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  first	  contemporary	  legislative	  
piece	  (Law	  3896/2010)	  within	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order	  that	  included	  a	  protective	  
provision	  against	  discrimination	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  “sex-­‐change.”	  That	  is,	  it	  traces	  
the	  adaptation	  of	  European	  legislation	  (2006/54/EC	  directive)	  regarding	  anti-­‐
discrimination	  in	  employment	  in	  the	  national	  legal	  order.	  Following	  the	  overall	  
rationale	  of	  the	  thesis,	  the	  effects	  of	  this	  legislation	  are	  appraised	  on	  a	  juridical,	  
social	  and	  molecular	  level.	  Moreover,	  through	  my	  interlocutors’	  analyses,	  an	  
empirically	  grounded	  critique	  is	  articulated	  that	  goes	  beyond	  the	  letter	  of	  the	  law	  
and	  hints	  towards	  structural	  injustices	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  life	  resources.	  As	  no	  
significant	  effect	  of	  the	  legislation	  has	  been	  traced	  on	  a	  legal	  or	  social	  level,	  the	  
chapter	  proceeds	  to	  interrogate	  its	  broader	  political	  workings	  of	  the	  legislation	  on	  a	  
state	  level	  and	  its	  interconnection	  with	  the	  political	  processes	  of	  Europeanisation	  
and	  their	  ideological	  underpinnings.	  	  
Chapter	  eight	  steps	  into	  the	  politically	  contested	  era	  of	  the	  Crisis,	  which	  initiated	  
from	  the	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2008-­‐2009.	  The	  chapter	  discusses	  the	  introduction	  of	  
“anti-­‐racist	  legislation”	  (Law	  4139/2013	  and	  Law	  4285/2014),	  which	  refers	  to	  
crimes	  motivated	  by	  the	  (perceived)	  characteristics	  of	  the	  victim	  including	  sexual	  
orientation	  and	  gender	  identity.	  This	  legislation	  was	  delivered	  during	  a	  period	  
wherein	  (state)	  racist	  discourses	  and	  the	  systematic	  targeting	  of	  the	  nation’s	  racial,	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gender,	  religious	  and	  sexual	  Others	  were	  instrumental	  parts	  of	  the	  national	  
governing	  paradigm	  (Athanasiou	  2012;	  Carastathis	  2015).	  The	  contradiction	  
between	  the	  ideological	  underpinnings	  of	  this	  governing	  paradigm	  and	  the	  anti-­‐
racist	  legislation	  imperatives	  is	  also	  reflected	  in	  the	  aporetic	  and	  ambivalent	  stance	  
of	  my	  interlocutors	  towards	  it.	  Although	  they	  appreciate	  the	  symbolic	  and	  
potentially	  educative	  function	  of	  this	  legal	  protection,	  in	  our	  discussions,	  they	  
underscore	  the	  limitations	  of	  any	  framework	  regarding	  racism,	  gender	  violence	  and	  
transphobia	  that	  focuses	  mainly	  on	  the	  interpersonal	  and	  the	  eruptive	  elements	  
while	  ignoring,	  and	  thus	  rendering	  invisible,	  the	  systemic	  and	  atmospheric	  aspects	  
of	  it.	  In	  view	  of	  the	  seemingly	  paradoxical	  relation	  of	  the	  anti-­‐racist	  legislation	  and	  
the	  regime	  that	  introduced	  it,	  the	  chapter	  traces	  its	  particular	  workings	  in	  the	  
context	  it	  was	  introduced	  in	  and,	  specifically,	  regardless	  of	  whatever	  positive	  
potential,	  its	  insidious	  contribution	  to	  the	  legitimisation	  of	  systemic	  racism,	  
violence	  and	  gender/sexual	  hierarchies.	  	  
Chapter	  nine	  discusses	  the	  issue	  of	  gender	  identity	  legal	  (mis)recognition	  and	  the	  
recent	  legislative	  initiative	  regarding	  this	  issue.	  First,	  the	  previously	  existing	  
framework	  for	  gender	  reclassification	  and	  identity	  documents’	  amendment	  is	  
presented	  and	  appraised	  through	  an	  empirical	  lens.	  Lead	  by	  my	  interlocutors’	  
narratives,	  the	  chapter	  underscores	  the	  role	  of	  margins	  of	  discretion	  within	  systems	  
of	  recognition,	  as	  well	  as	  informal	  practices	  and	  survival	  strategies	  within	  a	  broader	  
context	  of	  bureaucratic	  irregularity.	  The	  second	  half	  of	  the	  chapter	  acquaints	  the	  
reader	  with	  much	  discussed	  Law	  4491/2017	  on	  gender	  identity	  legal	  recognition.	  
Other	  than	  presenting	  the	  upsides	  and	  downsides	  of	  the	  new	  legislation	  that	  has	  
changed	  the	  national	  paradigm	  on	  gender	  identity	  recognition,	  this	  section	  of	  the	  
chapter	  explores	  the	  main	  parliamentary	  opposition	  during	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  law	  
and	  its	  ideological	  underpinnings,	  which	  draw	  connections	  between	  traditional	  
gender/sexual	  values,	  nationalism,	  and	  Christian	  Orthodoxy.	  Lastly,	  as	  in	  previous	  
chapters,	  the	  new	  legislation	  is	  also	  appraised	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  workings	  it	  
performed	  on	  a	  state-­‐level	  and,	  specifically,	  the	  aims	  and	  effects	  of	  its	  exploitation	  
on	  the	  communicational	  front	  by	  the	  governing	  party	  at	  the	  time.	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As	  has	  been	  established	  in	  this	  introductory	  chapter,	  the	  twofold	  contribution	  of	  
the	  present	  research	  consists	  of	  a	  critical	  genealogy	  of	  the	  legal	  management	  of	  
gender	  variance	  on	  one	  hand	  and	  of	  a	  multi-­‐level	  appraisal	  of	  contemporary	  trans-­‐
related	  legislation	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  Moreover,	  the	  main	  premise	  underpinning	  
the	  research	  is	  that	  the	  legal	  management	  of	  gender	  identity	  issues	  by	  the	  state	  
adheres,	  on	  a	  state-­‐level,	  to	  different	  projects,	  which	  might	  depart	  from	  its	  
declared	  intention,	  and,	  at	  a	  ground	  level,	  to	  various	  informal	  practices.	  The	  
different	  sources	  utilised	  in	  order	  to	  deliver	  the	  thesis	  and	  complicate	  the	  emerging	  
discussions	  concerning	  gender	  identity	  in	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order	  compose	  a	  text	  that	  
is	  the	  first	  of	  its	  kind	  within	  the	  context	  in	  which	  it	  is	  situated.	  Part	  A,	  which	  follows,	  
weaves	  the	  theoretical	  backbone	  of	  the	  thesis	  and	  presents	  its	  epistemological	  
premise.
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Part	  A.	  Theories,	  Disciplines	  and	  Worlds	  
The	  first	  part	  (chapters	  two,	  three	  and	  four)	  of	  the	  thesis	  maps	  out	  the	  disciplinary,	  
theoretical	  and	  epistemological	  environment	  within	  which	  the	  present	  research	  
unfolds.	  To	  that	  end,	  this	  part	  consists	  of	  three	  chapters	  that,	  combined,	  create	  a	  
theoretical	  and	  epistemological	  backdrop	  against	  which	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  entire	  
thesis	  can	  be	  comprehended.	  
Starting	  from	  a	  disciplinary	  and	  theoretical	  exploration	  of	  trans	  studies	  as	  an	  
emerging	  field,	  in	  chapter	  two,	  I	  tease	  out	  some	  fundamental	  issues	  that	  often	  led	  
to	  polarisations	  in	  the	  field	  (Stryker	  &	  Whittle	  (eds.)	  2006;	  Bettcher	  2009;	  Stryker	  &	  
Aizura	  (eds.)	  2013;	  Kunzel	  2014).	  The	  chapter	  explores	  the	  main	  ontological	  debates	  
that	  created	  friction	  among	  trans	  writers	  as	  well	  as	  the	  epistemological	  tensions	  
between	  some	  trans	  and	  queer	  approaches	  (Prosser	  1998a;	  Halberstam	  1998a,	  
1998b;	  Namaste	  [2005]	  2011;	  Serano	  2007).	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  exploration	  is	  not	  
only	  to	  give	  a	  theoretical	  background	  but	  also	  to	  situate	  my	  study	  within	  these	  
debates	  in	  a	  manner	  of	  ontological	  positioning	  that	  underpins	  my	  understanding	  of	  
the	  issues	  discussed.	  Narrowing	  down	  to	  the	  trans	  legal	  field,	  chapter	  three,	  
explores	  theories	  and	  concepts	  that	  will	  be	  used	  in	  my	  analysis	  of	  trans	  engagement	  
with	  the	  law	  (Whittle	  2002;	  Currah,	  Juang	  &	  Minter	  2006;	  Currah	  2009;	  Aizura	  
2012a,	  2017;	  Spade	  [2009]	  2015).	  Last,	  chapter	  four	  offers	  a	  broader	  
epistemological	  framework	  of	  the	  study,	  followed	  by	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  way	  
in	  which	  the	  research	  and	  analysis	  was	  conducted	  and	  the	  rationale	  behind	  these	  
methodological	  choices.	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Chapter	  2. Queer	  and	  Feminist	  Theorising	  	  
and	  Trans	  Studies	  
This	  chapter	  examines	  the	  emergence	  of	  trans	  studies	  as	  a	  field	  within	  Anglophone	  
scholarship	  and	  its	  interconnection	  with	  feminist	  and	  queer	  legacies	  (Whittle	  2006;	  
Stryker	  2006;	  Bettcher	  &	  Garry	  2009;	  Stryker	  &	  Aizura	  2013;	  Kunzel	  2014).	  
Attention	  is	  drawn	  to	  the	  epistemological	  tensions	  between	  trans	  and	  queer	  
conceptualisations	  of	  gender	  and	  the	  polarisation	  they	  produced	  (Currah	  1997,	  
2003,	  2017;	  Prosser	  1998a;	  Halberstam	  1998a,	  1998b;	  Namaste	  [2005]	  2011;	  
Serano	  2007).	  Moving	  beyond	  such	  an	  impasse	  and	  in	  keeping	  with	  my	  insistence	  
on	  facing	  up	  to	  complexity,	  I	  align	  with	  authors	  who	  call	  for	  polyvocality	  and	  
complexity	  in	  the	  study	  of	  trans	  issues	  and	  work	  towards	  critical	  adaptations	  of	  
feminist	  and	  queer	  elements	  (Rubin	  [1992]	  2006;	  Hale	  1998;	  Hines	  2006;	  Currah	  
2006;	  Bettcher	  2014).	  Allowing	  multiple	  frameworks	  to	  co-­‐exist	  also	  works	  towards	  
a	  trans	  analysis	  that	  is	  sensitive	  to	  historico-­‐political	  and	  geo-­‐temporal	  specificities.	  
To	  that	  end,	  in	  the	  last	  section	  of	  the	  chapter,	  I	  set	  to	  problematise	  linear	  and	  
universal	  understandings	  of	  (trans)	  historicity	  in	  favour	  of	  an	  analysis	  that	  stems	  
from	  and	  responds	  to	  alternative	  “geo-­‐temporal	  modalities”	  (Mizielińska	  &	  Kulpa	  
[2011]	  2016:	  14).	  In	  this	  sense,	  I	  build	  a	  framework	  that	  utilises	  queer	  and	  feminist	  
theories	  as	  they	  are	  yielded	  from	  trans	  theorising	  and	  experience,	  and	  ground	  these	  
notions	  further	  in	  the	  local	  context,	  thus	  allowing	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  τρανς6	  
framework	  for	  my	  study.	  	  
2.1. Claiming	  a	  Voice,	  Establishing	  a	  Field	  	  
This	  section	  traces	  the	  emergence	  of	  trans	  studies	  as	  a	  field	  of	  knowledge	  that	  
constitutes	  the	  theoretical	  environment	  of	  the	  present	  study.	  The	  1990s	  saw	  the	  
emergence	  of	  contemporary	  transgender	  identities	  in	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  context.7	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  “Τρανς”	  is	  the	  term	  trans	  written	  in	  Greek.	  	  	  
7
	  Long	  before	  the	  emergence	  of	  queer	  theory	  in	  the	  1990s,	  transsexual	  authors,	  mainly	  in	  North	  
America	  and	  the	  UK,	  were	  already	  claiming	  a	  space	  in	  public	  discourse	  (mostly	  through	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Faced	  with	  the	  pathologising	  underpinning	  of	  trans	  lives,	  transphobic	  violence	  
within	  society	  and	  the	  exclusionary	  politics	  of	  large	  part	  of	  gay/lesbian/feminist	  
communities,	  the	  transgender	  movement	  (and	  later	  the	  corresponding	  knowledge	  
discipline)	  emerged	  as	  the	  vehicle	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  gender	  non-­‐conforming	  identities	  
to	  establish	  a	  place	  within	  socio-­‐political	  communities	  of	  North	  America	  and	  the	  UK	  
(Whittle	  1998;	  Stryker	  2006;	  Bettcher	  &	  Garry	  2009).	  The	  formation	  of	  a	  
transgender	  identity	  and	  politics	  articulated	  claims	  of	  trans	  recognition,	  inclusion	  
and	  liberation	  that	  were	  in	  conversation	  with	  feminist	  and	  queer	  theories	  and	  
politics.	  Specifically,	  issues	  of	  gender	  variance	  and	  non-­‐conformity	  found	  the	  space	  
to	  be	  analysed	  within	  post-­‐structural	  feminist	  theories8	  and	  queer	  theory,9	  in	  ways	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
autobiographical	  accounts)	  to	  tell	  the	  story	  of	  transition	  through	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  subjects	  instead	  of	  
the	  medical	  experts,	  which	  has	  been	  the	  case	  for	  prior	  accounts	  of	  gender	  non-­‐conformity	  (Morris	  
1974;	  Martino	  1977;	  Hunt	  1978;	  Rees	  1996).	  Although	  this	  ground-­‐breaking	  shift	  was	  of	  historical	  
importance,	  the	  uniformity	  that	  many	  of	  these	  narratives	  promoted	  (being	  trapped	  in	  the	  wrong	  
body	  and,	  after	  transitioning,	  being	  at	  home	  in	  the	  “opposite”	  sex/gender)	  proved	  insufficient,	  
although	  to	  some	  extent	  necessary,	  to	  describe	  the	  experience	  of	  gender	  variance	  and	  gender-­‐
crossing	  identification.	  	  
8
	  Post-­‐structural	  feminism	  brought	  poststructuralist	  theory	  into	  feminist	  theories	  and	  praxis,	  
challenging	  the	  construction	  of	  gender	  and	  sexual	  identities	  as	  natural	  and	  coherent.	  Within	  post-­‐
structural	  feminism,	  the	  metaphysical	  core	  of	  the	  Cartesian	  subject	  was	  dethroned,	  thus,	  pointing	  
towards	  a	  problematisation	  of	  “woman”	  as	  an	  identity	  that	  is	  natural,	  stable	  and	  transcendent	  of	  
social	  norms	  (Athanasiou	  2006:	  85-­‐86).	  Challenging	  the	  essence	  of	  identity,	  this	  line	  of	  thought,	  was	  
faced	  with	  scepticism	  on	  the	  part	  of	  some	  feminist	  strands	  that	  perceived	  its	  de-­‐constructionist	  
analysis	  as	  a	  reduction	  of	  the	  category	  of	  “woman”	  to	  just	  “linguistic	  stuff”	  (Butler	  1993:	  28-­‐29;	  
Stanley	  &	  Wise	  1993;	  Ramazanoglu	  1996;	  Anderson	  2017).	  Nonetheless,	  for	  many,	  the	  “unease	  
alliance”	  (Benhabib	  1995)	  between	  post-­‐structuralism	  and	  feminism	  did	  not	  represent	  a	  leap	  in	  
relativism	  but,	  rather,	  a	  site	  that	  would	  allow	  critical	  engagement	  with	  power	  relations	  (following	  
often	  a	  foucauldian	  analysis)	  and	  an	  interrogation	  of	  the	  conditions	  within	  which	  subject-­‐positions	  
are	  naturalised	  as	  specific	  social	  hierarchies	  (Athanasiou	  2006:	  93-­‐94).	  Post-­‐structuralist	  feminists	  
were	  inevitably	  faced	  with	  the	  fundamental	  question	  whether	  any	  political	  critique	  is	  possible	  after	  
the	  de-­‐centring	  of	  the	  philosophical	  cogito.	  A	  question	  to	  which	  post-­‐structuralist	  feminists	  took	  an	  
affirmative	  stand	  not	  only	  by	  claiming	  the	  radical	  potentiality	  of	  such	  an	  analysis	  but	  also,	  often	  
times,	  by	  assuming	  a	  careful	  positioning	  that	  does	  not	  advocate	  for	  a	  complete	  abandoning	  of	  
political	  identities	  as	  such	  rather	  for	  their	  critical	  deployment	  (Athanasiou	  2006:	  94-­‐95).	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  highlight	  that	  the	  theoretical	  distinction	  between	  (especially	  post-­‐structural)	  
feminism	  and	  queer	  theory	  is	  schematic	  and	  not	  always	  that	  clear.	  That	  is,	  some	  theorists	  are	  both	  
feminist	  and	  queer	  while	  others	  do	  not	  identify	  as	  queer	  (or	  poststructuralist)	  although	  their	  work	  is	  
often	  labelled	  as	  such	  (Richardson	  2012	  [2006]:	  21).	  
9
	  Queer	  theory	  emerged	  during	  the	  1990s	  mainly	  in	  North	  American	  thought.	  Drawing	  from	  
feminist/LGBT	  scholarship	  and	  activism	  as	  well	  as	  AIDS	  activism	  and	  postmodern	  thought,	  queer	  
theory	  as	  a	  framework	  adopted	  the	  theoretical	  tools	  introduced	  by	  poststructuralist	  theorists	  and	  
touched	  upon	  various	  fields,	  such	  as	  linguistics,	  psychoanalysis,	  aesthetics	  and	  literature	  (Sullivan	  
2003;	  Wilchins	  2004;	  Cohen	  1997;	  Eng	  et	  al	  2005).	  The	  works	  of	  Eve	  Kosofsky	  Sedgwick	  (1990;	  1993;	  
2003),	  Judith	  Butler	  (1990;	  1993;	  2004),	  Michael	  Warner	  (1993;	  1999),	  Laurent	  Berlant	  (1997;	  2000),	  
Leo	  Bersani	  (1995)	  and	  Jack	  Halberstam	  (1994;	  1998a)	  are	  considered	  seminal	  for	  the	  birth	  and	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that	  could	  not	  have	  been	  enabled	  by	  other	  theoretical	  strands,	  which	  ontologically	  
entailed	  stricter	  narratives	  of	  gender	  teleology	  (More	  &	  Whittle	  1999;	  Whittle	  2002:	  
62-­‐74).	  
In	  this	  era,	  Sandy	  Stone’s	  (1991)	  “‘The	  Empire’	  Strikes	  Back:	  A	  Posttranssexual	  
Manifesto”,	  Leslie	  Feinberg’s	  (1992)	  “Transgender	  Liberation:	  A	  Movement	  whose	  
Time	  has	  Come”	  along	  with	  Kate	  Bornstein’s	  (1994)	  “Gender	  Outlaws”	  became	  
landmarks	  that	  epitomised	  these	  new	  sets	  of	  imperatives,	  possibilities	  and	  
aspirations.	  Such	  approaches	  developed	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  medical	  management	  of	  
trans	  experience	  as	  well	  as	  anti-­‐trans	  feminist	  and	  gay/lesbian	  politics.	  Moreover,	  
they	  broke	  with	  earlier	  trans	  narratives	  that	  were	  heavily	  invested	  in	  a	  stricter	  view	  
of	  gender	  normativity,	  articulating	  the	  need	  for	  a	  space	  for	  multiple	  gender	  
experiences	  and	  embodiments	  (Feinberg	  1992;	  Sullivan	  2003;	  Meyerowitz	  2004;	  
Stryker	  2008;	  Currah	  2008a).	  	  
Indeed	  the	  model	  of	  transgender	  (later	  to	  become	  trans	  and	  more	  recently	  trans*)	  
as	  an	  umbrella	  term10	  and	  a	  political	  project	  dominated	  the	  field	  of	  cross-­‐gender	  
identification	  politics	  and	  theory	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  scepticism	  expressed	  by	  some	  of	  
those	  it	  was	  meant	  to	  include	  (Prosser	  1998a;	  Rubin	  2003;	  Namaste	  [2005]	  2011).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
development	  of	  the	  field.	  Many	  of	  the	  fundamental	  works	  of	  queer	  theory	  adopted	  a	  foucauldian	  
analysis	  especially	  concerning	  power,	  sexuality	  and	  subjectivity-­‐formation.	  Gender	  and	  sexuality	  
were	  recognised	  and	  analysed	  as	  some	  of	  the	  central	  organising	  axes	  of	  contemporary	  society,	  
discursively	  (re)produced	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  contributes	  to	  the	  preservation	  of	  the	  normative	  
hegemonic	  order	  (Sullivan	  2003).	  Queer	  scholars	  articulated	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  heteronormative	  social	  
order	  and	  its	  reproduction	  through	  a	  posteriori	  naturalisation	  of	  identities	  and	  populations,	  some	  of	  
which	  are	  deemed	  deviant	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  the	  dominant	  status	  of	  the	  privileged	  ones	  (Sullivan	  
2003;	  Eng	  et	  al	  2005).	  Initially,	  queer	  theory	  mostly	  focused	  on	  analysing	  mechanisms	  of	  power	  and	  
the	  discourses	  that	  produce,	  recognise	  and	  normalise	  sexual	  identities	  (Eng	  et	  al	  2005).	  Nonetheless,	  
in	  the	  following	  years,	  the	  work	  of	  writers	  and	  activists	  that	  were	  in	  struggle	  against	  other	  socio-­‐
political	  hierarchies	  claimed	  the	  intellectual	  and	  political	  broadening	  of	  the	  field	  into	  a	  more	  holistic	  
critique	  including	  social	  antagonisms	  such	  as	  race,	  class,	  nationality	  and	  religion	  (Cohen	  1997;	  
Rodriguez	  2003;	  Ferguson	  2004;	  Namaste	  [2005]	  2011;	  Johnson	  &	  Henderson	  2005).	  	  
10
According	  to	  Whittle	  (2000)	  transgender	  was	  defined	  as:	  
An	  umbrella	  term	  used	  to	  define	  a	  political	  and	  social	  community	  which	  is	  inclusive	  of	  
transsexual	  people,	  transgender	  people,	  cross-­‐dressers	  (transvestites),	  and	  other	  groups	  of	  
“gender	  variant”	  people	  such	  as	  drag	  queens	  and	  kings,	  butch	  lesbians,	  and	  “mannish”	  or	  
“passing”	  women.	  “Transgender”	  has	  also	  been	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  all	  persons	  who	  express	  gender	  
in	  ways	  not	  traditionally	  associated	  with	  their	  sex.	  Similarly,	  it	  has	  also	  been	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  
people	  who	  express	  gender	  in	  non-­‐traditional	  ways,	  but	  continue	  to	  identify	  as	  the	  sex	  of	  their	  
birth	  (Whittle	  2000:	  65).	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In	  the	  following	  years,	  an	  increasing	  scholarship	  (mainly	  in	  North	  America	  and	  the	  
UK)	  started	  to	  create	  a	  separate	  knowledge-­‐field	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  queer	  and	  
feminist	  theories	  where	  “the	  margins	  of	  the	  academy	  overlapped	  with	  politicised	  
communities	  of	  identity”	  (Stryker	  2006:	  5;	  Stryker,	  Currah	  &	  Moore	  2008).	  
According	  to	  Bettcher	  and	  Garry	  (2009):	  	  
Transgender	  studies	  arose	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  in	  close	  connection	  to	  queer	  
theory.	  It	  can	  be	  best	  characterized	  as	  the	  coming-­‐to-­‐voice	  of	  (some)	  trans	  
people	  who	  have	  long	  been	  the	  researched	  objects	  of	  sexology,	  psychiatry,	  
psychoanalysis,	  and	  (non-­‐trans)	  feminist	  theory	  (Bettcher	  &	  Garry	  2009:	  1).	  	  	  
Trans	  writers	  as	  narrators11	  of	  their	  own	  lived	  experiences	  produced	  knowledge	  
through	  and	  along	  their	  accounts	  of	  navigating	  gender-­‐ambiguous	  terrains	  marking	  
the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  body	  of	  literature	  in	  close	  proximity	  to	  women/feminist	  and	  
queer	  studies	  (Stryker	  1994;	  Wilchins	  1997;	  Devor	  1997;	  Halberstam	  1998a;	  
Cromwell	  1999;	  Califia	  [1997]	  2003;	  Whittle	  2000).	  To	  that	  end,	  scholarship	  of	  the	  
trans	  studies	  discipline	  holds	  in	  its	  very	  core	  trans	  experience	  and	  expertise,	  moving	  
beyond	  the	  academic	  paradigm	  that	  saw	  trans	  people	  only	  as	  the	  subjects	  of	  
research	  rather	  than	  as	  authors.	  A	  fact	  that,	  as	  will	  become	  apparent	  in	  chapter	  
four,	  has	  significantly	  influenced	  the	  research	  and	  analytical	  modalities	  of	  the	  
present	  thesis.	  	  
By	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  2000s,	  a	  distinguishable	  interdisciplinary	  field	  of	  academic	  
research	  and	  knowledge-­‐production	  was	  founded,	  with	  the	  organisation	  of	  
conferences	  and	  publication	  of	  special	  issues	  and	  anthologies	  (Currah	  2008a:	  93;	  
Noble	  2011).12	  These	  collections	  of	  texts	  set	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  international	  debate	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  Self-­‐narration	  in	  the	  form	  of	  autobiography	  historically	  holds	  a	  complicated	  ground	  in	  the	  lives	  of	  
gender	  non-­‐conforming	  people.	  See	  Califia’s	  (1997)	  [2003]	  chapter	  “Contemporary	  Transsexual	  
Autobiography”	  and	  Prosser’s	  (1998)	  chapter	  “Mirror	  Images:	  Transsexuality	  and	  Autobiography.”	  
12
	  The	  special	  issue	  of	  GLQ	  (1998)	  on	  trans	  issues,	  the	  “Transgender	  Rights”	  collection	  (Currah,	  Juang	  
&	  Minter	  2006)	  and	  the	  “Transgender	  Studies	  Reader”	  (Stryker	  &	  Whittle	  2006)	  can	  be	  said	  to	  mark	  
this	  new	  academic	  territory,	  which	  Stryker	  has	  playfully	  called	  “queer	  theory’s	  evil	  twin”	  (Stryker	  
2004:	  2012).	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on	  trans	  matters	  and	  defined	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  field	  as	  described	  by	  Stryker	  in	  the	  
introduction	  to	  the	  Transgender	  Studies	  Reader:	  
Transgender	  studies,	  as	  we	  understand	  it,	  is	  the	  academic	  field	  that	  claims	  
as	  its	  purview	  transsexuality	  and	  cross-­‐dressing,	  some	  aspects	  of	  
intersexuality	  and	  homosexuality,	  cross-­‐cultural	  and	  historical	  
investigations	  of	  human	  gender	  diversity,	  myriad	  specific	  subcultural	  
expressions	  of	  “gender	  atypicality,”	  theories	  of	  sexed	  embodiment	  and	  
subjective	  gender	  identity	  development,	  law	  and	  public	  policy	  related	  to	  
the	  regulation	  of	  gender	  expression,	  and	  many	  other	  similar	  issues	  (Stryker	  
2006:	  3).	  	  
Since	  the	  first	  generation	  of	  trans	  scholars	  and	  activists,	  different	  strands	  of	  trans	  
writing	  enriched	  the	  field	  with	  various	  accounts,	  theories	  and	  politics	  (Kunzel	  2014).	  
Emerging	  trans	  research	  and	  advocacy	  projects	  within	  North	  American	  and	  
European	  academia	  found	  a	  ground	  to	  build	  upon,	  which	  had	  already	  theoretically	  
and	  methodologically	  challenged	  the	  authoritative	  research	  of	  “transgender	  
phenomena”	  by	  medical	  experts	  of	  the	  previous	  century	  (Stryker	  &	  Aizura	  2013).	  	  
As	  the	  field	  of	  trans	  studies	  gained	  momentum	  within	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  
academia	  and	  while	  trying	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  cultural	  capital	  of	  
transgender	  phenomena,	  critical	  voices	  within	  the	  field	  itself	  arose	  to	  denote	  the	  
field’s	  “implicit	  whiteness,	  U.S.-­‐centricity”	  and	  “Anglophone	  bias”	  (Aizura	  2006;	  
Valentine	  2007;	  Noble	  2011;	  Namaste	  [2005]	  2011;	  Bhanji	  2012;	  Stryker	  &	  Aizura	  
2013:	  4;	  Ellison	  et	  al	  2017).	  In	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  special	  issue	  of	  Feminist	  Studies	  
on	  “Race	  and	  Transgender	  Studies”,	  Richardson	  and	  Meyer	  (2011)	  note	  the	  lack	  of	  
representation	  of	  people	  of	  colour	  within	  trans	  scholarship	  and	  articulate	  the	  need	  
for	  integration	  with	  Critical	  Race	  Theory	  (Richardson	  &	  Meyer	  2011).	  Indeed,	  
increasingly	  more	  voices	  have	  commented	  on	  the	  lack	  of	  conceptualisation	  of	  
transness	  within	  trans	  theories	  along	  the	  axes	  of	  whiteness,	  national	  and	  racial	  
belonging,	  coloniality	  and	  class	  stratification	  within	  capitalism	  (Aizura	  2006;	  2012a;	  
2014;	  Bhanji	  2012;	  Noble	  2013;	  David	  2017;	  Ellison	  et	  al.	  2017).	  
By	  the	  time	  the	  “Transgender	  Studies	  Reader	  2”	  was	  published,	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  
field	  had	  broadened	  substantially	  and	  while	  this,	  or	  any,	  collection	  would	  not	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suffice	  to	  include	  the	  conversations	  on	  transgender	  issues	  that	  are	  taking	  place	  
globally,	  it	  managed	  to	  indicate	  the	  increasingly	  transnational	  and	  transdisciplinary	  
scope	  of	  the	  field	  (Stryker	  &	  Aizura	  2013;	  Kunzel	  2014:	  291).	  Trans	  literature	  on	  
issues	  of	  gender	  ontology,	  critiques	  of	  medical	  discourses	  and	  legal/cultural	  
representation	  had	  already	  established	  a	  stable	  basis	  so	  that	  broader	  themes	  
relating	  to	  trans	  experience	  in	  a	  world	  of	  increasing	  globalisation	  processes	  could	  
be	  explored	  (Stryker	  &	  Aizura	  2013;	  Kunzel	  2014).13	  Trans	  embodiment	  and	  
subjectivity	  is	  currently	  analysed	  through	  various	  critical	  lenses	  such	  as	  neoliberal	  
governance	  and	  politics	  of	  normativity,	  diaspora	  and	  migration,	  racialisation	  and	  
national	  belonging,	  surveillance	  and	  border	  securitisation,	  colonial	  pasts	  and	  
presents,	  political	  economy	  and	  productivity	  (Aizura	  2006;	  Ochoa	  2008;	  Crawford	  
2008;	  Irving	  2008;	  Currah	  &	  Moore	  2009;	  Spade	  2011;	  Bhanji	  2012;	  Sekuler	  2013;	  
Shakhsari	  2014a,	  2014b).	  Nonetheless,	  the	  perpetuation	  of	  the	  structural	  and	  
transnational	  power-­‐relations	  (even	  if	  through	  a	  shifting	  balance)	  that	  regulate	  
access	  to	  life-­‐resources,	  institutional	  support	  and	  social	  capital	  dictates	  a	  
continuous	  reflective	  process	  within	  the	  field	  and	  the	  discourses	  it	  reproduces.	  	  
Trans	  studies	  continues	  to	  grow	  in	  Euro-­‐American	  academia	  following	  the	  legacies	  
that	  have	  been	  schematically	  presented	  in	  this	  section	  and	  moves	  in	  close	  proximity	  
to	  women/feminist	  and	  queer	  studies.	  Overall,	  the	  relationship	  between	  feminist,	  
queer	  and	  trans	  studies	  (and	  politics)	  constitutes	  an	  evolving	  landscape	  dense	  with	  
opportunities	  for	  synthesis,	  critique	  and	  conflict.	  Although	  it	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  
this	  study	  to	  engage	  with	  questions	  of	  (in)compatibility	  between	  feminist	  and	  queer	  
critique14	  or	  feminist	  and	  trans	  politics,15	  it	  is	  important	  to	  tease	  out	  some	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13
	  Moreover,	  the	  launching	  of	  the	  “Transgender	  Studies	  Quarterly”	  journal	  (TSQ)	  in	  2014	  gave	  a	  
permanent	  discipline-­‐specific	  platform	  for	  Anglophone	  academic	  writers	  around	  the	  world	  that	  want	  
to	  circulate	  their	  work	  as	  part	  of	  an	  autonomous	  established	  field.	  
14
	  For	  more	  discussion	  on	  the	  issue	  see	  Fineman	  et	  al	  2009;	  Richardson	  et	  al	  2006;	  Elliot	  2010;	  
Cossman	  2012.	  
15
	  According	  to	  Kunzel’s	  (2014)	  appraisal	  of	  this	  debate	  and	  its	  place	  within	  the	  formation	  of	  
transgender	  studies:	  
The	  scholarly	  dialogue	  most	  fully	  developed	  in	  transgender	  studies	  is	  in	  some	  ways	  one	  of	  the	  
most	  surprising:	  from	  a	  history	  of	  conflict,	  dismissal,	  and	  epistemic	  disconnect	  with	  feminist	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tensions	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  trans	  and	  queer	  scholarship	  which	  have	  deeply	  
affected	  the	  development	  of	  both	  fields	  and	  are	  crucial	  for	  the	  understanding	  of	  
trans	  subjectivity	  in	  the	  present	  research.	  	  
2.2. Epistemological	  Tensions,	  Gender	  Ontologies	  	  
and	  Border	  Wars	  
Having	  mapped	  out	  trans	  studies	  as	  an	  area	  of	  theorising,	  I	  turn	  to	  the	  tensions	  
between	  and	  within	  different	  strands	  of	  trans	  scholarship	  and	  queer	  analysis	  and	  
their	  theoretical	  and	  epistemological	  underpinnings.	  The	  dialogue	  between	  the	  
authors	  explored	  below	  fleshes	  out	  some	  of	  the	  main	  theoretical	  and	  ontological	  
debates	  in	  the	  field	  of	  trans	  studies	  and	  anticipates	  the	  suggestion	  for	  
epistemological	  openness	  and	  for	  multiple,	  complex	  and	  synthetic	  trans	  
frameworks	  that	  is	  carried	  throughout	  the	  thesis.	  
Specifically,	  gender	  embodiment	  and	  the	  ontological	  claims	  of	  gendered	  identity	  
have	  been	  the	  main	  points	  of	  synthesis	  but	  also	  friction	  between	  trans	  and	  queer	  
studies.	  Queer	  theory’s	  project	  of	  deconstructing	  heteronormative	  gender	  and	  
sexual	  identities	  engaged	  with	  cross-­‐gender	  identifying	  subjects	  as	  emblematic	  
figures	  with	  a	  view	  to	  the	  dismantling	  of	  sex	  and	  gender	  as	  binary	  categories	  
(Currah	  1997;	  Sullivan	  2003:	  99;	  Whittle	  2006:	  xii;	  Hines	  2006).	  This	  brought	  a	  
variety	  of	  tensions	  concerning	  the	  workings	  of	  such	  theorising	  on	  both	  an	  
epistemological	  (concerning	  non-­‐trans	  writers)	  as	  well	  as	  an	  ontological	  (amongst	  
writers	  with	  cross-­‐gender	  identification	  experience)	  level.	  	  
The	  epistemological	  criticism	  concerned	  the	  utilitarian	  theorisation	  of	  trans	  subjects	  
as	  a	  means	  to	  uphold	  queer	  (and	  other	  poststructuralist)	  analytical	  endeavours	  of	  
deconstructing	  gender	  and	  sexual	  identities	  as	  natural	  and	  fixed.	  Indeed,	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and	  women’s	  studies,	  transgender	  studies	  scholars	  have	  developed	  a	  body	  of	  theoretical	  and	  
empirical	  work	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  ‘‘transfeminism’’	  (Kunzel	  2014:	  293).	  	  
For	  more	  discussion	  on	  the	  issue	  see	  MacDonald	  1998;	  Heyes	  2003;	  Koyama	  2003;	  Whittle	  2006;	  
Serano	  2007;	  Bettcher	  &	  Garry	  2009;	  Elliot	  2010;	  Connel	  2012;	  Enke	  (ed.)	  2012;	  Awkward-­‐Rich	  2017.	  
In	  addition,	  the	  special	  issue	  of	  TSQ	  on	  “Trans/Feminisms”	  includes	  a	  variety	  of	  texts	  many	  of	  which	  
analyse	  different	  national	  legacies	  of	  trans-­‐feminist	  conversations	  (Bettcher	  &	  Stryker	  [eds.]	  2016).	  
For	  analyses	  that	  include	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  term	  “TERF”	  and	  the	  political	  debate	  around	  it	  see	  
also	  Bettcher	  2017	  and	  Hines	  2019.	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writers,	  activists	  and	  artists	  who	  embraced	  queer	  theory,	  cross-­‐gender	  
identification	  and	  its	  implications	  became	  central	  in	  the	  project	  of	  demonstrating	  
the	  constructedness	  of	  gender.	  Some	  trans	  writers	  were	  quick	  to	  pick	  up	  on	  the	  
instrumentalisation	  of	  trans	  experience	  within	  queer	  writings	  and	  to	  bring	  to	  the	  
forefront	  what	  this	  entails	  for	  trans	  lives	  (Felski	  1996;	  Rubin	  [1992]	  2006,	  Wilson	  
2002;	  Rubin	  2003;	  Namaste	  [2005]	  2011;	  Bettcher	  2014;	  Davy	  2018).	  Moreover,	  
they	  pointed	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  trans	  experiences	  and	  narratives,	  which	  went	  against	  
or	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  such	  theoretical	  schemata,	  remained	  marginalised	  and	  
undertheorised.	  This	  line	  of	  critique	  was	  already	  thoroughly	  explored	  in	  the	  polemic	  
texts	  of	  Canadian	  activist	  and	  writer	  Viviane	  Namaste	  by	  the	  mid-­‐90s.	  Namaste	  
writes:	  
The	  violation	  of	  compulsory	  sex/gender	  relations	  is	  one	  of	  the	  topics	  most	  
frequently	  addressed	  by	  critics	  in	  queer	  theory.	  These	  discussions,	  however,	  
rarely	  consider	  the	  implications	  of	  an	  enforced	  sex/gender	  system	  for	  
people	  who	  live	  outside	  it.	  Critics	  in	  queer	  theory	  are	  fond	  of	  writing	  about	  
the	  ways	  in	  which	  specific	  acts	  of	  gender	  transgression	  can	  help	  dismantle	  
binary	  gender	  relations	  and	  hegemonic	  heterosexuality.	  While	  such	  an	  
intellectual	  program	  is	  important,	  it	  is	  equally	  imperative	  that	  we	  reflect	  on	  
which	  aspects	  of	  transgender	  lives	  are	  presented	  and	  how	  this	  discussion	  is	  
framed	  (Namaste	  [2005]	  2011:	  206).	  
Her	  analysis	  points	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  trans	  experience	  was	  often	  de-­‐
contextualised	  and	  superficially	  apprehended	  by	  queer	  (non-­‐trans)	  theorists	  but	  
also	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  engagement	  with	  trans	  issues	  beyond	  sex/gender	  ontologies.16	  
Reading	  the	  works	  of	  Judith	  Butler,	  Marjorie	  Garber,	  Harold	  Garfinkel	  and	  others,	  
Namaste	  claims	  a	  reduction	  of	  transgender	  subjectivity	  to	  “a	  mere	  tropological	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16
	  Namaste	  makes	  her	  point	  painfully	  obvious	  by	  naming	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  that	  had	  been	  cast	  
aside	  due	  to	  the	  focus	  on	  identity	  debates:	  	  
Violence	  against	  transsexuals,	  lack	  of	  access	  to	  health	  care	  and	  social	  services,	  police	  
harassment	  of	  transgender	  sex	  workers,	  the	  rape	  of	  transsexuals	  in	  prison,	  the	  staggering	  
incidence	  of	  HIV	  within	  transgender	  communities,	  the	  difficulties	  transgendered	  individuals	  
have	  in	  finding	  employment	  (…)	  (Namaste	  [2005]	  2011:	  227).	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figure,	  a	  textual	  and	  rhetorical	  device”	  that	  is	  invoked	  in	  order	  to	  exemplify	  the	  
categorical	  crises	  of	  postmodernity	  (Namaste	  [2005]	  2011:	  216).	  	  
Jay	  Prosser	  articulates	  similar	  concerns	  about	  the	  encoding	  of	  transsexuality	  as	  a	  
metaphor	  and	  the	  utilisation	  of	  trans	  experiences	  within	  queer	  accounts	  as	  
allegories	  that	  render	  obvious	  the	  constructedness	  of	  all	  gender	  (Prosser	  1998a:	  
31).	  Julia	  Serano	  (2007),	  in	  a	  similar	  vein,	  describes	  as	  “horribly	  exploitative”	  and	  
“shamelessly	  voyeuristic”	  the	  detailed	  bodily	  accounts	  concerning	  gender-­‐variant	  
people	  given	  by	  critical	  theorists	  writing	  on	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  (Serano	  2007:	  
207).	  Although	  Serano’s	  harsh	  characterisations	  are	  not	  directed	  necessarily	  
towards	  queer	  writers,	  her	  analysis	  firmly	  opposes	  the	  appropriation	  of	  the	  
experience	  of	  gender-­‐variant	  people	  by	  queer	  scholars	  as	  merely	  a	  means	  to	  
support	  their	  theoretical	  argumentation	  (Serano	  2007:	  211).	  Moreover,	  these,	  and	  
other	  trans	  writers	  that	  criticised	  the	  lack	  of	  attentiveness	  of	  queer	  engagement	  
with	  transness,	  pointed	  out	  the	  selective	  deployment	  of	  trans	  subjects,	  which	  are	  
“interesting	  only	  insofar	  as	  their	  subjectivity	  works	  to	  deconstruct	  categories”	  while	  
erasing	  the	  narratives	  that	  contradict	  the	  anti-­‐essentialist	  perception	  of	  identity	  
(Currah	  1997:	  1368;	  Serano	  2007:	  211).	  	  
The	  conceptualisation	  of	  gender	  within	  queer	  writings	  brought,	  painting	  with	  a	  
broad	  brush,	  the	  familiar	  schism	  of	  essentialism	  vs.	  constructionism,	  which	  
transferred	  in	  theoretical	  and	  political	  conversations	  as	  a	  differentiation	  between	  
transsexual	  and	  transgender	  (or	  later	  genderqueer)	  politics	  and	  identification.	  The	  
stakes	  in	  this	  debate	  laid	  in	  the	  possibility	  of	  carving	  spaces	  for	  self-­‐identification,	  
political	  resistance	  and/or	  survival.	  To	  that	  end,	  this	  debate	  was	  of	  crucial	  
importance	  in	  theorising	  gender-­‐variance	  and	  imagining	  trans	  frameworks	  of	  
analysis.	  Transgender	  authors,	  who	  aligned	  with	  queer	  theory	  criticised	  traditional	  
narratives	  of	  transsexuality	  that	  essentialised	  gender	  identity	  and	  presented	  a	  
uniform	  trans	  experience	  of	  “being	  trapped	  in	  the	  wrong	  body”	  and	  feeling	  “at	  
home”	  in	  a	  surgically	  sexed	  body	  (Bettcher	  2014).	  Indeed	  the	  rigidity	  of	  this	  
narrative	  could	  not	  account	  for	  a	  number	  of	  gender-­‐variant	  identities	  and	  practices	  
that	  were	  supposedly	  described	  by	  such	  narratives.	  Informed	  by	  deconstructionist	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theories	  of	  gender,	  transgender	  theories	  embraced	  queer	  and	  broader	  
poststructuralist	  imperatives	  claiming	  the	  discursive	  nature	  of	  gender	  as	  a	  construct	  
and	  the	  radical	  potential	  of	  gender	  transgression,	  liminality	  and	  non-­‐normativity	  
(Stone	  1991;	  Feinberg	  1992;	  Bornstein	  1994;	  Halberstam	  1998a).	  	  
Transgender	  theories	  expressed	  the	  political	  and	  theoretical	  shift	  in	  Anglo-­‐N.	  
American	  trans	  politics	  that	  brought	  a	  change	  in	  goals,	  narratives	  and	  practices.	  This	  
shift	  and	  the	  theoretical	  discussion	  it	  brought	  are	  apparent	  in	  the	  early	  texts	  of	  
Sandy	  Stone,	  Leslie	  Feinberg	  and	  Kate	  Bornstein	  mentioned	  earlier.	  According	  to	  
Stone’s	  (1991)	  posttranssexual	  manifesto,	  trans	  people,	  instead	  of	  aiming	  to	  blend-­‐
in	  by	  passing	  as	  “real”	  men	  and	  women,	  had	  more	  to	  gain	  by	  staying	  vocal	  about	  
their	  identities	  and	  fighting	  against	  the	  oppression	  of	  a	  polarised	  gender	  system.17	  
Leslie	  Feinberg	  (1992)	  used	  the	  word	  “transgender”	  as	  a	  broad	  term	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  
gender	  non-­‐conforming	  people	  and	  imagined	  transgender	  politics	  as	  part	  of	  
broader	  social	  struggles.	  The	  intricate	  and	  powerful	  gender	  imperatives	  in	  
Feinberg’s	  texts	  spoke	  to	  the	  ambiguity	  of	  gender	  experiences	  that	  not	  only	  did	  not	  
fit	  neatly	  into	  transsexual	  or	  gay/lesbian	  narratives	  but	  also	  carried	  an	  immense	  risk	  
of	  violence	  due	  to	  their	  liminality.	  Author	  and	  performer	  Kate	  Bornstein’s	  
provocative	  body	  of	  work	  introduced	  the	  figure	  of	  “gender	  outlaws”	  to	  describe	  
individuals	  crossing	  gender-­‐boundaries	  in	  various	  ways,	  thus,	  destabilising	  the	  
entire	  gendering	  system	  and	  being	  perceived	  as	  threats	  to	  those	  comfortable	  in	  the	  
existing	  power	  dynamics	  (Bornstein	  1994).	  Bornstein	  claimed	  fluidity	  as	  a	  possibility	  
for	  identification	  as	  well	  as	  gender	  ambiguity	  as	  an	  irrefutable	  reality	  that	  
challenges	  the	  assumption	  of	  a	  naturally	  existing	  system	  of	  two	  mutually	  excluding	  
genders	  (Whittle	  2002:	  74-­‐76;	  Califia	  [1997]	  2003:	  245).	  Although	  not	  all	  writers	  
from	  North	  America	  and	  the	  UK	  that	  are	  included	  in	  this	  line	  of	  thought	  agreed	  on	  
every	  aspect,	  many	  of	  them	  shared	  the	  conviction	  that	  the	  supposedly	  natural	  
gender	  order	  was	  not	  only	  oppressive	  but	  also	  escapable	  (Califia	  [1997]	  2003;	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  Stone’s	  text,	  which	  was	  a	  fierce	  reply	  to	  personal	  anti-­‐trans	  attacks	  by	  non-­‐trans	  feminists	  (such	  
as	  Janice	  Raymond),	  set	  the	  agenda	  for	  many	  trans	  activists	  in	  the	  US.	  This	  agenda	  aimed	  towards	  
visibility,	  political	  empowerment	  and	  the	  solicitation	  of	  “a	  new	  corpus	  of	  intellectual	  and	  creative	  
work	  capable	  of	  analysing	  and	  communicating	  to	  others	  the	  concrete	  realities	  of	  ‘changing	  sex’”	  
(Stryker	  2006:	  4).	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Wilchins	  1997;	  Whittle	  2000;	  Cromwell	  1999;	  Hale	  1998;	  Halberstam	  1998a).	  
Ideally,	  then,	  the	  gender	  binary	  as	  it	  were,	  could	  be	  resisted,	  destabilised,	  
deconstructed,	  and	  even	  dismantled.	  	  
This	  political	  vision	  of	  a	  “gender	  revolution”	  gained	  momentum	  due	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  
political	  and	  social	  factors	  (Califia	  [1997]	  2003:	  221-­‐244;	  Whittle	  2002:	  69-­‐74;	  
Stryker	  2006:	  4-­‐6).	  Key	  to	  the	  gender	  ontologies	  entailed	  in	  transgender	  theories	  
and	  politics	  was	  the	  theory	  of	  gender	  performativity	  as	  crystallised	  in	  Judith	  Butler’s	  
seminal	  work	  “Gender	  Trouble”	  (1990)	  and	  refined	  in	  “Bodies	  that	  Matter”	  (1993)	  
and	  later	  texts.	  Butler	  (1990,	  1993,	  2004)	  re-­‐read	  J.L.	  Austin’s	  theory18	  through	  a	  
Foucauldian	  lens,	  using	  a	  variety	  of	  psychoanalytical,	  philosophical	  and	  
anthropological	  theoretical	  tools	  and	  formulating	  a	  queer	  feminist	  
conceptualisation	  of	  gender	  performativity	  (Athanasiou	  2007:	  205).	  This	  analysis	  
questions	  the	  perception	  of	  gender	  as	  an	  innate	  and	  stable	  attribute	  within	  the	  core	  
of	  the	  subject,	  something	  that	  one	  is.	  What	  is	  suggested	  is	  that	  gender	  is	  not	  
expressed	  but	  rather	  constituted	  through	  an	  abundance	  of	  reiterative	  acts	  that,	  in	  
their	  repetition	  and	  through	  their	  iterability,	  in	  Derrida’s	  terms,	  produce	  the	  self	  in	  
a	  performative	  fashion,	  creating	  the	  illusion	  of	  an	  a	  priori	  existing	  substance,	  “a	  
natural	  sort	  of	  being”	  (Butler	  1990:	  30;	  Butler	  1993).	  	  
This	  notion	  of	  gender	  as	  discursively	  constructed	  and	  naturalised	  through	  the	  
concealment	  of	  the	  constitutive	  effect	  of	  the	  re-­‐iterated	  actions	  (that	  is,	  of	  doing	  
gender)	  offers	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  regulatory	  power	  of	  gender	  norms	  and	  the	  
consequent	  unlivability	  of	  unintelligibly	  gendered	  bodies	  (Butler	  1990;	  1993).	  
Moreover,	  in	  “Bodies	  that	  Matter”,	  Butler	  seeks	  to	  link	  the	  concept	  of	  
performativity	  with	  the	  materiality	  of	  sexed	  bodies	  and	  to	  complicate	  the	  reading	  of	  
sex	  as	  a	  static	  fact	  upon	  which	  gender	  is	  inscribed	  (Butler	  1993).	  Instead,	  “sex”	  is	  
analysed	  as	  “a	  process	  whereby	  regulatory	  norms	  materialize	  'sex'	  and	  achieve	  this	  
materialization	  through	  a	  forcible	  reiteration	  of	  those	  norms”	  (Butler	  1993:	  2).	  In	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  According	  to	  J.	  L.	  Austin’s	  speech-­‐act	  theory	  some	  utterances	  are	  not	  of	  descriptive	  nature	  –as	  it	  
was	  supported	  by	  positivist	  language	  philosophers	  and	  linguists-­‐	  but	  of	  a	  performative	  one	  (Austin	  
1962).	  Such	  utterances	  are	  thought	  as	  a	  form	  of	  action	  that	  does	  not	  describe	  an	  existing	  reality	  –
thus	  being	  true	  of	  false-­‐	  but	  rather	  alters	  or	  even	  creates	  it	  (Austin	  1962).	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order	  to	  land	  these	  points,	  Butler	  theorises	  around	  and	  across	  gender	  non-­‐
normative	  experiences	  and	  practices,	  such	  as	  drag	  performance,	  transsexuality	  and	  
intersexuality,	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  the	  imitative	  character	  of	  gender	  and	  the	  open-­‐
endedness	  of	  the	  re-­‐iteration	  process	  that	  materialises	  sexual	  difference	  (Butler	  
1990;	  1993).	  The	  theory	  of	  gender	  performativity	  along	  with	  the	  methodological	  
gesture	  of	  introducing	  cross-­‐gender	  experiences	  as	  a	  means	  to	  reveal	  the	  
constructedness	  of	  gender	  has	  generated	  a	  heated	  conversation	  within	  trans	  Anglo-­‐
American	  scholarship.	  	  
Trans	  writers	  that	  felt	  closer	  to	  theories	  that	  sought	  innate	  ontological	  ties	  between	  
gender	  and	  embodied	  experience	  articulated	  theoretical	  critiques	  that	  often	  
retained	  the	  identity	  and	  vocabulary	  of	  transsexuality	  to	  denote	  a	  distancing	  from	  
emerging	  transgender	  identities	  (Felski	  1996;	  Prosser	  1998a).	  Jay	  Prosser	  (1998a)	  
offers	  the	  most	  systematic	  critique	  of	  Butler’s	  work	  along	  those	  lines,	  raising	  a	  
variety	  of	  questions	  and	  claiming	  a	  theoretical	  impasse	  between	  queer	  studies’	  
theoretical	  grounds	  and	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  transsexual	  experience.	  Other	  
than	  a	  detailed	  critique	  regarding	  the	  methodological	  instrumentalisation	  of	  trans	  
experience	  within	  queer	  theory,	  his	  ontological	  accounts	  of	  transitioning	  suggest	  a	  
certain	  incompatibility	  of	  the	  transsexual	  experience	  with	  queer	  theories	  of	  
performativity	  (Prosser	  1998a).19	  Prosser	  adopts	  a	  model	  of	  a	  
transgender/transsexual	  dichotomy	  and	  from	  there	  embarks	  upon	  building	  a	  
“theory	  of	  transsexual	  embodiment”	  (Prosser	  1998a).	  Employing	  French	  
psychoanalyst	  Didier	  Anzieu’s	  concept	  of	  “skin	  ego”	  and	  drawing	  from	  Elizabeth	  
Grosz’s	  “corporeal	  feminism”,	  he	  establishes	  an	  approach	  to	  subjectivity	  grounded	  
in	  the	  flesh,	  the	  skin,	  the	  repeatedly	  underlined	  tangible	  materiality	  of	  the	  sexed	  
body	  (Prosser	  1998a:	  61-­‐96).	  	  
Scholars	  within	  trans	  studies	  have	  criticised	  Prosser’s	  analysis	  in	  “Second	  Skins”	  for,	  
among	  other	  things,	  suggesting	  a	  transsexual	  vs.	  transgender	  framework	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  Prosser	  asks	  “if	  sex	  as	  much	  as	  gender	  is	  performative,	  an	  effect	  of	  our	  doing	  not	  our	  being	  
(‘gender	  all	  along’),	  how	  can	  we	  conceive	  of	  the	  transsexual	  as	  intervening	  in	  sex	  at	  all”	  (Prosser	  
1998a:	  64)?	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(Halberstam	  1998a;	  Hale	  1998;	  Aizura	  2006;	  Bhanji	  2012).	  More	  specifically,	  
Prosser’s	  schema	  not	  only	  implies	  a	  certain	  authenticity	  of	  transsexual	  in	  
comparison	  with	  transgender	  experience	  but	  also	  traces	  this	  difference	  in	  the	  deep-­‐
seated	  feelings	  of	  unease	  in	  one’s	  flesh	  (Prosser	  1998a).	  According	  to	  his	  suggestion	  
for	  a	  “politics	  of	  home”,	  which	  is	  actualised	  through	  the	  refashioning	  of	  the	  body	  in	  
order	  to	  become	  a	  gendered	  home	  for	  the	  self,	  the	  (desire	  for)	  surgical	  intervention	  
itself	  marks	  the	  definitional	  boundaries	  of	  the	  transsexual	  experience.	  In	  order	  to	  
uphold	  his	  categorisation	  Prosser	  resorts	  to	  a	  conceptualisation	  of	  gender	  identities	  
that	  “relies	  on	  a	  belief	  in	  the	  two	  territories	  of	  male	  and	  female	  divided	  by	  a	  flesh	  
border	  and	  crossed	  by	  surgery	  and	  endocrinology”	  (Halberstam	  1998a:	  164).	  
In	  an	  attempt	  to	  draw	  clear	  lines	  between	  transsexual,	  transgender	  and	  
homosexual	  as	  categories,	  Prosser,	  looks	  at	  the	  figure	  of	  the	  stone	  butch	  as	  a	  
liminal	  position	  between	  those	  experiences	  and	  concludes	  that	  the	  difference	  is	  
that	  “the	  stone	  butch,	  unlike	  the	  transsexual,	  finds	  a	  way	  (I	  am	  suggesting	  her	  stone	  
sexuality,	  that	  act	  of	  sweet	  imagination)	  to	  manage	  the	  split,	  to	  balance	  in	  a	  
refigurative	  desire	  the	  difference	  between	  material	  body	  and	  body	  image”	  (Prosser	  
1998a:	  179).	  Nonetheless,	  the	  choice	  of	  Jess	  Goldberg	  (Leslie	  Feinberg’s	  Stone	  
Butch	  Blues’	  main	  character)	  as	  an	  example	  to	  mark	  clear	  gender	  boundaries	  does	  
not	  function	  in	  the	  way	  Prosser	  might	  have	  wanted.	  The	  complexity	  of	  Jess’s	  gender	  
experience	  and	  medically	  altered	  body	  works	  silently	  in	  the	  text	  to	  undermine	  the	  
point	  made	  by	  Prosser	  as	  the	  lines	  he	  is	  trying	  to	  draw	  are	  unavoidably	  blurred	  by	  
his	  own	  example.	  
Before	  lightheartedly	  dismissing	  Prosser’s	  framework	  in	  its	  totality,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  
recognise	  that	  the	  debate	  described	  here	  was	  taking	  place	  in	  the	  context	  of	  what	  
was	  called	  “butch/FTM	  border	  wars”	  and	  carried	  the	  tensions	  that	  had	  been	  
erupting	  within	  these	  communities	  (Rubin	  [1992]	  2006;	  Halberstam	  1994,	  1998a,	  
1998b;	  Prosser	  1998a;	  Hale	  1998;	  Hines	  2006;	  Aizura	  2006).	  In	  this	  context,	  some	  of	  
the	  texts	  produced	  include	  both	  very	  defensive	  and	  aggressive	  points	  that	  can	  
“easily”	  be	  criticised	  as	  such,	  from	  the	  vantage	  point	  of	  distance.	  Nonetheless,	  
precisely	  because	  this	  was	  a	  lively	  conversation,	  it	  led	  to	  a	  series	  of	  elaborate	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(re)positionings	  considering	  gender	  identity	  (especially	  masculinities),	  embodiment	  
and	  belonging	  that	  remain	  until	  today	  cherished	  for	  their	  articulation	  of	  gender-­‐
variant	  experiences.	  For	  example,	  following	  Halberstam’s	  famous	  statement	  that	  
“we	  all	  transsexuals….and	  there	  are	  no	  transsexuals,”	  Prosser	  critically	  pointed	  out	  
the	  apparent	  erasure	  of	  those	  who,	  within	  and	  despite	  all	  the	  postmodern	  
theoretical	  eruption,	  were	  indeed	  transsexuals	  and	  were	  struggling	  to	  legitimise	  
their	  existence	  (Halberstam	  1994:	  226;	  Prosser	  1998:	  14).	  Halberstam	  revoked	  this	  
phrasing	  recognising	  the	  point	  made	  by	  Prosser	  and	  reworked	  a	  lot	  of	  his	  analysis	  as	  
a	  response	  to	  Prosser’s	  critique	  (Halberstam	  1998a).	  Similarly,	  Prosser	  had	  initially	  
used	  the	  figure	  of	  the	  stone	  butch	  in	  a	  more	  simplified	  way	  that	  flattened	  
significantly	  its	  gender	  and	  sexual	  positioning.	  After	  Halberstam’s	  (1994;	  1998)	  
critique,	  he	  reworked	  his	  analysis	  of	  stone	  butch	  identity	  in	  order	  to	  grasp	  more	  of	  
its	  nuanced	  complexity	  and	  in	  turn	  thanked	  Halberstam	  for	  this	  in	  a	  footnote	  
(Prosser	  1998:	  254,	  footnote	  17).	  
Reading	  it	  within	  its	  historico-­‐political	  context,	  even	  if	  one	  disagrees	  with	  the	  main	  
imperatives	  of	  its	  theory,	  Second	  Skins	  includes	  concepts	  of	  great	  theoretical	  and	  
epistemological	  value	  for	  trans	  theorising.	  Among	  these	  is	  the	  epistemological	  
dedication	  to	  reclaiming	  the	  position	  of	  the	  body	  in	  trans	  theorising.	  Away	  from	  
both	  medicalising	  narratives	  and	  disembodied	  theorising,	  Prosser	  gives	  a	  unique	  
account	  of	  the	  affective	  workings	  of	  transitioning	  and	  delivers	  a	  text	  that	  does	  not	  
just	  talk	  about	  the	  body	  but	  a	  text	  that	  feels	  embodied,	  a	  text	  that	  bites	  and	  bleeds	  
and	  engages	  with	  the	  fleshliness	  of	  trans	  belonging	  without	  being	  voyeuristic.	  Jacob	  
Hale’s	  (1998)	  critique	  of	  Prosser’s	  work	  is	  useful	  inasmuch	  it	  values	  his	  analysis	  as	  
one	  positioning	  but	  rejects	  its	  unproductive	  methodological	  gesture	  of	  presenting	  
this	  as	  the	  positioning,	  meaning	  the	  experience	  of	  all	  trans	  men.	  Moreover,	  Hale	  
points	  out	  the	  impasse	  of	  Prosser’s	  “conception	  of	  borderlands	  as	  ‘the	  
uninhabitable	  space’	  between	  painful	  wrong	  embodiment	  and	  home,	  and	  his	  use	  of	  
an	  unproductive	  opposition	  of	  transgender	  and	  queer”	  (Hale	  1998:	  340).	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Furthermore,	  although	  Prosser’s	  analysis	  indeed	  has	  problematic	  central	  modalities	  
and	  is,	  thus,	  intensely	  criticised	  in	  more	  recent	  trans	  work,20	  his	  text	  remains	  
influential	  within	  trans	  studies	  and	  is	  present	  in	  this	  study	  for	  more	  than	  one	  
reason.	  First,	  because	  it	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  very	  necessary,	  critical	  responses	  to	  a	  
mode	  of	  theorising	  cross-­‐gender	  identification	  which	  ignored	  the	  lives	  and	  agency	  
of	  the	  people	  it	  analysed.	  Secondly,	  because	  it	  engaged	  systematically	  from	  a	  
transsexual	  viewpoint	  with	  Judith	  Butler’s	  work	  that	  was	  (and	  still	  is)	  underpinning	  
many	  of	  the	  discourses	  around	  gender.	  Thirdly,	  because	  it	  goes	  beyond	  this	  
criticism	  to	  articulate	  an	  alternative	  framework	  allowing	  the	  possibility	  to	  imagine	  
trans	  modes	  of	  theorising	  that	  are	  not	  necessarily	  contained	  in	  a	  handful	  of	  queer	  
notions.	  	  
It	  is	  precisely	  this	  last	  point,	  the	  possibility	  of	  self-­‐contained	  trans	  theoretical	  
frameworks,	  that	  provides	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  impasse	  between	  trans	  and	  queer	  
theorising	  as	  it	  has	  been	  analysed	  in	  this	  section.	  The	  next	  section	  explores	  the	  way	  
in	  which	  the	  polarisation	  between	  these	  different	  sets	  of	  approaches	  can	  give	  its	  
place	  to	  synthetic	  understandings	  of	  gender	  embodiment	  and	  belonging.	  It	  will	  be	  
suggested	  that	  epistemological	  openness	  towards	  multiple	  trans	  frameworks	  can	  
be	  considered	  as	  the	  most	  appropriate	  response	  to	  the	  need	  for	  meaningful	  
conceptualisations	  of	  varying	  experiences.	  	  
2.3. Letting	  a	  Thousand	  Trans	  Theories	  Bloom	  
The	  tensions	  that	  were	  described	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  led	  to	  theoretical	  and	  
personal	  impasses.	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  present	  the	  ways	  out	  of	  such	  impasses	  provided	  
by	  epistemological	  openness	  and	  feminist	  pedagogies.	  That	  is,	  by	  utilising	  a	  plurality	  
of	  frameworks	  in	  order	  to	  theorise	  trans	  experiences	  and	  to	  provide	  them	  with	  the	  
possibility	  of	  being	  in	  close	  relation	  to	  queer	  and	  feminist	  theories	  but	  also	  depart	  
from	  them	  when	  necessary.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20
	  Criticism	  has	  been	  articulated	  towards	  the	  rigid	  categorisation	  he	  attempts,	  his	  conceptualisation	  
of	  “politics	  of	  home”,	  the	  claim	  to	  a	  unified	  trans	  experience	  and	  the	  coining	  of	  dysphoric	  bodily	  
feelings	  as	  an	  exclusively	  transsexual	  experience	  (Hale	  1998;	  Aizura	  2006;	  Crawford	  2008;	  Bhanji	  
2012).	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As	  the	  definitional	  discussion	  around	  
transsexual/transgender/queer/genderqueer21	  etc.	  subjectivities	  took	  various	  
directions,	  it	  often	  reproduced	  sets	  of	  polarised	  (mis)representations.	  That	  is,	  the	  
queer/transgender	  imperatives	  were	  depicted	  as	  voluntarist,	  utopian	  or	  even	  as	  
“playing”	  in	  comparison	  to	  transsexual	  approaches	  that	  were	  real	  and	  authentic	  
(Halberstam	  1998a;	  Aizura	  2006;	  Bhanji	  2012).22	  On	  the	  flipside,	  the	  same	  (queer	  
transgender)	  theories	  and	  aesthetics	  were	  perceived	  by	  others	  as	  avant-­‐garde	  and,	  
by	  definition,	  radical,	  while	  transsexual	  narratives	  of	  gender	  embodiment	  were	  
seen	  as	  conservative,	  misled	  and	  naïve	  (Bettcher	  2014;	  Currah	  2017).	  	  
This	  antagonistic	  understanding	  of	  gender	  modalities	  and	  trans	  gender	  theories	  
resulted	  in	  an	  abundance	  of	  “border	  zone	  dwellers”,	  which	  did	  not	  fit	  neatly	  into	  
either	  of	  the	  supposedly	  mutually	  excluding	  lines	  of	  narratives	  (Hale	  1998).	  In	  her	  
insightful	  text	  “Of	  Catamites	  and	  Kings”,	  Gayle	  Rubin	  suggested	  to	  “let	  a	  thousand	  
flowers	  bloom”	  instead	  of	  pitting	  identities	  and	  practices	  one	  against	  the	  other	  in	  
the	  name	  of	  gender	  and	  sexual	  identification	  and	  politics	  (Rubin	  [1992]	  2006:	  478).	  
Similarly,	  Hale	  (1998)	  imagined	  that	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  frameworks	  was	  not	  only	  
possible	  but	  also	  essential	  in	  discussions	  about	  cross-­‐gender	  and	  gender	  non-­‐
conforming	  experiences:	  
Just	  as	  queer,	  transsexual,	  transgender,	  gender-­‐queer,	  butch,	  and	  ftm	  
embodiments	  and	  subjectivities	  are	  complex	  and	  complicatedly	  different	  
within	  any	  one	  category,	  so	  any	  discussion	  of	  them	  must	  be	  complex	  
enough	  to	  reflect	  the	  complex	  living,	  breathing	  specificities	  of	  the	  lives	  
lived—centrally	  or	  marginally—under	  these	  signs	  (Hale	  1998:	  340).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21
	  Writing	  in	  the	  present	  day,	  some	  of	  the	  writers	  refer	  to	  the	  polarisation	  between	  transsexual	  vs	  
genderqueer	  and	  not	  transsexual	  vs	  transgender	  as	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  such	  terms	  are	  defined	  
in	  their	  historicity.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  crux	  of	  the	  argument	  remains	  the	  same,	  that	  is,	  the	  rigidness	  of	  
theories	  that	  rely	  on	  the	  alignment	  of	  one	  model	  (transsexual/“wrong	  body”	  approach)	  with	  
authenticity	  and	  realness	  or	  stasis	  and	  normativity	  while	  the	  latter	  model	  
(transgender/genderqueer/”beyond	  the	  binary”	  approach)	  with	  subversiveness	  and	  agency	  or,	  on	  
the	  flipside,	  with	  voluntarism	  and	  inauthenticity	  (Bettcher	  2014;	  Davy	  2018).	  	  
22
	  In	  such	  depictions,	  gender	  performativity	  was	  often	  oversimplified	  as	  mere	  “performance”	  (a	  
reading	  that	  was	  far	  from	  Butler’s	  actual	  argument)	  and	  the	  challenging	  of	  identity’s	  given	  core	  was	  
read	  as	  a	  negation	  of	  any	  sense	  of	  gender	  identity	  stability.	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Indeed,	  addressing	  the	  impasse	  within	  the	  Anglo-­‐N.	  American	  trans	  theories	  of	  
gender,	  several	  writers	  have	  since	  engaged	  with	  frameworks	  that	  reject	  a	  binary	  
representation	  of	  trans	  experiences	  (as	  either	  transsexual	  or	  
transgender/genderqueer)	  and	  acknowledge	  the	  overlap	  of	  such	  narratives	  and	  
modes	  of	  belonging.	  	  
For	  example,	  Talia	  Mae	  Bettcher’s	  work	  is	  highly	  critical	  of	  the	  epistemological	  
polarisation23	  that	  has	  been	  discussed	  above	  and	  especially	  the	  view	  that	  a	  gender	  
positioning	  “beyond	  the	  binary”	  is	  a	  priori	  subversive,	  while	  self-­‐identification	  as	  a	  
(trans)	  man	  or	  woman	  is	  problematic	  in	  itself	  (Bettcher	  2014).	  Bettcher	  claims	  that	  
trans	  people	  become	  “trapped	  in	  the	  wrong	  theory”	  and	  suggests	  a	  theoretical	  
frame	  that	  utilises	  feminist	  theorist	  Maria	  Lugones’	  concept	  of	  “multiple	  worlds	  of	  
sense,”	  which	  had	  been	  also	  embedded	  in	  Hale’s	  work	  (Hale	  1997a;	  Bettcher	  
2014).24	  Applying	  a	  Lugonian	  framework,	  Bettcher	  suggests	  that	  multiple	  trans	  
worlds	  exist	  and	  that	  the	  trans	  bodies	  that	  are	  part	  of	  them	  face	  various	  forms	  of	  
oppression	  by	  multiple	  other	  dominant	  worlds.	  The	  meaning	  of	  gender,	  thus,	  differs	  
from	  one	  world	  to	  the	  other,	  allowing	  for	  alternative	  resistant	  conceptualisations	  of	  
gender-­‐belonging	  (Bettcher	  2014:	  389-­‐390).	  Zowie	  Davy	  (2018),	  in	  her	  approach,	  
deploys	  an	  intercorporeal	  materialist	  frame	  of	  analysis,	  drawing	  from	  the	  work	  of	  
Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  looking	  at	  bodily	  aesthetics	  and	  affectivities	  of	  both	  
transsexual	  and	  genderqueer	  people.	  She	  rejects	  frameworks	  that	  see	  transsexual	  
people	  solely	  as	  subjugated	  and	  genderqueer	  people	  as	  a	  priori	  subversive	  or,	  for	  
that	  matter,	  any	  theory	  that	  pits	  these	  categories	  as	  oppositional	  and	  claims	  the	  
political	  viability	  of	  only	  one	  against	  the	  other.25	  Sally	  Hines	  (2006),	  in	  her	  work,	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  With	  regards	  to	  the	  polarisation	  between	  transgender	  and	  transsexual	  theorising,	  Bettcher	  (2014)	  
notes,	  that	  although	  the	  transgender	  model	  has	  prevailed	  within	  both	  the	  academia	  and	  political	  
debates,	  its	  current	  conceptualisation	  includes	  elements	  from	  both	  “sides”	  of	  trans	  gender	  theories.	  
24
	  This	  schema	  recognises	  various	  intertwined	  worlds	  “with	  a	  logic	  that	  is	  sufficiently	  self-­‐coherent	  
and	  sufficiently	  in	  contradiction	  with	  others	  to	  constitute	  an	  alternative	  construction	  of	  the	  social”	  
(Lugones	  quoted	  in	  Bettcher	  2014:	  389).	  Multiple	  worlds	  can	  relate	  in	  different	  ways	  but	  most	  
importantly	  give	  different	  meanings	  to	  given	  terms	  and	  concepts,	  and	  employ	  different	  practices.	  
25
	  Bodily	  aesthetic	  desires	  are	  analysed	  along	  the	  unpredictability	  of	  gender	  formation	  and	  to	  that	  
end	  Davy	  finds	  that	  “both	  transsexual	  and	  genderqueer	  people’s	  bodily	  aesthetic	  assemblages	  
produce	  desires	  for	  and	  resistances	  against	  civil	  registers	  of	  recognition”	  (Davy	  2018:	  5).	  Her	  analysis	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claims	  the	  usefulness	  of	  queer	  sociology	  as	  a	  framework	  to	  study	  transgender	  
realities	  (Hines	  2006).	  Within	  a	  queer	  sociological	  frame,	  Hines	  sees	  the	  potential	  of	  
analysing	  the	  discursive	  and	  material	  production	  of	  power	  (macro	  level)	  while	  
remaining	  attentive	  to	  the	  specificities	  of	  various	  trans	  experiences	  (micro	  level)	  
(Hines	  2006:	  52).26	  	  
The	  variety	  of	  approaches	  suggested	  by	  different	  writers	  in	  trans	  studies	  speaks	  to	  
the	  polyvocality	  and	  complexity	  needed	  to	  frame	  these	  debates.	  Moreover,	  
although	  feminist,	  queer	  and	  other	  poststructuralist	  concepts	  are	  often	  used	  to	  
formulate	  these	  theories,	  the	  quest	  for	  meaningful	  frameworks	  often	  dictates	  a	  
creative	  distancing	  from	  feminist	  and/or	  queer	  notions.	  Indeed,	  within	  
poststructuralist	  theories	  it	  became	  a	  challenge	  for	  many	  trans	  individuals	  (even	  
those	  adhering	  to	  queer	  imperatives)	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  their	  identity,	  embodied	  
experience	  and	  gender	  belonging.	  As	  Whittle	  puts	  it,	  within	  such	  a	  theoretical	  
framework,	  “for	  the	  trans	  person’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  self,	  the	  question	  becomes	  
whether	  gender,	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  self-­‐understanding,	  can	  be	  theoretically	  
recuperated”	  (Whittle	  2006:	  xii).	  In	  this	  vein,	  Hale’s	  work	  is	  exemplary	  of	  a	  mode	  of	  
self-­‐contained	  trans	  theorising	  which	  uses	  feminist	  and	  queer	  legacies	  but	  also	  
critically	  departs	  from	  them	  when	  needed.	  In	  his	  auto-­‐ethnographic	  account	  of	  a	  US	  
community	  of	  leatherdyke	  boys	  and	  their	  daddies,	  Hale	  suggests	  that	  queer	  
theorists	  in	  their	  focus	  on	  gender	  as	  a	  regulatory	  construct	  have	  missed	  the	  
community-­‐based	  “rich	  and	  subtly	  nuanced	  discourses	  of	  gendered	  pleasure,	  
practice,	  desire,	  and	  subjectivity”	  (Hale	  1997a:	  223).27	  In	  a	  careful	  navigation	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
suggests	  that	  in	  various	  ways	  transsexual	  and	  genderqueer	  embodiments	  are	  produced	  within	  
gender	  and	  sexuality	  assemblages	  as	  “fleeing,	  eluding,	  flowing	  and	  leaking”	  (Davy	  2018:	  8)	  	  
26
	  Hines	  insists	  on	  the	  value	  of	  poststructuralist	  imperatives	  of	  deconstructionism	  but	  only	  as	  they	  
can	  be	  informed	  by	  a	  sociological	  appraisal	  of	  lived	  trans	  experiences.	  Looking	  at	  such	  experiences,	  
she	  concludes	  that	  “transgender	  identity	  positions	  and	  subjectivities	  are	  contingently	  situated	  
alongside	  divergent	  gendered	  experiences”,	  thus,	  hinting	  towards	  the	  need	  for	  theories	  that	  are	  
open	  to	  such	  contested	  narratives	  of	  trans	  genders	  (Hines	  2006:	  64).	  
27
	  Hale	  describes	  his	  self-­‐construction	  as	  a	  leatherdyke	  boy	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  SM	  technology	  in	  
his	  (FTM)	  transition.	  He’s	  framework	  of	  multiple,	  context-­‐specific	  and	  purpose-­‐specific	  gender	  
statuses	  can	  be	  read	  closely	  to	  Bettcher’s	  (2014)	  adaptation	  of	  Lugones’	  framework	  (Hale	  1997a).	  
His	  account	  of	  gender	  categorical	  differentiation	  between	  different	  social	  terrains	  (specific	  
subcultures,	  legal	  jurisdictions,	  medical	  fields)	  can	  be	  imagined	  as	  an	  example	  of	  such	  multiple	  
worlds	  of	  sense.	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community-­‐based	  relational	  gender	  formulations,	  he	  suggests	  a	  nuanced	  
understanding	  of	  the	  organisation	  and	  workings	  of	  gender	  categories.	  Furthermore,	  
Hale’s	  analysis	  is	  important	  inasmuch	  as	  it	  manages	  to	  employ	  fluidity	  without	  
undermining	  gender	  solidification	  practices	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  belonging.	  He	  
also	  succeeds	  in	  utilising	  the	  concept	  of	  gender	  performativity	  without	  stripping	  
(trans)	  gender	  from	  its	  facticity	  in	  social/cultural/corporeal	  terms	  (Hale	  1997a).	  
Hale’s	  insightful	  analysis	  indicates	  how	  crucial	  specificities	  are	  within	  different	  
communities,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  they	  can	  show	  us	  the	  way	  to	  critically	  recuperate	  
aspects	  of	  identity	  and	  gender	  through	  complex	  gender	  and	  sexual	  configurations.28	  	  
Following	  these	  suggestions	  on	  how	  to	  think	  and	  write	  about	  trans	  issues,	  the	  
frame	  of	  this	  study	  is	  not	  solely	  feminist	  and/or	  queer.	  It	  relies	  often	  on	  feminist	  
and	  queer	  concepts	  as	  they	  are	  yielded	  by	  trans	  specificity	  and	  critique.	  Other	  than	  
the	  methodological	  inclusion	  of	  trans	  accounts,	  this	  is	  also	  enabled	  by	  the	  
employment	  of	  trans	  theories	  and	  arguments	  that	  do	  not	  necessarily	  fit	  neatly	  
within	  feminist	  and/or	  queer	  frameworks.29	  Such	  an	  analysis	  is	  enabled	  by	  feminist	  
and	  queer	  legacies	  but	  also	  reserves	  the	  right	  to	  depart	  -­‐	  to	  break	  or	  “take	  a	  break”	  
-­‐	  from	  feminist	  and/or	  queer	  concepts	  when	  necessary	  (Keegan	  2018).	  More	  
importantly,	  this	  gesture	  is,	  in	  itself,	  inherently	  connected	  with	  feminist	  and	  queer	  
pedagogies	  that	  mould	  theory	  through	  and	  along	  complexity,	  specificity,	  open-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28
	  Eve	  Kosofsky	  Sedgwick	  appears	  to	  be	  surprised	  and	  fascinated	  by	  the	  way	  Hale	  uses	  the	  concept	  
of	  the	  self	  to	  theorise	  complex	  gender	  and	  sexual	  experiences	  and	  embodiments	  without	  folding	  
back	  to	  a	  “conservative	  essentialism”	  (Sedgwick	  1997:	  238).	  Sedgwick	  not	  only	  is	  open	  to	  Hale’s	  
suggestion	  of	  the	  “inadequacy	  of	  available	  theoretical	  languages	  concerning	  gender”	  but	  also	  to	  his	  
affective	  and	  relational	  account	  of	  self-­‐recognition	  (Sedgwick	  1997:	  236).	  She	  notes:	  
Rather	  than	  using	  self	  as	  an	  essentialist	  or	  conservative	  concept,	  and	  rather	  than	  simply	  throwing	  it	  
into	  free	  fall	  or	  free	  play,	  the	  itineraries	  sketched	  in	  this	  essay	  seem	  to	  articulate	  an	  altogether	  
different,	  theoretically	  very	  important	  possibility:	  something	  like	  identification	  with	  what	  is,	  at	  any	  
given	  moment,	  understood	  to	  be	  the	  growing	  edge	  of	  a	  self.	  […]	  Self,	  in	  fact,	  like	  gender,	  can	  
motivate	  and	  instantiate	  change	  as	  readily	  as	  stasis.	  Perhaps,	  indeed,	  it	  is	  a	  smug	  and	  sterile	  
opposition	  between	  stasis	  and	  change,	  between	  passivity	  and	  agency,	  between	  hegemony	  and	  
subversion,	  that	  such	  accounts	  of	  the	  journeys	  of	  subjectivity	  can	  most	  importantly	  challenge	  
(Sedgwick	  1997:	  238-­‐9).	  
This	  also	  indicates	  a	  point	  that	  will	  not	  be	  explored	  here,	  that	  is,	  that	  queer	  and	  feminist	  theories	  
have	  in	  turn	  much	  to	  gain	  in	  philosophical	  and	  epistemological	  terms	  by	  being	  open	  to	  different	  
meaning-­‐making	  frameworks	  deployed	  in	  trans	  experiences.	  
29
	  For	  example,	  other	  than	  Prosser’s	  critique	  that	  suggests	  stepping	  out	  of	  the	  queer	  field,	  it	  has	  
been	  claimed	  even	  within	  queer	  writings,	  that	  the	  theory	  of	  performativity	  appears	  to	  find	  its	  limits	  
in	  the	  discussion	  of	  some	  trans	  experiences	  (Raj	  2011).	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endedness	  and	  ambiguity	  (Haraway	  1988;	  Anzaldúa	  ([1987]	  2012);	  Sedgwick	  1990,	  
hooks	  1989).	  In	  this	  sense,	  feminist	  and	  queer	  pedagogies	  carry	  within	  them	  the	  
tools	  that	  allow	  theory	  to	  be	  yielded	  and	  transformed	  by	  the	  specificity	  of	  trans	  
lived	  experience.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  fully	  comprehend	  this,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  remember	  the	  deep	  influence	  of	  
feminist,	  and	  later	  queer	  theories,	  on	  early	  texts	  of	  transgender	  scholarship.	  For	  
example,	  Sandy	  Stone’s	  posttransexual	  manifesto,	  which	  is	  often	  cited	  as	  one	  of	  the	  
starting	  points	  of	  North	  American	  transgender	  scholarship,	  was	  influenced	  by,	  
among	  others,	  the	  thoughts	  of	  Donna	  Haraway	  and	  Gloria	  Anzaldúa	  (Stone	  1991).	  
Anzaldúa’s	  theory	  of	  the	  new	  mestiza30,	  as	  well	  as	  Haraway’s	  investment	  in	  
hybridity	  are	  indicative	  of	  the	  theoretical	  underpinnings	  of	  a	  field	  whose	  de	  facto	  
overarching	  theme	  is	  border-­‐crossing	  and	  the	  realities	  of	  those	  who	  cross	  or	  inhibit	  
or	  trouble	  specific	  categorical	  borders.	  Tracing	  such	  theoretical	  ties	  in	  the	  
foundations	  of	  trans	  scholarship	  allows	  for	  an	  understanding	  of	  its	  epistemological	  
interaction	  with	  feminist	  and	  queer	  frameworks.	  In	  this	  vein,	  I	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  
precisely	  through	  and	  along	  feminist	  and	  queer	  engagements	  with	  theory	  and	  
knowledge-­‐production	  that	  the	  proximity	  and	  the	  distancing	  of	  trans	  frameworks	  
from	  those	  disciplines	  should	  be	  understood.	  
As	  has	  been	  established,	  the	  impasses	  emerging	  within	  trans	  theorising	  as	  well	  as	  
between	  trans	  and	  queer	  lines	  of	  analysis	  can	  be	  overcome	  by	  accepting	  multiple	  
frameworks	  of	  theorising	  as	  meaningful	  instead	  of	  retaining	  polarised	  
understandings	  of	  gender	  belonging.	  Moreover,	  although	  feminist	  and	  queer	  
theoretical	  legacies	  have	  proved	  valuable	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  trans	  discourses,	  it	  is	  
necessary	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  trans	  scholarship	  might,	  in	  its	  turn,	  bring	  its	  own	  set	  
of	  tools.	  In	  this	  vein,	  I	  claim	  that	  within	  feminist	  and	  queer	  pedagogical	  legacies	  lay	  
the	  ways	  in	  which	  to	  think	  and	  write	  about	  trans	  issues	  by	  using	  feminist	  and	  queer	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  Anzaldúa	  ([1987]	  2012)	  in	  Borderlands/La	  Frontera	  carves	  out	  a	  theoretical	  and	  political	  space	  for	  
a	  subject	  that	  claims	  its	  multiplicity	  and	  refuses	  to	  be	  subsumed	  in	  a	  simplified	  version	  of	  itself.	  
Anzaldúa’s	  own	  experience	  as	  “a	  border	  woman”	  dictates	  la	  mezcla	  not	  only	  as	  a	  modality	  of	  
belonging	  but	  also	  as	  a	  way	  of	  writing	  and	  theorising,	  which	  refuses	  to	  be	  contained	  in	  linguistic,	  
disciplinary	  and	  theoretical	  patterns	  that	  cannot	  grasp	  the	  reality	  of	  inhabiting	  ethnical,	  
geographical,	  sexual	  and	  political	  borders	  (Anzaldúa	  [1987]	  2012).	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analyses	  and	  concepts	  but	  also	  by	  departing	  from	  them	  when	  dictated	  by	  the	  
specificity	  of	  lived	  experience.	  	  
Accordingly,	  discussing	  and	  writing	  about	  trans	  issues	  is	  enriched	  by	  being	  open	  to	  
different	  understandings	  of	  gender	  identification	  processes	  within	  various	  contexts.	  
The	  quest	  for	  meaningful	  frameworks	  when	  crossing	  national	  and	  cultural	  borders	  
demands	  constant	  renegotiations	  not	  only	  of	  concepts	  and	  theoretical	  tools	  but	  
also	  of	  political	  imperatives	  and,	  even	  more	  so,	  historicities.	  To	  that	  end,	  engaging	  
with	  another	  context	  than	  those	  which	  have	  hosted	  these	  debates	  means	  (or	  
should	  mean)	  to	  engage	  with	  different	  conceptualisations,	  nuances	  and	  
genealogies.	  Taking	  this	  into	  account,	  the	  next	  section	  demonstrates	  the	  way	  in	  
which	  the	  importance	  of	  context-­‐specificity	  can	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  when	  
employing	  specifically	  Anglo-­‐N.	  American	  theories	  in	  what	  might	  be	  considered	  
peripheral	  or	  semi-­‐peripheral	  loci.	  
2.4. At	  the	  Same(?)	  Time,	  Somewhere	  Else…	  
The	  debates	  outlined	  in	  the	  previous	  parts	  have	  taken	  place	  in	  specific	  geo-­‐
temporal	  contexts	  (mainly	  North	  American	  and	  UK	  academia	  and	  activism).	  This	  
section	  considers	  the	  epistemological	  gestures	  that	  might	  allow	  the	  transfer	  of	  
inputs	  from	  these	  debates	  to	  alternative	  contexts	  without	  flattening	  their	  
historicity.	  Specifically,	  through	  the	  utilisation	  of	  critiques	  from	  alternative	  contexts	  
I	  attempt	  to	  build	  a	  framework	  that	  allows	  the	  discussion	  of	  gender	  variance	  and	  
the	  law	  in	  relation	  to	  context-­‐specific	  issues,	  such	  as	  Europeanisation	  processes,	  
Greek	  national(ist)	  politics	  and	  Crisis	  discourses.	  	  
The	  centrality	  of	  the	  Anglophone	  contexts	  in	  the	  production,	  legitimation	  and	  
circulation	  of	  knowledge	  creates	  a	  variety	  of	  effects	  including	  a	  procrustean	  
theorisation	  and	  historicisation	  of	  heterogeneous	  experiences	  and	  socio-­‐political	  
processes	  (Stychin	  1998;	  Binnie	  2004;	  Namaste	  [2005]	  2011;	  Lewis	  2006;	  Kulpa	  &	  
Mizielińska	  [2011]	  2016).	  In	  this	  vein,	  the	  use	  of	  political	  and	  theoretical	  notions	  of	  
gender	  and	  sexuality	  as	  universally	  applicable	  stems	  from,	  and	  implicitly	  
reproduces,	  power	  relations	  connected	  to	  histories	  of	  colonialism,	  imperialism	  and	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dominance.31	  Accordingly,	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  genealogy	  of	  queer/trans	  
movements	  and	  theories,	  often	  situated	  only	  in	  time	  but	  not	  in	  space	  (in	  specific	  
geo-­‐political	  loci)	  is	  presented	  as	  the	  history	  instead	  of	  one	  history	  among	  many	  
others	  (Mizielińska	  &	  Kulpa[2011]	  2016).	  Such	  a	  framing	  does	  not	  acknowledge	  or	  
engage	  with	  the	  different	  contexts	  in	  which	  trans	  and	  queer	  scholarship	  and	  politics	  
have	  travelled	  to	  and	  have	  been	  re-­‐articulated	  within	  connecting	  alternative	  socio-­‐
political	  landscapes	  and	  their	  histories	  (Mizielińska	  [2011]	  2016).	  	  
Trans	  studies	  as	  a	  field	  cannot	  entirely	  overthrow	  its	  Anglo-­‐American	  theoretical,	  
cultural	  and	  linguistic	  modalities,	  at	  least	  no	  more	  than	  any	  other	  field	  of	  similar	  
origins,	  as	  that	  would	  imply	  that	  such	  a	  gesture	  of	  complete	  de-­‐contextualisation	  is	  
possible	  or	  desired.	  Neither	  should	  it,	  though,	  ignore	  these	  power-­‐dynamics,	  as	  well	  
as	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  Anglo-­‐American	  modalities	  are	  imported	  and	  re-­‐worked	  in	  
other	  contexts	  within	  an	  increasingly	  globalised	  and	  transnational	  cultural	  and	  
political	  landscape.	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  it	  is	  imperative	  to	  explore	  these	  tensions	  in	  
order	  to	  use	  (and	  not	  be	  used	  by)	  the	  valuable	  analytical	  tools	  provided	  by	  
Anglophone	  trans	  and	  queer	  theories.	  That	  is,	  it	  becomes	  imperative	  to	  ask:	  What	  
does	  it	  mean	  to	  write	  about	  trans	  issues	  at	  the	  same	  time	  but	  somewhere	  else?	  
Somewhere	  where	  legal,	  political	  and	  theoretical	  genealogies	  are	  different	  and	  
where	  trans	  studies	  (or	  queer	  studies),	  as	  such,	  never	  was.	  How	  can	  these	  
(hi)stories	  be	  told	  and	  understood	  in	  the	  present	  moment	  through	  and	  against	  a	  
globalised	  but	  also	  fragmented	  grammar	  of	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  theories?	  
Useful	  insights	  for	  such	  an	  endeavour	  are	  provided	  by	  critical	  approaches	  within	  
LGBTI+	  and	  queer	  critical	  scholarship	  emerging	  at	  “contemporary	  peripheries”	  of	  
Europe	  (Kulpa	  &	  Mizielińska	  [2011]	  2016).32	  Kulpa	  and	  Mizielińska’s	  ([2011]	  2016)	  
anthology	  titled	  De-­‐Centring	  Western	  Sexualities:	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  European	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  The	  TSQ	  journal	  has	  featured	  a	  variety	  of	  special	  issues	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  seems	  to	  be	  attentive	  to	  
earlier	  criticisms	  within	  the	  field	  (e.g.	  “Decolonizing	  the	  Transgender	  Imaginary”	  (Aizura	  et	  al.	  2016),	  
“The	  Issue	  of	  Blackness”	  (Ellison	  et	  al.	  2017)	  and	  “Trans-­‐in-­‐Asia,	  Asia-­‐in-­‐Trans”	  (Chiang	  et	  al.	  2018)).	  
32
	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  (and	  to	  some	  extent	  South)	  European	  scholarship	  has	  pointed	  out	  the	  
importance	  of	  locality	  in	  LGBT	  and	  queer	  politics	  and	  knowledge-­‐production	  (Štulhofer	  &	  Sandfort	  
(eds.)	  2005;	  Kuhar	  &	  Takács	  (eds.)	  2007;	  Renkin	  2009;	  Kulpa	  &	  Mizielińska	  [2011]	  2016;	  Canakis	  
2013;	  Navickaitė	  2014;	  Kahlina	  2015;	  Bilić	  (ed.)	  2016;	  Rexhepi	  2016).	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Perspectives	  has	  been	  an	  important	  milestone	  in	  the	  development	  of	  this	  debate.	  
Mizielińska	  and	  Kulpa	  ([2011]	  2016),	  in	  their	  introduction,	  suggest	  a	  schema	  of	  
“Western	  and	  Eastern	  geo-­‐temporal	  modalities”	  within	  which	  “Western”	  time	  is	  a	  
time	  of	  sequence	  with	  the	  different	  models	  of	  LGBTI+	  politics	  and	  theories	  
following	  one	  another	  (homophile	  movement/gay	  liberation	  and	  lesbian	  
feminism/AIDS	  activism/LGBT	  and	  queer	  theory)	  (Mizielińska	  &	  Kulpa	  [2011]	  2016:	  
14-­‐19).	  In	  this	  model,	  CEE	  time	  is	  “communist	  time”	  up	  until	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  “Iron	  
Curtain”	  and,	  following	  1989,	  it	  is	  a	  time	  of	  coincidence,	  a	  “knotted	  time”	  where	  all	  
these	  different	  political	  and	  theoretical	  concepts	  are	  applied	  “at	  once”	  Mizielińska	  
&	  Kulpa	  [2011]	  2016:	  16).	  
(…)	  a	  time	  of	  mismatched	  models	  and	  realities,	  strategies	  and	  possibilities,	  
understandings	  and	  uses,	  ‘all	  at	  once’.	  It	  is	  the	  time	  when	  ‘real’	  and	  ‘fake’,	  
‘the	  original’	  and	  ‘the	  copy’	  collapse	  into	  ‘the	  same’/’the	  one’;	  and	  yet,	  
nothing	  is	  the	  same,	  nothing	  is	  straight	  any	  more.	  (Had	  it	  ever	  been?)	  
(Mizielińska	  &	  Kulpa[2011]	  2016:	  16).	  
The	  model	  of	  Kulpa	  and	  Mizielińska	  features	  several	  points	  that	  are	  open	  to	  
criticism	  and	  have	  been	  discussed	  by	  other	  authors	  who	  nonetheless	  recognise	  the	  
crucial	  value	  of	  this	  body	  of	  work	  (Pichardo	  Galán	  2013;	  Takácks	  2013;	  Navickaitė	  
2014).	  
The	  core	  criticism	  facing	  this	  schema	  is	  that	  it	  does	  not	  move	  beyond	  the	  unilateral	  
evolutionary	  tale	  of	  progress	  and,	  especially	  in	  the	  “Western	  time,”	  it	  flattens	  the	  
complexities	  of	  the	  contexts	  grouped	  under	  the	  sign	  of	  the	  West,	  while	  also	  taking	  
for	  granted	  the	  dominant	  timeline	  and	  value	  of	  the	  milestones	  within	  it	  (Pichardo	  
Galán	  2013;	  Takácks	  2013;	  Navickaitė	  2014).	  Indeed,	  although	  the	  book	  sets	  out	  to	  
challenge	  the	  monotemporal	  understanding	  of	  this	  genealogy,	  at	  times	  it	  appears	  
to	  slip	  back	  into	  it.	  Arguments	  such	  as	  Mizielińska	  and	  Kulpa’s	  point	  that	  the	  anti-­‐
social	  critique	  against	  futurity	  (epitomised	  in	  Lee	  Edelman’s	  No	  Future	  published	  in	  
2004)	  cannot	  register	  in	  contexts	  wherein	  queers	  do	  not	  actually	  have	  a	  future	  yet	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or	  that	  it	  is	  too	  early	  for	  concepts	  such	  as	  homonormativity33	  and	  
homonationalism34	  	  appear	  as	  such	  slippages	  (Mizielińska	  &	  Kulpa	  [2011]	  2016:	  18;	  
Kulpa	  [2011]	  2016:	  58).	  Although	  imported	  concepts	  can	  indeed	  remain	  empty	  
signifiers	  within	  other	  contexts,	  the	  way	  these	  arguments	  are	  articulated	  follows	  
the	  (chrono)logic	  of	  something	  having	  to	  be	  established	  before	  any	  critique	  of	  
something	  might	  appear	  -­‐	  a	  (chrono)logic	  that	  the	  authors	  themselves	  rightfully	  
challenge	  for	  the	  CEE	  contexts	  where	  “in	  a	  sense	  a	  deconstruction	  coincides	  with	  
the	  construction”	  (Mizielińska	  [2011]	  2016:	  91).	  	  
Other	  points	  of	  critique	  refer	  to	  the	  use	  of	  postcolonial	  theories	  as	  directly	  
applicable	  in	  the	  post-­‐socialist	  context.	  Rasa	  Navickaitė	  (2014)	  offers	  a	  detailed	  
critique	  of	  such	  an	  unproblematic	  analogy	  of	  post-­‐socialist	  and	  postcolonial	  
contexts	  that	  underpins	  Mizielińska	  and	  Kulpa’s	  model.	  This	  taps	  into	  a	  broader	  
debate	  concerning	  Balkanism	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  the	  European	  imaginary	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  suitability	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  Orientalism,	  as	  theorised	  by	  Edward	  Said	  (1978),	  
and	  of	  other	  tools	  of	  postcolonialist	  thought	  in	  the	  Balkan	  case	  (Bakić-­‐Hayden	  &	  
Robert	  1992;	  Todorova	  [1997]	  2009;	  Goldsworthy	  1998;	  Bjelić	  2002;	  Lampropoulos	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  The	  term	  “homonormativity”	  was	  popularised	  in	  21st	  century	  politics	  and	  academic	  work	  in	  the	  
sense	  that	  Lisa	  Duggan	  (2003)	  used	  in	  “The	  Twilight	  of	  Equality,”	  that	  is,	  as:	  
A	  politics	  that	  does	  not	  contest	  dominant	  heternomative	  assumptions	  and	  institutions,	  but	  upholds	  
and	  sustains	  them,	  while	  promising	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  demobilised	  gay	  constituency	  and	  a	  privitized,	  
depoliticized	  gay	  culture	  anchored	  in	  domesticity	  and	  consumption	  (Duggan	  2003:	  50).	  	  
This	  concept	  obviously	  refers	  to	  contexts,	  such	  as	  the	  U.S.	  or	  the	  U.K.,	  wherein	  LGBT	  assimilation	  
politics	  have	  formed	  during	  the	  last	  decades	  new	  possibilities	  of	  sexual	  citizenship	  for	  those	  most	  
privileged	  within	  the	  LGBT	  populations.	  Nonetheless,	  as	  Berlant	  and	  Warner	  had	  warned,	  the	  
thoroughly	  naturalised	  character	  of	  heterosexuality	  will	  not	  allow	  for	  homonormativity	  to	  ever	  
become	  an	  equivalent	  to	  heteronormativity	  and	  should	  not	  be	  analysed	  as	  such	  (Berlant	  &	  Warner	  
1998).	  Indeed,	  Duggan	  herself	  notes:	  
I	  am	  riffling	  here	  on	  the	  term	  heteronormativity,	  introduced	  by	  Michael	  Warner.	  I	  don’t	  mean	  the	  
terms	  to	  be	  parallel;	  there	  is	  no	  structure	  for	  gay	  life,	  no	  matter	  how	  conservative	  or	  normalizing	  that	  
might	  compare	  to	  the	  institutions	  promoting	  and	  sustaining	  heterosexual	  coupling	  (Duggan	  2003:	  
94,	  no	  15).	  
The	  “travelling”	  of	  this	  idea	  into	  contemporary	  peripheries,	  where	  this	  kind	  of	  gay	  culture	  and	  
politics	  were	  only	  (if	  at	  all)	  possible	  to	  a	  very	  limited	  extent,	  accounts	  for	  surprising	  political	  effects	  
(Mizielińska	  [2011]	  2016).	  	  
34
	  Jasbir	  Puar	  coined	  the	  term	  “homonationalism”	  in	  2007	  in	  her	  book	  “Terrorist	  Assemblages:	  
Homonationalism	  in	  Queer	  Times.”	  She	  built	  on	  Duggan’s	  concept	  of	  homonormativity	  to	  establish	  a	  
critique	  of	  “how	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  liberal	  rights	  discourses	  produce	  narratives	  of	  progress	  and	  
modernity	  that	  continue	  to	  accord	  some	  populations	  access	  to	  cultural	  and	  legal	  forms	  of	  citizenship	  
at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  partial	  and	  full	  expulsion	  from	  those	  rights	  of	  other	  populations”	  (Puar	  2013:	  
25).	  :	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2003;	  Carastathis	  2014).	  To	  that	  end,	  although	  the	  insights	  of	  postcolonial	  writings	  
are	  valuable,	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  their	  utilisation	  in	  contexts	  that	  are	  subject	  to	  
international	  imperialist	  projects	  but	  do	  not	  have	  a	  history	  of	  colonial	  occupation	  
per	  se	  should	  be	  very	  attentive	  (Chari	  &	  Verdery	  2009;	  Todorova	  [1997]	  2009;	  
Navickaitė	  2014).	  	  
Maria	  Todorova	  ([1997]	  2009),	  whose	  work	  on	  Balkanism	  is	  highly	  influential,	  
suggests	  that	  “the	  Balkans’	  semicolonial,	  quasi-­‐colonial,	  but	  clearly	  not	  purely	  
colonial	  status”	  creates	  an	  undeniable	  bond	  between	  critical	  Balkan	  studies	  and	  
theories	  of	  Orientalism	  and	  Postcolonialism	  (Todorova	  [1997]	  2009:	  16).	  
Nonetheless,	  she	  finds	  the	  conflation	  of	  imperialism	  and	  subordination	  in	  the	  
Balkan	  context	  with	  histories,	  and	  thus	  theories,	  of	  (post)coloniality	  not	  only	  
historically	  questionable	  but	  also	  methodologically	  inexpedient	  (Todorova	  [1997]	  
2009:	  17,	  193-­‐201).	  Bakić-­‐Hayden	  and	  Robert	  (1992),	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  suggest	  
that	  the	  orientalist	  perception	  that	  underlies	  the	  colonial	  understanding	  of	  the	  
“West”	  and	  its	  Others	  can	  be	  found	  in	  different	  “gradations,”	  thus	  creating	  a	  	  
variety	  of	  hierarchies	  of	  comparatively	  more	  or	  less	  “Eastern”	  cultures	  and	  
identities	  (Bakić-­‐Hayden	  &	  Robert	  1992).	  Last,	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  not	  just	  
the	  “neo-­‐colonialist”	  European	  projects	  that	  call	  for	  the	  use	  of	  postcolonial	  critique	  
in	  the	  Balkans	  but	  earlier	  colonial	  legacies	  that	  have	  been	  erased	  as	  such	  (Rexhepi	  
2018).	  Although	  these	  different	  approaches	  will	  not	  be	  thoroughly	  examined	  here,	  
their	  common	  denominator	  is	  that	  whether	  studied	  within	  or	  in	  proximity	  to	  
Orientalism	  and	  postcoloniality,	  the	  discursive	  construction	  of	  the	  Balkans	  is	  heavily	  
imbedded	  with	  “West”	  vs.	  “East”	  oriented	  narratives.	  	  
Returning	  to	  the	  critique	  of	  Mizielińska	  and	  Kulpa’s	  model,	  according	  to	  Navickaitė	  
(2014),	  their	  model	  does	  not	  challenge	  the	  epistemological	  divide	  of	  “West”	  vs.	  
“East”	  but	  rather	  reverses	  the	  power	  dynamics	  and	  produces	  a	  romanticised	  view	  
of	  the	  post-­‐socialist	  context	  as	  inherently	  queer	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  static	  “straight”	  
Western	  counterpart.	  Last,	  as	  both	  Takácks	  (2013)	  and	  Pichardo	  Galán	  (2013)	  point	  
out,	  the	  ambitious	  project	  of	  “de-­‐centring”	  does	  not	  really	  take	  place	  as	  most	  of	  the	  
concepts	  and	  frameworks	  used	  are	  indeed	  of	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  or	  North	  American	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origins	  and,	  of	  course,	  written	  in	  English.	  Nonetheless,	  both	  authors	  praise	  the	  
value	  of	  the	  anthology	  in	  offering	  such	  “peripheral”	  accounts	  and	  analyses	  of	  
under-­‐represented	  territories	  and	  politics,	  thus,	  “doing	  their	  work”	  towards	  the	  
emergence	  of	  alternative	  critiques	  on	  sexuality	  (Takácks	  2013;	  Pichardo	  Galán	  
2013:	  101).	  
Although	  I	  agree	  with	  most	  of	  the	  critiques	  of	  this	  model,	  I	  do	  follow	  some	  of	  its	  
theoretical	  threads	  that	  prove	  crucial	  when	  thinking	  about	  contexts	  that	  are	  not	  
central	  in	  the	  production	  and	  distribution	  of	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  theories.	  I	  stay	  
with	  the	  idea	  of	  “contemporary	  peripheries”	  as	  well	  as	  the	  concept	  of	  “an	  
expended	  ‘now’	  in	  which	  past,	  present	  and	  future	  do	  not	  follow	  one	  after	  another	  
(…)	  but	  coincide	  and	  coexist”	  (Mizielińska	  [2011]	  2016:	  100).	  The	  problematisation	  
of	  linear	  temporalities	  and	  universalising	  concepts	  dictates	  the	  strenuous	  but	  
essential	  task	  of	  holding	  multiple	  conceptualisations	  and	  modes	  of	  existence	  in	  
tension	  rather	  than	  collapsing	  them	  into	  one	  linear,	  and	  thus	  seemingly	  coherent,	  
narrative.	  In	  this	  vein,	  I	  share	  Mizielińska	  and	  Kulpa’s	  path	  up	  to	  a	  point	  but	  also	  
depart	  from	  it	  in	  order	  to	  actualise	  my	  own	  route.	  The	  liminal	  geo-­‐political	  place	  of	  
Greece	  in	  Europe	  allows	  for	  its	  loose	  framing	  as	  a	  “contemporary	  periphery”,	  which,	  
according	  to	  Mizielińska	  and	  Kulpa	  ([2011]	  2016),	  is	  defined	  by	  being	  “‘European	  
enough’	  (geographically),	  ‘yet	  not	  enough	  advanced’	  to	  become	  ‘Western’	  
(temporally)”	  (Mizielińska	  &	  Kulpa[2011]	  2016:	  18).	  In	  such	  a	  context	  of	  geopolitical	  
liminality,	  Mizielińska	  and	  Kulpa’s	  framework	  offers	  the	  epistemological	  space	  to	  
think	  about	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  issues	  within	  this	  “in-­‐betweenness”	  (Mizielińska	  &	  
Kulpa	  2013:	  103).	  	  
Nonetheless,	  Greece	  has	  its	  own	  timeline	  which	  does	  not	  share	  the	  “communist	  
time”	  of	  CEE	  countries	  but	  is	  still	  different	  from	  North	  European	  historicities.	  
Standing	  at	  the	  edge	  of	  what	  is	  described	  in	  broad	  terms	  as	  “West”	  and	  “East”,	  
Greece	  is	  culturally	  and	  politically	  included	  both	  in	  the	  Balkans	  (often	  as	  an	  
imperialist	  power	  within	  that	  context,	  Huliaras	  and	  Tsardanidis	  2006)	  but	  also	  in	  
Southern	  Europe’s	  “PIGS”	  (Portugal,	  Italy,	  Greece,	  Spain).	  Moreover,	  other	  than	  not	  
sharing	  the	  past	  of	  a	  communist	  regime	  with	  other	  Balkan	  states,	  Greece	  also	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differs	  vastly	  with	  regards	  to	  it’s	  relation	  to	  Europe	  and	  the	  “West”	  because	  of	  the	  
complexities	  created	  by	  Hellenism	  (Herzfeld	  1987;	  Gourgouris	  1996;	  Koundoura	  	  
[2007]	  (2012);	  Tziovas	  2001,	  2014;	  Carastathis	  2014).	  Indeed,	  the	  idea	  of	  Hellenism	  
and	  the	  supposed	  continuity	  between	  –a	  whitewashed	  version	  of-­‐	  ancient	  Greek	  
ideals	  and	  the	  contemporary	  European	  civilisation	  creates	  a	  conundrum	  for	  the	  
positioning	  of	  modern	  Greek	  identities	  within	  the	  contemporary	  European	  
imaginary.	  	  
To	  certain	  extent,	  from	  before	  the	  Greek	  state	  joined	  the	  European	  Communities	  
up	  to	  the	  present	  day,	  it	  has	  been	  felt	  that	  Greece	  is	  “European	  not	  because	  of	  its	  
geographical	  location	  but	  because	  she	  [Greece]	  ‘was	  the	  birthplace	  of	  European	  
civilisation’”	  (Huliaras	  and	  Tsardanidis	  2006:	  478).	  Unsurprisingly,	  the	  European	  
classicist	  fantasy	  of	  a	  glorified	  Aryanised	  Greek	  past	  continuously	  clashes	  with	  the	  
reality	  of	  modern	  Greece.	  This	  constitutes	  steadily	  a	  disappointment	  for	  the	  
“frustrated	  Philhellenes”	  that	  have	  been	  expecting	  to	  find	  the	  classicist	  ideals	  
reflected	  in	  the	  cultural	  practices	  of	  modern	  Greece	  (Herzfeld	  1987;	  Todorova	  
[1997]	  2009:	  92;	  Carastasthis	  2014).	  Confronted	  with	  a	  people	  that	  does	  not	  
correspond	  culturally,	  or	  even	  racially,	  to	  this	  romanticised	  ideal	  “the	  west’s	  
‘sympathy’	  for	  Greek	  culture	  extends	  only	  to	  its	  whitewashed	  ancient	  form,	  not	  its	  
ineluctably	  pre-­‐modern	  contemporary	  underdevelopment”	  (Carastathis	  2014:	  4).	  
This	  constructed	  idea	  of	  Greekness	  that	  has	  been	  “a	  yardstick	  of	  cultural	  self-­‐
definition	  for	  all	  of	  Europe”	  and	  that	  is	  also	  very	  popular	  within	  Greek	  nationalist	  
and	  patriotic	  discourses,	  presents	  modern	  Greece	  as	  fallen	  from	  the	  Hellenist	  ideal,	  
which	  has	  nonetheless	  always	  been	  a	  European	  fantasy	  (Herzfeld	  1987:	  48).	  As	  a	  
result,	  modern	  Greeks	  “in	  their	  endlessly	  attributed	  imperfections,	  […]	  are	  still	  
atoning	  politically	  for	  a	  fall	  defined	  as	  such	  by	  the	  hard	  hand	  of	  occidental	  power”	  
(Herzfeld	  1987:	  48).	  	  
Under	  this	  prism,	  although	  Said	  himself	  glossed	  over	  the	  relationship	  of	  Hellenism	  
with	  Orientalism	  claiming	  simply	  their	  incomparability	  (Said	  quoted	  in	  Carastathis	  
2014:3),	  many	  writers	  have	  suggested	  that	  a	  critical	  study	  of	  the	  structure,	  effects	  
and	  role	  of	  Hellenism	  offers	  a	  more	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	  how	  it	  made	  possible	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for	  Greece	  to	  appear,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  as	  both	  Europe’s	  origin	  and	  Europe’s	  
backward	  Other	  (Herzfeld	  1987;	  Koundoura	  [2007]	  2012,	  Tziovas	  2014).	  As	  Tziovas	  
explains:	  
The	  loaded	  relationship	  between	  ancient	  ruins,	  the	  Hellenic	  topos,	  and	  the	  
European	  logos	  about	  them	  has	  offered	  scholars	  the	  opportunity	  to	  study	  
Greece	  in	  the	  context	  of	  postcolonial	  studies	  by	  employing	  the	  concepts	  of	  
crypto-­‐colonialism	  or	  ‘colonialism	  of	  the	  mind’	  and	  the	  Foucauldian	  notion	  
of	  heterotopia.	  […]	  Considered	  to	  lie	  outside	  the	  West,	  but	  also	  perceived	  
by	  the	  western	  imagination	  as	  a	  place	  of	  origins,	  Greece	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  
heterotopic	  space	  of	  ruins,	  set	  apart	  yet	  not	  apart,	  mythic	  and	  real	  at	  the	  
same	  time	  (Tziovas	  2014:	  3).	  
Accordingly,	  Carastathis	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  work	  performed	  by	  Hellenism	  is	  rather	  
insidious	  and	  that	  it	  confers	  an	  “Orientalist	  structure—or,	  at	  least,	  [a]	  kinship	  with	  
Orientalism”	  (Carastathis	  2014:	  4).	  Undoubtedly,	  tracing	  the	  complex	  discursive	  and	  
ideological	  interplays	  that	  constitute	  modern	  Greeks	  as	  less	  advanced	  than	  other	  
Europeans	  and	  less	  European	  than	  their	  own	  ancestors	  (that	  is,	  of	  how	  these	  
ancestors	  were	  imagined	  by	  the	  Euro-­‐American	  classicists	  to	  be),	  reveals	  many	  of	  
the	  tensions	  underpinning	  the	  Greek	  national	  identity.	  Even	  though,	  “throughout	  its	  
contemporary	  history	  since	  its	  foundation	  as	  a	  nation-­‐state,	  Greece	  has	  been	  
subject	  to	  indirect	  western	  European	  rule,	  and	  U.S.-­‐supported	  dictatorships,”	  the	  
Hellenistic	  appropriation	  of	  the	  Greek	  past	  and	  its	  effects	  on	  the	  formation	  of	  
modern	  Greek	  identity	  could	  be	  seen	  more	  as	  “a	  metaphorical	  form	  of	  colonialism”	  
or	  a	  “colonization	  of	  the	  ideal”	  	  (Carastathis	  2014:	  4;	  Tziovas	  2014:	  3;	  Gourgouris	  
1996:	  124).	  	  
By	  this	  token,	  following	  Todorova,	  I	  would	  stay	  with	  the	  question	  “whether	  the	  
methodological	  contribution	  of	  subaltern	  and	  postcolonial	  studies	  (as	  developed	  for	  
India	  and	  expanded	  and	  refined	  for	  Africa	  and	  Latin	  America)	  can	  be	  meaningfully	  
applied	  to	  the	  Balkans”	  and	  specifically	  Greece	  (Todorova	  [1997]	  2009:	  17).	  Indeed,	  
given	  the	  historical	  specificity	  and	  constitutive	  intensity	  (even	  in	  the	  self-­‐
understanding	  of	  colonised	  peoples)	  of	  the	  colonial	  rule,	  I	  would	  be	  very	  hesitant	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towards	  a	  direct	  application	  of	  postcolonialist	  theories	  and	  concepts	  for	  the	  Greek	  
case.	  In	  any	  case,	  even	  if	  one	  does	  not	  fully	  accept	  the	  thesis	  concerning	  the	  
orientalist	  discursive	  structure	  of	  Hellenism,	  it	  is	  commonly	  accepted	  that	  the	  study	  
of	  modern	  Greece	  is	  riddled	  with	  questions	  about	  its	  positioning	  within	  the	  
schemata	  of	  European	  vs.	  Other,	  Occidental	  vs.	  Oriental,	  West	  vs.	  East	  etc.	  The	  
liminal	  geopolitical	  positioning,	  the	  culturally	  and	  ethnically	  mixed	  past	  of	  the	  
region	  and	  the	  particular	  working	  of	  Hellenist	  discourses	  perpetually	  sustain	  the	  
contestation,	  both	  internally	  and	  on	  an	  international	  terrain,	  regarding	  the	  identity	  
of	  Greece	  as	  a	  Balkan	  or	  European	  state	  and	  its	  understanding	  as	  an	  “equally	  
developed”	  counterpart	  of	  other	  Western	  states.	  	  
To	  that	  end,	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  develop	  an	  analysis	  that	  takes	  into	  account	  specifically	  
the	  politics	  of	  Greek	  nationalism	  and	  ethno-­‐sexual	  violence,	  the	  intricate	  workings	  
of	  Balkanism	  and	  Hellenism,	  discourses	  of	  Europeanisation	  and,	  more	  recently,	  the	  
effects	  and	  politics	  of	  the	  Greek	  Crisis	  and	  what	  has	  been	  called	  the	  “migrant	  crisis”.	  
In	  this	  vein,	  the	  regulation	  of	  legal	  gender	  is	  analysed	  in	  the	  present	  text	  in	  the	  
intersections	  of	  LGBTI+	  rights	  politics,	  Europeanisation	  processes	  and	  nation-­‐
building	  ideological	  discourses.	  By	  utilising	  context-­‐specific	  critiques,	  I	  locate	  the	  
formulation	  of	  gender	  normative	  discourses	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  Greek	  nationalist	  
politics	  and	  the	  forging	  of	  national	  identity	  through	  the	  ideological	  triptych	  of	  
πατρίς-­‐θρησκεία-­‐οικογένεια	  (motherland-­‐religion-­‐family)	  (Varikas	  1993;	  Halkias	  
2004;	  Apostolidou	  2014).	  The	  centrality	  of	  national	  ideology	  in	  the	  constitution	  of	  
patriotic	  heterosexuality	  is	  explored	  through	  the	  analytical	  lens	  provided	  by	  Greek	  
critiques	  of	  such	  ethno-­‐sexual	  politics	  (Athanasiou	  2007,	  2012;	  Canakis	  2013;	  
Chalkidou	  2013;	  Carastathis	  2015).	  Conceptualising	  the	  “national	  body”	  as	  
gendered	  and	  sexually	  threatened	  in	  specific	  ways,	  I	  step	  into	  a	  political	  terrain	  very	  
different	  from,	  for	  example,	  the	  North	  American,	  thus,	  allowing	  myself	  theoretical	  
diversions	  towards	  debates	  on	  Europeanisation,	  Orthodox	  Christianity,	  crisis-­‐scapes	  
and	  specific	  forms	  of	  racialised	  violence	  (Athanasiou	  2012;	  Canakis	  2013).	  In	  this	  
sense,	  I	  would	  not	  claim	  this	  study	  to	  have	  a	  trans	  framework	  but	  rather	  a	  τρανς	  
framework.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  a	  context-­‐specific	  utilisation	  of	  trans	  studies	  scholarship	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as	  it	  is	  informed	  by	  non-­‐Anglo-­‐American	  critiques	  and	  the	  input	  of	  trans	  lived	  
experiences	  in	  Greece.	  
Moreover,	  concerning	  LGBTI+	  and	  queer	  politics	  and	  theories	  in	  Greece,	  I	  attempt	  
to	  use	  the	  space	  provided	  by	  Kulpa	  and	  Mizielińska’s	  approach	  to	  account	  for	  
“temporal	  disjunctions”	  such	  as	  not	  necessarily	  having	  a	  long	  institutional	  legacy	  of	  
gay	  identity	  politics	  before	  the	  emergence	  of	  queer	  politics	  or	  having	  the	  critique	  
towards	  homonormativity	  emerging	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  or	  even	  before,	  
homornomativity	  itself	  (Mizielińska	  &	  Kulpa	  [2011]	  2016:	  14).35	  Within	  this	  “queer	  
asynchrony”	  (Mizielińska	  [2011]	  2016),	  criticisms,	  for	  example,	  of	  the	  
institutionalisation	  of	  queer	  and	  trans	  studies	  and	  politics	  have	  travelled	  and	  
resonated	  with	  writers	  and	  activists	  in	  Greece	  while	  there	  has	  never	  been	  a	  single	  
department	  of	  queer	  or	  trans	  studies.36	  Therefore,	  within	  the	  Greek	  context,	  queer	  
critique,	  as	  a	  political	  discourse	  first	  and	  later	  as	  an	  academic	  and	  artistic	  project,	  
has	  its	  own	  timeline	  where/when	  LGBTI+	  and	  queer	  identities	  and	  strategies	  were	  
deployed	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  Similarly,	  with	  Kulpa	  and	  Mizielińska’s	  claim	  for	  CEE	  
countries,	  “queer	  and	  gay	  in	  Greece	  have	  been	  going	  on	  together	  for	  quite	  some	  
time”	  (Papanikolaou	  2018b:	  31:16’’).	  	  
An	  example	  of	  diverse	  political	  temporalities	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  development	  of	  
the	  Athens	  Pride	  of	  which	  the	  first	  march	  (2005)	  already	  included	  critical	  discourses	  
on	  commercialisation	  and	  assimilation,	  as	  well	  as	  various	  radical	  political	  slogans	  
that	  had	  travelled	  to	  Athens	  long	  before	  there	  was	  an	  official	  Athens	  Pride.	  Claims	  
to	  space	  and	  identity	  were	  combined	  with	  the	  questioning	  of	  identity	  and	  
homonormativity,	  as	  well	  as	  politics	  of	  hope	  were	  articulated	  along	  with	  anti-­‐future	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  Indeed,	  Mizielińska’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  Polish	  context	  seems	  to	  have	  many	  similarities	  with	  
contemporary	  Greek	  historicity	  of	  LGBT	  politics	  where	  “in	  a	  sense	  a	  deconstruction	  coincides	  with	  
the	  construction”	  (Mizielińska	  [2011]	  2016:	  91).	  
36
	  The	  first	  volume	  on	  LGBT/queer	  politics	  in	  Greece	  was	  published	  in	  2012	  and	  was	  a	  result	  of	  
collaboration	  between	  activists	  and	  scholars	  (Apostolelli	  &	  Chalkia	  2012).	  Up	  to	  then,	  there	  was	  
barely	  any	  queer	  scholarship	  in	  Greek	  but	  there	  was	  already	  a	  body	  of	  queer	  texts	  from	  political	  
groups	  (Apostolelli	  &	  Chalkia	  2012:	  17-­‐18).	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and	  anti-­‐social	  aggression.37	  Although	  the	  struggle	  to	  claim	  Athens	  Pride	  as	  a	  non-­‐
commercial	  political	  event	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  lost,	  local	  Pride-­‐like	  events	  have	  
been	  organised	  in	  smaller	  cities	  following	  different	  models	  of	  self-­‐organisation,	  
anti-­‐consumerism	  and	  anti-­‐racist	  politics.38	  These	  political	  events	  do	  not	  come	  after	  
a	  commercial	  local	  Pride	  and	  have	  varying	  relationships	  with	  the	  Athens	  Pride.	  Are	  
they,	  then,	  ahead	  or	  behind	  in	  the	  development	  of	  LGBTI+/queer	  politics	  compared	  
to	  commercial	  Prides	  of	  European	  cities?	  How	  can	  they	  be	  situated	  within	  the	  
Stonewall	  timeline	  or	  the	  much-­‐contested	  Belgrade	  Pride	  timeline	  (Bilić	  2016)?	  As	  it	  
becomes	  obvious,	  to	  line	  up	  such	  events	  within	  a	  linear	  universal	  timeline	  of	  
“simple	  replications”	  of	  Stonewall	  oversees	  their	  political	  potentiality	  (Lalor	  2015:	  
21).	  Moreover,	  it	  cannot	  be	  done.	  At	  least	  not	  in	  a	  meaningful	  way.	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  The	  first	  Athens	  Pride	  marches	  included	  (among	  others)	  LGBT	  blocks	  claiming	  gay	  marriage,	  left-­‐
wing	  blocks	  (coming	  of	  course	  as	  allies,	  not	  as	  left	  wing	  and	  LGBT),	  an	  anarchist	  block	  (as	  well	  mostly	  
as	  allies),	  and,	  scattered	  within	  these	  different	  blocks,	  the	  newly	  forming	  queer	  groups.	  The	  birth	  of	  
the	  official	  Athens	  Pride	  and	  its	  attempt	  to	  establish	  itself	  institutionally,	  politically	  and	  commercially	  
coincided	  with	  the	  birth	  of	  queer	  critiques	  towards	  such	  political	  endeavours.	  The	  first	  Athens	  Pride	  
marches	  had	  also	  occasional	  encounters	  with	  fascist	  and	  Christian	  groups	  and,	  overall,	  have	  given	  
rise	  to	  intense	  debates	  within	  various	  political	  scenes	  throughout	  the	  years	  (see	  also	  Boukli	  2018	  for	  
the	  recent	  reaction	  in	  the	  form	  of	  ‘Straight	  Pride’).	  These	  political	  discourses	  fused	  at	  the	  very	  first	  
Pride	  march	  (and	  many	  of	  the	  following)	  as	  did	  pop-­‐music	  with	  radical	  political	  chants	  and	  
commercial	  flyers	  with	  political	  stencils	  and	  slogans.	  Some	  of	  the	  slogans	  of	  the	  political	  group	  
queericulum	  vitae	  for	  the	  first	  Athens	  Pride	  included:	  “homosexuality	  is	  a	  possibility”,	  “the	  faggots	  
and	  lesbians	  of	  your	  city	  wish	  you	  a	  good	  summer”,	  “heterosexuality	  is	  a	  political	  system”,	  “pride	  is	  
(not)	  a	  protest”,	  “patriarchy	  is	  a	  political	  system”,	  “pride	  is	  (not)	  a	  celebration”,	  “heteronormativity	  
is	  a	  political	  system”,	  “we	  don’t	  like	  kids,	  we	  like	  their	  daddies”,	  “how	  many	  normativities	  fit	  in	  your	  
pants?”	  (QVzine	  website).	  QV’s	  playful	  slogans	  (that	  kept	  coming	  for	  a	  decade	  in	  the	  Prides	  to	  
follow)	  expressed	  the	  tensions	  and	  ambivalence	  of	  doing	  queer	  politics	  in	  a	  context	  that	  LGBT	  rights	  
have	  not	  been	  established.	  The	  group’s	  critical	  participation	  in	  such	  events	  often	  included	  the	  
spreading	  of	  leaflets	  and	  slogans	  that	  openly	  expressed	  the	  conflicting	  political	  desires	  within	  the	  
first	  generation	  of	  queer	  politics	  in	  Athens	  (“pride	  is	  (not)	  a	  protest”,	  “pride	  is	  (not)	  a	  celebration”).	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  Since	  2015	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Thessaloniki,	  which	  had	  its	  first	  official	  Pride	  in	  2010,	  there	  is	  a	  “RADical	  
self-­‐organised	  Thessaloniki	  Pride	  for	  LGBTQIA+	  Claims	  and	  the	  Liberation	  of	  Gender	  and	  Sexuality”.	  
The	  Radical	  Thessaloniki	  Pride	  is	  self-­‐financed	  “without	  sponsorships	  from	  companies,	  embassies	  
and	  the	  European	  Union”	  and	  organised	  through	  open	  horizontal	  assemblies	  (Thessaloniki	  Pride	  
website).	  In	  2015,	  the	  island	  of	  Crete	  saw	  the	  first	  “Visibility	  and	  Rights	  Assertion	  for	  Liberation	  of	  
Gender,	  Body	  and	  Sexuality	  Festival,”	  known	  as	  well	  as	  Crete	  LGBTQI+	  Pride	  (Crete	  Pride	  website).	  
This	  event	  follows	  the	  same	  principles	  of	  self-­‐organisation	  and	  anti-­‐hierarchical	  decision-­‐making	  and	  
has	  similar	  political	  goals.	  Last,	  since	  2016	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Patras	  there	  is	  a	  “LGBTQI+	  Pride	  Festival	  for	  
the	  Liberation	  of	  Gender,	  Body	  and	  Sexuality;	  Against	  Repression	  and	  Discrimination”.	  Similarly,	  the	  
LGBTQI+	  Patras	  (its	  shortened	  title)	  is	  organised	  horizontally,	  without	  sponsors/companies/political	  
parties	  and	  has	  strong	  anti-­‐capitalist	  and	  anti-­‐assimilationist	  political	  imperatives	  while	  still	  
collaborating	  with	  LGBT	  institutional	  groups.	  	  
All	  three	  events	  connect	  with	  other	  local	  struggles	  (e.g.	  migrant	  groups,	  right	  to	  the	  city	  struggles)	  
and	  include	  a	  march	  that	  marks	  the	  end	  of	  a	  two	  or	  three-­‐day	  schedule	  of	  political	  discussions,	  
workshops,	  screenings,	  and	  performances	  and	  usually	  a	  closing	  party.	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Similarly,	  the	  politics	  of	  travesti	  (τραβεστί)	  activists	  of	  the	  1980s	  sit	  uneasily	  with	  
such	  attempts	  at	  temporal	  translation.39	  The	  framing	  of	  such	  political	  archives	  
within	  monotemporal	  concepts	  of	  history	  proves	  impossible	  and	  unproductive.	  Was	  
the	  discourse	  of	  those	  activists	  regarding	  sex-­‐work	  ahead	  of	  its	  time?	  The	  re-­‐
emergence	  of	  such	  work	  as	  a	  point	  of	  interest	  for	  contemporary	  queer	  and	  LGBT	  
politics	  points	  towards	  a	  need	  for	  frameworks	  that	  can	  accommodate	  a	  relationship	  
between	  past	  and	  present	  (as	  well	  as	  other	  pasts	  and	  presents)	  that	  is	  not	  linear	  
and	  unidirectional.	  It	  should	  be,	  thus,	  taken	  into	  account	  that	  different	  contexts	  
have	  given	  rise	  to	  alternative	  political	  genealogies	  and	  conceptualisations	  of	  gender	  
and	  sexual	  belonging.	  	  
In	  this	  vein,	  I	  try	  to	  employ	  a	  framework	  that	  is	  not	  just	  trans	  and/or	  queer	  but	  
rather	  τρανς	  and/or	  κουήρ.	  That	  is,	  a	  framework	  that	  is	  committed	  to	  the	  
localisation	  of	  theories	  and	  concepts	  that	  do	  not	  originally	  refer	  to	  the	  Greek	  
context	  and	  responds	  to	  the	  historical	  and	  political	  specificity	  of	  this	  context.	  In	  this	  
process,	  I	  suggest	  that	  writing	  about	  issues	  of	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  from	  within	  
communities	  of	  alternative	  political	  and	  cultural	  historicities	  can	  be	  accommodated	  
by	  an	  openness	  to	  different	  political	  and	  theoretical	  conceptualisations	  and,	  even	  
more	  so,	  to	  diverse	  genealogies	  and	  radical	  “exercises	  of	  historical	  retrieval	  and	  
archival	  reappropriation”	  (Papanikolaou	  2018b:	  51.17’’).	  Nonetheless,	  although	  I	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  For	  example	  in	  the	  recent	  years	  there	  has	  been	  a	  new-­‐found	  interest	  in	  the	  early	  works	  of	  Paola	  
Revenioti,	  a	  trans	  woman,	  activist,	  sex	  worker	  and	  artist.	  From	  1981	  to	  1993,	  Paola	  (self-­‐identifying	  
as	  a	  τραβεστί	  and	  a	  prostitute)	  published	  a	  magazine	  of	  sexual	  anti-­‐authoritarian	  politics	  (including	  
social	  critique,	  interviews,	  poems,	  erotica	  etc.),	  whose	  content	  is	  considered	  radical	  for	  today’s	  
politics	  in	  Greece	  (Faubion	  1993;	  Papanikolaou	  2018a).	  The	  magazine	  had	  newspaper-­‐like	  
appearance	  and	  was	  financed	  by	  the	  sex	  work	  of	  Paola	  and	  the	  contributions	  of	  friends	  and	  
supporters	  within	  the	  Greek	  underground	  and	  intelligentsia.	  It	  was	  titled	  “Το	  Κράξιμο”	  (To	  Kraximo),	  
which	  translates	  (or	  struggles	  to	  be	  translated)	  as	  “heckling”	  but	  also	  outing	  or	  gay/trans	  bashing,	  
and	  it	  featured	  original	  photos	  of	  young	  studs	  taken	  by	  Paola	  next	  to	  anarchist	  analyses	  and	  
τραβεστί	  street	  workers’	  anecdotes	  next	  to	  interviews	  with	  intellectuals	  such	  as	  Félix	  Guattari	  
(Revenioti	  [1981-­‐1993]	  2007).	  Above	  its	  title	  it	  read,	  “Any	  labour	  with	  intention	  of	  profit	  is	  
prostitution”	  (κάθε	  εργασία	  με	  σκοπό	  το	  κέρδος	  είναι	  πορνεία)	  and	  beneath	  “journal	  of	  
revolutionary	  homosexual	  expression”	  (περιοδικό	  επαναστατικής	  ομοφυλόφιλης	  έκφρασης)	  
(Revenioti	  [1981-­‐1993]	  2007).	  Can	  the	  discourse	  of	  Paola	  Revenioti	  in	  the	  1980s	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  
precursor	  of-­‐	  or	  a	  (utopian)	  future	  for-­‐	  today’s	  trans	  or	  sex	  work	  politics?	  In	  which	  stage	  of	  
international	  transgender	  history	  can	  we	  situate	  her	  claim	  of	  homosexual	  desire,	  anti-­‐authoritarian	  
politics	  and	  erotic	  art,	  which	  was	  persecuted	  by	  the	  law	  but	  embraced	  by	  part	  of	  the	  intelligentsia	  of	  
that	  time?	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employ	  various	  theoretical	  concepts	  and	  make	  odd	  connections	  in	  the	  attempt	  to	  
remain	  committed	  to	  the	  context	  in	  hand,	  this	  study	  is	  enabled	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  by	  
legal	  and	  political	  theories	  of	  Anglo-­‐N.	  American	  origins.	  My	  aim	  is	  to	  combine	  
some	  of	  these	  theories,	  which	  have	  been	  presented	  in	  the	  previous	  sections,	  with	  
Greek	  critiques	  and	  τρανς	  lived	  experience	  to	  tell	  a	  story	  of	  τρανς	  legal	  regulation	  
and	  recognition	  in	  Greece	  without	  flattening	  its	  complex	  historicity.	  
Closing	  this	  chapter,	  I	  have	  given	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  theoretical	  and	  disciplinary	  
environment	  of	  the	  present	  study.	  That	  is,	  I	  have	  traced	  the	  emergence	  of	  trans	  
studies	  as	  a	  field	  and	  have	  outlined	  some	  of	  the	  main	  debates	  and	  tensions	  within	  
the	  field	  and	  along	  its	  proximity	  to	  queer	  theories.	  My	  own	  approach	  aligns	  with	  
the	  suggestion	  that	  multiple	  frameworks,	  theories	  and	  concepts	  are	  necessary	  in	  
order	  to	  think	  about	  gender	  identities	  without	  lapsing	  towards	  self-­‐confirming	  
theoretical	  schemata	  (such	  as	  the	  organising	  of	  trans	  experiences	  along	  polarised	  
locations	  of	  a	  priori	  radical	  vs.	  conservative,	  critical	  vs.	  naïve,	  cutting	  edge	  vs.	  out-­‐
dated	  identities).	  With	  that	  in	  mind,	  gender	  identity	  and	  trans	  realities	  are	  analysed	  
in	  this	  study	  through	  a	  framework	  which	  draws	  from	  queer	  and	  feminist	  theories	  
but	  nonetheless	  is	  not	  a	  solely	  queer	  or	  feminist	  framework.	  What	  makes	  up	  the	  
theoretical	  backbone	  of	  the	  present	  analysis	  are	  critical	  adaptations	  of	  such	  
theories	  by	  trans	  studies’	  writers	  as	  they	  are	  informed	  and	  fertilised	  by	  non-­‐Anglo-­‐
American	  critiques	  and	  the	  input	  of	  trans	  lived	  experiences	  in	  Greece.	  The	  next	  
chapter	  provides	  a	  set	  of	  more	  specialised	  theories	  and	  concepts	  regarding	  the	  
recognition	  and	  regulation	  of	  gender	  by	  the	  state	  through	  legal	  apparatuses	  and	  a	  
critical	  interrogation	  of	  some	  of	  the	  power	  embedded	  within	  them.	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Chapter	  3. Theories	  of	  Trans	  Engagement	  	  
with	  Law	  and	  the	  State	  	  
Chapter	  three	  narrows	  down	  the	  position	  of	  the	  present	  research	  within	  the	  wider	  
theoretical	  and	  disciplinary	  environment	  that	  has	  been	  presented	  in	  the	  previous	  
chapter	  and,	  specifically,	  sets	  to	  engage	  with	  some	  of	  the	  discussions	  that	  have	  
taken	  place	  in	  Euro-­‐American	  scholarship	  concerning	  trans	  engagement	  with	  the	  
law	  (Whittle	  &	  Turner	  2007;	  Currah	  &	  Moore	  2009;	  Currah	  2009;	  West	  2013).	  In	  the	  
first	  section,	  I	  follow	  the	  emergence	  of	  trans	  rights	  scholarship	  in	  conversation	  with	  
a	  debate	  concerning	  the	  ideological	  and	  political	  premises	  of	  trans	  rights	  within	  the	  
liberal	  legal	  tradition	  (Spade	  [2009]	  2015;	  Currah,	  Juang	  &	  Minter	  2006;	  Beger	  
[2004]	  2009;	  Aizura	  2012b;	  2017).	  	  
The	  second	  section	  departs	  from	  the	  framework	  of	  rights	  in	  order	  to	  explore	  gender	  
classification	  as	  part	  of	  a	  series	  of	  modern	  techniques	  of	  state	  governance	  and,	  
specifically,	  as	  part	  of	  civil	  registration	  and	  its	  crucial	  function	  in	  creating	  legible	  
citizens	  (Spade	  2008;	  Currah	  &	  Moore	  2009;	  Moore	  &	  Currah	  2015).	  This	  section	  
connects	  and	  brings	  in	  dialogue	  critiques	  of	  gender	  classification,	  classic	  theories	  of	  
categorisation,	  and	  governance	  modalities	  of	  the	  modern	  state	  as	  they	  converge	  on	  
ambiguously	  sexed/gendered	  subjectivities	  (such	  as	  the	  medico-­‐legal	  category	  of	  
the	  “hermaphrodite,”	  which	  historically	  has	  been	  exemplary	  of	  this	  process	  and	  its	  
limitations).	  	  
Last,	  as	  gender	  classification	  in	  the	  law	  relies	  largely	  upon	  the	  commonsensical	  
character	  of	  gender	  notions	  and	  taxonomies,	  historically	  the	  guide	  for	  this	  process	  
has	  not	  been	  the	  letter	  of	  the	  law,	  which	  usually	  offers	  little	  or	  no	  definition	  of	  such	  
categories,	  but	  its	  conceptualisation	  by	  the	  jurists	  applying	  the	  law.	  By	  this	  token,	  
the	  issue	  of	  interpretation	  emerges	  in	  a	  spectacular	  way	  within	  histories	  of	  gender	  
identity	  regulation	  (Whittle	  2002).	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  final	  sub-­‐section	  of	  chapter	  
three	  embarks	  on	  a	  critical	  examination	  of	  the	  power	  modalities	  that	  lay	  within	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legal	  interpretation	  and	  its	  crucial	  role	  in	  enforcing	  the	  imperatives	  of	  a	  legal	  order	  
(Cover	  1986;	  Karavokyris	  2013).	  
3.1. Trans	  Rights	  	  
Focusing	  on	  the	  legal	  aspects	  of	  trans	  experience	  in	  Greece,	  this	  study	  is	  informed	  
by	  and	  is	  in	  conversation	  with	  critical	  approaches	  to	  trans	  rights	  and	  a	  rich	  legacy	  
interrogating	  the	  law’s	  gender	  imperatives	  (Currah	  1997;	  Currah	  &	  Minter	  2000;	  
Whittle	  2002;	  Sharpe	  2002).	  This	  section	  provides	  a	  critical	  conceptualisation	  of	  
trans	  rights	  within	  a	  broader	  debate	  about	  rights	  politics	  and	  their	  paradoxical	  
imperatives	  (Brown	  2002;	  Duggan	  2003;	  Currah	  2009;	  Beger	  [2004]	  2009).	  The	  
concepts	  and	  debates	  that	  will	  be	  outlined	  constitute	  an	  essential	  theoretical	  
backdrop	  against	  which	  current	  legislation	  on	  gender	  identity	  will	  be	  analysed	  in	  
Part	  C.	  
In	  most	  Euro-­‐American	  legal	  orders,	  the	  engagement	  with	  gender	  variance	  
followed,	  during	  most	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  the	  trends	  of	  sexology	  and	  psychology,	  
leaving	  little	  room	  for	  the	  gender	  variant	  individual	  to	  emerge	  as	  a	  socio-­‐political	  
agent	  (Sharpe	  2002).	  To	  that	  end,	  the	  strenuous	  task	  of	  shifting	  the	  paradigm	  was	  
taken	  on	  by	  trans,	  queer	  and	  other	  critical	  scholars	  of	  legal	  and	  political	  sciences	  
who	  introduced	  their	  own	  analyses	  on	  the	  existing	  legislation	  and	  judicial	  practices	  
surrounding	  gender	  identity	  and	  the	  law	  (Currah	  1997;	  Coombs	  1998;	  Currah	  &	  
Minter	  2000;	  Beger	  2000;	  Whittle	  2002;	  Sharpe	  2002).	  Writing	  within	  mainly	  Anglo-­‐
American	  queer	  and	  feminist	  theories	  and	  in	  close	  proximity	  with	  trans	  and	  queer	  
political	  movements,	  such	  texts	  came	  to	  critically	  examine	  notions	  of	  sex	  and	  
gender	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  change	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  politico-­‐legal	  debate	  around	  
gender	  and	  sexual	  identities	  and	  practices	  (Valdes	  1995;	  Greenberg	  2000;	  Cruz	  
2002).	  	  
Since	  the	  1990s,	  trans	  rights	  scholarship	  analysed	  exclusionary	  judicial	  practices	  and	  
legislation	  in	  order	  to	  advocate	  for	  legal	  change	  and	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  trans	  
rights	  within	  frameworks	  of	  civil	  and	  human	  rights	  (Currah	  1997;	  Whittle	  2002;	  
Currah,	  Juang	  &	  Minter	  2006;	  Kendall	  2006).	  Moreover,	  these	  approaches	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challenged	  the	  de-­‐humanising	  medico-­‐legal	  concepts	  and	  the	  “(bio)logic”	  (in	  
Sharpe’s	  terms)	  of	  the	  law	  when	  faced	  with	  gender	  variance	  in	  general	  and	  with	  
trans	  claims	  specifically	  (Whittle	  2002;	  Sharpe	  2002).	  Deploying	  an	  equality	  and	  
rights-­‐focused	  rhetoric,	  Shannon	  Price	  Minter,	  Stephen	  Whittle,	  Paisley	  Currah,	  Alex	  
Sharpe	  and	  others	  contributed	  to	  create	  a	  body	  of	  Anglophone	  legal	  literature	  that	  
adopted	  key-­‐points	  of	  legal	  theories	  concerning	  the	  (inter)national	  protection	  of	  
trans	  rights	  (Currah	  &	  Minter	  2000;	  Whittle	  2002;	  Sharpe	  2002).	  Key	  publications	  
for	  the	  emergence	  of	  this	  body	  of	  work	  were	  Stephen	  Whittle’s	  “Respect	  and	  
Equality:	  Transsexual	  and	  Transgender	  Rights”	  (2002)	  and	  the	  anthology	  
“Transgender	  Rights”	  edited	  by	  Paisley	  Currah,	  Richard	  M.	  Juang	  and	  Shannon	  P.	  
Minter.	  Common	  focus	  points	  were	  employment	  rights	  (Broadus	  2006;	  Currah	  
2008b),	  the	  right	  to	  marriage	  (Fisher	  2009;	  Sharpe	  2002)	  and	  reproduction	  (Whittle	  
2002),	  protection	  against	  hate	  crimes,	  and	  inclusion	  in	  anti-­‐discriminatory	  
legislation	  (Currah	  &	  Minter	  2000;	  Heber	  2009).	  	  
Another	  recurrent	  issue	  in	  these	  texts	  is	  the	  amendment	  of	  identity	  documents	  and	  
the	  state-­‐imposed	  preconditions	  for	  it	  (Currah	  &	  Moore	  2009).	  The	  necessity	  of	  
such	  a	  possibility	  for	  people	  who	  underwent	  gender	  reassignment	  surgeries	  was	  the	  
departing	  point	  of	  the	  line	  of	  thought	  that	  argued	  for	  the	  right	  to	  legal	  recognition	  
of	  gender	  identity	  (Whittle	  2002;	  Sharpe	  2002).	  As	  the	  post-­‐operative	  status	  proved	  
to	  be	  a	  complicated	  and	  invasive	  precondition,	  which	  excluded	  numerous	  trans	  
identities,	  it	  became	  apparent	  that	  the	  most	  appropriate	  theoretical	  device	  was	  the	  
de-­‐medicalisation	  of	  legal	  procedures	  surrounding	  the	  recognition	  of	  gender	  
identity	  (Whittle	  &	  Turner	  2007).	  It	  became	  commonplace	  among	  trans	  legal	  
scholars	  to	  assume	  a	  theoretical	  position	  that	  would	  support	  detaching	  gender	  
identity	  recognition	  from	  surgical	  body	  alterations.	  The	  relevant	  case	  law	  from	  
certain	  national	  and	  international	  courts	  has	  been	  thoroughly	  analysed	  with	  regards	  
to	  the	  criteria	  that	  have	  been	  considered	  substantive	  for	  defining	  gender	  identity	  
before	  the	  law	  (Whittle	  2002;	  Sharpe	  2002;	  Herald	  2009).	  	  
Underlining	  the	  incongruence	  of	  such	  criteria	  within	  and	  among	  different	  legal	  
orders,	  many	  writers	  sought	  to	  explore	  the	  legal	  impasses	  stemming	  from	  denying	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the	  realities	  of	  transgender	  identities	  across	  their	  various	  entanglements	  with	  the	  
law	  (Greenberg	  2000;	  Whittle	  and	  Turner	  2007;	  Spade	  2008;	  Meadow	  2010;	  Cruz	  
2010).	  Accordingly,	  writers	  engaging	  with	  trans	  identities	  and	  the	  law	  have	  called	  
for	  the	  legal	  recognition	  of	  trans	  genders	  through	  a	  reappraisal	  of	  the	  classification	  
criteria/systems	  or	  by	  decreasing	  the	  official	  contexts	  in	  which	  gender	  classification	  
is	  relevant	  and	  even	  by	  aspiring	  to	  uproot	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  state	  to	  impose	  
official	  gender	  classifications	  (Sharpe	  2002;	  Cooper	  &	  Renz	  2016).	  Upholding	  the	  
latter	  as	  a	  long-­‐term	  political	  goal	  often	  coexists	  with	  claims	  to	  the	  former	  as	  a	  
necessary	  means	  for	  survival	  and	  access	  to	  legal	  legibility	  (Currah	  1997;	  2009;	  2017)	  	  
In	  parallel	  with	  the	  literature	  concentrating	  on	  legal	  reform	  through	  the	  granting	  of	  
rights,	  a	  critical	  approach	  to	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  inclusionary	  arguments	  emerged.	  
Having	  a	  legacy	  of	  legal	  reforms	  and	  assimilation	  politics	  to	  reflect	  upon,	  these	  
approaches	  brought	  attention	  to	  the	  unproblematic	  embrace	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  
rights	  within	  a	  structurally	  problematic	  system	  (Spade	  [2009]	  2015;	  Aizura	  2017).	  
This	  debate	  intensified	  after	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century	  when	  the	  legislation	  in	  many	  
countries	  started	  to	  change	  in	  order	  to	  accommodate	  the	  needs	  of	  their	  
transgender	  citizens.	  Moreover,	  it	  developed	  within	  a	  broader	  debate	  concerning	  
minority	  claims	  for	  rights	  and	  recognition	  and	  their	  political	  implications	  (Stychin	  
1998;	  Brown	  1995;	  Beger	  [2004]	  2009).	  	  
An	  overall	  critical	  point	  that	  should	  be	  kept	  in	  mind	  is	  that	  the	  emergence	  of	  rights	  
discourses	  within	  the	  Western	  tradition	  of	  liberal	  humanism	  translates	  into	  a	  
grafting	  of	  racial,	  gender	  and	  class	  hierarchies	  within	  their	  core.	  Built	  within	  a	  
specific	  politico-­‐economical	  system,	  rights	  can	  operate	  in	  a	  way	  that	  naturalises	  the	  
foundational	  powers	  of	  that	  system	  by	  masking	  them	  (Stychin	  1998;	  Brown	  1995;	  
Beger	  [2004]	  2009).	  Wendy	  Brown’s	  (1995)	  critique	  in	  “States	  of	  Injury”	  has	  been	  
crucial	  in	  underlining	  some	  of	  the	  insidious	  workings	  of	  rights	  within	  neoliberal	  
capitalist	  states.	  Brown	  employs	  a	  post-­‐Marxist	  feminist	  analysis	  drawing	  insights	  
from	  Nietzsche	  and	  Foucault’s	  writings	  to	  rework	  Marx’s	  critique	  of	  rights.	  She	  
presents	  a	  set	  of	  paradoxes	  inherent	  within	  rights,	  not	  arguing	  against	  rights	  
themselves,	  but	  posing	  a	  series	  of	  questions	  such	  as:	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When	  does	  identity	  articulated	  through	  rights	  become	  production	  and	  
regulation	  of	  identity	  through	  law	  and	  bureaucracy?	  When	  does	  legal	  
recognition	  become	  an	  instrument	  of	  subordination	  (Brown	  1995:	  99)?	  
If	  rights	  thus	  reify	  the	  social	  power	  they	  are	  designed	  to	  protect	  against,	  
what	  are	  the	  political	  implications	  of	  doing	  both?	  What	  happens	  when	  we	  
understand	  individual	  rights	  as	  a	  form	  of	  protection	  against	  certain	  social	  
powers	  of	  which	  the	  ostensibly	  protected	  individual	  is	  actually	  an	  effect?	  If,	  
to	  paraphrase	  Marx,	  rights	  do	  not	  liberate	  us	  from	  relations	  of	  class,	  
gender,	  sexuality,	  or	  race,	  but	  only	  from	  formal	  recognition	  of	  these	  
elements	  as	  politically	  significant,	  thereby	  liberating	  them	  “to	  act	  after	  
their	  own	  fashion,”	  how	  does	  the	  project	  of	  political	  emancipation	  square	  
with	  the	  project	  of	  transforming	  the	  conditions	  against	  which	  rights	  are	  
sought	  as	  protection	  (Brown	  1995:	  115)?	  
Exploring	  these	  and	  other	  important	  inquiries,	  Brown’s	  analysis	  offers	  a	  valuable	  
theoretical	  framework	  as	  it	  closely	  traces	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  rights	  discourses	  can	  
work	  to	  de-­‐politicise	  social	  power	  dynamics	  and	  transform	  collective	  political	  
struggles	  into	  individual(ist)	  claims.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  individual	  withdrawn	  from	  the	  
collective,	  through	  the	  legal	  destigmatisation	  offered	  by	  formal	  equality	  loses	  the	  
vocabulary	  “to	  describe	  the	  character	  of	  domination,	  violation,	  or	  exploitation”	  that	  
remains	  at	  play	  and	  has	  originally	  generated	  the	  need	  for	  protection	  (Brown	  1995:	  
126).	  To	  that	  end,	  although	  Brown	  does	  not	  argue	  against	  rights	  politics,	  she	  
stresses	  that	  “rights	  must	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  equality	  nor	  legal	  recognition	  with	  
emancipation”	  (Brown	  1995:	  133).	  	  
Furthermore,	  according	  to	  Brown,	  a	  position	  for	  or	  against	  rights	  themselves,	  as	  
trans-­‐historical	  concepts,	  cannot	  stand	  on	  its	  own.	  As	  rights	  are	  formed	  and	  claimed	  
within	  given	  cultural	  and	  political	  contexts,	  they	  should	  be	  evaluated	  along	  an	  
analysis	  of	  these	  conditions	  and	  their	  historical	  specificity	  (Brown	  1995:	  98).40	  This	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40
	  Within	  Brown’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  paradoxes	  of	  rights,	  historical	  linearity	  and	  progressivist	  narratives	  
also	  appear	  to	  have	  a	  key	  role	  in	  the	  creation	  and	  navigation	  of	  political	  impasse	  since	  “the	  language	  
carrying	  the	  fatality	  of	  paradox	  occurs	  in	  the	  temporality	  of	  a	  progressive	  historiography”	  (Brown	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is	  an	  insightful	  suggestion	  that,	  as	  will	  become	  apparent	  in	  Part	  C,	  I	  have	  followed	  
with	  conviction	  in	  the	  present	  analysis.	  Nonetheless,	  as	  Brown’s	  analysis	  proceeds	  
in	  the	  book,	  she	  fails	  to	  commit	  to	  this	  call	  for	  specificity	  and	  delivers	  a	  unilateral	  
critique	  that	  ignores	  “the	  most	  radically	  transformative	  and	  creative	  moments”	  of	  
identity-­‐based	  movements	  (Duggan	  2003:	  79).	  More	  importantly,	  as	  Lisa	  Duggan	  
notes,	  the	  overall	  tone	  and	  structure	  of	  the	  text	  formulates	  a	  pedagogical	  modality	  
that	  creates	  a	  sense	  of	  hierarchical	  opposition	  between	  Brown’s	  (and	  others’)	  
critique	  and	  the	  political	  movements	  that	  use	  identity-­‐based	  rights	  claims	  (Duggan	  
2003:	  79-­‐80).	  To	  that	  end,	  I	  agree	  with	  Duggan’s	  implication	  that	  this	  analysis	  does	  
not	  necessarily	  do	  justice	  to	  the	  critical	  discourses	  and	  practices	  that	  have	  
flourished	  within	  movements	  claiming	  identity-­‐based	  recognition.	  	  
Duggan	  is	  herself	  very	  critical	  of	  the	  efficacy	  of	  liberal	  reforms	  and	  formal	  equality	  
to	  battle	  social	  injustices	  but	  advocates	  that	  extracting	  identity-­‐based	  claims	  from	  
political	  critique	  as	  a	  priori	  conservative	  and	  misguided	  is	  a	  position	  that	  follows	  the	  
neoliberal	  doctrine	  of	  separation	  between	  politics,	  culture	  and	  economics	  (Duggan	  
2003).	  	  
In	  the	  real	  world,	  class	  and	  racial	  hierarchies,	  gender	  and	  sexual	  
institutions,	  religious	  and	  ethnic	  boundaries	  are	  the	  channels	  through	  
which	  money,	  political	  power,	  cultural	  resources,	  and	  social	  organisation	  
flow	  (Duggan	  2003:	  XIV).	  	  
In	  this	  vein,	  a	  discourse	  of	  rights,	  which	  aspires	  to	  address	  the	  results	  of	  continuing	  
inequalities	  with	  formal	  equality	  stripped	  from	  other	  redistributive	  claims,	  does	  
indeed	  have	  its	  limitations.	  But	  similar	  limitations	  await	  a	  political	  discourse	  that	  
engages	  with	  a	  critique	  of	  neoliberal	  regimes	  by	  dismissing	  “cultural	  and	  identity	  
politics”	  overall	  (Duggan	  2003:	  XX).	  Indeed,	  it	  seems	  more	  useful	  to	  write	  about	  
such	  politics	  not	  in	  a	  modality	  that	  gives	  “advice”	  to	  political	  actors	  but	  one	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2002:	  432).	  Indeed,	  due	  to	  the	  inherent	  futurity	  of	  rights	  politics	  and	  the	  dominance	  of	  this	  
temporality	  of	  progress,	  critical	  engagement	  with	  rights	  brings	  an	  implicit	  emphasis	  on	  the	  
articulation	  of	  time,	  historical	  narration	  and	  temporal	  political	  grammars	  (Binnie	  2004;	  Woodcock	  
[2011]	  2016;	  Mizielińska	  [2011]	  2016;	  Lalor	  2015,	  2019).	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allows	  us	  to	  see	  and	  appreciate	  these	  “transformative	  and	  creative	  moments”	  
(Duggan	  2003:	  79).	  
Within	  trans	  legal	  scholarship,	  Dean	  Spade	  ([2009]	  2015)	  has	  engaged	  in	  a	  
systematic	  critique	  of	  the	  paradox	  of	  rights.	  Writing	  in	  close	  connection	  with	  trans	  
movements,	  Spade’s	  analysis	  seeks	  to	  understand	  “what	  relationship	  trans	  politics	  
has	  to	  ‘individual	  rights	  –	  the	  framework	  most	  frequently	  articulated	  by	  the	  
demands	  of	  many	  contemporary	  social	  movements	  -­‐”	  and	  to	  investigate	  “other	  
ways	  to	  conceive	  of	  law	  reform	  tactics	  in	  trans	  resistance	  that	  forgo	  the	  limitations	  
of	  demands	  for	  individual	  rights”	  (Spade	  [2009]	  2015:	  7).	  Spade	  draws	  upon	  the	  
work	  of	  Critical	  Race	  theorists	  to	  make	  a	  compelling	  argument	  about	  the	  complex	  
workings	  of	  rights	  in	  perpetuating	  social	  inequalities	  within	  neoliberal	  states.	  There	  
are	  many	  strengths	  in	  Spade’s	  analysis.	  One	  is	  the	  firm	  grounding	  of	  trans	  politics	  
within	  the	  broader	  context	  of	  contemporary	  American	  politics	  and	  its	  international	  
appendages.	  Another	  is	  the	  core	  argument	  that	  many	  central	  themes	  in	  the	  claim	  
for	  trans	  legal	  recognition	  and	  inclusion	  (such	  as	  marriage	  and	  adoption	  rights,	  
formal	  equality	  etc.)	  do	  not	  address	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  most	  vulnerable	  trans	  
populations.	  Moreover,	  according	  to	  Spade,	  marginalising	  factors	  such	  as	  poverty,	  
racial	  criminalisation,	  lack	  of	  citizenship,	  immigration	  status,	  racial	  pay-­‐gap,	  and	  a	  
lack	  of	  access	  to	  social	  welfare	  and	  health	  care	  will	  not	  disappear	  through	  
statements	  of	  formal	  equality	  (Spade	  [2009]	  2015).	  Nonetheless,	  he	  also	  stresses	  
the	  indispensability	  of	  legal	  claims:	  
Decentralising	  legal	  strategies,	  however,	  does	  not	  mean	  abandoning	  them	  
altogether.	  Trans	  people’s	  lives	  are	  heavily	  mediated	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  legal	  
barriers	  that	  create	  dire	  conditions,	  especially	  those	  related	  to	  the	  use	  of	  
gender	  classification	  in	  a	  range	  of	  state	  care-­‐taking/control	  programs.	  
Legal	  work	  of	  various	  kinds	  can	  be	  a	  part	  of	  the	  arsenal	  of	  tools	  available	  
for	  addressing	  those	  conditions.	  Using	  legal	  reform	  requires	  a	  careful,	  
reflective	  analysis	  in	  each	  instance	  of	  the	  potential	  impact	  on	  the	  survival	  
of	  trans	  populations	  (Spade	  [2009]	  2015:	  88).	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To	  that	  end,	  he	  suggests	  that	  rights	  and	  legal	  reform	  claims	  should	  be	  employed	  
tactically	  while	  retaining	  a	  “commitment	  to	  centre	  racial,	  economic,	  ability,	  and	  
gender	  justice”	  (Spade	  [2009]	  2015:	  37).	  	  
More	  importantly,	  by	  using	  a	  Foucauldian	  framework	  to	  conceptualise	  power	  as	  
operating	  through	  not	  only	  top-­‐down	  enforcement	  but	  also	  through	  disciplinary	  
norms	  and	  population-­‐management,	  Spade’s	  analysis	  brings	  into	  focus	  multiple	  
areas	  of	  legal	  practice	  other	  than	  equality	  legislation	  (Spade	  [2009]	  2015:	  50).	  That	  
is,	  state	  control	  apparatuses	  and	  administration	  mechanisms	  that	  mediate	  the	  
distribution	  of	  life-­‐resources	  become	  focal	  points	  within	  this	  line	  of	  thought.	  I	  
consider	  very	  crucial	  the	  preoccupation	  with	  “what	  the	  law	  says	  about	  us”	  not	  only	  
in	  legal	  areas	  explicitly	  engaged	  with	  issues	  of	  gender	  and	  sexual	  discrimination	  or	  
violence	  (Spade	  [2009]	  2015:	  69;	  Kravaritou	  1995).	  The	  gendering,	  racialisation	  and	  
class	  stratification	  of	  a	  legal	  order	  does	  not	  rely	  solely	  on	  provisions	  that	  directly	  
refer	  to	  such	  social	  hierarchies.	  Rather	  it	  relies	  upon	  provisions,	  underlying	  
principles	  and	  structures	  that	  mobilise	  ideas	  about	  nationality,	  race,	  gender	  and	  
sexuality	  to	  sustain	  or	  create	  “a	  general	  policy	  or	  program	  that	  may	  not	  explicitly	  
target	  a	  group	  on	  its	  face,	  but	  that	  still	  accomplishes	  its	  racist/sexist	  purpose”	  
(Spade	  [2009]	  2015:	  59).	  In	  this	  vein,	  such	  an	  understanding	  proves	  valuable,	  as	  is	  
demonstrated	  in	  the	  next	  section	  of	  the	  chapter,	  to	  critically	  evaluate	  supposedly	  
neutral	  state	  practices.	  Accordingly,	  it	  might	  not	  always	  be	  the	  recognition	  of	  a	  
group’s	  identity-­‐based	  rights	  that	  operates	  to	  improve	  quality	  of	  life	  and	  access	  to	  
resources	  but	  other	  distributive	  policies	  that	  relate	  to	  public	  medical	  insurance	  and	  
education,	  housing,	  unemployment	  or	  migrant	  policies.	  	  
In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  Aren	  Aizura	  has	  problematised	  several	  aspects	  of	  trans	  formal	  
recognition,	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  national	  and	  racial	  belonging.	  Departing	  from	  an	  
Australian	  context,	  Aizura	  critiques	  the	  way	  in	  which	  attributes	  of	  national	  
belonging	  and	  “‘whiteness’	  as	  a	  form	  of	  cultural	  capital”	  weigh-­‐in	  when	  discussing	  
claims	  of	  gender-­‐variant	  subjects	  (Aizura	  2006:	  289).	  Aizura’s	  contribution	  is	  of	  
unquestionable	  value	  in	  this	  historical	  moment	  as	  he	  proceeds	  to	  also	  analyse	  
transgender	  rights	  in	  relation	  to	  immigration	  law	  and	  global	  regulation	  of	  migration,	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tracing	  “the	  limits	  of	  neoliberal-­‐rights	  frameworks	  that	  produce	  gender-­‐variant	  
people	  as	  subjects	  who	  must	  perfectly	  perform	  regulatory	  procedures	  to	  gain	  
access	  to	  rights”	  (Aizura	  2012b:	  134).	  Aizura’s	  imperative	  to	  interrogate	  the	  
workings	  of	  trans	  rights	  discourses	  within	  and	  among	  modern	  states	  draws	  
connections	  between	  claims	  for	  inclusion	  as	  well	  as	  recognition	  and	  the	  shifting	  
forms	  of	  neoliberal	  politics,	  global	  political	  economy	  and	  “Western”	  nationalist	  
imaginaries	  (Aizura	  2012a;	  2012b;	  2013;	  2017).	  	  
Both	  Spade	  and	  Aizura’s	  insightful	  works	  are	  open	  to	  critical	  engagement	  to	  the	  
point	  that,	  as	  Wendy	  Brown	  too,	  they	  create	  a	  framework	  within	  which	  the	  claim	  to	  
recognition,	  to	  sheer	  legitimation	  of	  one’s	  identity	  within	  society	  is	  inextricably	  
linked	  with	  a	  queer	  political	  agenda.	  This	  can	  be	  an	  asphyxiating	  framework	  for	  a	  
few	  reasons.	  Even	  though	  I	  appreciate	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  claim	  to	  gender	  
legal	  recognition	  as	  a	  claim	  of	  a	  political	  nature,41	  that	  is	  far	  from	  conflating	  gender-­‐
crossing	  identification	  with	  radical	  anti-­‐capitalist	  politics	  or	  any	  politics	  for	  that	  
matter.	  According	  to	  Aizura	  “trans	  politics	  in	  its	  more	  trenchant	  form	  wants	  
abolition,	  an	  end	  to	  wealth,	  full	  communism,	  free	  water,	  food,	  air,	  and	  health	  care,	  
reparations,	  and	  decolonization”	  (Aizura	  2017:	  610).	  In	  the	  same	  vein,	  Spade	  
([2009]	  2015),	  throughout	  his	  analysis,	  constructs	  radical	  trans	  politics	  as	  opposed	  
to	  liberal,	  middle-­‐class,	  American	  trans	  politics	  which	  fully	  embrace	  and	  promote	  
trans	  rights	  as	  the	  solution	  to	  transphobia.	  Nonetheless,	  although	  this	  set	  of	  politics	  
does	  exist,	  Spade’s	  framework	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  take	  into	  account	  trans	  politics	  
that	  do	  not	  follow	  one	  of	  these	  two	  opposing	  lines	  or	  trans	  experiences	  that	  are	  not	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  I	  refer	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  such	  a	  process	  as	  political	  following	  Hale	  and	  Bettcher’s	  work	  that	  
have	  been	  mentioned	  in	  the	  previous	  part.	  Bettcher	  writes:	  	  
The	  point	  I’m	  pressing	  is	  that	  transsexual	  claims	  to	  belong	  to	  a	  sex	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  
metaphysically	  justified:	  they	  are	  claims	  that	  self-­‐identities	  ought	  to	  be	  definitive	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
question	  of	  sex	  membership	  and	  gendered	  treatment.	  They	  are	  therefore	  political	  in	  nature	  (Bettcher	  
2014:	  387).	  
By	  that,	  it	  is	  not	  suggested	  that	  gender	  identification	  is	  (or	  should	  be)	  equivalent	  to	  the	  intention	  of	  
articulating	  a	  political	  stance.	  Nor	  that	  trans	  people	  are	  (or	  should	  be)	  necessarily	  conceptualising	  
their	  identities	  through	  trans	  (or	  other)	  political	  frameworks.	  Nonetheless,	  as	  Hale	  puts	  it,	  the	  
decision	  on	  how	  to	  view	  gender	  identification	  claims	  and	  whether	  to	  apply	  the	  dominant	  sex/gender	  
discourse	  or	  consider	  other	  cultural	  discourses	  and	  practices	  is	  a	  political	  decision	  (Hale	  1997a:	  234).	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articulated	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  (Anglo-­‐American)	  trans	  politics	  (whether	  liberal	  or	  
radical	  or	  anything	  else).	  	  
As	  Vivian	  Namaste	  has	  pointed	  out,	  trans	  experience	  does	  not	  necessarily	  align	  with	  
LGBTI+	  political	  frames	  and	  should	  not	  be	  forced	  into	  being	  articulated	  in	  such	  a	  
strict	  political	  grammar	  (Namaste	  [2005]	  2011).	  Moreover,	  Spade’s	  analysis	  
systematically	  underplays	  the	  symbolic	  and	  social	  value	  that	  connects	  to	  the	  
granting	  of	  rights	  as	  well	  as	  the	  unpredictable	  moments	  of	  radical	  transformation	  
that	  can	  erupt	  within	  the	  most	  “conservative”	  legal	  struggles.	  Overall,	  although	  
Spade	  calls	  for	  specificity	  in	  the	  appraisal	  of	  rights	  politics,	  he	  follows	  Brown’s	  
tendency	  to	  criticise	  legal	  reform	  strategies	  and	  rights	  claims	  as	  if	  they	  were	  indeed	  
trans-­‐historical	  concepts.	  The	  strictness	  of	  their	  criticism	  fails	  to	  leave	  room	  for	  
political	  modalities	  that	  may	  use	  these	  concepts	  in	  different	  ways	  or	  towards	  
different	  directions,	  what	  Mizielińska	  calls	  “local	  flavours”	  of	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  
politics	  that	  “once	  used	  and	  defined	  in	  the	  US,	  can	  have	  different	  meanings	  and	  
produce	  (or	  not)	  different	  outcomes	  when	  transplanted	  elsewhere”	  (Mizielińska	  
[2011]	  2016:	  89).	  In	  this	  fashion,	  we	  might	  miss	  the	  pleasure	  afforded	  by	  the	  
encounter	  with	  hybrid	  political	  formations	  and	  bastard	  political	  claims	  that	  utilise	  
elements	  from	  both	  or	  neither	  of	  these	  lines.	  I	  would	  not	  suggest	  that	  there	  are	  
contexts	  within	  which	  rights	  politics	  can	  have	  a	  “happy	  ending”	  meaning	  that	  it	  can	  
bring	  by	  itself	  social	  justice	  and	  uproot	  social	  inequalities.	  Nonetheless,	  I	  gravitate	  
more	  towards	  an	  understanding	  of	  rights	  claims	  as	  open-­‐ended	  instances	  of	  a	  
political	  discourse	  and,	  for	  that	  matter,	  available	  to	  all	  sorts	  of	  uses	  and	  misuses	  
with	  varying	  results	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  generative	  of	  unexpected	  socio-­‐political	  
currents	  on	  the	  way	  to	  reaching	  those	  results.42	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42
	  This	  debate	  has	  also	  been	  enriched	  by	  the	  insights	  of	  writers	  engaging	  with	  the	  language	  of	  
gendered	  citizenship	  as	  a	  broader	  concept	  of	  relating	  to	  trans	  identities	  to	  state	  apparatuses	  (Hines	  
2007,	  2009;	  Ochoa	  2008;	  West	  2013).	  Although	  I	  do	  not	  take	  this	  theoretical	  route	  in	  this	  section,	  in	  
the	  spirit	  of	  recognising	  the	  importance	  of	  multiple	  frameworks’	  availability,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  hint	  
towards	  this	  set	  of	  valuable	  concepts.	  Specifically,	  critical	  writings	  on	  feminist,	  intimate	  and	  sexual	  
citizenship	  (Evans	  1993;	  Alexander	  1994;	  Yuval-­‐Davis	  1997;	  Berlant	  1997;	  Weeks	  1998;	  Bell	  &	  Binnie	  
2000;	  Phelan	  2001;	  Stychin	  2003)	  have	  offered	  a	  set	  of	  theoretical	  tools	  in	  order	  to	  explore	  
gendered	  notions	  of	  citizenship	  modalities.	  Complex	  conceptualisations,	  such	  as	  Aihwa	  Ong’s	  (1999)	  
“flexible	  citizenship”	  and	  Laurent	  Berlant’s	  (1997)	  “diva	  citizenship,”	  have	  claimed	  also	  instances	  of	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Paisley	  Currah,	  writing	  from	  a	  background	  of	  political	  science,	  has	  created	  
throughout	  his	  oeuvre	  a	  framework	  that	  navigates	  the	  paradoxical	  nature	  of	  trans	  
rights	  and	  aligns	  with	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  critical	  points	  mentioned	  above	  without	  entirely	  
dismissing	  rights	  claims	  and	  their	  potential	  in	  political	  praxis.	  The	  analytical	  
plasticity	  of	  such	  an	  approach	  allow	  Currah’s	  arguments	  to	  be	  more	  easily	  read	  and	  
re-­‐worked	  within	  different	  contexts	  even	  if	  they	  cannot	  be	  fully	  adaptable.	  They	  do	  
not	  dismiss	  the	  political	  and	  legal	  struggles	  of	  trans	  movements	  but	  also	  do	  not	  
necessarily	  conceptualise	  trans	  experiences	  with	  the	  terms	  of	  such	  movements	  
Following	  Namaste,	  Currah	  opposes	  the	  “widely	  held	  assumption	  in	  queer	  and	  trans	  
studies”	  that	  trans	  individuals	  necessarily	  aspire	  to	  a	  kind	  of	  gender	  revolution	  and	  
trans	  rights	  claims	  should	  be	  articulated	  in	  a	  way	  that	  destabilises	  gender	  norms	  
(Currah	  2017:	  446-­‐447).	  Instead,	  he	  argues	  for	  a	  politics	  of	  “gender	  pluralism”,	  
meaning	  that	  a	  variety	  of	  theories	  and	  perceptions	  about	  the	  meanings	  and	  
workings	  of	  sex	  and	  gender	  can	  co-­‐exist	  within	  a	  politico-­‐legal	  framework	  like	  the	  
one	  he	  suggests:	  	  
My	  argument,	  then,	  is	  that	  it	  is	  a	  mistake	  to	  assume	  the	  goals	  of	  defending	  
gender	  as	  a	  coherent	  legal	  category	  and	  disestablishing	  it	  need	  be	  
characterized	  by	  a	  zero-­‐sum	  calculus.	  Instead,	  I	  think	  the	  solution	  lies	  in	  
ensuring	  that	  the	  many,	  often	  conflicting,	  narratives	  of	  transgender	  
identity	  that	  now	  appear	  in	  social	  and	  legal	  arenas	  continue	  to	  circulate	  
and	  proliferate.	  Rather	  than	  trying	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  all	  these	  contradictory	  
accounts	  of	  sex,	  gender,	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  them,	  rather	  than	  
trying	  to	  develop	  the	  “one	  perfect	  theory”	  to	  unify	  them	  within	  the	  larger	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
radical	  political	  potential	  within	  various	  sets	  of	  practices	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  citizenship.	  In	  this	  vein,	  trans	  
claims	  to	  citizenship	  have	  been	  theorised	  within	  a	  layered	  understanding	  of	  citizenship	  containing	  
“both	  structural	  components	  (the	  law	  and	  other	  practices	  of	  citizenship,	  such	  as	  carrying	  a	  national	  
ID	  card,	  getting	  a	  birth	  certificate,	  being	  recognised	  by	  the	  state,	  and	  voting)	  and	  affective	  
components	  (feelings	  of	  belonging,	  participation,	  one's	  stance	  with	  respect	  to	  state	  recognition	  or	  
lack	  thereof”	  (Ochoa	  2008:	  156).	  Writings	  such	  as	  Ochoa’s	  (2008)	  work	  on	  Venezuelan	  “perverse	  
citizenship”,	  which	  draws	  on	  Latina	  notions	  of	  ciudadania	  sexual,	  or	  West’s	  (2013)	  understanding	  of	  
North	  American	  “transgender	  citizenship”	  within	  a	  framework	  of	  “performative	  repertoires	  of	  
citizenship,”	  work	  towards	  complicating	  the	  effects	  of	  trans	  claims	  to	  citizenship.	  That	  is,	  as	  with	  
open-­‐ended	  conceptualisations	  of	  rights	  they	  move	  beyond	  a	  rigid	  legal	  or	  political	  appraisal	  of	  such	  
notions	  and	  towards	  synthetic	  approaches	  that	  are	  informed	  by	  “the	  ways	  in	  which	  citizenship	  is	  
actually	  practised	  and	  lived	  in	  our	  movement	  through	  space	  and	  time”	  (West	  2013:	  17).	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transgender	  rights	  imaginary,	  we	  should,	  as	  a	  movement,	  be	  celebrating	  
the	  incoherencies	  between	  them	  even	  as	  we	  continue	  to	  pursue	  rights	  
claims	  by	  invoking	  particular	  constructions	  of	  gender	  definition	  (Currah	  
2009:	  256).	  	  
More	  importantly,	  Currah	  does	  not	  see	  the	  project	  of	  legal	  reform	  and	  the	  project	  
of	  challenging	  the	  state’s	  power	  to	  institute	  gender	  classification/regulation	  as	  
inherently	  incompatible	  (Currah	  1997;	  2009;	  2017).	  
(…)	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  very	  different	  goals	  of	  working	  to	  dismantle	  gender	  as	  
a	  coherent	  legal	  concept	  and	  working	  to	  expand	  gender	  to	  include	  trans	  
people	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  either-­‐or	  proposition.	  In	  fact,	  construing	  
this	  opposition	  as	  a	  divide	  between	  gender	  theorists	  and	  transgender	  rights	  
advocates	  (as	  a	  tradeoff	  between	  theoretical	  purity	  and	  political	  
expediency)	  misrepresents	  the	  broad	  scope	  of	  the	  trans	  advocacy	  actually	  
happening	  in	  the	  legal	  arena	  (Currah	  2009:	  245).	  
Indeed,	  the	  body	  of	  work	  he	  has	  created	  points	  towards	  both	  projects	  engaging	  
both	  with	  rights	  claims	  and	  policy-­‐making	  (Currah	  1997;	  Currah	  &	  Minter	  2000;	  
Currah	  &	  Spade	  2007;	  Currah	  2008a)	  as	  well	  as	  a	  critique	  of	  neoliberal	  state	  
apparatuses,	  homonationalism,	  surveillance	  practices,	  securitisation	  and,	  of	  course,	  
trans	  politics	  and	  activism	  (Currah	  2008a;	  Currah	  &	  Mulqueen	  2011;	  Currah	  2013;	  
2014;	  2017).	  More	  importantly,	  he	  manages	  to	  intertwine	  the	  two	  projects	  
engaging	  in	  analyses	  that	  support	  rights	  claims	  while	  questioning	  the	  power	  
structures	  that	  are	  the	  backdrop	  against	  which	  these	  claims	  are	  articulated	  (Currah	  
2009;	  Currah	  &	  Moore	  2009;	  Moore	  &	  Currah	  2015).43	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  Although	  Currah	  does	  not	  claim	  a	  race-­‐gender	  analogy	  in	  content,	  it	  can	  be	  suggested	  that	  he	  
works	  with	  a	  kind	  of	  epistemological	  analogy.	  He	  draws	  from	  Critical	  Race	  theorists’	  positioning	  
between	  traditional	  civil	  rights	  movements	  and	  Critical	  Legal	  Studies	  movement,	  arguing	  for	  a	  similar	  
positioning	  of	  a	  transgender	  rights	  imaginary	  that	  neither	  uncritically	  embraces	  medicalised	  
perceptions	  of	  trans	  identity	  nor	  abandons	  the	  claim	  to	  recognition	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  queer	  critique	  to	  
gender	  normativity	  and	  liberal	  politics	  (Currah	  1997;	  2009).	  In	  order	  to	  create	  an	  understanding	  of	  
how	  such	  an	  endeavour	  might	  look	  like,	  Currah	  (as	  Spade)	  turns	  to	  Critical	  Race	  theorists	  (Currah	  
1997;	  2009).	  He	  quotes	  Kimberle	  Crenshaw’s	  analysis	  of	  Plessy	  v.	  Ferguson	  (1986)	  that	  presents	  
indeed	  a	  solid	  point	  of	  departure:	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For	  example,	  Currah	  (2013)	  has	  problematised	  the	  perception	  of	  U.S.	  gay-­‐friendly	  
legislation	  as	  solely	  a	  victory,	  calling	  for	  an	  appraisal	  of	  such	  legal	  developments	  
that	  would	  be	  informed	  by	  a	  wider	  critique.	  To	  that	  end,	  he	  employs	  the	  concepts	  
of	  homonormativity	  (in	  relation	  to	  heteronormativity)	  and	  homonationalism	  to	  
ultimately	  suggest	  that	  “the	  promise	  of	  equal	  sexual	  citizenship	  in	  this	  moment	  of	  
extreme	  income	  inequality,	  of	  the	  erosion	  if	  not	  gradual	  dismantling	  of	  the	  social	  
safety	  net,	  of	  the	  ‘hyper-­‐incarceration’	  of	  the	  prison	  industrial	  complex,	  and	  of	  
record-­‐high	  rates	  of	  deportation	  is	  not	  a	  cause	  for	  celebration”	  (Currah	  2013:	  3).	  
Currah	  (2013),	  following	  Jasbir	  Puar’s	  (2007;	  2013)	  line	  of	  thought,	  relates	  the	  
granting	  of	  LGBTI+	  rights	  with	  the	  “war	  on	  terror,”	  the	  dismantling	  of	  the	  welfare	  
state	  and	  other	  mechanisms	  of	  mass	  precarisation	  of	  life.	  Yet	  he	  does	  so,	  not	  to	  
dismiss	  the	  necessity	  of	  legal	  rights,	  but	  to	  ask	  whether	  the	  legal	  normalisation	  of	  
sexual	  and	  gender	  identities	  “by	  an	  administration	  that	  assassinates	  individuals	  
through	  ‘targeted’	  extrajudicial	  killing”	  can	  be	  unproblematically	  celebrated	  as	  a	  
victory	  (Currah	  2013:	  3).	  This	  point	  will	  be	  exemplified	  in	  chapter	  eight	  wherein	  the	  
introduction	  of	  antiracist	  legislation	  by	  a	  regime	  heavily	  invested	  in	  racialised	  
violence	  is	  discussed.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  above,	  throughout	  my	  analysis,	  I	  take	  into	  account	  Currah’s	  
argument	  that	  the	  legal	  management	  of	  gender	  by	  the	  state	  might	  take	  different,	  
often	  contradicting,	  forms	  “which	  reflect	  different	  state	  projects	  -­‐	  recognition,	  
security,	  surveillance,	  distribution,	  reproduction”	  (Currah	  2013:	  5).	  An	  argument	  
that	  contributes	  not	  only	  in	  demystifying	  the	  incoherencies	  in	  gender	  regulation	  
between	  different	  state	  agents,	  but	  also	  in	  fathoming	  the	  different	  political	  
projects,	  at	  state	  or	  suprastate	  level,	  that	  might	  be	  enabled	  by	  the	  adaptation	  of	  
“progressive”	  legislation.	  This	  crucial	  point	  inspires	  and	  overarches	  my	  entire	  
analysis.	  Bringing	  Currah’s	  argument	  into	  the	  Greek	  context,	  I	  develop	  it	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
At	  issue	  were	  multiple	  dimensions	  of	  domination,	  including	  categorisation,	  the	  sign	  of	  race,	  and	  the	  
subordination	  of	  those	  so	  labelled.	  There	  were	  at	  least	  two	  targets	  for	  Plessy	  to	  challenge:	  the	  
construction	  of	  identity	  (“What	  is	  a	  Black?”),	  and	  the	  system	  of	  subordination	  based	  on	  that	  identity	  
(“Can	  Blacks	  and	  Whites	  sit	  together	  on	  a	  train?”).	  Plessy	  actually	  made	  both	  arguments,	  one	  against	  
the	  coherence	  of	  race	  as	  a	  category,	  the	  other	  against	  the	  subordination	  of	  those	  deemed	  to	  be	  Black	  
(Crenshaw	  quoted	  in	  Currah	  1997:	  1382).	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performing	  critical	  readings	  of	  different	  trans-­‐related	  legislative	  pieces	  in	  relation	  to	  
the	  historico-­‐political	  context	  that	  produced	  them	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  of	  the	  
specific	  work	  they	  perform.	  Specifically,	  in	  Part	  B	  of	  the	  thesis,	  gender	  identity	  
regulation	  (under	  different	  frameworks	  that	  existed	  before	  the	  emergence	  of	  trans	  
rights)	  is	  analysed	  in	  proximity	  to	  state	  processes	  that	  relate	  to	  standardisation,	  
citizen	  legibility	  and	  normalisation.	  Accordingly,	  in	  Part	  C	  of	  the	  thesis,	  LGBT	  and	  
especially	  trans-­‐related	  legislation	  will	  be	  appraised	  not	  solely	  regarding	  its	  
effectiveness	  and	  applicability	  but	  also	  in	  relation	  to	  different	  state	  projects	  or	  
state-­‐level	  goals	  achieved	  by	  its	  introduction.	  
In	  this	  section,	  I	  have	  reflected	  upon	  the	  formation	  of	  trans	  legal	  scholarship	  with	  a	  
focus	  on	  rights,	  situating	  it	  within	  a	  broader	  debate	  on	  the	  role	  of	  rights	  within	  a	  
neoliberal	  context.	  	  Overall,	  I	  have	  underlined	  the	  importance	  of	  an	  approach	  that	  
acknowledges	  the	  significance	  and	  open-­‐endedness	  of	  rights	  while	  engaging	  in	  a	  
critique	  of	  their	  limitations,	  paradoxes	  and	  problematic	  underpinnings.	  Although	  
this	  scholarship	  is	  crucial	  for	  legal	  studies	  of	  gender	  and	  sexuality,	  part	  of	  my	  
research	  extends	  beyond	  areas	  that	  can	  be	  effectively	  discussed	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  
(trans)	  rights,	  thus	  necessitating	  additional	  theoretical	  tools	  for	  theorising	  gender	  
identity	  regulation.	  In	  this	  vein,	  the	  next	  section	  lays	  the	  theoretical	  ground	  for	  a	  
critical	  interrogation	  of	  state-­‐level	  registration	  and	  classification	  processes	  that	  will	  
be	  particularly	  valuable	  in	  the	  second	  part	  of	  thesis,	  which	  is	  concerned	  with	  an	  era	  
pre-­‐dating	  the	  emergence	  of	  trans	  rights	  as	  a	  framework	  for	  theorising	  and	  
conceptualising	  gender	  non-­‐conforming	  experience	  in	  the	  law.	  
3.2. Civil	  Registration,	  Gender	  Classification	  	  
and	  the	  Modern	  State	  
At	  the	  bottom	  of	  sex,	  there	  is	  truth	  (Foucault	  1980:	  xi).	  
The	  present	  section	  explores	  additional	  theoretical	  tools	  that	  inform	  my	  research	  
and	  analysis.	  Later	  in	  the	  text	  (in	  chapters	  five	  and	  six),	  I	  will	  trace	  the	  
establishment	  of	  civil	  registration	  in	  Greece	  and	  analyse	  legal	  texts,	  which	  explore	  
the	  juridical	  discourse	  that	  naturalised	  sex/gender	  classification	  in	  the	  Greek	  legal	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order	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  During	  that	  era,	  which	  predates	  trans	  rights	  
theories,	  dominant	  discourses	  conceptualised	  gender	  non-­‐conforming	  experience	  
in	  the	  law	  through	  different	  frames	  such	  as	  the	  medico-­‐legal	  category	  of	  
hermaphroditism,	  which	  is	  of	  major	  historical	  importance	  for	  the	  present	  analysis	  
due	  to	  its	  adaptation	  in	  Civil	  law.	  For	  this	  purpose,	  this	  section	  takes	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  
such	  normalising	  frames	  and	  specifically	  at	  state-­‐imposed	  processes	  of	  registration	  
and	  classification.	  The	  gendered	  character	  of	  civil	  registration	  is	  problematised	  by	  
engaging	  with	  critical	  accounts	  of	  civil	  registration	  as	  a	  process	  but	  also	  by	  making	  
connections	  with	  critiques	  on	  (gender)	  classification	  systems	  and	  the	  classical	  
theories	  of	  categorisation	  they	  adhere	  to.	  Such	  pertinent	  critiques	  of	  the	  
naturalisation	  of	  gender	  categories,	  which	  is	  achieved	  through	  the	  operation	  of	  
classificatory	  systems,	  inform	  my	  analysis	  throughout	  the	  parts	  to	  follow.	  	  
3.2.a. Civil	  Registration	  as	  a	  (Gendered)	  Mode	  	  
of	  Modern	  State	  Governance	  
In	  this	  section	  of	  the	  chapter,	  I	  utilise	  the	  work	  of	  James	  C.	  Scott	  (1998)	  and	  others,	  
as	  read	  by	  trans	  theorists,	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  intricate	  connections	  between	  
sex/gender	  categories,	  state	  power	  and	  modern	  techniques	  of	  governance.	  As	  it	  will	  
be	  demonstrated,	  there	  are	  common	  (legal	  as	  well	  as	  ideological)	  threads	  
connecting	  state	  registration	  processes,	  classical	  modes	  of	  (gender)	  categorisation,	  
and	  “the	  very	  real,	  material	  effects”	  these	  concepts	  have	  on	  gender	  non-­‐normative	  
lives	  (Meadow	  2010:	  818).	  
Civil	  registration	  and	  especially	  the	  attributes	  needed	  for	  citizen	  legibility	  are	  
underpinned	  with	  cultural	  norms	  and	  expectations	  of	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  context	  they	  
are	  situated	  in.	  For	  example,	  civil	  registration	  in	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order	  did	  not	  
include	  racial	  classifications	  (as	  racial	  homogeneity	  was	  assumed	  but	  also	  devised	  
by	  the	  modern	  Greek	  state)	  but	  has	  always	  been	  concerned	  with	  recording	  religious	  
beliefs.44	  James	  C.	  Scott	  in	  his	  book	  “Seeing	  like	  a	  State”	  analyses	  a	  series	  of	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  By	  the	  the	  first	  half	  of	  20th	  century,	  the	  Greek	  State	  showed	  an	  unusually	  high	  level	  of	  ethnic	  and	  
religious	  homogeneity	  that	  amounted	  to	  a	  percentage	  of	  at	  least	  95%	  of	  the	  population	  being	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standardisation	  processes	  concerning	  nature,	  the	  city	  and	  its	  citizens	  (Scott	  1998).	  
These	  processes	  were	  instrumental	  for	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  modern	  nation-­‐state	  and	  the	  
bureaucratic	  logics	  that	  might	  be	  considered	  as	  self-­‐evident	  for	  contemporary	  
administrative	  regimes.	  Scott	  (1998)	  examines	  the	  creation	  of	  surnames,	  the	  
registration	  of	  vital	  records	  and	  other	  similar	  processes	  as	  instances	  of	  state-­‐
imposed	  simplifications.	  Such	  simplifications	  aim	  to	  erase	  the	  vast	  complexity	  of	  
people’s	  lives	  and	  classify	  them	  through	  abstraction	  and	  standardisation	  in	  order	  to	  
create	  a	  schematic	  impression	  of	  a	  homogenous	  and	  legible	  population	  (Scott	  1998:	  
81-­‐82).	  State	  simplifications	  are	  the	  means	  by	  which	  “the	  chaotic,	  disorderly,	  
constantly	  changing	  social	  reality”	  is	  reduced	  to	  a	  set	  of	  comprehensible	  schemata	  
(Scott	  1998:	  82).	  This	  enables	  data	  aggregation,	  population	  monitoring	  and	  central	  
administrative	  control,	  which	  are	  fundamental	  elements	  of	  the	  modern	  state’s	  
governance	  modes.	  
Moreover,	  these	  simplifications	  contribute	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  legible	  citizens	  that	  
can	  be	  recognised	  and	  accounted	  for	  by	  the	  decision-­‐making	  centre	  at	  any	  given	  
moment	  (Scott	  1998:	  67;	  Caplan	  2001).	  The	  project	  of	  creating	  a	  fully	  legible	  society	  
is	  a	  sine-­‐qua-­‐non	  condition	  of	  modern	  statehood	  since	  successful	  governance	  on	  a	  
large	  scale	  is	  considered	  analogous	  to	  a	  state’s	  capability	  of	  knowing	  the	  citizens	  
under	  its	  rule	  (Scott	  1998:	  67).	  This	  goal	  is	  achieved	  through	  the	  replacement	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Christian	  Orthodox	  Greek	  (Rasku	  2007:	  43).	  To	  achieve	  that,	  religion	  was	  used	  as	  the	  only	  coherent	  
criterion	  to	  classify	  a	  variety	  of	  ethnically	  and	  linguistically	  mixed	  populations	  and	  selectively	  contain	  
some	  within	  state-­‐borders.	  To	  that	  end,	  Christian	  Orthodoxy	  translated	  to	  Greek-­‐ness	  by	  official	  
standards	  (even	  if	  some	  of	  these	  populations	  did	  not	  speak	  Greek)	  and	  a	  project	  of	  nation-­‐building	  
proceeded	  along	  that	  axis.	  National	  homogeneity	  was	  constructed	  through	  forced	  population	  
movement	  (such	  as	  population	  exchanges	  foreseen	  by	  the	  Lausanne	  Treaty	  following	  the	  defeat	  of	  
the	  Greek	  army	  in	  Asia	  Minor	  in	  1922)	  as	  well	  as	  assimilation	  pressure	  to	  the	  remaining	  ethnic	  and	  
religious	  minorities	  (Rasku	  2007:	  43;	  Fokas	  2008:	  12;	  Roudometof	  2011:	  97).	  As	  Roudometof	  
explains:	  
In	  other	  words,	  up	  until	  the	  20th	  century	  Eastern	  Orthodox	  Christianity	  was	  used	  as	  the	  
principal	  criterion	  for	  inclusion	  of	  a	  person	  in	  Greece‘s	  “imagined	  community”.	  The	  cultural	  
homogenization	  of	  modern	  Greece‘s	  population	  was	  predicated	  on	  using	  membership	  in	  
Orthodox	  Christianity	  as	  a	  foundational	  category	  for	  setting	  the	  nation‘s	  cultural	  
boundaries,	  and	  therefore	  for	  defining	  “insiders”	  and	  “outsiders”	  to	  the	  nation	  (Roudometof	  
2011:	  97).	  
Specifically	  in	  civil	  registration,	  Christian	  Orthodox	  baptism	  was	  recorded	  in	  a	  seperate	  registration	  
act	  and	  until	  the	  reform	  of	  Family	  Law	  in	  1983	  it	  was	  the	  only	  route	  to	  legally	  obtain	  a	  name.	  Even	  to	  
this	  day	  many	  registration	  offices	  conflate	  baptism	  and	  name-­‐giving	  registration	  acts	  with	  very	  
confusing	  results	  and	  of	  course	  a	  structural	  tendency	  to	  erase	  everything	  beyond	  the	  Christian	  
Orthodox	  dogma	  (Tsapogas	  2017).	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local	  politics	  of	  recognition	  by	  a	  state-­‐mediated	  system,	  which	  enables	  individual	  
identification	  on	  a	  national	  level	  using	  standardised	  codes	  and	  procedures	  (Scott	  
1998:	  78).	  This	  information	  and	  its	  organisation	  into	  demographic	  data	  through	  
aggregation,	  increases	  national	  transparency,	  which	  is	  the	  level	  of	  supervision	  a	  
state	  has	  over	  who	  (citizens,	  subjects)	  and	  what	  (land,	  resources)	  exists	  within	  its	  
territory	  (Scott	  1998:	  78).	  	  
Scott	  takes	  us	  one	  step	  further	  by	  suggesting	  that	  the	  aim	  of	  state	  administration	  
and	  its	  systematic	  methods	  of	  simplification	  is	  not	  to	  merely	  describe	  but	  to	  
produce	  a	  population	  that	  possesses	  precisely	  the	  recorded	  attributes	  (Scott	  1998:	  
81-­‐82).	  Such	  a	  population	  “will	  be	  easiest	  to	  monitor,	  count,	  assess	  and	  manage”	  as	  
it	  fits	  the	  closed	  systems	  that	  have	  been	  designed	  for	  this	  purpose	  (Scott	  1998:	  82).	  
This	  “caricature	  of	  society”	  is	  imagined	  as	  the	  total	  sum	  of	  easily	  legible	  and	  
perfectly	  classifiable	  individuals,	  which	  present	  a	  neat	  segmentation	  along	  the	  axes	  
used	  by	  the	  administrative	  authorities	  to	  collect	  and	  process	  data	  (Scott	  1998:	  82).	  
In	  this	  sense,	  the	  population	  that	  is	  mapped	  as	  bearing	  certain	  characteristics	  is	  
simultaneously	  formed	  to	  have	  these	  characteristics	  since	  people’s	  daily	  experience	  
is	  understood	  through	  the	  categories	  used	  to	  describe	  it	  by	  state	  institutions	  (Scott	  
1998:	  82-­‐83).	  	  
Although	  there	  is	  a	  deterministic	  sense	  in	  this	  portrayal	  of	  populations,	  moving	  
unavoidably	  into	  a	  bureaucratic	  chokehold,	  there	  always	  exist	  ruptures	  in	  state	  
standardisation	  projects.	  Scott	  sees	  the	  attempt	  to	  create	  and	  manage	  a	  fully	  
legible	  society	  as	  “a	  project	  that	  is	  never	  fully	  realized”	  (Scott	  1998:	  80).	  Whether	  
due	  to	  technical	  difficulties	  and	  flaws	  or	  due	  to	  the	  subjects’	  resistance,	  this	  
procedure	  can	  never	  be	  seamless	  and	  finalised.	  Even	  though	  statecraft	  techniques	  
are	  becoming	  increasingly	  refined	  and	  catholic,	  it	  is	  still	  a	  somewhat	  utopian	  goal	  to	  
aspire	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  static	  and	  accurate	  mapping	  of	  the	  permanently	  shifting	  
and	  riddled-­‐with-­‐complications	  social	  reality	  (Scott	  1998:	  82).	  Nonetheless,	  the	  
stakes	  that	  such	  codifications	  of	  society	  can	  have	  in	  identity	  formation	  are	  high	  
since	  “the	  categories	  used	  by	  state	  agents	  are	  not	  merely	  means	  to	  make	  their	  
Part	  A	   	   	  Chapter	  3	  
	   81	   	  
environment	  legible;	  they	  are	  an	  authoritative	  tune	  to	  which	  most	  of	  the	  
population	  must	  dance”	  (Scott	  1998:	  83).	  	  
Accordingly,	  the	  assumption	  that	  sex/gender	  is	  obvious	  since	  birth	  and	  immutable	  
in	  time	  has	  been	  the	  basis	  of	  gender	  classification	  and	  its	  use	  to	  describe	  and	  
identify	  citizens	  within	  civil	  registration	  processes	  (Spade	  2008:	  802).	  Trans	  
literature	  has	  engaged	  with	  the	  way	  such	  processes	  work	  to	  normalise	  gender	  
categories	  -­‐	  historically	  upheld	  by	  medical	  sciences	  (and	  specifically	  sexology)	  -­‐	  and	  
their	  regulation	  by	  the	  state	  (Hale	  1998).	  Specifically,	  civil	  registration	  and	  the	  
creation	  of	  nation-­‐wide	  vital	  records	  as	  a	  state-­‐building	  process	  of	  modern	  western	  
nation-­‐states	  has	  been	  commented	  upon	  by	  trans	  theorists	  during	  the	  last	  decade	  
(Spade	  2008;	  Currah	  &	  Moore	  2009;	  Meadow	  2010;	  Moore	  &	  Currah	  2015).	  Writing	  
about	  birth	  certificates	  and	  other	  identification	  documents,	  these	  texts	  look	  to	  
earlier	  critiques	  of	  identity	  formation,	  population	  management,	  data	  collection	  and	  
state	  surveillance	  (Hacking	  1986;	  Scott	  1998;	  Bowker	  &	  Star	  1999;	  Caplan	  &	  Torpey	  
2001).45	  Furthermore,	  they	  are	  significantly	  informed	  by	  Critical	  Race	  theories	  and	  
the	  categorical	  work	  performed	  by	  “race”	  in	  terms	  of	  population	  monitoring	  and	  
management	  (Freeman	  1978;	  Crenshaw	  et	  al	  1995).	  	  
Indeed,	  reading	  Scott’s	  text	  through	  a	  critical	  trans	  lens	  allows	  us	  to	  grasp	  how	  
gender	  classification	  within	  civil	  registration	  performs	  the	  work	  of	  reinforcing	  social	  
norms	  about	  the	  character	  of	  sex/gender	  as	  a	  biological	  as	  well	  as	  a	  legal	  category	  
(Spade	  2008;	  Currah	  &	  Moore	  2009;	  Moore	  &	  Currah	  2015).	  In	  this	  procedure	  of	  
constructed	  legibility,	  civil	  registration	  acts46	  and	  birth	  certificates	  have	  a	  central	  
role	  as	  “breeder	  documents”,	  that	  is,	  as	  documents	  which	  can	  verify	  individual	  
identity	  when	  applying	  for	  other	  official	  documents	  in	  front	  of	  state	  authorities	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  Bringing	  forth	  issues	  of	  trans	  identity	  and	  embodiment	  in	  modern	  western	  states	  governed	  by	  the	  
logics	  of	  bureaucracy	  and	  security,
 
this	  debate	  is	  unfolding	  within,	  or	  in	  proximity	  with,	  the	  emerging	  
field	  of	  Feminist	  Surveillance	  Studies	  (Beauchamp	  2009;	  Currah	  &	  Mulqueen	  2011;	  Clarkson	  2014;	  
Mackenzie	  2017).	  Trans	  literature	  coming	  from	  the	  US	  has	  brought	  securitisation	  in	  focus,	  as	  is	  
expected,	  due	  to	  the	  increased	  surveillance	  and	  other	  security	  practices	  and	  legislation	  that	  followed	  
9/11	  and	  the	  “war	  on	  terror”	  (Spade	  2008;	  Beauchamp	  2009;	  Currah	  &	  Mulqueen	  2011).	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  The	  birth/marriage/death	  register	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  “registration	  act”	  (ληξιαρχική	  πράξη)	  in	  the	  
Greek	  legal	  order,	  hence	  this	  is	  the	  term	  that	  will	  be	  used	  throughout	  the	  text.	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(Currah	  &	  Moore	  2009:	  126;	  Moore	  &	  Currah	  2015:	  63).47	  It	  is	  hence	  essential	  to	  
include	  fixed	  pieces	  of	  data,	  that	  is,	  facts	  and	  attributes,	  which	  unlike	  other	  aspects	  
of	  identity,	  are	  immutable	  (Currah	  &	  Moore	  2009:	  126;	  Moore	  &	  Currah	  2015:	  63).	  	  
Including	  sex	  (or,	  later,	  gender)	  among	  this	  information	  (birthplace,	  birthdate,	  
parent’s	  names	  etc.)	  reflects	  the	  social	  expectation	  about	  the	  stability	  of	  sexual	  
identities	  (Spade	  2008:	  745;	  Moore	  &	  Currah	  2015:	  59).	  In	  the	  administrative	  
imaginary,	  thus,	  civil	  registration	  merely	  depicts	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  body	  of	  the	  
subject	  with	  its	  natural	  sex,	  its	  natural	  parents	  and	  all	  the	  other	  elements	  of	  
coherence	  that	  frame	  the	  birth	  of	  a	  legible	  citizen	  (Moore	  &	  Currah	  2015:	  62-­‐63).	  It	  
is	  in	  this	  process	  of	  registering	  and	  classifying	  citizens	  that	  the	  inevitability	  of	  (legal	  
and	  social)	  belonging	  in	  the	  used	  categories	  emerges.	  When	  these	  expectations	  are	  
not	  met,	  in	  other	  words,	  when	  the	  classification	  is	  troubled,	  the	  subjects	  have	  to	  
inhibit	  the	  space	  of	  taxonomic	  impossibility,	  thus	  living	  in	  what	  Whittle	  refers	  to	  as	  
the	  legal	  “outer	  space”	  (Whittle	  2002:	  13).	  	  
To	  understand	  how	  such	  a	  normalising	  process	  functions	  it	  is	  essential	  not	  just	  to	  
think	  critically	  about	  sex/gender	  as	  a	  category	  but	  firstly	  about	  category	  as	  a	  notion	  
in	  itself.	  Categorisation48	  as	  a	  cognitive	  activity	  has	  been	  regarded	  as	  a	  natural	  
process	  in	  Western	  thought	  for	  many	  years,	  thus	  evading	  critical	  approaches	  (Lakoff	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  According	  to	  Currah	  and	  Moore	  (2009),	  birth	  certificates	  have	  a	  dual	  function	  “as	  a	  documentary	  
record	  of	  a	  static	  historical	  fact	  and	  as	  a	  primary	  document	  authenticating	  the	  identity	  of	  a	  person”	  
(Currah	  &	  Moore	  2009:	  126).	  The	  first	  function	  concentrates	  in	  describing	  the	  birth	  history	  of	  the	  
individual	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  it	  fulfils	  the	  second	  function	  by	  creating	  a	  unique	  combination	  of	  data	  
that	  makes	  them	  fully	  identifiable	  among	  the	  general	  population	  in	  past,	  present	  and	  future.	  
48
	  The	  terms	  “categorisation”	  and	  “classification”	  are	  often	  perceived	  as	  synonymous	  even	  though	  
in	  theory	  they	  are	  not.	  That	  said,	  because	  the	  two	  processes	  feed	  into	  each	  other	  and	  often	  
understood	  as	  one,	  the	  use	  of	  both	  terms	  in	  my	  analysis	  might	  in	  some	  occasions	  overlap.	  Although	  I	  
will	  not	  engage	  in-­‐depth	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  their	  definition,	  below	  is	  a	  schematic	  distinction:	  
Categorization	  is	  the	  process	  of	  dividing	  the	  world	  into	  groups	  of	  entities	  whose	  members	  are	  in	  
some	  way	  similar	  to	  each	  other.	  Recognition	  of	  resemblance	  across	  entities	  and	  the	  subsequent	  
aggregation	  of	  like	  entities	  into	  categories	  lead	  the	  individual	  to	  discover	  order	  in	  a	  complex	  
environment	  (Jacob	  2004:	  518).	  
Classification	  as	  process	  involves	  the	  orderly	  and	  systematic	  assignment	  of	  each	  entity	  to	  one	  and	  
only	  one	  class	  within	  a	  system	  of	  mutually	  exclusive	  and	  nonoverlapping	  classes.	  This	  process	  is	  
lawful	  and	  systematic:	  lawful	  because	  it	  is	  carried	  out	  in	  accordance	  with	  an	  established	  set	  of	  
principles	  that	  governs	  the	  structure	  of	  classes	  and	  class	  relationships;	  and	  systematic	  because	  it	  
mandates	  consistent	  application	  of	  these	  principles	  
within	  the	  framework	  of	  a	  prescribed	  ordering	  of	  reality	  (Jacob	  2004:	  522).	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1987:	  6).	  According	  to	  classical	  theories	  of	  categorisation,	  categories,	  whether	  used	  
as	  scientific	  tools	  or	  just	  cognitive	  mechanisms,	  have	  clear	  and	  set	  boundaries.	  
Hence,	  “things”	  are	  inevitably	  inside	  or	  outside	  of	  these	  boundaries,	  with	  their	  
common	  properties	  constituting	  the	  content	  of	  the	  category	  in	  a	  seamless	  and	  
indisputable	  manner	  (Lakoff	  1987:	  6;	  Taylor	  2003	  [1989]:	  20-­‐21,	  Jacob	  2004:	  520).	  
These	  assumptions	  have	  been	  underpinning	  various	  disciplines	  as	  objective	  facts	  of	  
sorts	  and	  have	  remained	  unexamined	  for	  centuries	  (Lakoff	  1987:	  6).	  In	  short,	  
categorisation	  as	  a	  process	  was	  considered	  to	  spawn	  from	  the	  existing	  common	  
properties	  of	  a	  category’s	  members,	  regardless	  of	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  agent	  that	  
serves	  as	  the	  observer	  and	  classifier.	  The	  classifying	  agent	  appeared	  to	  be	  merely	  
recognising	  and	  describing	  naturally	  pre-­‐existing	  groupings	  of	  things	  (Jacob	  2004:	  
520).	  	  
An	  important	  shift	  in	  the	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  categories	  can	  be	  traced	  in	  the	  late	  
works	  of	  Ludwig	  Wittgenstein	  (1953),	  whose	  theory	  challenged	  the	  idea	  that	  
categories	  have	  set	  boundaries	  inscribed	  by	  the	  common	  properties	  of	  their	  
members	  (Lakoff	  1987:	  16).	  Instead,	  by	  studying	  specific	  categories	  as	  examples,	  
Wittgenstein	  concluded	  that	  their	  boundaries	  are	  unstable	  and	  can	  be	  expanded	  or	  
restricted	  artificially	  when	  this	  serves	  a	  particular	  purpose	  (Taylor	  2003	  [1989]:	  42-­‐
43).	  Another	  contribution	  to	  category	  theories	  by	  Wittgenstein	  was	  the	  suggestion	  
that	  the	  inner	  structure	  of	  categories	  should	  not	  be	  imagined	  as	  uniform	  but	  rather	  
as	  pertaining	  to	  members	  that	  can	  be	  considered	  more	  or	  less	  representative	  
members,	  “good	  and	  bad	  examples	  of	  a	  category”	  (Lakoff	  1987:	  17).	  Therefore,	  
members	  that	  hold	  a	  less	  central	  position	  in	  a	  category	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  find	  
themselves	  outside	  the	  boundaries	  in	  the	  case	  of	  an	  artificial	  restriction	  of	  the	  
category	  content.	  The	  end	  of	  the	  absolute	  reign	  of	  classical	  theories	  of	  
categorisation	  marks	  an	  enormous	  paradigm	  shift,	  since	  changing	  “the	  concept	  of	  
category	  itself	  is	  to	  change	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  world”	  (Lakoff	  1987:	  9).49	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  Similar	  critiques	  to	  the	  classical	  category	  theories	  have	  been	  articulated	  in	  various	  fields	  changing	  
radically	  the	  course	  of	  these	  disciplines.	  For	  example,	  J.	  L.	  Austin’s	  and	  Eleanor	  Rosch’s	  work,	  which	  
revolutionised	  the	  fields	  of	  Linguistic	  Philosophy	  and	  Cognitive	  Psychology	  accordingly	  (Lakoff	  1987:	  
17-­‐21,	  39-­‐55;	  Taylor	  2003	  [1989]:	  45-­‐48,	  50-­‐52).	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These	  critiques	  saw	  categories,	  concepts	  and	  words	  as	  instances	  of	  creation	  rather	  
than	  recognition	  or	  description	  of	  pro-­‐existing	  realities,	  thus	  allowing	  for	  a	  
problematisation	  of	  taken-­‐for-­‐granted	  categorisations	  and	  their	  effects	  (Jacob	  
2004:	  520).	   
Such	  critical	  accounts	  prove	  crucial	  when	  turning	  to	  prominent	  categories,	  which	  
are	  often	  naturalised	  and	  presented	  as	  internally	  coherent,	  historically	  stable	  and	  
apolitical	  (Spade	  2008:	  745;	  Moore	  &	  Currah	  2015:	  63).	  Not	  surprisingly,	  trans	  
scholars	  have	  underlined	  the	  necessity	  of	  critical	  interrogations	  of	  categorisation	  
processes	  and	  the	  resulting	  classification	  systems	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  social,	  
ideological	  and	  legal	  anxieties	  that	  short-­‐circuit	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  trans	  subjectivity	  
(Hale	  1998;	  Meadow	  2010).	  Indeed,	  sex/gender	  classification	  has	  been	  used	  by	  
modern	  states	  as	  an	  administrative	  process	  that	  is	  based	  on	  the	  supposedly	  natural,	  
permanent	  and	  commonsensical	  character	  of	  sex/gender	  and,	  thus,	  is	  nothing	  more	  
than	  a	  reflection	  of	  an	  evenly	  gendered	  world	  (Spade	  2008:	  746;	  Meadow	  2010;	  
Moore	  &	  Currah	  2015:62-­‐	  63).	  To	  that	  end,	  trans	  theorists	  have	  used	  critical	  
accounts	  of	  categorisation	  processes	  and	  classification	  systems50	  in	  order	  to	  
problematise	  the	  use	  of	  sex	  (and,	  later,	  gender)	  as	  a	  legal	  category	  in	  registration,	  
classification	  and	  management	  of	  populations	  by	  modern	  administration	  
mechanisms	  (Spade	  2008;	  Currah	  &	  Moore	  2009;	  Meadow	  2010;	  Moore	  &	  Currah	  
2015).	  	  
In	  this	  sense,	  trans	  writers	  underscore	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  gendered	  character	  of	  
civil	  registration	  as	  a	  way	  not	  just	  to	  describe	  but	  to	  constitute	  modern	  citizens	  and	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  The	  work	  of	  Geoffrey	  Bowker	  and	  Susan	  Leigh	  Star	  (1999)	  has	  proved	  useful	  as	  a	  basis	  to	  
problematise	  gender	  classification	  through	  the	  critical	  approach	  of	  classification	  as	  a	  process	  (Spade	  
2008:	  744-­‐746;	  Meadow	  2010).	  In	  their	  book	  Sorting	  Things	  Out,	  Bowker	  and	  Star,	  analyse	  the	  
operation	  and	  consequences	  of	  classification	  claiming	  that	  classification	  systems	  tend	  to	  be	  
considered	  neutral	  thus	  allowing	  for	  the	  invisibility	  of	  their	  normalising	  effects.	  Their	  work	  suggests	  
that	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  ethically	  evaluate	  classification	  systems,	  which,	  while	  appearing	  neutral,	  
dangerously	  impose	  their	  underlying	  ideological	  norms	  as	  a	  pro-­‐existing	  reality,	  untainted	  by	  moral	  
and	  political	  decisions	  (Bowker	  and	  Star	  1999:	  195-­‐225).	  Bowker	  and	  Star	  use	  the	  term	  
“convergence”	  to	  conceptualise	  the	  mutual	  constitution	  of	  classification	  systems	  and	  the	  things	  
classified	  (Bowker	  and	  Star	  1999:	  49).	  This	  argument	  echoes	  Scott’s	  suggestion	  of	  populations	  being	  
produced	  rather	  than	  described	  through	  their	  official	  registration	  and	  standardisation	  by	  state	  
agents	  (Scott	  1998:	  82).	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they	  include	  official	  gender	  classification	  among	  other	  classification	  systems	  that	  
represent	  themselves	  as	  expressing	  “basic	  truths	  about	  distinctions	  existing	  in	  the	  
world”	  (Spade	  2008:	  745).	  In	  this	  framework,	  Moore	  and	  Currah	  (2015),	  writing	  
about	  birth	  certificates	  that	  are	  produced	  through	  this	  process,	  point	  out	  that	  
regardless	  of	  their	  veneer	  of	  objectivity	  as	  factual	  records,	  birth	  certificates	  are	  
“inscribed	  with	  cultural	  norms	  and	  values	  exercised	  through	  legally	  certified	  social	  
relations”	  (Moore	  &	  Currah	  2015:	  62).	  Similarly,	  Meadow	  (2010)	  suggests	  that	  the	  
management	  of	  claims	  articulated	  by	  trans	  people	  “expose(s)	  the	  ways	  larger	  social	  
institutions	  impose	  expectations	  of	  gender	  coherence	  on	  individuals,	  providing	  both	  
ideological	  and	  material	  disincentives	  for	  its	  disarray”	  (Meadow	  2010:	  819).	  	  
This	  official	  documentation	  of	  legible	  citizens	  and	  the	  recognition	  it	  entails	  is	  
instrumental	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  rights	  and	  resources	  (Currah	  &	  Moore	  2009:	  116;	  
Spade	  2008;	  Meadow	  2010).	  What	  is	  drawn	  here	  is	  a	  straight	  line	  connecting	  the	  
gendered,	  racialised	  and	  otherwise	  classified	  body	  and	  its	  citizenship	  status	  with	  
state	  authority,	  social	  norms,	  and	  life-­‐resources	  (Spade	  2008).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  
the	  granting	  or	  deprivation	  of	  rights	  and	  resources	  that	  is	  connected	  to	  various	  legal	  
categories	  appears	  as	  a	  politically	  and	  ethically	  neutral	  choice,	  or	  even	  as	  not	  a	  
choice	  but	  an	  effect	  of	  the	  natural	  order	  of	  things.	  It	  is,	  thus,	  crucial	  to	  consider	  the	  
structural	  violence	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  life	  chances	  that	  await	  when	  the	  complexity	  of	  
lived	  experience	  clashes	  with	  the	  official	  representation	  of	  subjects	  as	  neatly	  
classified	  citizens.	  	  
What	  has	  been	  established	  in	  this	  section	  is	  that	  it	  is	  precisely	  civil	  registration	  and	  
the	  documentation	  it	  produces	  that	  create	  the	  crucial	  link	  between	  sexual	  anatomy,	  
legal	  subjectivity	  and	  the	  state	  (Currah	  &	  Moore	  2009:	  113-­‐114).	  That	  way,	  a	  
specific	  body	  is	  tied	  to	  a	  gender	  identity,	  a	  legal	  subject	  is	  tied	  to	  its	  gendered	  
bureaucratic	  representation	  and	  all	  this,	  hopefully,	  remains	  intact	  throughout	  the	  
citizen’s	  physical	  life,	  thus,	  not	  disturbing	  their	  comprehensible	  administrative	  
depiction.	  When	  this	  coherence	  and	  stability	  prove	  mistakenly	  assumed,	  the	  
function	  of	  civil	  registration	  acts	  and	  birth	  certificates	  is	  fundamentally	  challenged	  
creating	  legal	  anxiety.	  Indeed,	  those	  “clear”	  boundaries	  have	  been	  often	  blurred	  by	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liminal	  subjects	  who	  could	  not	  adequately	  and	  exclusively	  fit	  into	  one	  of	  the	  used	  
categories	  (Whittle	  2002).	  The	  next	  section	  explores	  some	  instrumental	  categories	  
that	  have	  been	  used	  in	  the	  face	  of	  this	  instability	  to	  maintain	  sexual	  order	  in	  the	  
law.	  	  
3.2.b. Sexology,	  Law	  and	  the	  Categories	  in-­‐between	  Categories	  
During	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  assigning	  sex	  to	  individuals	  that	  were	  troubling	  sexual	  
classification	  systems	  in	  any	  way,	  was	  largely	  a	  task	  for	  “men	  of	  medical	  sciences”	  
(Dreger	  1998;	  Whittle	  &	  Turner	  2007:	  3.12).	  Legal	  scientists,	  in	  their	  turn,	  were	  
trusted	  to	  incorporate	  the	  increasingly	  complex	  sexological	  and	  psychiatric	  
taxonomies	  in	  the	  legal	  imaginary.	  Around	  the	  cases	  of	  such	  individuals,	  medical	  
and	  legal	  truisms	  about	  the	  (im)possibilities	  of	  the	  sexes	  were	  articulated,	  debated,	  
(dis)proved	  and	  materialised.	  The	  “essence	  and	  signifiers	  of	  femalehood	  and	  
malehood”	  had	  to	  be	  analysed	  and	  agreed	  upon	  within	  and	  across	  scientific	  fields	  
through	  the	  regulation	  of	  ambiguously	  sexed	  bodies	  (Dreger	  1998:	  12).	  	  
Specifically,	  the	  “hermaphrodite”	  as	  a	  historical	  category	  is	  of	  great	  importance	  for	  
any	  legal	  study	  interrogating	  sexual	  and	  gender	  classifications	  in	  the	  law	  (Whittle	  &	  
Turner	  2007).	  Across	  different	  periods	  and	  states,	  a	  plethora	  of	  anatomies,	  sexual	  
expressions	  and	  practices	  have	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  taxonomic	  ordering	  under	  the	  
broadly	  perceived	  phenomenon	  of	  hermaphroditism	  (Mak	  2012:	  6-­‐7;	  Tzanaki	  
2018).51	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  hermaphrodite	  as	  a	  category	  is	  necessary	  to	  tell	  the	  story	  
of	  a	  variety	  of	  historical	  subjects	  scrutinised	  by	  the	  medico-­‐legal	  professionals	  in	  a	  
quest	  to	  “keep	  people	  straight”	  (Dreger	  1998:	  8).	  Although	  the	  history	  of	  the	  legal	  
status	  of	  hermaphrodites	  up	  to	  the	  eighteenth	  century	  is	  widely	  disputed,52	  it	  is	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  For	  further	  discussion	  on	  different	  aspects	  of	  what	  was	  historically	  defined	  as	  hermaphroditism	  
see	  Foucault	  1980;	  Epstein	  1990;	  Reis	  1992;	  Dreger	  1998;	  Foucault	  [1999]	  2003;	  Whittle	  &	  Turner	  
2007;	  Cleminson	  &	  Vázquez	  García	  2009;	  Mak	  2012;	  Kritsotaki	  2013;	  Tzanaki	  2018.	  
52
	  According	  to	  Foucault’s	  genealogy	  of	  hermaphroditism,	  before	  the	  seventeenth	  century,	  
hermaphrodites	  were	  persecuted	  in	  European	  legal	  orders	  as	  their	  sheer	  existence	  traversed	  the	  
natural	  and	  legal	  line	  distinguishing	  the	  two	  sexes	  (Foucault	  [1999]	  2003:	  66-­‐67).	  From	  the	  
seventeenth	  century,	  although	  these	  persecutions	  appear	  to	  cease,	  the	  disruption	  caused	  to	  the	  
natural	  and	  legal	  order	  by	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  mixture	  of	  sexes	  is	  thought	  to	  demarcate	  hermaphrodites	  
as	  monsters	  within	  the	  juridico-­‐medical	  discourse	  (Foucault	  [1999]	  2003:	  68-­‐72).	  This	  genealogy,	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rather	  commonly	  accepted	  that,	  during	  the	  eighteenth	  and	  by	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  
nineteenth	  century,	  a	  fundamental	  alteration	  in	  the	  medico-­‐legal	  view	  of	  
hermaphroditism	  occurred	  as	  is	  described	  below	  (Foucault	  1980).	  	  
Within	  Roman	  law	  tradition,	  hermaphrodites	  were	  thought	  to	  be	  members	  of	  both	  
sexes	  in	  the	  natural	  order	  but	  were	  obliged	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  sex	  that	  was	  
considered	  to	  prevail	  anatomically	  in	  order	  “to	  participate	  in	  the	  civil	  life”	  
(Cleminson	  &	  Vázquez	  García	  2009:	  56).	  Roman	  legal	  texts	  that	  engage	  with	  the	  
issue	  (such	  as	  the	  Digest	  and	  the	  Lex	  Repentudarum)	  reserved	  the	  assignment	  of	  
the	  “predominant	  sex”	  to	  midwives	  and	  doctors	  and,	  only	  if	  they	  could	  not	  reach	  a	  
decision	  beyond	  doubt,	  the	  choice	  was	  made	  by	  the	  parents	  (Cleminson	  &	  Vázquez	  
García	  2009:	  57).	  In	  that	  case,	  after	  reaching	  marriage	  age,	  the	  individuals	  were	  
allowed	  to	  make	  their	  own	  decision,	  which	  was	  never	  to	  be	  altered	  again	  under	  the	  
threat	  of	  punishment.	  This	  very	  exceptional	  procedure,	  which	  adopted	  the	  adult	  
individual’s	  choice	  was	  followed	  in	  the	  extremely	  rare	  cases	  of	  “perfect	  
hermaphrodites”	  (Cleminson	  &	  Vázquez	  García	  2009:	  57).53	  Overall,	  following	  this	  
canon,	  during	  the	  seventeenth	  century,	  the	  term	  hermaphrodite	  as	  a	  medical	  
category	  was	  used	  to	  imply	  the	  “mixture	  of	  the	  two	  sexes	  in	  a	  single	  body,”	  one	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
although	  widely	  reproduced,	  has	  been	  criticised	  as	  not	  entirely	  accurate	  (Rolker	  2014).	  As	  noted	  by	  
Alex	  Sharpe	  (2010),	  the	  genealogy	  mapped	  out	  by	  Foucault,	  even	  if	  found	  to	  be	  accurate	  for	  the	  
French	  legal	  order,	  is	  not	  necessarily	  identical	  in	  all	  European	  national	  orders,	  which	  might	  diverge	  in	  
the	  ways	  they	  have	  historically	  defined	  and	  regulated	  some	  of	  these	  concepts	  (Sharpe	  2010:	  54).	  	  
Similarly,	  Alice	  Dreger’s	  periodisation	  of	  the	  medical	  discourse	  on	  hermaphroditism	  has	  been	  
considered	  as	  being	  “hermetic”	  and	  over-­‐schematising	  by	  scholars	  writing	  within	  different	  national	  
paradigms	  (Cleminson	  &	  Vázquez	  García	  2009:	  79).	  According	  to	  Cristof	  Rolker	  (2014),	  any	  linear	  
narrative	  might	  fail	  to	  accurately	  depict	  the	  interrelation	  between	  pre-­‐modern	  discourses	  on	  
hermaphrodites.	  Nonetheless,	  he	  asserts	  that	  the	  widely	  accepted	  narrative	  of	  hermaphrodites	  
being	  persecuted	  before	  the	  seventeenth	  century	  is	  not	  backed	  up	  by	  the	  existing	  historical	  
documents	  (Rolker	  2014:	  186-­‐187).	  Through	  a	  re-­‐reading	  of	  the	  two	  cases,	  which	  have	  been	  used	  to	  
substantiate	  this	  claim,	  as	  well	  medieval	  canon	  law	  and	  Roman	  law,	  he	  calls	  into	  question	  both	  the	  
idea	  of	  such	  a	  persecution	  and	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  hermaphrodites	  as	  monsters	  in	  the	  legal	  
culture	  of	  the	  same	  period	  (Rolker	  2014).	  	  
53
	  In	  that	  sense,	  Roman	  law	  included	  elements	  of	  choice	  but,	  as	  Cleminson	  and	  Vázquez	  García	  point	  
out,	  this	  fact	  is	  occasionally	  misread	  to	  mean	  that	  hermaphrodites	  within	  the	  Roman	  law	  system	  
lived	  “in	  some	  kind	  of	  Arcadia	  whereby	  they	  could	  elect	  the	  sex	  of	  their	  choice”	  (Cleminson	  &	  
Vázquez	  García	  2009:	  56).	  In	  reality	  the	  procedure	  although	  sometimes	  unclear,	  followed	  the	  dogma	  
of	  the	  “predominant	  sex”	  -­‐as	  in	  common	  law	  systems	  as	  well	  (Greenberg	  1999:	  277;	  Whittle	  &	  
Turner	  2007:	  3.8)-­‐	  and,	  as	  already	  established,	  only	  in	  highly	  exceptional	  conditions	  included	  the	  
possibility	  of	  choice.	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which	  (the	  “predominant”)	  would	  be	  considered	  to	  override	  the	  other	  and,	  thus,	  
would	  serve	  as	  the	  official	  sex	  of	  the	  person	  (Foucault	  1980:	  viii;	  Foucault	  2003:	  68).	  
Notwithstanding,	  throughout	  the	  eighteenth	  century,	  the	  dominant	  medical	  
paradigm	  disclaimed	  the	  notion	  of	  two	  sexes	  co-­‐existing	  in	  a	  single	  body.	  It	  was	  
considered	  crucial	  to	  establish	  that	  every	  body,	  every	  person,	  has	  one	  “true”	  sex,	  
which	  might,	  in	  some	  cases,	  be	  concealed	  and	  misread	  due	  to	  anatomical	  flaws	  
pointing	  to	  the	  opposite	  sex	  (Foucault	  1980).	  Such	  an	  important	  shift	  changed	  the	  
definition	  of	  hermaphroditism	  and,	  thus,	  the	  definition	  of	  sex	  that	  governed	  the	  
regulation	  and	  management	  of	  doubtful	  sex.	  Consequently,	  both	  the	  medical	  and	  
the	  legal	  treatment	  of	  hermaphrodites	  boiled	  down	  to	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  right	  
theories	  and	  criteria	  in	  order	  to	  discover	  the	  “true”	  sex	  of	  ambiguously	  sexed	  
individuals	  (Foucault	  1980:	  viii).54	  	  
In	  legal	  terms,	  this	  new	  thesis	  translated	  into	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  juridical	  process	  of	  
assigning	  sex.	  Under	  the	  “true	  sex”	  paradigm,	  which	  does	  not	  recognise	  the	  mixture	  
of	  sexes,	  the	  law	  “had	  to	  establish	  or	  re-­‐establish	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  sexual	  
constitution	  that	  had	  not	  been	  sufficiently	  well	  recognized”	  (Foucault	  1980:	  ix).	  
Henceforth,	  the	  sex	  of	  a	  body	  is	  always	  only	  one	  in	  number	  and	  the	  task	  of	  the	  
expert	  becomes	  to	  discover	  it.	  The	  “predominant	  sex”	  of	  the	  hermaphrodite	  shifted	  
from	  being	  one	  of	  the	  two	  sexes	  co-­‐existing	  in	  the	  same	  body	  to	  being	  the	  “true	  
sex”	  that	  was	  being	  concealed	  by	  anatomical	  anomalies.	  	  
The	  twentieth	  century,	  within	  which	  the	  texts	  that	  will	  be	  analysed	  are	  mostly	  
situated,	  brought	  major	  changes	  concerning	  the	  management	  of	  doubtful	  sex	  on	  
many	  levels.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  period	  that	  cross-­‐gender	  categories,	  under	  various	  
classifications,	  become	  objects	  of	  sexological	  study	  as	  well	  as	  other	  medical	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  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  hermaphrodite	  not	  only	  escaped	  the	  realm	  of	  teratology	  (if	  we	  accept	  Foucault’s	  
genealogy	  of	  hermaphroditism),	  but	  also	  ceased	  to	  be	  considered	  real	  in	  the	  scientific	  discourse	  
(Cleminson	  &	  Vázquez	  García	  2009:	  8).	  The	  existence	  of	  “true	  hermaphrodites”	  was	  limited	  to	  very	  
specific	  cases	  where	  both	  ovarian	  and	  testicular	  tissue	  was	  present	  and	  by	  the	  dawn	  of	  the	  
nineteenth	  century,	  almost	  all	  hermaphrodites	  were	  considered	  “pseudo-­‐hermaphrodites”	  (Foucault	  
1980:	  ix;	  Cleminson	  &	  Vázquez	  García	  2009:	  85-­‐86,	  109).	  As	  Dreger	  notes,	  the	  constant	  revision	  of	  
the	  medical	  criteria	  for	  “true	  hermaphrodites”	  was	  making	  it	  increasingly	  harder	  for	  anyone	  to	  be	  
classified	  as	  such	  (Dreger	  1998:139).	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intervention	  (Prosser	  1998b;	  Prosser	  &	  Storr	  1998).	  One	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  
tools	  of	  sexology	  was	  the	  notion	  of	  “sexual	  inversion,”	  which	  was	  established	  in	  the	  
nineteenth	  century	  but	  was	  maintained	  and	  evolved	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century	  
(Prosser	  1998b).	  Foucault’s	  work	  traced	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  homosexual	  as	  a	  
category	  in	  the	  studies	  of	  sexologists	  on	  sexual	  inversion	  and	  similar	  concepts	  
during	  this	  period	  (Foucault	  1978).	  Nonetheless,	  as	  Jay	  Prosser	  (1998b)	  points	  out,	  
this	  assertion	  and	  its	  wide	  influence	  has	  led	  to	  a	  historical	  reading	  of	  sexual	  
inversion	  as	  homosexuality	  (Prosser	  1998b).	  Such	  an	  understanding	  stems	  from	  the	  
prioritisation	  of	  homosexual	  desire	  among	  the	  variety	  of	  sexual	  and	  gender	  
“anomalies”	  that	  constituted	  sexual	  inversion.	  	  
Nonetheless,	  reading	  the	  works	  of	  famous	  sexologists	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  
described	  experiences	  and	  not	  their	  theoretical	  classification	  by	  the	  authors	  reveals	  
an	  apparent	  emphasis	  on	  gender-­‐crossing	  narratives	  (Prosser	  1998b).	  These	  
narratives	  were	  retrospectively	  interpreted	  by	  theorists	  as	  gender-­‐crossing	  not	  for	  
the	  sake	  of	  gender	  identification	  but	  rather,	  as	  a	  vehicle	  for	  homosexual	  desire	  
since	  the	  desire	  for	  women	  was	  acceptable	  solely	  for	  men	  and	  vice	  versa	  (Prosser	  
1998b:	  117).	  In	  that	  sense,	  Prosser	  suggests	  that:	  
(…)	  inversion’s	  cross-­‐gendered	  paradigms	  have	  been	  considered	  the	  
“discursive	  frame”	  for	  homosexuality	  (…).	  Transgender	  has	  thus	  been	  
configured	  –	  with	  the	  emphasis	  on	  figure	  -­‐	  as	  homosexuality’s	  fictional	  
construct:	  not	  referential	  of	  actual	  transgendered	  subjects	  but	  
metaphorical	  of	  homosexuals	  falsely	  transgendered	  (Prosser	  1998b:	  116-­‐
117).	  	  
What	  is	  suggested	  here	  by	  Prosser	  is	  not	  a	  dehistorisation	  of	  the	  sexological	  work	  
on	  “sexual	  inversion”	  but	  a	  rehistorisation	  that	  takes	  into	  account	  not	  only	  the	  
gender	  categories	  that	  have	  claimed	  their	  existence	  and	  history	  in	  the	  last	  decades,	  
but	  also	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  can	  (and	  hopefully	  have)	  moved	  beyond	  a	  reading	  of	  
sexology	  which	  collapses	  “sexual	  inversion”	  into	  homosexuality	  (Prosser	  1998b:	  
117,	  127).	  Indeed,	  in	  the	  most	  influential	  works	  of	  sexology,	  the	  gender	  aspect	  of	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“inversion”	  cannot	  be	  ignored	  as	  “the	  congenital	  invert	  was	  always	  seen	  as	  a	  
hermaphrodite	  of	  a	  sort,	  even	  if	  not	  an	  anatomically	  one”	  (Dreger	  1998:	  135).	  	  	  
In	  1910,	  Magnus	  Hirschfeld	  publishes	  his	  study	  Transvestites,	  the	  subject	  of	  which	  
proved	  “pivotal	  to	  the	  discursive	  emergence	  of	  the	  transsexual”	  (Prosser	  1998b:	  
121).	  The	  term	  “transsexual”	  itself	  appeared	  in	  the	  1920s	  and	  was	  established	  by	  
the	  late	  1940s	  through	  the	  work	  of	  sexologists,	  the	  most	  prominent	  of	  which	  is	  
considered	  to	  be	  Harry	  Benjamin	  (Prosser	  1998b:	  123).	  This	  work	  relied	  upon	  
decades	  of	  studying	  gender-­‐crossing	  identification	  and	  practices	  (under	  the	  purview	  
of	  sexual	  inversion,	  moral/psychic	  hermaphroditism/bisexuality	  etc.)	  and	  drew	  from	  
earlier	  literature	  such	  as	  the	  writings	  of	  Karl	  Heinrich	  Ulrichs,	  Richard	  von	  Krafft-­‐
Ebing	  and	  Havelock	  Ellis	  (Prosser	  1998b:	  119-­‐123).	  	  
These	  new	  taxonomies,	  the	  discovery	  of	  “male	  and	  female	  hormones”	  and	  the	  new	  
medical	  technologies	  allowing	  for	  changes	  in	  the	  sexual	  embodiment55	  complicated	  
even	  further	  the	  task	  of	  jurists	  to	  interpret	  sexual	  characteristics	  and	  uphold	  
existing	  classifications	  in	  the	  law.	  If	  one	  adds	  to	  the	  evolving	  parameters	  of	  sexual	  
anatomical	  differentiation,	  sexual	  preferences,	  the	  ability	  for	  heterosexual	  
intercourse,	  the	  ability	  to	  procreate	  etc.	  it	  becomes	  evident	  that,	  during	  the	  
twentieth	  century,	  the	  interpretation	  of	  doubtful	  sex	  within	  the	  courtrooms	  
became	  a	  complex	  task	  -­‐	  a	  task	  that,	  at	  every	  step,	  posed	  a	  challenge	  to	  strict	  binary	  
sex/gender	  classifications	  along	  anatomical	  axes	  and	  social	  norms.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  
constantly	  manifesting	  inability	  of	  the	  official	  sexual	  classification	  to	  contain	  reality,	  
as	  Foucault	  noted,	  throughout	  the	  twentieth	  century	  “the	  idea	  that	  one	  must	  
indeed	  finally	  have	  a	  true	  sex	  is	  far	  from	  being	  dispelled”	  (Foucault	  1980:	  x).	  Indeed,	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  While	  for	  trans	  individuals	  the	  advances	  of	  surgical	  technologies	  were	  crucial	  in	  bringing	  new	  
possibilities	  of	  gender	  embodiment,	  for	  the	  upcoming	  generations	  of	  intersex	  people	  they	  
established	  a	  new	  terrain	  of	  medical	  disciplinary	  intervention.	  The	  introduction	  of	  genital	  
“corrective”	  surgeries	  in	  new-­‐borns	  and	  toddlers	  has	  made	  intersex	  individuals	  vulnerable	  to	  a	  level	  
of	  medical	  normalisation,	  which	  is	  structurally	  invasive	  and	  violent	  (Kessler	  1998;	  Dreger	  1998:	  119,	  
180;	  Preves	  2003:	  50,	  Mak	  2012:	  171).	  Additionally	  the	  anatomical	  “correction”	  on	  an	  early	  age	  
renders	  many	  intersex	  people	  invisible	  as	  this	  gendered	  past	  is	  kept	  secret	  often	  even	  from	  them.	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this	  notion	  of	  the	  truth,	  which	  lies	  within	  sex,	  is	  still	  very	  apparent	  in	  the	  debates	  
around	  trans	  and	  intersex	  identities,	  especially	  within	  the	  legal	  regime.56	  	  	  
As	  it	  has	  been	  established,	  a	  large	  part	  of	  the	  normative	  function	  of	  sex/gender	  
classification	  in	  the	  law	  relies	  on	  its	  commonsensical	  –	  even	  though	  constantly	  
challenged	  -­‐	  character.	  This	  will	  become	  particularly	  apparent	  in	  Part	  B,	  wherein	  
overlapping	  classifications	  and	  categorical	  conflations	  are	  studied.	  Such	  messiness	  
hints	  towards	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  oversimplifying	  schemata	  but,	  nonetheless,	  did	  not	  
affect	  the	  dominant	  conviction	  regarding	  such	  categories’	  naturalness	  and	  
coherency.	  The	  particular	  meaning	  of	  supposedly	  self-­‐evident	  concepts	  (such	  as	  
woman,	  man,	  sex/gender	  etc.)	  has	  been	  historically	  defined	  not	  by	  the	  legislator	  
but	  by	  those	  interpreting	  the	  law	  in	  every	  era.	  This	  begs	  the	  question	  of	  how	  
interpretation	  functions	  in	  such	  a	  context	  and	  what	  kind	  of	  power	  lays	  within	  it.	  The	  
next	  section	  briefly	  introduces	  a	  critical	  account	  of	  interpretation	  as	  a	  crucial	  power	  
modality	  not	  only	  over	  the	  text	  of	  the	  law	  but	  also	  over	  those	  who	  are	  governed	  by	  
the	  law.	  
3.2.c. Interpretation	  as	  an	  Instance	  of	  Power	  	  
Legal	  interpretation	  takes	  place	  in	  a	  field	  of	  pain	  and	  death.	  This	  is	  true	  in	  several	  
senses.	  Legal	  interpretive	  acts	  signal	  and	  occasion	  the	  imposition	  of	  violence	  upon	  
others	  (…)	  Interpretations	  in	  law	  also	  constitute	  justifications	  for	  violence	  which	  has	  
already	  occurred,	  or	  which	  is	  about	  to	  occur.	  When	  interpreters	  have	  finished	  their	  
work,	  they	  frequently	  leave	  behind	  victims	  whose	  lives	  have	  been	  torn	  apart	  by	  
these	  organized,	  social	  practices	  of	  violence.	  Neither	  legal	  interpretation	  nor	  the	  
violence	  it	  occasions	  may	  be	  properly	  understood	  apart	  from	  one	  another	  (Cover	  
1986:	  1601).	  
Having	  explored	  the	  workings	  of	  sex/gender	  categories	  in	  civil	  registration	  and	  legal	  
classification	   overall,	   I	   now	   procede	   to	   problematise	   the	   process	   by	   which	  
individuals	  are	  subsumed	   in	  these	  categories.	  That	   is,	   the	  process	  by	  which	   jurists	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  Especially	  in	  discussions	  that	  use	  the	  frame	  of	  fraud	  or	  the	  moral	  (that	  occasionally	  becomes	  
legal)	  obligation	  of	  disclosure	  of	  gender	  identity	  history	  (Sharpe	  2018).	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interpret	  the	  legal	  categories	  and	  their,	  usually	  unwritten,	  criteria	  in	  order	  to	  decide	  
and	  impose	  the	  position	  of	  ambiguously	  sexed/gendered	  individuals	  within	  a	  strict	  
gender	  order.	  
The	   concept	   of	   interpretation	   is	   embedded	   in	   legal	   thought	   as	   a	   necessary	   and	  
continuous	  project	  in	  any	  legal	  system.	  Throughout	  different	  periods	  and	  schools	  of	  
thought	   there	  have	  been	  various	  approaches	  to	   interpretation	  and	   its	   importance	  
for	   the	   force	   of	   law.	   Representatives	   of	   (classical)	   legal	   positivism	   have	   firmly	  
supported	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   pre-­‐interpretative	   meaning	   of	   law	   which	   can	   be	  
preserved	   through	   an	   accurate	   (preferably	   literal)	   interpretation	   of	   legal	   texts	  
(Karavokyris	   2013:	   27,	   44).	   By	   applying	   the	   “right”	   interpretative	   method,	   an	  
attempt	  is	  made	  to	  eliminate	  linguistic	  and	  other	  ambiguities	  in	  search	  for	  the	  true	  
pre-­‐interpretative	  meaning	  of	  the	  law,	  thus,	  annihilating	  the	  distance	  between	  the	  
application	   of	   the	   legal	   text	   and	   the	  will	   of	   its	   author	   (Karavokyris	   2013:	   27-­‐28).	  
These	   -­‐	   and	   various	   other	   -­‐	   different	   approaches	   aim	   to	   work	   against	   any	  
interpretative	  arbitrariness,	  which	  cannot	  be	  traced,	  through	  one	  of	  the	  commonly	  
accepted	  legal	  interpretation	  methods	  (literal,	  teleological,	  authoritative	  etc.),	  back	  
to	  the	  will	  of	  the	  legislator	  and	  the	  authority	  they	  have	  over	  the	  text	  of	  the	  law.	  	  	  
As	  poststructuralist	  theories	  of	  textual	  interpretation	  emerged	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  
Literature	  and	  Language	  Theory,	  critical	  strands	  of	  legal	  scholarship	  attempted	  to	  
incorporate	  principles	  of	  modern	  Pragmatics	  in	  legal	  thought	  challenging	  the	  
exegetical	  and	  formalist	  views	  of	  former	  approaches	  to	  legal	  language	  and	  
interpretation	  (Hutton	  2014:	  37).57	  Questioning	  the	  concept	  of	  legal	  language	  as	  
the	  expression	  of	  an	  authoritative	  agent	  who	  produces	  static,	  intentional	  and	  
unilateral	  meaning,	  allows	  for	  a	  fundamentally	  different	  view	  of	  the	  law	  overall.	  
According	  to	  Peter	  Goodrich,	  “if	  linguistics	  is	  to	  be	  of	  value	  to	  legal	  studies	  it	  will	  be	  
by	  virtue	  of	  an	  endeavour	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  study	  of	  legal	  texts	  as	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  One	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  of	  such	  connections	  is	  exploring	  the	  application	  of	  Searle	  and	  Austin’s	  
speech	  act	  theory	  (especially	  the	  concept	  of	  performativity)	  in	  legal	  theory	  and	  practise	  (Hancher	  
1980;	  Tiersma	  1986;	  Kurzon	  1986;	  Maley	  1994;	  Schane	  2006;	  Solan	  et	  al.	  2015).	  Although	  the	  area	  of	  
legal	  linguistics	  will	  not	  be	  analysed	  in	  depth	  here,	  it	  set	  the	  ground	  for	  a	  radical	  shift	  in	  legal	  
interpretation	  theories.	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communicational	  processes”	  (Goodrich	  1987:	  7).	  Indeed,	  the	  traditional	  schema	  in	  
which	  the	  power	  of	  law	  is	  structured	  upon	  on	  the	  monologic,	  top	  to	  bottom,	  
direction	  of	  the	  legal	  utterance	  is	  shaken	  to	  the	  core	  once	  placed	  in	  a	  linguistic	  
analytical	  frame	  that	  regards	  legal	  discourse	  as	  a	  communicative	  practise	  
(Karavokyris	  2013:	  53,	  Panaretou	  2009:	  61-­‐63).	  	  
Perceiving	  legal	  texts	  as	  non-­‐monologic	  utterances	  shifts	  structurally	  the	  focus	  and	  
role	  of	  legal	  interpretation.	  It	  follows	  that	  there	  is	  not	  one	  but	  two	  constitutive	  
moments	  of	  the	  law:	  its	  composition	  by	  the	  author	  (legislator)	  and	  its	  reading	  by	  
the	  interpreter	  (jurist).	  Influenced	  by	  post-­‐modern	  approaches	  to	  literature	  and	  
language,	  critical	  approaches	  to	  legal	  interpretation	  questioned	  the	  relationship	  
between	  the	  author	  and	  the	  legal	  text	  suggesting	  that	  the	  interpreters	  play	  a	  
different	  role	  than	  merely	  discovering	  the	  intentional,	  pre-­‐interpretational	  meaning	  
of	  the	  law	  (Karavokyris	  2013:	  53;	  Hutton	  2014:	  37).	  Holding	  the	  intention	  or	  the	  will	  
of	  the	  legislator	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  true	  meaning	  of	  the	  legal	  text	  reduces	  the	  
understanding	  of	  such	  a	  text	  to	  a	  matter	  of	  subjectivity,	  which	  is	  a	  rather	  limited	  
way	  of	  viewing	  any	  utterance	  (Goodrich	  1987:	  54).	  	  
If	  instability	  is	  a	  fundamental	  feature	  of	  language,	  and	  thus	  law,	  then	  “it	  is	  the	  
interpreters	  who	  give	  meaning	  to	  words”	  (Hutton	  2014:37).	  The	  detachment	  
between	  author	  and	  text	  and	  the	  liberation	  of	  the	  interpreter	  from	  the	  strict	  textual	  
ties	  should	  not	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  suggested	  plunge	  into	  relativism	  on	  the	  part	  of	  those	  
who	  endorse	  such	  an	  analysis.	  Other	  than	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  specific	  –	  
strategic,	  historical,	  political	  -­‐	  confines	  that	  draw	  the	  limits	  within	  which	  different	  
interpretative	  outcomes	  can	  been	  seen	  as	  legitimate,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  aim	  of	  such	  an	  
approach	  to	  prove	  the	  voidness	  of	  legal	  text	  (Karavokyris	  2013:	  55).	  On	  the	  
contrary,	  what	  is	  suggested	  is	  the	  density	  of	  legal	  discourse,	  this	  time	  not	  as	  a	  
closed	  objective	  system	  but	  as	  a	  social	  and	  political	  discourse.	  Placing	  the	  search	  for	  
legal	  meaning	  in	  a	  Foucauldian	  frame	  of	  power,	  Goodrich	  marks	  the	  recognition	  of	  
social	  ideologies	  within	  legal	  discourse	  as	  a	  crucial	  point	  for	  such	  a	  critical	  reading	  
of	  legal	  texts	  (Goodrich	  1987:	  78-­‐79).	  What	  this	  analysis	  suggests	  is	  that	  claiming	  
the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  law	  as	  text	  denies	  the	  fact	  that	  “political,	  moral	  or	  other	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references	  are	  considerations	  that	  play	  any	  role	  within	  semantics	  of	  legal	  validity”	  
(Goodrich	  1987:	  81).	  	  
Such	  an	  understanding	  re-­‐establishes	  the	  relationship	  between	  author	  (legislator)	  
and	  reader	  (interpreter)	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  enhances	  the	  power	  that	  lays	  within	  
interpretation.	  Especially	  in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  notions	  that	  are	  too	  obvious	  to	  
require	  an	  explicit	  definition	  in	  the	  law	  –	  which	  is	  often	  the	  case	  for	  terms	  such	  as	  
“man”,	  “woman”,	  “gender”	  etc.-­‐	  these	  underlying	  ideological	  elements	  come	  to	  
light.	  For	  example,	  the	  lack	  of	  explicit	  gender	  definition	  in	  a	  legal	  order	  does	  not	  
imply	  a	  lack	  of	  gendered	  norm58	  that	  legitimises	  -­‐	  and	  is	  legitimised	  by	  -­‐	  certain	  
kinds	  of	  interpretation.	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  being	  subsumed	  in	  gender	  categories	  in	  
the	  law,	  Whittle	  (2002)	  notes	  that	  “the	  transsexual	  faces	  the	  problem	  of	  
interpretation”	  as	  “they	  prove	  a	  problem	  to	  law,	  in	  its	  role	  as	  the	  omniscient	  
protector	  of	  truth”	  (Whittle	  2002:	  41).	  Throughout	  the	  years,	  the	  constant	  re-­‐
reading	  of	  gender	  within	  legal	  texts	  is	  part	  of	  a	  never-­‐ending	  process	  of	  negotiating	  
current	  scientific	  principles,	  social	  morals	  and	  their	  legal	  codification.	  As	  Whittle	  
suggests:	  
If	  a	  post-­‐structuralist	  framework	  is	  accepted,	  legal	  knowledge	  is	  
constructed	  through	  text;	  it	  is	  secured	  in	  language	  that	  continually	  re-­‐
examines	  it,	  alters	  it	  and	  then	  recreates	  it	  –	  like	  a	  game	  of	  Chinese	  
whispers.	  […]	  To	  apply	  the	  law	  means	  to	  place	  interpretations	  on	  the	  text	  
of	  others,	  to	  expound	  what	  is	  within	  texts	  and	  to	  overlay	  it	  into	  a	  new	  
context	  (Whittle	  2002:	  41).	  
Hence,	  the	  “givenness”	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  gender	  in	  each	  historical	  moment	  reveals	  
not	  only	  the	  inherent	  connection	  of	  law	  and	  norm	  but	  also	  power	  as	  the	  authority	  
to	  interpret	  what	  is	  self-­‐evident	  in	  the	  law	  (Karavokyris	  2013:	  26).	  In	  this	  light,	  
interpretation	  cannot	  be	  disconnected	  from	  the	  power,	  or	  the	  violence	  as	  Cover	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  Michel	  Foucault	  in	  one	  his	  1977-­‐78	  lectures	  at	  the	  College	  de	  France	  mentions	  the	  relationship	  
between	  norm	  and	  the	  law	  tracing	  it	  back	  to	  Kelsenian	  thought	  (Foucault	  2003:	  55).	  Departing	  from	  
the	  position	  that	  “every	  system	  of	  law	  is	  related	  to	  a	  system	  of	  norms,”	  Foucault	  argues	  that	  the	  law	  
refers	  to	  a	  set	  of	  norms,	  to	  which	  it	  offers	  a	  kind	  of	  codification	  (Foucault	  2003:	  55).	  
Part	  A	   	   	  Chapter	  3	  
	   95	   	  
(1986)	  suggests,	  that	  organises	  and	  determines	  meaning	  (and	  non-­‐meaning)	  within	  
a	  discourse,	  by	  embodying	  political	  and	  social	  ideologies	  (Goodrich	  1987:	  78-­‐79).	  
Through	  this	  line	  of	  arguments,	  interpretation	  has	  been	  established	  as	  a	  central	  and	  
insidious	  function	  that	  I	  will,	  thus,	  attempt	  to	  tease	  out	  and	  bring	  to	  the	  forefront	  in	  
my	  analysis	  of	  legal	  texts.	  
Closing	  this	  chapter,	  I	  have	  offered	  a	  nexus	  of	  legal	  critiques	  and	  concepts	  that	  
frame	  my	  research	  and	  analysis	  on	  gender	  identity	  and	  its	  management	  within	  the	  
Greek	  legal	  order.	  Having	  mapped	  out	  in	  detail	  the	  disciplinary	  and	  theoretical	  
environment	  of	  my	  research	  in	  the	  last	  two	  chapters,	  the	  remaining	  chapter	  of	  Part	  
A	  is	  intended	  to	  present	  the	  broader	  epistemological	  premises	  of	  my	  research	  as	  
well	  as	  its	  exact	  methodological	  route	  and	  the	  rationale	  behind	  it.
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Chapter	  4. Methodology	  	  
This	  chapter	  presents	  the	  way	  in	  which	  this	  research	  was	  conducted	  and	  the	  
rationale	  behind	  it	  that	  has	  been	  significantly	  influenced	  by	  the	  debates,	  explored	  in	  
chapter	  two,	  concerning	  the	  utilisation	  of	  trans	  identities	  in	  knowledge	  production.	  
Drawing	  from	  feminist	  debates	  on	  positionality	  and	  objectivity	  in	  knowledge	  
production,	  this	  chapter	  reflects	  on	  issues	  of	  (my)	  positionality	  in	  doing	  trans	  
research	  from	  a	  specific	  position	  and	  within	  a	  specific	  context,	  while	  trying	  to	  follow	  
an	  ethical	  method	  and	  an	  accountable	  epistemology	  (Haraway	  1998;	  Stryker	  2006;	  
Haritaworn	  2007).	  Moreover,	  it	  lays	  out	  in	  detail	  the	  different	  sources	  used	  in	  the	  
text,	  their	  approach	  in	  terms	  of	  research	  and	  analysis,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  reasons	  behind	  
these	  choices.	  	  
In	  specific,	  echoing	  the	  call	  for	  the	  composition	  of	  critical	  historiographies,	  in	  Part	  B	  
I	  use	  archival	  research	  material	  (from	  the	  Athens	  Bar	  Association	  Library	  and	  the	  
digital	  archive	  of	  the	  Hellenic	  Police	  Periodicals)	  in	  order	  to	  compose	  an	  alternative	  
genealogy	  of	  the	  legal	  frames	  concerning	  gender	  variance	  in	  the	  previous	  century.	  
Part	  C	  is	  based	  on	  contemporary	  legal	  sources	  (legislation,	  litigation,	  parliamentary	  
minutes,	  etc.)	  and	  other	  texts	  (press	  releases,	  media	  article,s	  etc.)	  which	  sketch	  out	  
the	  socio-­‐political	  contexts	  within	  which	  the	  former	  are	  situated.	  Moreover,	  Part	  C	  
is	  oriented	  not	  solely	  based	  on	  the	  dominant	  legal	  discourses	  but	  also	  based	  on	  
everyday	  aspects	  of	  trans	  legal	  realities,	  thus,	  using	  a	  set	  of	  semi-­‐structured	  
interviews.	  These	  in-­‐depth	  conversations	  enter	  the	  text	  as	  a	  parallel	  theoretical	  or	  
analytical	  lens	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  body	  of	  pre-­‐theoretical	  data.	  They	  reveal	  the	  
contradicting	  (practical,	  political	  and	  affective)	  effects	  of	  the	  legal	  concepts	  studied,	  
the	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  theoretical	  understandings	  of	  trans	  legal	  issues,	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  alternative	  legal	  realities	  that	  unfold	  within	  or	  without	  formal	  legal	  frameworks.	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4.1. Accountable	  Epistemologies:	  	  
Positionality	  in	  Knowledge	  Production	  	  	  
Epistemological	  questions	  of	  how	  knowledge	  is	  produced	  and	  what	  objectivity	  and	  
partiality	  have	  meant	  historically	  when	  doing	  research	  and	  representing	  the	  world	  
lie	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  feminist	  debates	  that	  have	  crucially	  influenced	  the	  development	  
of	  trans	  scholarship	  (Tisdell	  2012;	  Haraway	  1998;	  Stryker	  2006;	  Haritaworn	  2007).	  
This	  section	  briefly	  touches	  upon	  issues	  of	  reflexivity	  and	  positionality	  in	  research	  as	  
they	  have	  emerged	  within	  feminist	  discussions	  about	  processes	  of	  knowledge	  
production	  and	  the	  role	  of	  power	  in	  building	  epistemological	  paradigms.	  	  
Framing	  knowledge	  production	  as	  a	  site	  contested	  with	  gender	  hierarchies	  has	  
been	  one	  the	  great	  legacies	  of	  feminist	  researchers	  who,	  struggling	  with	  the	  
positivist	  understanding	  of	  objectivity,	  embraced	  the	  political	  nature	  of	  doing	  
research	  as	  well	  as	  its	  emancipatory	  potential	  (Tisdell	  2012).	  Other	  than	  challenging	  
the	  possibility	  (and	  even	  desirability)	  of	  “unbiased”	  research,	  such	  critical	  strands	  
have	  interrogated	  the	  role	  of	  experience	  in	  constructing	  knowledge,	  as	  well	  as	  
issues	  of	  the	  representation	  and	  hierarchy	  within	  scientific	  paradigms	  (Spivak	  1988;	  
Scott	  1991;	  Alcoff	  1991;	  Phoenix	  1994).	  During	  the	  1980s,	  feminist	  standpoint	  
theories	  became	  part	  of	  the	  Western	  objectivity	  debate	  suggesting	  that	  knowledge-­‐
construction	  through	  politicised	  research	  had	  a	  better	  chance	  of	  giving	  meaningful	  
accounts	  of	  the	  world	  than	  what	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  “unbiased”	  research	  (Tisdell	  
2012).	  	  
This	  claim,	  which	  re-­‐articulates	  a	  similar	  Marxist	  argument,	  theorised	  the	  desire	  for	  
transformative,	  emancipatory	  and	  accountable	  scientific	  knowledge	  that	  utilises	  the	  
expertise	  offered	  by	  standpoints	  of	  the	  subjugated	  instead	  of	  abstract,	  supposedly	  
universal	  truths	  articulated	  from	  nowhere	  specific	  (Haraway	  1988).	  The	  work	  of	  
Sandra	  Harding	  and	  others	  has	  been	  seminal	  in	  the	  development	  of	  feminist	  
standpoint	  theories	  as	  such	  (Hartsock	  1983;	  Harding	  1986,	  1991).	  Moreover,	  as	  the	  
standing	  epistemic	  paradigm	  has	  been	  as	  racist	  as	  it	  has	  been	  sexist,	  feminist	  
standpoint	  epistemologies	  were	  greatly	  informed	  by	  the	  works	  of	  feminists	  of	  
colour	  and	  their	  complex	  analyses	  regarding	  understanding	  and	  representing	  the	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world	  from	  different	  positions	  involving	  overlapping	  systemic	  oppressions	  (hooks	  
1984;	  Collins	  1986,	  1991).	  	  
Through	  these	  epistemological	  debates,	  the	  concept	  of	  positionality	  has	  emerged	  
as	  a	  tool	  to	  underline	  the	  way	  a	  researcher’s	  speaking	  position	  “(in	  terms	  of	  race,	  
nationality,	  age,	  gender,	  social	  and	  economic	  status,	  sexuality)	  may	  influence	  the	  
‘data’	  collected	  and	  thus	  the	  information	  that	  becomes	  coded	  as	  ‘knowledge’”	  
(Madge	  1993:	  293).	  In	  this	  vein,	  Donna	  Haraway	  (1988),	  furthering	  Harding’s	  
arguments,	  developed	  a	  frame	  for	  “a	  usable,	  but	  not	  innocent,	  doctrine	  of	  
objectivity”	  (Haraway	  1988:	  582).	  Haraway’s	  analysis	  calls	  for	  the	  production	  of	  
“situated	  knowledges”	  in	  a	  feminist	  version	  of	  science	  that	  counters	  universalist	  
reductionism	  with	  “partial	  perspective”	  and	  “limited	  location”	  (Haraway	  1988:	  583).	  
Using	  a	  set	  of	  visual	  metaphors,	  Haraway	  critiques	  the	  “god	  trick”	  performed	  by	  
traditional	  scientific	  methods	  in	  Western	  sciences	  wherein	  the	  researcher/scientist	  
claims	  to	  be	  nowhere	  in	  specific	  (unmarked,	  disembodied,	  unbiased)	  but,	  at	  the	  
same,	  to	  be	  able	  to	  see	  and	  comprehend	  all,	  thus	  producing	  objective	  knowledge	  
(Haraway	  1988).	  As	  Haraway	  rightfully	  points	  out,	  “knowledge	  from	  the	  point	  of	  
view	  of	  the	  unmarked	  is	  truly	  fantastic,	  distorted,	  and	  irrational”	  (Haraway	  1988:	  
587).	  On	  the	  contrary,	  in	  a	  feminist	  version	  of	  objectivity,	  better	  accounts	  of	  the	  
world	  can	  be	  produced	  through	  “elaborate	  specificity	  and	  difference	  and	  the	  loving	  
care	  people	  might	  take	  to	  learn	  how	  to	  see	  faithfully	  from	  another's	  point	  of	  view”	  
(Haraway	  1988:	  583).	  	  
The	  call	  for	  situatedness,	  partiality	  and	  careful	  positioning	  is	  not	  a	  call	  for	  relativism	  
(named	  as	  another	  “god	  trick”	  by	  Haraway)	  but	  a	  call	  for	  “embodied	  knowledges	  
and	  an	  argument	  against	  various	  forms	  of	  unlocatable,	  and	  so	  irresponsible,	  
knowledge	  claims”	  (Haraway	  1988:	  583).	  Such	  a	  feminist	  epistemology	  makes	  
visible	  end	  employs	  a	  fundamental	  interconnection	  between	  methodology,	  
research	  ethics	  and	  reflexivity	  within	  knowledge	  production.	  In	  this	  vein,	  the	  effort	  
to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  position	  of	  researcher	  and	  researched	  within	  various	  
overlapping	  power	  structures	  and	  the	  way	  it	  affects	  their	  interaction	  and	  produced	  
narratives	  has	  become	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  critical	  self-­‐reflection	  in	  research,	  not	  only	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within	  feminist	  but	  broader	  critical	  settings	  (Rose	  1997;	  Robina	  2001;	  Dowling	  2005;	  
Kobayashi	  2003;	  Nash	  2010).	  As	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  two,	  such	  issues	  have	  been	  
central	  in	  the	  formulation	  and	  development	  of	  critical	  epistemologies	  within	  trans	  
studies	  and	  are,	  thus,	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  the	  epistemological	  framework	  of	  the	  
present	  research,	  as	  will	  become	  evident	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  
Overall,	  the	  emergence	  of	  members	  of	  marginalised	  groups	  (in	  gendered,	  racial	  and	  
other	  terms)	  as	  knowing	  subjects	  placed	  questions	  of	  politics	  and	  ethics	  at	  the	  
centre	  of	  discussions	  about	  scientific	  method	  and	  dictated	  the	  reworking	  of	  the	  
dominant	  scientific	  paradigm	  from	  its	  foundation.	  That	  is,	  it	  demanded	  a	  form	  of	  
scientific	  method	  which	  holds	  that,	  although	  the	  position	  of	  the	  subjugated	  might	  
not	  be	  an	  “innocent”	  position	  (in	  the	  sense	  of	  producing	  a	  priori	  unproblematic	  
accounts),	  nonetheless,	  it	  provides	  a	  better	  chance	  of	  constructing	  knowledge	  that	  
is	  more	  meaningful,	  accountable	  and	  adequate	  to	  respond	  to	  our	  worlds’	  
multiplicity	  (Haraway	  1988:	  584).	  Nonetheless,	  even	  with	  the	  legacy	  of	  decades	  
long	  discussions,	  speaking	  for/about	  others	  in	  theory	  and	  politics	  and	  positioning	  
one’s	  self	  during	  that	  process	  has	  proved	  an	  ethically	  and	  politically	  slippery	  terrain	  
that	  demands	  constant	  renegotiation	  (Alcoff	  1991;	  Rose	  1997).	  As	  writers	  from	  
different	  locations	  within	  modern	  gendered,	  racialised	  and	  otherwise	  stratified	  
society	  have	  engaged	  in	  these	  debates,	  they	  have	  worked	  towards	  enriching	  them	  
with	  insights	  from	  different	  positions	  within	  the	  broad	  spectrum	  of	  who	  might	  be	  
considered	  to	  be	  “the	  subjugated”	  (Haraway	  1988).	  In	  this	  vein,	  the	  next	  section	  
connects	  these	  discussions	  not	  only	  with	  the	  epistemological	  imperatives	  of	  trans	  
studies	  as	  a	  field	  but	  also	  with	  the	  epistemological	  and	  ethical	  considerations	  
emerging	  in	  the	  present	  research.	  	  
4.2. Doing	  Trans	  Research	  from	  Somewhere	  Specific	  
With	  the	  debates	  discussed	  above	  in	  mind,	  I	  now	  turn	  to	  a	  consideration	  of	  the	  way	  
they	  converse	  with	  knowledge	  production	  about	  trans	  issues	  in	  general	  but	  also	  
with	  the	  present	  research	  in	  particular.	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As	  analysed	  in	  chapter	  two,	  concerns	  about	  knowledge	  production	  and	  power	  
relations	  within	  trans-­‐related	  research	  have	  been	  brought	  to	  the	  forefront	  by	  trans	  
scholars	  and	  activists	  who	  articulated	  a	  sharp	  critique	  as	  regards	  the	  
transdisciplinary	  exploitation	  of	  trans	  experience	  by	  non-­‐trans	  writers	  (Prosser	  
1998a;	  Namaste	  [2005]	  2011;	  Serano	  2007;	  Haritaworn	  2007).	  Arguably,	  it	  became	  
evident	  that	  trans-­‐related	  scholarship	  was,	  more	  often	  than	  not,	  produced	  by	  
writers	  and	  institutions	  that	  bore	  no	  connection	  to	  trans	  communities	  and	  
individuals,	  while	  the	  analyses	  of	  trans	  writers	  themselves	  were	  dismissed	  as	  
“merely”	  personal	  accounts	  (Stryker	  2008).	  Even	  within	  feminist,	  gay/lesbian	  and	  
queer	  scholarship,	  trans	  experience	  and	  subjectivity	  was	  often	  instrumentalised	  by	  
non-­‐trans	  writers	  who	  performed	  abstract	  readings	  of	  trans	  lives	  without	  adequate	  
reflection	  on	  the	  power-­‐balances	  at	  play	  and	  the	  different	  positions	  of	  individuals	  
within	  them	  (Prosser	  1998a).	  	  
For	  example,	  for	  Prosser	  and	  others,	  the	  analysis	  and	  evaluation	  of	  the	  film	  “Paris	  is	  
Burning”	  by	  Judith	  Butler	  (among	  other	  queer	  theorists)	  raised	  specific	  
methodological	  questions	  that	  touch	  upon	  the	  issues	  discussed	  above	  (Prosser	  
1998,	  Haritaworn	  2007).	  Prosser	  echoes	  bell	  hook’s	  critique	  about	  the	  masking	  of	  
the	  filmaker’s	  (white	  cis	  lesbian)	  gaze	  and	  the	  issues	  of	  power	  and	  representation	  
that	  stem	  from	  it	  (hooks	  1992;	  Prosser	  1998).	  “Livingston,”	  writes	  Prosser,	  “remains	  
omnipresent	  and	  unsituated”	  (Prosser	  1998:	  51).	  Similarly	  failing	  “to	  position	  
herself	  and	  the	  filmmaker	  to	  privileges	  around	  whiteness,	  class,	  and	  non-­‐
transness,”	  Butler	  proceeded	  to	  a	  reading	  of	  the	  film	  that	  was	  open	  to	  criticism	  for	  
a	  reductionist	  representation	  of	  working-­‐class	  trans	  women	  of	  color	  and	  for	  
disregarding	  the	  particularities	  of	  the	  articulations	  of	  their	  (racial,	  gendered,	  sexual)	  
identity	  (Haritaworn	  2007:	  2.2).	  According	  to	  Haritaworn,	  “it	  was	  her	  [Butler’s]	  
implicit	  acceptance	  of	  the	  film	  as	  an	  ethnography	  which	  presented	  the	  biggest	  
cause	  of	  concern	  for	  her	  critics”	  (Haritaworn	  2007:	  2.2).	  That	  is,	  the	  issue	  was	  
framed	  greatly	  as	  a	  methodological	  issue	  and	  more	  specifically	  one	  of	  positionality	  
concerning	  both	  the	  making	  of	  the	  film	  by	  Livingston	  and	  its	  reading	  by	  queer	  
theorists	  as	  an	  “objective	  description	  of	  minoritised	  lives”	  (Haritaworn	  2007:	  2.3).	  
Part	  A	   	   	  Chapter	  4	  
	   101	   	  
Atuned	  with	  such	  critiques,	  trans	  studies	  as	  an	  emerging	  field	  was	  largely	  organised	  
around	  the	  need	  to	  generate	  critical	  discourses	  through	  the	  mobilisation	  of	  
“(de)subjugated	  knowledges”	  (Stryker	  2006:	  12-­‐13).59	  As	  Stryker	  suggests,	  
transgender	  studies	  scholarship	  relies	  on	  the	  embodied	  knowledge	  of	  transness	  and	  
the	  intimate	  understanding	  of	  “gendered	  subjectivity	  and	  sexed	  embodiment”	  for	  
the	  articulation	  of	  critical	  commentary	  (Stryker	  2006:	  13;	  Stryker	  2008).	  
Accordingly,	  as	  trans-­‐related	  research	  has	  been	  moving	  increasingly	  away	  from	  the	  
hands	  of	  self-­‐acclaimed	  “specialists”,	  Currah	  and	  Spade	  note	  that,	  “unlike	  the	  
traditional	  research	  paradigm,	  which	  has	  been	  defined	  by	  the	  distance	  between	  the	  
researcher	  and	  his	  or	  her	  subjects,	  today’s	  new	  crop	  of	  promising	  transgender	  
researchers	  are	  firmly	  located	  within	  the	  populations	  they	  study	  –	  either	  as	  
members	  or	  as	  allies	  with	  long	  histories	  of	  involvement”	  (Currah	  &	  Spade	  2007:	  
3).60	  	  
Indeed,	  in	  the	  present	  research,	  my	  own	  personal	  attachment	  to	  trans	  individuals	  
and	  communities	  has	  been	  central	  from	  the	  very	  beginning.	  Firstly,	  the	  personal	  
involvement	  with	  trans	  individuals	  and	  the	  common	  life	  we	  have	  shared	  was	  the	  
initiative	  to	  think	  and	  write	  about	  trans	  issues	  even	  before	  this	  project	  (Kasapidou	  
2015,	  2017).	  Although	  not	  trans-­‐identified	  myself,	  I	  did	  not	  come	  into	  contact	  with	  
trans	  lives	  as	  a	  researcher.	  It	  was	  rather	  the	  other	  way	  around.	  Living	  with	  those	  
close	  to	  me	  in	  transition	  drove	  me	  to	  research	  and	  write	  about	  trans	  issues	  and	  the	  
law.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  my	  position,	  “access”	  was	  not	  a	  problem	  in	  itself,	  but	  that	  does	  
not	  imply	  that	  I	  was	  not	  still	  the	  researcher	  and	  my	  interlocutors	  the	  researched,	  
even	  if	  there	  were	  pre-­‐existing	  or	  newly	  formed	  relationships	  between	  us.	  
Furthermore,	  as	  the	  limits	  of	  friend/ally/researcher	  were	  not	  always	  clear	  -­‐
sometimes	  not	  even	  when	  standing	  on	  the	  opposite	  sides	  of	  a	  recorder	  -­‐	  I	  had	  to	  re-­‐
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  This	  term	  plays	  on	  Foucault’s	  concept	  of	  subjugated	  knowledge	  as	  a	  means	  to	  validate	  a	  “whole	  
series	  of	  knowledges	  that	  have	  been	  disqualified	  as	  nonconceptual	  knowledges,	  as	  insufficiently	  
elaborated	  knowledges,	  naïve	  knowledges,	  hierarchically	  inferior	  knowledges,	  knowledges	  that	  are	  
below	  the	  required	  level	  of	  erudition	  or	  scientificity”	  (Foucault	  quoted	  in	  Stryker	  2006:	  13).	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  Similarly,	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  researched	  have	  repeatedly	  exemplified	  the	  importance	  of	  being	  
situated	  within	  the	  communities	  one	  is	  writing	  about	  (Weston	  1991;	  Rubin	  &	  Butler	  1994).	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evaluate	  the	  meaning	  of	  this	  awkward	  new	  position	  I	  held	  within	  already	  familiar	  
settings.	  After	  careful	  consideration,	  it	  has	  become	  clear	  to	  me	  that	  this	  extra	  layer	  
of	  meaning	  remains	  (and	  probably	  will	  remain	  even	  after	  concluding	  the	  project)	  
active	  in	  my	  relationship	  with	  all	  things	  trans.	  	  
Secondly,	  apart	  from	  the	  interviews,	  the	  empirical	  aspect	  of	  this	  study	  lies	  in	  the	  
understandings	  provided	  by	  the	  location	  of	  my	  own	  lens	  as	  a	  researcher.	  That	  
means	  that	  the	  overall	  analysis	  and	  theorising	  of	  the	  project	  relies	  on	  an	  
understanding	  of	  trans	  issues	  that	  is	  afforded	  precisely	  by	  an	  intimate	  connection	  
with	  trans	  experiences.	  Legal	  research	  might	  provide	  access	  to	  policies,	  various	  
documents	  and	  even	  personal	  narratives	  through	  interviews	  but	  without	  sharing	  
trans	  lives	  and	  trans	  worlds,	  these	  sources	  provide	  very	  limited	  insights.	  In	  this	  case,	  
the	  capacity	  for	  meaningful	  interpretations	  of	  legal	  issues	  as	  real-­‐life	  instances	  
instead	  of	  formal	  scripts	  about	  how	  trans	  lives	  are	  imagined	  to	  be	  lived	  has	  been	  
afforded	  to	  me	  through	  years	  of	  personal	  engagement	  outside	  of	  the	  academic	  
context.	  That	  is,	  through	  the	  countless	  hours	  discussing	  with	  those	  close	  to	  me	  -­‐	  
over	  coffee	  and	  food	  and	  cigarettes	  and	  sex	  -­‐	  about	  aspects	  of	  their	  specific	  trans	  
reality	  in	  Greece,	  through	  the	  years	  of	  being	  active	  in	  queer	  (among	  other)	  politics	  
and	  its	  bitter-­‐sweet	  legacies,	  and	  through	  years	  of	  providing	  support	  in	  getting	  
things	  done	  against	  all	  odds.	  
On	  the	  flipside,	  interacting	  with	  varying	  trans	  experiences	  within	  the	  research-­‐
process	  pointed	  to	  the	  vast	  difference	  among	  them	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  complexity	  of	  
what	  positionality	  might	  mean	  in	  practice.	  Due	  to	  my	  own	  gender	  non-­‐conforming	  
presentation,	  I	  have	  experienced	  (sometimes	  skin-­‐on-­‐skin)	  the	  dense	  
atmosphericity	  of	  gender	  scrutiny	  and	  violence	  in	  the	  Athenian	  context	  (Carastathis	  
2018a).	  In	  some	  settings,	  this	  was	  enough	  to	  create	  a	  “we”	  that	  included	  me	  in	  the	  
spectrum	  of	  trans	  experience	  or	  placed	  me	  in	  a	  proximity	  of	  gendered	  kinship	  even	  
though	  I	  clearly	  stated	  that	  I	  do	  not	  identify	  as	  trans.	  On	  other	  occasions,	  my	  
perceived	  identity	  did	  very	  little	  or	  even	  worked	  against	  connecting	  me	  with	  the	  
context	  in	  hand.	  For	  example,	  in	  interviewing	  a	  working-­‐class	  second	  generation	  
migrant	  trans	  woman,	  my	  education,	  and	  my	  Greekness,	  as	  well	  as	  my	  apparent	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gender	  non-­‐normativity	  and	  overall	  presentation	  had	  already	  opened	  up	  a	  distance	  
between	  us	  that	  could	  not	  be	  lessened	  by	  some	  kind	  of	  supposed	  gender-­‐
transgressing	  affinity.	  This	  kind	  of	  “shifting	  positionality”	  (Haritaworn	  2007)	  
complicated	  the	  “insider/outsider”	  question	  both	  in	  my	  mind	  and	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  my	  
interlocutors.	  Research	  reflexivity,	  in	  this	  case,	  translated	  not	  only	  into	  
interrogating	  my	  position	  in	  relation	  to	  my	  interlocutors	  but	  my	  (gender)	  identity	  
and	  presentation.	  This	  might	  be	  perceived	  as	  an	  exemplary	  instance	  suggesting	  that	  
“reflexivity	  may	  be	  less	  a	  process	  of	  self-­‐discovery	  than	  of	  self-­‐construction”	  (Rose	  
1997:	  313).	  It	  also	  confirmed	  the	  common	  ground	  argument	  that	  “insider/outsider	  
status”	  significantly	  affects	  the	  route	  and	  content	  of	  a	  piece	  of	  research	  (Hines	  
2007).	  	  
Arguably,	  understanding	  the	  role	  of	  one’s	  position	  within	  a	  research	  project	  (or	  
understanding	  what	  that	  position	  is)	  does	  not	  simply	  depend	  on	  intentionality	  and,	  
moreover,	  it	  entails	  many	  contradictions,	  uncertainties	  and	  failures.	  Gillian	  Rose	  
describes	  some	  of	  the	  impossibilities	  of	  this	  process	  claiming	  rightfully	  that	  “the	  
search	  for	  positionality	  through	  transparent	  reflexivity	  is	  bound	  to	  fail”	  (Rose	  1997:	  
311).	  By	  “transparent	  reflexivity”,	  Rose	  (1997)	  refers	  to	  a	  kind	  of	  reflexivity	  that	  
claims	  to	  fully	  see	  and	  comprehend	  both	  the	  positions	  of	  researcher	  and	  
researched,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  particular	  context	  they	  are	  situated	  in.	  Indeed,	  such	  a	  
quest	  seems	  like	  a	  “god	  trick”	  itself	  and	  was	  not	  pursued	  during	  the	  present	  
research.	  My	  intention	  was	  to	  avoid	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  epistemic	  dominance	  that	  has	  
been	  thoroughly	  criticised	  by	  trans	  writers,	  while	  remaining	  aware	  that,	  in	  any	  case,	  
I	  have	  the	  last	  word	  in	  analytic	  and	  interpretive	  terms	  and	  that	  reveals	  something	  
about	  the	  power	  balance	  at	  play	  (Haritaworn	  2007).	  Moreover,	  my	  intention	  was	  to	  
make	  the	  research	  process	  visible	  and,	  thus,	  accountable,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  claim	  
responsibility	  for	  its	  failures	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  overall	  outcomes.	  
In	  practical	  terms,	  Jacob	  Hale’s	  (1997b)	  rules	  for	  non-­‐trans	  people	  writing	  about	  
trans	  people	  have	  been	  a	  valuable	  resource	  for	  making	  decisions	  concerning	  both	  
the	  methodological	  approach	  as	  well	  as	  the	  research	  ethics	  of	  this	  project.	  This	  set	  
of	  rules	  was	  published	  by	  Hale	  (1997b)	  in	  the	  context	  described	  in	  chapter	  two	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wherein	  cross-­‐gender	  identifying	  experience	  became	  a	  privileged	  terrain	  of	  
theorising	  for	  queer	  and	  other	  poststructuralist	  authors.	  Written	  in	  a	  
straightforward	  manner,	  Hale’s	  (1997b)	  rules	  can	  cultivate	  the	  impression	  on	  the	  
researcher	  that	  they	  are	  easy	  to	  grasp	  and	  apply.	  In	  reality,	  their	  content	  is	  layered	  
and	  grounded	  in	  a	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	  power	  equilibria	  embedded	  in	  the	  
fabric	  of	  gendered	  belonging,	  and	  social	  hierarchies,	  in	  addition	  to	  processes	  of	  
knowledge	  production.	  	  
Having	  read	  Hale’s	  text	  and	  reflected	  upon	  it	  several	  times	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  this	  
project,	  I	  initially	  overestimated	  the	  epistemological	  openness	  and	  the	  perceptivity	  
of	  my	  approach	  and	  considered	  them	  as	  finished	  tasks.	  This	  is	  what	  can	  be	  called	  a	  
lack	  of	  epistemic	  humility.	  Soon	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  this	  guidance,	  offered	  so	  
generously	  by	  Hale,	  is	  not	  only	  based	  on	  years	  of	  first-­‐hand	  experience	  but	  also	  
requires	  years	  of	  practice	  in	  order	  to	  be	  apprehended.	  More	  accurately,	  it	  is	  a	  
companion	  for	  a	  task	  that	  is	  never	  to	  be	  completed	  perfectly.	  For	  example,	  my	  
understanding	  of	  the	  law’s	  importance	  within	  trans	  lives	  changed	  more	  than	  once	  
due	  to	  different	  encounters	  with	  trans	  experience	  and	  had	  to	  be	  re-­‐positioned,	  as	  I	  
describe	  in	  section	  9.2,	  in	  relation	  to	  trans	  legal	  realities	  extending	  beyond	  the	  
official	  regulation	  of	  gender	  identity.	  In	  this	  vein,	  Hale’s	  (1997b)	  text	  should	  be	  read	  
not	  as	  a	  static	  sign	  that	  points	  towards	  the	  “right”	  path	  but	  as	  a	  compass	  that	  the	  
researcher	  can	  consult	  at	  any	  step	  of	  the	  way,	  allowing	  them	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  
direction	  they	  are	  heading	  and,	  if	  needed,	  re-­‐orientate.	  Overall,	  the	  space	  created	  
by	  the	  debates	  described	  in	  this	  and	  the	  previous	  chapter	  constitutes	  the	  
epistemological	  premise	  for	  the	  present	  study.	  That	  is,	  a	  space	  to	  converse	  with	  
trans	  experience	  as	  a	  set	  of	  discourses	  valuable	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  and	  indispensable	  in	  
the	  process	  of	  trans-­‐related	  theorising.	  	  
Here,	  I	  have	  briefly	  presented	  the	  broader	  epistemological	  imperatives	  that	  
underpin	  my	  position	  throughout	  the	  present	  project.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  the	  
methodological	  necessities	  of	  the	  project	  and	  my	  approach	  to	  them	  are	  broken	  
down	  and	  explained.	  	  
Part	  A	   	   	  Chapter	  4	  
	   105	   	  
4.3. Research	  and	  Analysis:	  	  
The	  Reasons,	  the	  Ways,	  The	  Sources,	  The	  Challenges	  	  	  
In	  this	  section,	  I	  present	  the	  reasons	  behind	  my	  methods	  as	  well	  as	  the	  sources	  that	  
make	  up	  the	  body	  of	  the	  research,	  that	  is,	  texts	  and	  interviews.	  Specifically,	  as	  it	  will	  
be	  explained,	  research	  purposes	  and	  the	  desire	  that	  has	  been	  described	  in	  previous	  
chapters	  to	  keep	  up	  with	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  issues	  discussed	  demanded	  the	  use	  
of	  various	  texts,	  thus	  necessitating	  different	  research	  and	  analytic	  modalities.	  
Moreover,	  in	  order	  to	  accommodate	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  legal	  framework	  that	  does	  
not	  restrict	  “the	  law	  to	  a	  state-­‐based	  practice	  of	  meaning-­‐making”,	  I	  attempted	  to	  
include	  empirical	  understandings	  of	  contemporary	  trans-­‐related	  legislation	  (West	  
2013:	  18).	  That	  is,	  through	  the	  conduction	  of	  a	  small	  number	  of	  in-­‐depth	  interviews,	  
I	  depart	  from	  a	  rigid	  understanding	  of	  official	  scripts	  towards	  a	  nuanced	  
conceptualisation	  of	  trans	  legal	  realities.	  The	  content	  of	  the	  interviews	  is	  not	  
analysed	  as	  pre-­‐theoretical	  data	  but,	  rather,	  is	  used	  as	  a	  means	  of	  analysis	  in	  order	  
to	  complicate	  and	  re-­‐read	  the	  law	  itself	  (Haritaworn	  2007;	  Carastathis	  2018b).	  To	  
that	  end,	  my	  interlocutors’	  narratives	  serve	  to	  bring	  the	  law	  to	  the	  level	  of	  everyday	  
practices	  and	  to	  reveal	  its	  contradictory	  effects	  on	  practical,	  symbolic	  (or	  even	  
affective)	  and	  political	  levels.	  In	  the	  next	  sections,	  I	  will	  explain	  the	  rationale	  behind	  
my	  methodological	  choices	  as	  well	  as	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  sources	  were	  
approached	  and	  utilised	  in	  the	  research.	  	  
4.3.a. Texts	  	  
i. Doing	  History	  
Aiming	  to	  create	  a	  legal	  genealogy	  of	  gender	  identity	  regulation	  in	  twentieth	  
century	  Greece,	  I	  was	  presented	  with	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  critically	  trace	  the	  
historicity	  of	  this	  regulation	  through	  and	  along	  past	  gender	  identification	  modes,	  
anachronistic	  medico-­‐legal	  taxonomies,	  conflicting	  judicial	  practice	  and	  hostile	  
theorising.	  Additionally,	  as	  mentioned	  in	  chapter	  two,	  temporal	  complexity,	  
synchronicity	  and	  asynchrony	  emerged	  repeatedly	  writing	  about	  a	  “contemporary	  
periphery”	  within	  theories	  and	  disciplines	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  origin	  (Mizielińska	  &	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Kulpa	  [2011]	  2016).61	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  problematisation	  of	  linear	  accounts	  of	  
history	  and	  the	  interrogation	  of	  historiographic	  modalities	  became	  an	  essential	  part	  
of	  building	  a	  critical	  research	  method.	  	  	  
Queer	  theorist	  Dimitris	  Papanikolaou	  (2018b;	  2018c)	  suggests	  a	  critical	  
historiographical	  framework	  that	  addresses	  issues	  of	  temporal	  complexity	  when	  
discussing	  gender	  and	  sexual	  variance	  in	  the	  Greek	  context.	  Papanikolaou	  (2018b;	  
2018c)	  traces	  the	  simultaneous	  and	  complimentary	  development	  of	  LGBTI+	  and	  
queer	  politics	  (as	  such)	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  century	  and	  explores	  the	  ways	  in	  
which	  the	  contemporary	  LGBT	  and	  queer	  present(s)	  relate	  to	  past	  modes	  of	  
gendered/sexual	  practices	  and	  politics.	  Moreover,	  he	  notes	  that,	  within	  the	  Greek	  
context,	  the	  progressive	  legislation	  of	  the	  last	  years	  but	  also	  the	  queer	  critique	  of	  
idenitity-­‐based	  claims	  that	  are	  happening	  simultaneously	  with	  a	  “return	  of	  the	  
undead	  homophobia”,	  as	  well	  as	  of	  racist	  and	  anti-­‐feminist	  discourses	  and	  violence	  
(Papanikolaou	  2018c:	  171).62	  Nonetheless,	  Papanikolaou	  situates	  this	  “knotted”	  
LGBT/queer	  historical	  time	  of	  Greece	  within	  a	  global	  fragmented	  tale	  of	  progress	  in	  
which	  LGBT-­‐friendly	  legislation	  and	  recognition	  are	  granted	  “yet,	  in	  a	  parallel	  
development,	  and	  often	  in	  the	  very	  same	  ‘locations’,	  homophobic,	  
ethnophallocentric	  and	  homonationalist	  apparatuses	  work	  to	  undo,	  sometimes	  in	  
spectacular	  ways,	  these	  achievements”	  (Papanikolaou	  2018c:	  170).63	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  The	  understanding	  of	  historical	  temporalities	  as	  multiple,	  fragmented	  and	  synchronous	  has	  been	  
also	  explored	  in	  various	  critical	  historiographic	  writings	  (Chakrabarty	  2000;	  Felski	  2000;	  Bastian	  
2011;	  Browne	  2014).	  These	  writings	  develop	  a	  complex	  understanding	  of	  diverse	  temporalities	  that	  
forces	  us	  to	  engage	  with	  historical	  time	  in	  terms	  of	  relationality,	  multiplicity	  and	  interconnectedness.	  
Michelle	  Bastian’s	  reading	  of	  the	  work	  of	  Gloria	  Anzaldúa	  formulates	  a	  concept	  of	  simultaneity	  that	  
leads	  to	  temporally	  complex	  modes	  of	  belonging	  and	  being-­‐together,	  which	  are	  incommensurable	  
with	  linear	  time	  (Bastian	  2011).	  Similarly,	  drawing	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Chakrabarty,	  Victoria	  Browne	  
suggests	  the	  concept	  of	  polytemporality	  that	  is	  a	  feminist	  framing	  of	  historical	  time	  as	  “composite	  
and	  internally	  complex”	  (Browne	  2014:	  31).	  	  
62
	  A	  point	  also	  briefly	  made	  by	  Alexandra	  Halkias	  (2019).	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  Here	  we	  can	  see	  clearly	  the	  way	  out	  of	  one	  of	  the	  impasses	  in	  Kulpa	  &	  Mizielińska’s	  model	  
wherein	  “Western”	  temporality	  appears	  linear	  and	  coherent,	  and	  thus	  static,	  while	  CEE	  temporality	  
in	  its	  “knottedeness”	  has	  an	  underlying	  air	  of	  exceptionalism.	  This	  exceptionalism	  not	  only	  
undermines	  the	  epistemological	  endeavour	  of	  Kulpa	  &	  Mizielińska’s	  model	  by	  failing	  to	  challenge	  
the	  linear	  historicity	  of	  “Western”	  LGBT/queer	  progress	  but	  also	  flirts	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  national	  pride	  
inherent	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  exceptionalism	  (Navickaitė	  2014).	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Accordingly,	  Papanikolaou	  examines	  recent	  attempts	  to	  produce	  LGBT/queer	  
chronologies	  that	  form	  around	  what	  are	  internationally	  considered	  as	  milestones	  in	  
LGBT	  movements	  (e.g.	  first	  official	  Pride,	  specific	  legislation	  provisions).	  Such	  
chronologies,	  claims	  Papanikolaou,	  other	  than	  creating	  the	  image	  of	  a	  linear	  and	  
unidirectional	  move	  towards	  liberation,	  also	  leave	  out	  important	  parts	  that	  formed	  
these	  political	  genealogies,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Greece,	  the	  close	  and	  complex	  
relationships	  of	  LGBT/queer	  mobilisations	  with	  radical	  feminist,	  anti-­‐racist	  and	  
other	  political	  movements.64	  More	  importantly,	  Papanikolaou	  suggests	  the	  
existence	  of	  (at	  least)	  two	  distinct	  approaches	  to	  the	  past,	  which	  not	  only	  co-­‐exist	  
but	  also	  are	  somehow	  complementary	  and	  produce	  historical	  narratives	  concerning	  
non-­‐normative	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  in	  Greece.	  He	  groups	  these	  two	  sets	  of	  
accounts	  under	  the	  names	  “we	  have	  always	  been	  queer	  (but	  without	  a	  concrete	  
sexual	  identity)”65	  and	  “there	  have	  always	  been	  homosexuals	  (but	  they	  were	  
hidden	  from	  view)”	  (Papanikolaou	  2018c:	  175).	  	  
The	  former	  develops	  around	  the	  argument	  that,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  traditional	  
homosexual	  politics	  and	  identities,	  people	  and	  communities	  in	  Greece	  found	  other	  
ways	  to	  express,	  socialise,	  have	  sex	  and	  do	  politics.66	  To	  that	  end,	  this	  way	  of	  
accounting	  for	  the	  past	  sees	  these	  practices	  as	  radical	  and	  less	  static	  than	  the	  
identity-­‐based	  model	  that	  dominated	  in	  other	  contexts	  and,	  thus,	  sees	  Greek	  non-­‐
normative	  gender	  and	  sexual	  practices	  as	  queer	  before	  the	  emergence	  of	  queer	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  For	  an	  account	  of	  the	  feminist	  and	  sexual	  political	  struggles	  of	  individuals	  in	  the	  intersections	  of	  
radical	  antiauthoritarian	  movements	  from	  the	  late	  1990s	  up	  to	  2010	  (which	  can	  be	  grouped	  as	  the	  
first	  period	  of	  queer	  politics	  in	  Greece)	  see	  Soula	  Marinoudi’s	  (2017)	  book	  “Life	  without	  me.	  
Gendered	  subjects	  in	  and	  out	  of	  movements”	  [in	  Greek].	  
65
	  This	  notion	  of	  queer	  as	  the	  past,	  as	  something	  that	  “we	  always	  have	  been”	  would	  be	  interesting	  
to	  be	  read	  along	  José	  Esteban	  Muñoz’s	  (2009)	  account	  of	  queer	  as	  something	  that	  is	  not	  here	  yet	  in	  
Cruising	  Utopia:	  The	  Then	  and	  There	  of	  Queer	  Futurity.	  I	  do	  not	  attempt	  such	  a	  reading	  here	  as	  it	  
would	  lead	  more	  towards	  the	  discussion	  about	  politics	  of	  futurity	  rather	  than	  archival	  politics	  that	  is	  
what	  I	  focus	  on	  in	  this	  section.	  	  
66
	  For	  example,	  Yannakopoulos’	  (2010;	  2016)	  ethnographic	  accounts	  of	  community-­‐specific	  male	  
(homo)sexuality,	  erotic	  desire	  and	  subjectivities	  present	  an	  alternative	  framework	  that	  goes	  beyond	  
dominant	  concepts	  of	  homosexual	  identity	  and	  (in)visibility.	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critique.67	  The	  latter	  historiographical	  project,	  analysed	  by	  Papanikolaou,	  excavates	  
identity-­‐based	  articulations	  of	  non-­‐normative	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  that	  took	  place	  
in	  the	  past	  but	  have	  since	  been	  ignored,	  undermined	  or	  distorted	  in	  the	  official	  
(meaning	  nationalist	  heteronormative)	  historical	  accounts	  (Papanikolaou	  2018c:	  
175-­‐176).	  These	  two	  modalities	  of	  looking	  to	  the	  past,	  are	  described	  by	  
Papanikolaou	  not	  only	  as	  complementary	  but	  also	  as	  deeply	  interrelated,	  as	  
haunting	  one	  another	  and	  in	  a	  schema	  wherein,	  by	  haunting	  one	  another,	  “they	  
hold	  each	  other	  in	  check”	  (Papanikolaou	  2018c:	  175).	  	  
The	  account	  of	  a	  past	  of	  gender	  and	  sexual	  fluidity	  (“we	  were	  always	  queer”)	  
where/when	  everything	  was	  possible,	  and	  desire	  and	  expression	  were	  not	  
contained	  in	  the	  rigid	  limits	  of	  identity	  is	  haunted	  (and	  probably	  enabled)	  by	  the	  
impossibility	  of	  identity-­‐based	  political	  claims.	  That	  is,	  according	  to	  Papanikolaou,	  
these	  practices	  and	  communities	  were,	  through	  violence	  and	  marginalisation,	  met	  
with	  a	  denial	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  identity-­‐based	  claims	  to	  political	  subjectivity	  or	  
some	  kind	  of	  sexual	  citizenship	  articulation	  (Papanikolaou	  2018c:	  175).	  That	  is	  not	  
to	  suggest	  that	  there	  were	  no	  sexual	  politics	  but	  that	  these	  politics,	  dared	  even	  
within	  their	  impossibility,	  were	  moments	  of	  rupture	  that	  complicate	  even	  more	  the	  
historical	  vocabulary	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  do	  justice	  to	  this	  cultural	  and	  political	  past.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  project	  that	  follows	  the	  second	  mode	  of	  doing	  history	  (“there	  
have	  always	  been	  homosexuals”)	  risks	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  “cleansed,	  white-­‐washed,	  
stable	  history	  of	  gay	  emergence”	  (Papanikolaou	  2018c:	  176).	  Unearthing	  
LGBT/queer	  identities	  in	  the	  past	  but	  ignoring	  gender	  expression	  and	  sexual	  
practices	  that	  cannot	  be	  understood	  through	  unified	  concepts	  imported	  from	  
another	  place/time	  (e.g.	  “coming	  out”,	  “visibility”,	  “transgender”)	  produces	  a	  
limited	  understanding	  of	  the	  past	  and,	  thus,	  the	  present.	  It	  produces	  an	  
LGBTI+/queer	  image	  of	  the	  past	  that	  translates	  in	  present	  political	  modalities	  that	  
cannot	  engage	  critically	  with	  the	  current	  impossibilities	  of	  political	  articulations,	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  In	  this	  model,	  I	  see	  a	  link	  with	  Kulpa	  &	  Mizielińska’s	  project	  of	  “De-­‐centring”	  wherein,	  similarly,	  
contexts	  that	  did	  not	  share	  the	  same	  path	  of	  LGBT	  identity	  politics	  are	  presented	  as	  always	  already	  
queer	  and	  are	  elevated	  as	  such	  in	  a	  romantic	  account	  of	  the	  past/present	  (Navickaitė	  2014).	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that	  is,	  with	  those	  populations	  that,	  in	  an	  “extended	  present”	  (Tsilimpounidi	  2016:	  
83)	  of	  precarity	  and	  vulnerability,	  are	  denied	  access	  to	  political	  subjectivity.	  	  
Conversely,	  Papanikolaou	  finds	  that	  both	  lines	  should	  be	  interwoven	  within	  radical	  
historiographical	  projects	  concerning	  non-­‐normative	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  in	  
Greece.	  Given	  the	  stiffness	  of	  the	  legal	  field,	  transferring	  such	  analyses	  from	  other	  
fields	  might	  not	  be	  easy	  but	  I	  hold	  that	  it	  is	  essential.	  Utilising	  such	  an	  
understanding	  of	  the	  role	  of	  different	  historiographical	  frameworks,	  the	  next	  
section	  explains	  the	  way	  in	  which	  I	  have	  attempted	  to	  construct	  a	  critical	  genealogy	  
of	  the	  legal	  management	  of	  gender	  identity	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  cross-­‐gender	  
identification.	  That	  is,	  an	  approach	  to	  this	  legal	  management	  that	  goes	  beyond	  a	  
succession	  of	  legislative	  landmarks	  and,	  in	  this	  way,	  complements	  the	  emerging	  
Greek	  scholarship	  on	  trans	  legal	  issues.	  	  	  
ii. A	  Fragmented	  Archive	  of	  Gender	  Regulation	  
In	  this	  section,	  I	  describe	  the	  methods	  used	  to	  organise	  a	  legal	  genealogy	  of	  gender	  
identity	  regulation	  (Part	  B)	  and	  the	  rationale	  behind	  them.	  The	  complementary	  way	  
this	  critical	  archive	  functions	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  unidirectional	  legal	  scholarship	  on	  
trans	  issues	  in	  Greece	  suggests	  that	  it	  constitutes	  a	  significant	  contribution	  of	  the	  
present	  research	  to	  a	  currently	  emerging	  body	  of	  literature.	  	  
During	  the	  last	  couple	  of	  years,	  the	  concept	  of	  gender	  identity	  became	  a	  focus-­‐
point	  for	  legal	  scholars	  and	  advocates	  in	  Greece	  overnight	  (Chamtzoudis	  2015;	  
Theofilopoulos	  2016;	  Kotzabasi	  2017;	  Kounougeri-­‐Manoledaki	  2017a;	  2017b;	  Leleki	  
2017;	  Pantelidou	  2018;	  Papadopoulou	  2017;	  2018;	  Peraki	  2017;	  Fountedaki	  2017;	  	  
Kaiafa-­‐Gbadi	  et	  al	  (eds.)	  2018;	  Tsirou	  2019).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  difficult	  task	  
undertaken	  by	  those	  advocating	  for	  legal	  reform	  required	  very	  specific	  frames	  i.e.	  
legible	  frames	  of	  trans	  rights	  frames	  with	  supranational	  recognition	  (Papazisi	  2000;	  
2016;	  ILGA	  &	  OLKE	  2013;	  Theofilopoulos	  2015a;	  GNCHR	  2015;	  Galanou	  2016).	  Using	  
these	  frames	  has	  the	  undeniable	  value	  of	  intelligibility	  in	  (inter)national	  legal	  arenas	  
where,	  indeed,	  it	  has	  furthered	  claims	  of	  contemporary	  trans	  communities	  at	  an	  
accelerated	  pace	  (Papadopoulou	  2018).	  This	  line	  of	  engagement,	  nonetheless,	  looks	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to	  the	  legal	  past	  mainly	  in	  order	  to	  create	  chronologies	  that	  make	  sense	  in	  
international	  legal	  terms	  while	  mapping	  out	  linear	  tales	  of	  progress	  and	  successful	  
lobbying.	  In	  this	  procedure,	  an	  alternative	  legal	  historiographical	  project	  is	  missing,	  
haunting	  the	  emerging	  scholarship	  on	  trans	  issues	  only	  by	  its	  absence.	  More	  
specifically,	  I	  suggest	  that	  a	  lot	  is	  lost	  in	  the	  process	  of	  cataloguing	  only	  the	  useful	  
parts	  of	  the	  legal	  past	  and	  ignoring	  the	  rest.	  This	  way,	  stories	  of	  cross-­‐gender	  
experience	  that	  do	  not	  correspond	  with	  the	  contemporary	  legal	  concept	  of	  gender	  
identity	  remain	  unclaimed	  historical	  instances.	  	  
With	  that	  in	  mind,	  I	  have	  mobilised	  Papanikolaou’s	  (2018b;	  2018c)	  insights	  on	  the	  
need	  for	  critically	  engaged	  archives	  and	  attempted	  to	  fertilise	  contemporary	  legal	  
trans	  frames	  in	  Greece	  with	  the	  haunting	  presence	  of	  a	  τρανς	  legal	  history	  of	  the	  
twentieth	  century	  that	  works	  complementary,	  almost	  reparatively,	  to	  the	  one	  
described	  above.	  To	  that	  end,	  I	  organise	  a	  legal	  genealogy	  that	  studies	  the	  
regulation	  of	  gender	  identity	  beyond	  frames	  of	  current	  legibility	  following	  the	  
winding	  paths	  of	  past	  modes	  of	  gender	  belonging	  and	  state	  power.	  By	  this	  gesture,	  
instead	  of	  assuming	  linearity	  and	  coherence	  within	  the	  evolution	  of	  gender	  identity	  
management,	  I	  draw	  different	  connections	  among	  medico-­‐legal	  taxonomies,	  
ideological	  apparatuses,	  legal	  theories	  and	  judicial	  practice.	  In	  this	  process	  there	  are	  
many	  “inconsistencies”	  that	  create	  a	  chaotic	  nexus	  of	  different	  pasts	  marching	  
towards	  what	  is,	  on	  paper,	  a	  unified	  legal	  present,	  that	  is,	  the	  framework	  of	  
contemporary	  trans	  rights.	  	  
What	  drove	  me	  to	  undertake	  this	  research	  task	  was	  the	  understanding	  that,	  
without	  a	  genealogy	  of	  gender	  identity	  in	  the	  law,	  which	  makes	  some	  less	  obvious	  
connections,	  we	  are	  left	  with	  the	  impression	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  past	  entanglements	  
between	  trans	  people	  and	  the	  law.	  For	  example,	  a	  2007	  FRA	  legal	  study	  about	  
discrimination	  on	  grounds	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  in	  Greece	  stated	  that	  “trans	  people	  
under	  the	  Greek	  legal	  system	  are	  a	  non-­‐issue,	  since	  there	  is	  not	  a	  single	  legal	  text	  or	  
judicial	  decision	  dealing	  with	  them”	  (Hatzopoulos	  2007:	  [13]).	  The	  author	  
continues:	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Trans	  people	  under	  the	  Greek	  legal	  system	  are	  not	  specifically	  legislated	  
upon.	  A	  research	  in	  the	  electronic	  legal	  databases	  using	  the	  words	  
‘transgender’	  or	  ‘transexual’	  gives	  no	  hits,	  but	  for	  the	  occasional	  reference	  
to	  extra-­‐conjugal	  relationships	  in	  the	  course	  of	  divorce	  and	  child	  custody	  
proceedings.	  Not	  a	  single	  presidential	  decree	  or	  ministerial	  decision	  has	  
ever	  been	  issued	  concerning	  the	  status	  of	  trans	  people.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  
whether	  trans	  people	  are	  covered	  by	  legislation	  prohibiting	  discrimination	  
on	  the	  basis	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  or	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  sex.	  What	  seems	  
certain,	  however,	  is	  that	  no	  judicial	  or	  other	  equality	  body	  decision	  has	  ever	  
been	  issued	  concerning	  trans	  issues	  (Hatzopoulos	  2007:	  [67]).	  	  
Although	  this	  might	  be	  a	  useful	  strategic	  choice	  within	  legal	  lobbying	  in	  order	  to	  
prove	  the	  lack	  of	  an	  antidiscrimination	  framework,	  it	  disenables	  an	  understanding	  
of	  the	  historicity	  of	  trans	  engagement	  with	  the	  law.	  To	  be	  exact,	  since,	  as	  will	  be	  
described	  in	  Part	  C	  (chapters	  seven,	  eight	  and	  nine),	  trans	  legal	  protection	  as	  such	  is	  
a	  very	  recent	  concept	  in	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order,	  the	  text	  above	  is	  indeed	  accurate	  in	  
letter.	  Nonetheless,	  an	  abundance	  of	  texts	  that	  is	  analysed	  in	  Part	  B	  (chapters	  five	  
and	  six)	  reveal	  that	  gender	  variance	  and	  specifically	  cross-­‐gender	  identification,	  in	  
its	  historically	  shifting	  taxonomies,	  is	  far	  from	  being	  described	  as	  a	  “non-­‐issue”	  for	  
the	  Greek	  law.	  	  
The	  epistemological	  endeavour	  described	  above	  translated	  into	  a	  series	  of	  
methodological	  choices	  within	  my	  research	  into	  documents	  and	  archives	  of	  the	  
20th	  century.	  The	  research	  took	  place	  mainly	  at	  the	  Library	  of	  the	  Athens	  Bar	  
Association.	  The	  first	  choice	  of	  major	  importance	  was	  to	  look	  beyond	  current	  
understandings	  of	  transness	  into	  gender	  identifications	  that,	  although	  they	  might	  
be	  considered	  anachronistic	  in	  today’s	  trans	  identification	  terms,	  have	  deeply	  
influenced	  their	  development.	  Even	  though	  contemporary	  conceptualisations	  of	  
homosexuality,	  intersexuality	  and	  gender	  variance	  demand	  a	  distinct	  framing	  of	  
these	  issues	  in	  the	  legal,	  medical	  and	  political	  arena,	  it	  has	  been	  established	  by	  
authors	  in	  different	  fields	  that	  gender	  identity	  and	  sexuality	  have	  been	  historically	  
organised	  and	  managed	  under	  different	  taxonomies	  than	  the	  currently	  existing	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ones	  (Kritsotaki	  2013;	  Tzanaki	  2018).	  I	  consider	  it	  crucial	  to	  bear	  in	  mind	  that	  the	  
criteria	  of	  such	  classifications	  are	  always	  shifting,	  thus,	  altering	  the	  borders	  among	  
and	  within	  such	  categories	  in	  time	  (Dreger	  1998;	  Halberstam	  1998a).	  Moreover,	  
although	  currently	  intersex	  issues	  are	  struggling	  to	  be	  sufficiently	  represented	  in	  
the	  LGBTQI+	  agenda	  and	  legislation,	  in	  the	  previous	  century,	  at	  least	  in	  a	  national	  
context,	  trans	  issues	  have	  stowed	  away	  within	  the	  management	  of	  
“hermaphroditism,”	  which	  is	  understood	  as	  the	  problematic	  precursor	  of	  
intersexuality	  (Dreger	  1998;	  Kritsotaki	  2013).	  In	  this	  sense,	  drawing	  a	  straight	  line	  
from	  the	  concept	  of	  “hermaphroditism”	  to	  today’s	  meaning	  of	  intersexuality	  misses	  
out	  a	  variety	  of	  experiences	  that	  might	  fall	  under	  the	  purview	  of	  trans	  identity	  
today	  (if	  such	  a	  “translation”	  is	  absolutely	  necessary).	  
For	  this	  reason,	  during	  my	  research	  in	  legal	  journals68	  and	  databases	  of	  the	  Athens	  
Bar	  Association	  I	  used	  not	  only	  the	  Greek	  equivalent	  terms	  for	  “transgender”	  
(διεμφυλική/ός)	  and	  “transsexual”	  (διαφυλική/ός,	  τρανσέξουαλ)	  as	  keywords	  but	  
also	  “travesti”	  (τραβεστί),	  “hermaphrodite”	  (ερμαφρόδιτος),	  
“pseudohermaphrodite”	  (ψευδο-­‐ερμαφρόδιτος/ψευδερμαφρόδιτος),	  “sex	  change”	  
(αλλαγή	  φύλου),	  and	  “homosexual”	  (ομοφυλόφιλος)	  etc.	  in	  order	  to	  find	  legal	  
traces	  of	  gender-­‐variant	  subjects	  within	  an	  archive	  of	  dominant	  hostile	  discourses.	  
Some	  documents	  were	  found	  this	  way	  and	  several	  more	  by	  following	  the	  legal	  
references	  in	  these	  documents	  as	  is	  a	  common	  way	  of	  tracking	  case-­‐law	  and	  other	  
texts	  within	  Greek	  legal	  fields.	  The	  litigation	  and	  articles	  I	  found	  often	  propelled	  me	  
into	  the	  fields	  of	  Criminology,	  Legal	  Medicine	  and	  Sexology,	  which	  were	  key	  fields	  
for	  the	  unfolding	  of	  the	  debate	  on	  gender	  variance	  and	  the	  law.	  As	  those	  fields	  
follow	  a	  different	  canon,	  which	  is	  currently	  being	  explored	  by	  writers	  such	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68
	  	  In	  Greek	  legal	  science,	  legal	  journals	  are	  often	  where	  case-­‐law	  and	  other	  jurisprudence	  used	  by	  
legal	  professionals	  and	  courts	  can	  be	  located:	  	  
Whereas	  there	  are	  no	  official	  reporters	  in	  Greece,	  many	  important	  cases	  are	  reprinted	  in	  major	  
journals,	  which	  can	  be	  said	  to	  function	  primarily	  as	  reporters.	  Such	  journals	  also	  include	  secondary	  
legal	  materials,	  such	  as	  articles	  and	  comments	  on	  reprinted	  cases	  (…)	  Case	  reporters	  are	  not	  
published	  by	  the	  courts,	  but	  by	  private	  high	  academic	  committees.	  (Guide	  to	  Foreign	  and	  
International	  Legal	  Citations	  2006:	  74-­‐75).	  
For	  this	  reason,	  case-­‐law	  is	  often	  cited	  according	  to	  the	  journal	  it	  has	  been	  published	  in,	  which	  is	  the	  
case	  with	  some	  of	  the	  jurisprudence	  analysed	  in	  the	  next	  chapters.	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Tzanaki	  (2018)	  and	  Kritsotaki	  (2013),	  my	  interest	  was	  directed	  more	  towards	  Civil	  
law	  as	  the	  main	  field	  responsible	  for	  citizen	  registration	  and,	  thus,	  gender	  
classification	  in	  the	  law.	  For	  this	  reason,	  I	  stepped	  only	  momentarily	  into	  those	  
fields	  in	  order	  to	  retrieve	  what	  was	  necessary	  for	  my	  own	  research	  task	  and	  
avoided	  getting	  lost	  in	  them	  and	  compiling	  a	  chaotic	  listing	  of	  different	  paradigms	  
instead	  of	  a	  meaningfully	  structured	  archive	  of	  regulatory	  frames.	  
Having	  collected	  a	  variety	  of	  documents	  during	  several	  visits	  in	  the	  Library	  of	  the	  
Athens	  Bar	  Association,	  my	  conviction	  was	  that	  there	  was	  more	  to	  this	  debate	  than	  
what	  could	  be	  found	  this	  way.	  Therefore,	  I	  decided	  to	  manually	  go	  through	  the	  legal	  
reviews	  and	  monographs	  of	  authors	  that	  are	  considered	  authorities	  in	  Civil	  Law.69	  
The	  parts	  that	  I	  focused	  on	  were	  those	  concerning	  the	  definition	  and	  attributes	  of	  
the	  “natural	  person”,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  preconditions	  for	  marriage	  and	  divorce.	  There	  I	  
found	  more	  theories	  about	  sex	  and	  gender	  and	  how	  they	  were	  defined	  and	  
regulated	  when	  in	  doubt.	  
Moreover,	  looking	  in	  the	  field	  of	  Criminal	  Law,	  the	  main	  debate	  I	  traced	  was	  within	  
Medical	  Law	  and	  it	  concerned	  the	  potential	  criminal	  liability	  of	  doctors	  performing	  
“sex	  change	  operations.”	  Nonetheless,	  acknowledging	  the	  social	  exclusion	  trans	  
people	  have	  historically	  been	  subjected	  to,	  I	  was	  aware	  that	  many	  trans	  individuals	  
(in	  this	  case	  trans	  women	  more	  specifically)	  have	  had	  daily	  interactions	  with	  the	  
police	  and	  criminal	  courts	  due	  to	  their	  engagement	  with	  precarious	  sex	  work	  and	  
other	  underground	  outlaw	  networks.	  Additionally,	  during	  the	  1980s	  police-­‐forces	  
commonly	  raided	  cruising	  areas	  and	  other	  parts	  of	  city	  centres	  harassing	  those	  
frequenting	  there	  -­‐	  especially	  trans-­‐feminine	  sex-­‐workers	  (Paola	  Revenioti	  2011).	  As	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  Within	  the	  Greek	  legal	  tradition,	  prominent	  jurists	  of	  each	  field	  publish	  volumes	  of	  theory	  and	  
article-­‐by-­‐article	  interpretative	  analysis	  following	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  main	  Codes,	  thus,	  giving	  an	  
overview	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  their	  field.	  These	  volumes,	  although	  as	  all	  “jurisprudence,	  scholars’	  
opinions	  and	  other	  legal	  literature	  are	  not	  considered	  formal	  sources	  of	  law,	  owed	  partly	  to	  Greece’s	  
civil	  law	  background,”are	  a	  point	  of	  reference,	  for	  other	  legal	  scholars	  when	  interpreting	  and	  
applying	  legal	  texts	  (Guide	  to	  Foreign	  and	  International	  Legal	  Citations	  2006:	  72).	  The	  influence	  of	  
such	  volumes	  depended	  (and	  still	  does)	  more	  on	  the	  prestige	  of	  the	  author	  and	  the	  degree	  of	  
authority	  he	  is	  claimed	  to	  have	  within	  his	  field	  and	  less	  on	  the	  grounding,	  coherence	  and	  currentness	  
of	  the	  arguments	  used.	  	  
	  
RESERVING	  THE	  RIGHT	  TO	  BE	  COMPLEX	  
	   114	   	  
will	  be	  established	  in	  the	  course	  of	  my	  analysis,	  especially	  during	  the	  1970s-­‐1980s	  
this	  “familiarity”	  of	  trans	  women	  with	  the	  legal	  order	  and	  its	  functionaries	  is	  
concealed	  within	  theoretical	  Civil	  law	  texts.	  Overall,	  as	  will	  be	  suggested	  in	  the	  
following	  chapters,	  the	  tendency	  in	  Greek	  legal	  theory,	  especially	  Civil	  law,	  of	  the	  
20th	  century	  was	  not	  only	  to	  pathologise	  and	  “sort	  out”	  gender	  variance	  but	  also,	  
especially	  in	  the	  case	  of	  trans	  women	  of	  that	  era,	  to	  render	  them	  invisible	  within	  
specific	  contexts.	  To	  that	  end,	  I	  decided	  to	  take	  a	  methodological	  detour	  and	  
research	  similar	  keywords	  in	  the	  database	  of	  the	  Hellenic	  Police	  journals	  that	  have	  
been	  recently	  digitalised.	  There,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  find	  semi-­‐official	  traces	  recording	  the	  
frequent	  interaction	  between	  trans	  women	  and	  the	  law.	  By	  this	  manoeuvre,	  I	  was	  
able	  to	  establish	  that,	  in	  this	  period,	  although	  trans	  feminine	  individuals	  (under	  
different	  nomenclature)	  were	  no	  strangers	  to	  the	  law	  and	  its	  various	  apparatuses,	  
legal	  theorists	  were	  systematically	  erasing	  them	  from	  their	  theories.	  
The	  collected	  documents	  from	  all	  sources	  were	  read	  and	  re-­‐read	  in	  almost	  an	  
archaeological	  fashion	  of	  trying	  to	  trace	  links	  and	  discover	  their	  own	  
methodological	  routes	  and	  epistemological	  underpinnings.	  Overall,	  the	  archive	  that	  
is	  presented	  is	  fragmented,	  partial	  and	  relies	  on	  various	  sources.	  Although	  I	  use	  a	  
chrono-­‐logical	  order	  in	  presenting	  this	  legal	  archive,	  it	  is	  a	  legal	  genealogy	  that	  is	  
not	  built	  under	  the	  canon	  of	  an	  evolutionary	  linearity.	  Last,	  as	  my	  approach	  holds	  
that	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  operation	  of	  law	  in	  everyday	  life	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  
“avoid	  mistaking	  the	  public	  transcript	  for	  reality”	  (West	  2013:	  43),	  it	  must	  be	  stated	  
clearly	  that	  this	  is	  a	  genealogy	  of	  dominant	  discourses	  -­‐	  an	  archive	  of	  regulatory	  
frames	  and	  not	  an	  account	  of	  legal	  realities	  of	  gender	  variant	  individuals	  in	  the	  20th	  
century.	  That	  would	  be	  a	  different	  endeavour	  that	  would	  entail	  looking	  into	  the	  
political	  scene	  of	  the	  era	  as	  well	  as	  the	  individual	  narratives.	  Nonetheless,	  my	  aim	  in	  
this	  part	  of	  the	  research	  was	  to	  establish	  the	  historicity	  of	  formal	  regulatory	  frames	  
and	  an	  in-­‐depth	  understanding	  of	  judicial	  practices	  and,	  to	  this	  direction,	  I	  have	  
undertaken	  the	  methodological	  approach	  described	  above.	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iii. Contemporary	  Legal	  Texts	  
In	  a	  different	  spirit,	  in	  Part	  C	  (chapters	  seven,	  eight	  and	  nine)	  the	  aim	  is	  to	  
interrogate	  political	  premises	  of	  trans-­‐related	  legislation	  on	  a	  state-­‐level	  and	  the	  
complex	  relationship	  of	  such	  legislation	  with	  social	  reality	  and	  individual	  
perceptions,	  practices	  and	  agency.	  To	  that	  end,	  the	  texts	  used	  in	  these	  chapters	  
differ	  in	  terms	  of	  research	  methods	  and	  analysis	  compared	  to	  those	  described	  
above.	  The	  texts	  used	  here	  include	  current	  legislation,	  (inter)national	  case-­‐law,	  
various	  reports	  and	  Parliamentary	  minutes.	  These	  texts	  can	  be	  found	  online	  (and,	  
thus,	  did	  not	  demand	  physical	  presence	  in	  a	  research	  location)	  and	  are	  situated	  
within	  a	  familiar	  legal	  and	  socio-­‐political	  context	  that	  does	  not	  entail	  the	  type	  of	  
archaeological	  research	  and	  analysis	  used	  in	  the	  previous	  part.	  Other	  texts	  used	  are	  
press-­‐releases	  from	  various	  organisations	  and	  more	  scarcely	  media	  articles.70	  	  
The	  texts	  are	  analysed	  not	  just	  along	  their	  historico-­‐political	  context	  but	  as	  parts	  of	  
state-­‐level	  political	  projects	  and	  national	  ideological	  debates.	  That	  is,	  trans-­‐related	  
legislation	  is	  read	  along	  processes	  of	  Europeanisation,	  nationalist	  politics	  and	  legal	  
imaginaries	  of	  protection	  and	  progress.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  law	  is	  not	  studied	  just	  
according	  to	  what	  it	  claims	  to	  do	  but	  rather	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  various	  workings	  it	  
enables	  on	  a	  juridico-­‐political	  level	  (Beger	  [2004]	  2009;	  Spade	  [2009]	  2015).	  This	  
translated	  into	  posing	  alternative	  questions	  when	  assessing	  a	  legal	  reform	  and	  its	  
effects.	  For	  example,	  instead	  of	  examining	  what	  an	  anti-­‐discrimination	  law	  claims	  it	  
does,	  I	  proceeded	  to	  interrogate	  the	  political	  conditions	  that	  dictated	  its	  
introduction	  but	  also	  the	  work	  it	  performed	  both	  on	  a	  state	  level	  as	  well	  as	  a	  social	  
and	  even	  individual	  level.	  Such	  a	  reading	  requires	  a	  combination	  of	  sources,	  as	  well	  
as	  a	  synthesis	  of	  different	  discourses	  and	  levels	  of	  discourses.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  legal	  
texts	  analysed	  are	  not	  read	  in	  a	  vacuum	  but	  in	  combination	  with	  other	  texts	  and,	  
most	  importantly,	  as	  I	  describe	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  in	  close	  relation	  to	  personal	  
narratives	  of	  trans	  experiences	  and	  the	  law.	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  Although	  the	  media	  discourse	  and	  its	  impact	  is	  often	  implied	  in	  this	  part	  of	  the	  text,	  I	  have	  chosen	  
not	  to	  take	  the	  route	  of	  a	  systematic	  analysis	  of	  media	  discussions,	  which	  would	  have	  led	  me	  to	  a	  
different	  task.	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4.3.b. Interviews	  
Weaving	  personal	  experiences	  into	  the	  analysis	  of	  trans-­‐related	  legislation	  was	  
imperative	  for	  my	  approach.	  It	  was	  not	  only	  a	  means	  to	  interrogate	  the	  applicability	  
of	  the	  law	  but	  its	  conflicting	  affective	  and	  material	  qualities.	  As	  modern	  law	  is	  built	  
upon	  an	  imaginary	  of	  coherence	  within	  contexts	  of	  imperialism	  and	  colonialism,	  it	  
has	  been	  traditionally	  considered	  -­‐	  and	  studied	  -­‐	  as	  a	  set	  of	  autonomous	  and	  
sovereign	  rules	  claiming	  an	  uncontested	  authority	  (Darian-­‐Smith	  2004:	  554).	  In	  that	  
sense,	  the	  law	  does	  not	  appear	  inherently	  open	  to	  an	  inquiry	  that	  highlights	  its	  
ambiguities,	  contradictions	  and	  its	  porous	  nature,	  thus,	  challenging	  fundamental	  
assumptions	  of	  objectivity,	  authority	  and	  universality	  (Darian-­‐Smith	  2004:	  554).	  
Nonetheless,	  engaging	  in	  critical	  empirical	  studies	  of	  the	  law	  allows	  for	  a	  different	  
analysis	  and	  evaluation	  of	  legal	  concepts	  and	  their	  role	  in	  daily	  meaning-­‐making	  
processes	  (Darian-­‐Smith	  2004:	  553).	  This	  is	  aligned	  with	  a	  general	  tendency	  within	  
critical	  approaches	  to	  legal	  research	  that	  moves	  away	  from	  using	  the	  state	  as	  a	  unit	  
of	  analysis	  and	  resorts	  to	  grounding	  legal	  studies	  in	  the	  dynamic	  experiences	  of	  
people	  (Darian-­‐Smith	  2004:	  547).	  	  
Accordingly,	  I	  decided	  to	  conduct	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  aiming	  to	  facilitate	  a	  
grounded	  approach	  that	  can	  address	  the	  complexities	  of	  the	  emerging	  issues.	  As	  
dictated	  by	  critical	  epistemologies	  of	  feminist	  and	  other	  poststructuralist	  origins,	  
these	  interviews	  were	  designed	  and	  utilised	  in	  a	  way	  that	  moves	  away	  from	  
traditional	  models	  of	  empirical	  research	  in	  social	  sciences	  (Holstein	  &	  Gubrium	  
2003;	  Kong,	  Mahoney,	  &	  Plummer	  2003).	  That	  is,	  the	  interview	  is	  not	  seen	  as	  a	  
means	  to	  obtain	  access	  to	  the	  “truth”	  of	  the	  subject	  but	  an	  instance	  of	  social	  
interaction	  constitutive	  of	  both	  parts	  involved,	  dense	  with	  delicate	  power	  
(im)balances	  and	  open	  to	  different	  patterns	  of	  meaning-­‐production	  (Phoenix	  1994;	  
Plummer	  1995;	  Holstein	  &	  Gubrium	  2003).	  As	  Holstein	  and	  Gubrium	  (2003)	  note	  
“treating	  interviewing	  as	  a	  social	  encounter	  in	  which	  knowledge	  is	  constructed	  
means	  that	  the	  interview	  is	  more	  than	  a	  simple	  information-­‐gathering	  operation;	  
it's	  a	  site	  of,	  and	  occasion	  for,	  producing	  knowledge	  itself”	  (Holstein	  &	  Gubrium	  
2003:	  3).	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Moreover,	  having	  considered	  the	  critiques	  mentioned	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  
chapter	  regarding	  positionality	  and	  reflexivity	  in	  research,	  I	  tried	  not	  only	  to	  be	  
aware	  of	  the	  location	  (in	  every	  sense)	  in	  which	  these	  encounters	  were	  taking	  place	  
but	  also	  to	  be	  open	  towards	  my	  interlocutors.	  Ellis	  and	  Berger	  (2003)	  refer	  to	  such	  a	  
mode	  of	  interviewing	  as	  the	  “reflexive	  dyadic	  interview,”	  which	  they	  describe	  as	  
such:	  	  
Reflexive	  dyadic	  interviews	  follow	  the	  typical	  protocol	  of	  the	  interviewer	  
asking	  questions	  and	  the	  interviewee	  answering	  them,	  but	  the	  interviewer	  
typically	  shares	  personal	  experience	  with	  the	  topic	  at	  hand	  or	  reflects	  on	  
the	  communicative	  process	  of	  the	  interview.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  researcher's	  
disclosures	  are	  more	  than	  tactics	  to	  encourage	  the	  respondent	  to	  open	  up;	  
rather,	  the	  researcher	  often	  feels	  a	  reciprocal	  desire	  to	  disclose,	  given	  the	  
intimacy	  of	  the	  details	  being	  shared	  by	  the	  interviewee.	  The	  interview	  is	  
conducted	  more	  as	  a	  conversation	  between	  two	  equals	  than	  as	  a	  distinctly	  
hierarchical,	  question-­‐and-­‐answer	  exchange,	  and	  the	  interviewer	  tries	  to	  
tune	  in	  to	  the	  interactively	  produced	  meanings	  and	  emotional	  dynamics	  
within	  the	  interview	  itself	  (Ellis	  &	  Berger	  2003:	  471).	  
Hence,	  the	  discussions	  were	  also	  designed	  to	  be	  open-­‐ended	  and,	  while	  to	  a	  great	  
extent	  guided	  by	  me,	  they	  allowed	  diversions,	  story-­‐telling	  and	  bilateral	  sharing	  of	  
information,	  experiences	  and	  thoughts.	  
In	  terms	  of	  analysis,	  I	  followed	  critical	  strands	  of	  research	  that,	  informed	  by	  
feminist	  and	  other	  critiques	  on	  representation	  and	  power,	  do	  not	  view	  interviews	  
as	  a	  pre-­‐theoretical	  source	  which	  is	  interpreted,	  theorised	  and	  generalised	  by	  the	  
sole	  agent	  of	  the	  research:	  the	  researcher	  (Phoenix	  1994;	  Ellis	  &	  Berger	  2003;	  
Haritaworn	  2007;	  Carastathis	  2018b).	  Kong,	  Mahoney	  and	  Plummer	  (2003)	  describe	  
traditional	  models	  of	  interview-­‐analysis	  in	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  related	  research	  as	  such:	  
The	  standard	  mode,	  of	  course,	  is	  to	  use	  interview	  extracts	  in	  such	  a	  way	  
that	  the	  representative	  text	  becomes	  littered	  with	  examples	  of	  first	  person	  
speech	  drawn	  out	  of	  interview	  findings.	  In	  this	  mode	  of	  representation,	  the	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interviewed	  gay	  or	  lesbian	  is	  engrossed	  by	  the	  author's	  own	  writing	  and	  
scholarly	  authority	  (Kong,	  Mahoney,	  &	  Plummer	  2003:	  99).	  
Departing	  from	  such	  analytic	  models,	  trans	  scholar	  Jin	  Haritaworn	  (2007),	  following	  
feminist	  lines	  of	  thought,	  writes	  that,	  in	  terms	  of	  analytical	  modalities,	  “participants	  
are	  not	  merely	  raw,	  pre-­‐theoretical	  sources	  of	  'experience',	  but	  active	  producers	  of	  
their	  own	  interpretations	  which	  compete	  with	  those	  of	  the	  researcher”	  (Haritaworn	  
2007:	  2.4).	  Acknowledging	  the	  limit	  of	  such	  a	  critical	  practice	  (that	  is,	  the	  fact	  that	  
the	  researcher	  has	  the	  final	  word	  in	  the	  interpretative	  process),	  it	  is	  nonetheless	  
important	  to	  be	  self-­‐conscious	  about	  the	  way	  interviews	  are	  analysed	  and	  used	  in	  a	  
text.	  	  
With	  these	  concerns	  in	  mind,	  I	  decided	  on	  a	  small	  number	  of	  interviewees	  (ten	  in	  
2017	  and	  include	  an	  additional	  four	  that	  had	  been	  conducted	  in	  2014	  as	  it	  is	  
explained	  below).	  This	  would	  allow	  me	  to	  include	  extended	  parts	  of	  my	  
interlocutors’	  understandings	  of	  the	  issues	  discussed	  rather	  than	  grouped	  
summaries	  of	  their	  experiences	  or	  scattered	  quotes	  confirming	  my	  own	  pre-­‐
conceived	  theories.	  Moreover,	  the	  small	  number	  of	  interviews	  ties	  in	  with	  the	  
entire	  research-­‐design,	  within	  which	  these	  conversations	  constitute	  one	  of	  the	  
different	  sources	  of	  the	  text	  but	  not	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  project	  that	  was	  not	  meant	  
to	  be	  ethnography	  or	  an	  extensive	  empirical	  study.	  	  
I	  interviewed	  three	  legal	  professionals,	  who,	  in	  turn,	  offered	  their	  perspective	  
concerning	  the	  legal	  aspects	  of	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  examined	  (see	  Appendix	  B	  for	  
further	  details).	  One	  of	  them	  had	  experience	  with	  various	  human	  rights	  cases,	  
including	  trans-­‐related	  jurisprudence.	  The	  other	  two	  were	  chosen	  for	  having	  
worked	  in	  various	  positions	  within	  what	  is	  being	  called	  the	  “refugee	  crisis”	  in	  
Greece,	  as	  my	  initial	  intention	  was	  to	  interrogate	  challenges	  faced	  by	  trans	  migrants	  
and	  refugees	  in	  Greece.	  Nonetheless,	  as	  already	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  one,	  the	  
issues	  that	  arose	  from	  these	  interviews	  as	  well	  as	  other	  studied	  sources	  (media	  
interviews,	  instrument	  reports,	  texts	  from	  political	  groups/NGOs	  and	  other	  
organisations)	  were	  vastly	  different	  than	  those	  negotiated	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  
research	  and	  demanded	  a	  different	  perspective,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  different	  framework	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and	  a	  different	  body	  of	  literature	  (Aizura	  2012b;	  Bhanji	  2012;	  Cotten	  2012;	  
Shakhsari	  2014a,	  2014b;	  Camminga	  2017).	  After	  careful	  consideration	  of	  the	  
complexity	  of	  the	  related	  issues	  (see	  footnote	  4),	  I	  decided	  against	  including	  those	  
issues	  without	  guaranteeing	  them	  enough	  space	  to	  be	  equally	  reflected	  upon.	  That	  
choice	  also	  meant	  that	  two	  interviews	  with	  legal	  professionals	  are	  not	  used	  to	  a	  
great	  extent	  in	  the	  text.	  
Undertaking	  this	  project	  during	  the	  period	  of	  the	  most	  accelerated	  changes	  for	  
trans	  rights	  in	  Greece,	  I	  decided	  to	  utilise	  time	  itself	  in	  my	  method.	  I	  had	  already	  
undertaken	  some	  research	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  gender	  identity	  recognition	  in	  2014	  for	  
my	  Masters	  thesis	  at	  the	  department	  of	  Social	  Anthropology	  and	  History	  of	  the	  
University	  of	  the	  Aegean	  (Kasapidou	  2015).	  During	  that	  time,	  I	  had	  conducted	  in-­‐
depth	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  with	  five	  trans	  individuals.	  Those	  three	  years	  
between	  the	  two	  pieces	  of	  field	  research	  brought	  immense	  changes	  in	  the	  national	  
political	  terrain	  but	  also,	  as	  will	  be	  established	  in	  the	  following	  chapters,	  in	  the	  
realm	  of	  LGBTI+Q	  politics	  and	  legislation.71	  In	  this	  context,	  I	  decided	  not	  only	  to	  re-­‐
interview	  some	  of	  the	  same	  individuals	  (four	  out	  of	  five)	  I	  had	  conversed	  with	  in	  
2014,	  but	  also	  (after	  obtaining	  both	  my	  interlocutors’	  and	  my	  department’s	  
permission)	  to	  use	  the	  transcripts	  from	  the	  first	  interviews	  in	  my	  analysis	  as	  well.	  
In	  addition	  to	  these	  pre-­‐existing	  interviews,	  in	  2017,	  I	  recorded	  and	  transcribed	  
discussions	  with	  seven	  trans	  individuals	  -­‐	  four	  that	  I	  had	  already	  conducted	  
interviews	  with	  in	  the	  past	  and	  three	  that	  I	  interviewed	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  I	  
conversed	  overall	  with	  three	  trans	  men	  and	  four	  trans	  women	  of	  different	  ages	  (in	  
the	  range	  19-­‐40)	  and	  social	  status	  (see	  Appendix	  B	  for	  further	  details).	  All	  the	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  Specifically,	  the	  first	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  under	  the	  previous	  legislative	  frame	  wherein	  
legal	  gender	  amendment	  followed	  a	  historically	  vague	  set	  of	  case-­‐law	  and	  was	  possible	  only	  after	  
“sex	  change”	  through	  a	  series	  of	  operations	  (see	  chapter	  eight).	  Overall,	  it	  was	  a	  period	  of	  intense	  
political	  turbulence	  in	  Greece	  and	  also	  it	  followed	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  infamous	  “antiracist	  law”	  (Law	  
4139/2013)	  that	  is	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  seven.	  The	  second	  set	  of	  interviews	  was	  conducted	  within	  a	  
climate	  of	  an	  overall	  popularisation	  of	  LGBT	  claims	  in	  the	  mainstream	  political	  agenda	  and	  the	  
granting	  of	  new	  LGBT-­‐related	  legislation	  by	  the	  SYRIZA	  government	  (Gkeltis	  2019).	  More	  
importantly,	  these	  discussions	  took	  place	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  passing	  of	  Law	  4491/2017	  on	  
gender	  identity	  recognition,	  which	  brought	  a	  paradigm-­‐shift	  	  for	  trans	  legal	  issues	  but	  also	  a	  
deafening	  explosion	  of	  visibility	  and	  public	  hostile	  discourses	  (see	  chapter	  eight).	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individuals	  that	  agreed	  to	  talk	  to	  me	  were	  either	  people	  I	  knew,	  to	  different	  
extents,	  or	  friends	  of	  friends.	  Three	  of	  the	  trans	  women	  were	  of	  non-­‐Greek	  or	  of	  
mixed	  national	  (and	  in	  one	  case	  racial)	  origin,	  but	  all	  were	  born	  or	  had	  lived	  from	  a	  
very	  young	  age	  in	  Greece.	  Among	  these	  seven	  trans	  people	  that	  conversed	  with	  me,	  
there	  was	  a	  range	  from	  having	  been	  heavily	  involved	  in	  LGBTI+	  and	  queer	  politics	  to	  
being	  completely	  unaware	  and	  slightly	  opposed	  to	  it,	  and	  other	  degrees	  in-­‐
between.	  I	  considered	  this,	  other	  than	  age	  and	  social	  status,	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  most	  
important	  factors	  influencing	  their	  perception	  regarding	  the	  issues	  we	  discussed.	  	  
Using	  interviews	  with	  the	  same	  individuals	  conducted	  a	  few	  crucial	  years	  apart	  
allowed	  for	  a	  much	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  issues	  that	  were	  being	  discussed,	  
as	  we	  had	  all	  been	  radically	  changed	  by	  the	  passing	  of	  this	  time.72	  During	  our	  
discussions,	  we	  repeatedly	  reflected	  upon	  the	  changes	  that	  had	  occurred	  at	  the	  
individual	  but	  also	  national	  level	  and,	  looking	  back	  to	  this	  methodological	  choice	  
and	  the	  depth	  it	  offered	  to	  my	  research,	  I	  consider	  its	  contribution	  to	  this	  project	  
indispensable.	  There	  was	  one	  exception	  nonetheless,	  which	  is	  my	  responsibility	  as	  a	  
researcher	  to	  acknowledge.	  	  
When	  I	  approached	  Mike	  for	  an	  interview	  (he	  was	  a	  friend	  of	  a	  friend)	  in	  2014,	  he	  
was	  open	  and	  willing	  to	  meet.	  I	  met	  him	  and	  his	  partner	  in	  their	  house,	  where	  we	  
talked	  for	  several	  hours.	  My	  presence	  there	  felt	  welcomed	  and	  they	  were	  both	  
eager	  to	  talk	  about	  gender	  identity	  issues.	  Nonetheless,	  this	  time,	  in	  2017,	  Mike	  
was	  harder	  to	  reach	  and,	  although	  he	  assured	  me	  he	  would	  be	  happy	  to	  meet	  
again,	  it	  didn’t	  quite	  feel	  this	  way.	  This	  time,	  we	  met	  in	  a	  café	  and	  he	  was	  very	  
reluctant	  to	  talk	  about	  any	  of	  the	  topics	  I	  brought	  up	  although	  they	  were	  a	  lot	  less	  
personal	  than	  those	  we	  had	  discussed	  in	  our	  first	  interview,	  often	  by	  his	  own	  
initiative.	  By	  the	  time	  of	  our	  second	  meeting,	  Mike	  had	  amended	  his	  documents	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72
	  That	  is,	  I	  could	  see	  the	  changes	  in	  my	  interlocutors’	  experiences	  and	  analyses	  due	  to	  having	  
amended	  their	  papers,	  having	  changed	  their	  engagement	  with	  politics,	  having	  had	  surgeries,	  having	  
been	  broken	  by	  the	  extended	  crisis	  or	  just	  having	  moved-­‐on	  in	  life.	  I	  also	  saw	  that	  my	  own	  stance	  
had	  changed,	  transferring	  from	  a	  small	  island	  university	  on	  the	  Greek-­‐Turkish	  borders	  to	  a	  
prestigious	  UK	  university,	  returning	  from	  the	  field	  of	  Social	  Anthropology	  to	  the	  legal	  field,	  having	  
developed	  a	  more	  substantive	  knowledge	  of	  trans	  scholarship	  but	  also	  having	  moved-­‐on	  in	  life	  as	  
well.	  
Part	  A	   	   	  Chapter	  4	  
	   121	   	  
and	  he	  had	  married	  his	  partner,	  who	  was	  expecting	  a	  child.	  As	  he	  explained,	  he	  had	  
struggled	  to	  go	  through	  the	  entire	  procedure	  with	  many	  difficulties	  and	  his	  
documents	  were	  amended	  before	  the	  new	  legislation	  was	  introduced.	  At	  some	  
point,	  as	  I	  was	  asking	  if	  he	  had	  followed	  the	  news	  about	  the	  new	  legislation	  and	  
what	  was	  his	  opinion	  about	  the	  law,	  he	  said:	  	  
Mike:	  I	  didn’t…I	  honestly	  tell	  you	  I	  heard	  nothing	  about	  it.	  I	  don’t	  know	  if	  it	  
has	  to	  do	  with	  a	  reaction	  on	  my	  part,	  I	  didn’t	  even	  pay	  attention,	  I	  don’t	  
know	  if	  it’s	  denial...so	  be	  it,	  let	  it	  be	  denial!	  (…)	  I	  didn’t,	  I	  would	  just	  have	  
gotten	  more	  pissed	  off	  if	  I	  were	  to	  bother	  with	  it	  because	  I’m	  thinking,	  wait	  
a	  minute,	  I	  dragged	  it	  out	  so	  much…I	  dragged	  out	  my	  life.	  Because	  I	  didn’t	  
want	  to	  get	  to	  thirty-­‐seven,	  to	  put	  it	  this	  way	  Roussa,	  to	  have	  a	  kid!	  
Because	  you	  get	  to	  thirty-­‐seven,	  by	  the	  time	  it’s	  born	  you	  are	  forty,	  by	  the	  
time	  it’s	  a	  bit	  older...I’m	  going	  to	  be	  fifty…and	  ok,	  I’m	  not	  saying	  that	  this	  is	  
too	  old	  but…I	  wanted	  to	  have	  done	  this	  earlier!	  So	  I	  would	  just	  get	  pissed	  
off	  again.	  So…as	  if	  none	  of	  this	  happened,	  I	  don’t	  care.	  This	  is	  how	  my	  life	  
had	  to	  be,	  to	  reach	  this	  point,	  stage	  by	  stage	  by	  stage…step	  by	  step…what	  
laws	  and	  what	  bullshit,	  ok	  now,	  so	  what?	  [Interview	  with	  Mike	  in	  2017].	  
What	  I	  had	  failed	  to	  recognise	  before	  this	  point	  was	  that	  because	  the	  law	  -­‐	  as	  well	  
as	  time	  itself	  -­‐	  had	  been	  against	  him	  for	  many	  years,	  regardless	  of	  our	  best	  
intentions,	  this	  discussion	  was	  a	  reminder	  of	  everything	  he	  had	  chosen	  to	  leave	  
behind	  (“I	  have	  drawn	  a	  big	  X	  on	  all	  of	  this	  and	  never	  think	  about	  it”	  he	  told	  me).	  As	  
it	  became	  clear	  during	  our	  conversation,	  Mike	  felt	  as	  “a	  man,	  who	  just	  had	  a	  
medical	  issue	  in	  the	  past”	  and	  it	  was	  precisely	  this	  trans	  -­‐	  in	  my	  words	  but	  not	  his	  -­‐	  
past,	  which	  he	  had	  distanced	  himself	  from,	  that	  I	  was	  asking	  him	  about.	  I	  proceeded	  
with	  trying	  to	  discuss	  only	  things	  that	  he	  was	  comfortable	  with	  and,	  overall,	  cut	  our	  
interview	  short.	  Reflecting	  on	  this	  interview,	  I	  do	  wonder	  whether	  I	  should	  have	  
foreseen	  this	  outcome	  based	  on	  my	  previous	  discussion	  with	  Mike.	  Even	  if	  so,	  in-­‐
depth	  interviews	  always	  entail	  a	  certain	  uncertainty,	  a	  risk	  factor	  that	  cannot	  be	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fully	  eliminated.73	  Nonetheless,	  this	  incident	  underlines	  that,	  as	  was	  discussed	  
earlier,	  it	  is	  imperative	  to	  consider	  ethics	  as	  a	  crucial	  part	  of	  the	  research	  and	  
especially	  of	  methodology.	  It	  also	  confirms	  that	  grafting	  ethics	  into	  research-­‐design	  
requires	  a	  lot	  more	  than	  securing	  anonymity,	  protection	  from	  harm	  and	  a	  right	  to	  
withdraw	  (Campbell	  &	  Lassiter	  2014).74	  Sometimes	  it	  means	  taking	  responsibility	  
for	  being	  less	  intuitive	  than	  what	  the	  situation	  demanded.	  	  
Last,	  all	  the	  interviews	  closed	  with	  my	  offer	  to	  answer	  any	  questions	  my	  
interlocutors	  might	  have	  as	  a	  minimum	  attempt	  to	  break	  the	  traditionally	  unilateral	  
schema	  of	  the	  interview.	  The	  questions	  I	  received	  varied	  from	  the	  genuine	  aporia	  
regarding	  whether	  anyone	  would	  read	  this	  text	  up	  to	  my	  personal	  opinion	  and	  
experience	  of	  the	  issues	  discussed.	  In	  one	  of	  the	  more	  intense	  moments,	  Philip,	  at	  
the	  end	  of	  our	  first	  interview	  in	  2014,	  asked	  me	  several	  questions	  concerning	  my	  
own	  gender	  non-­‐conformity	  and	  its	  bodily	  and	  sexual	  expression.	  I	  tried	  to	  reply	  to	  
his	  questions	  but	  realised	  that	  the	  task	  he	  had	  made	  seem	  easy	  by	  discussing	  
intimate	  details	  of	  his	  own	  experience	  was	  rather	  overwhelming	  when	  addressed	  to	  
me.	  Faced	  with	  my	  apparent	  uneasiness,	  he	  reached	  for	  my	  recorder	  and	  switched	  
it	  off,	  stating	  with	  a	  playful	  wink	  “don’t	  worry,	  this	  is	  between	  you	  and	  me”.	  This	  
gesture	  not	  only	  exposed	  my	  own	  weakness	  to	  adequately	  fulfil	  my	  methodological	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  Laurent	  Berlant’s	  directions	  to	  her	  students	  for	  a	  research	  project	  that	  included	  interviews	  
enclose	  the	  fragilities	  of	  the	  risky	  endeavour	  of	  interviewing	  people:	  
So	  the	  rules	  were:	  tell	  them	  what	  you’re	  doing	  and	  what	  it’s	  for,	  no	  tricking.	  They	  have	  to	  consent	  to	  
talk	  with	  you	  under	  explicit	  parameters,	  which	  makes	  the	  demand	  for	  consent	  a	  fantasy	  of	  
governance	  as	  a	  good	  luck	  charm,	  because	  when	  we	  consent	  it’s	  to	  the	  unpredictable	  and	  the	  
unreliable	  thing	  to	  come	  and	  not,	  sadly,	  to	  a	  capsule	  of	  safety.	  In	  the	  interviews	  you	  have	  to	  have	  a	  
plan	  and	  both	  stick	  to	  it	  and	  be	  a	  human	  in	  the	  situation,	  following	  out	  arcs	  with	  care,	  which	  is	  
different	  than	  carefully.	  Good	  luck	  with	  that.	  Do	  no	  harm,	  break	  no	  things,	  including	  trust.	  Good	  luck	  
with	  that.	  Try	  to	  be	  worthy	  of	  trust.	  Be	  attentive	  to	  intervals	  (Berlant	  28.4.2016).	  
This	  paragraph	  gave	  me	  a	  lot	  more	  guidance	  than	  several	  texts	  on	  methodology	  and	  research-­‐
design.	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  Some	  additional	  concerns	  included	  the	  navigation	  of	  sensitive	  issues	  during	  interviews,	  the	  over-­‐
scrutinised	  history	  of	  trans	  bodily	  anatomy	  and	  identity,	  as	  well	  as,	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  
relationships	  formed	  through	  and	  during	  research.	  Although	  these	  concerns	  led	  me	  to	  avoid	  certain	  
topics,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  issues	  discussed	  often	  created	  a	  space	  of	  sudden	  intimacy,	  within	  which	  my	  
interlocutors	  shared	  far	  more	  sensitive	  and	  explicit	  information	  than	  what	  was	  requested.	  Details	  of	  
bodily	  anatomy,	  illegal	  activities,	  childhood	  memories	  and	  instances	  of	  abuse	  were	  recorded	  but	  not	  
used	  as	  I	  felt	  that	  these	  were	  not	  the	  things	  I	  had	  asked	  consent	  for	  using.	  They	  were	  shared	  with	  me	  
in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  interview	  but	  the	  thin	  line	  of	  what	  was	  shared	  with	  me	  as	  a	  researcher	  was	  too	  
blurry	  to	  risk	  any	  mistakes.	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promise	  to	  be	  open	  to	  my	  interlocutors	  but	  also	  shattered	  the	  interview	  protocol,	  
establishing	  -­‐	  or	  revealing	  -­‐	  a	  different	  set	  of	  dynamics	  between	  us.	  This	  challenging	  
dynamic	  was	  intensified	  by	  other	  ever	  so	  slightly	  noticeable	  means	  in	  both	  
interviews,	  which	  contributed	  to	  making	  the	  navigation	  of	  this	  terrain	  one	  of	  the	  
most	  difficult	  and	  exciting	  instances	  of	  the	  field-­‐research.75	  	  
Throughout	  this	  chapter,	  I	  have	  presented	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  I	  conducted	  this	  
research	  and	  the	  reasons	  that	  led	  me	  to	  this	  specific	  methodological	  path.	  
Influenced	  by	  feminist	  and	  other	  critical	  modes	  of	  research,	  this	  project	  follows	  
strands	  of	  trans-­‐related	  scholarship	  which	  value	  personal	  experience	  and	  
positioning	  within	  knowledge	  production.	  In	  such	  a	  critical	  understanding	  of	  the	  
research-­‐process	  reflexivity	  and	  ethics	  become	  integral	  parts	  of	  the	  methodology.	  
Specifically,	  in	  this	  project,	  writing	  about	  a	  marginalised	  identity,	  I	  had	  to	  reflect	  on	  
the	  effect	  of	  my	  connection	  to	  trans	  individuals	  but	  also	  to	  trans	  identity	  itself.	  I	  
tried	  to	  compile	  a	  set	  of	  research	  and	  analytical	  modalities	  that	  would	  minimise	  the	  
reproduction	  of	  the	  epistemic	  violence,	  which	  has	  been	  pointed	  out	  by	  trans	  writers	  
in	  the	  past,	  as	  well	  as	  walk	  the	  thin	  line	  of	  researcher/trusted	  ally	  taking	  
responsibility	  for	  my	  choices.	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  For	  example,	  although	  when	  meeting	  in	  cafés	  with	  interlocutors	  I	  normally	  paid	  for	  anything	  
consumed,	  Philip	  insisted	  on	  getting	  the	  bill	  but	  also	  picking	  me	  up	  by	  car	  and	  even	  getting	  the	  door	  
for	  me.	  These	  details	  unsettled	  not	  only	  the	  research	  protocol	  but	  also	  the	  gender	  dynamics	  
between	  us,	  creating	  a	  confusingly	  intimate	  interaction	  with	  an	  elusive	  power-­‐balance.	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CLOSING	  PART	  A	  
Part	  A	  presented	  the	  main	  theoretical	  debates	  that	  have	  formulated	  the	  disciplinary	  
environment	  of	  the	  present	  study.	  Having	  mapped	  out	  the	  theoretical	  background	  
of	  the	  field,	  the	  present	  study	  opts	  to	  align	  with	  writers	  who	  call	  for	  theoretical	  
polyvocality	  and	  framework	  multiplicity	  as	  the	  most	  appropriate	  response	  to	  the	  
issues	  arising	  via	  the	  diverse	  experiences	  theorised	  within	  trans	  studies.	  
Additionally,	  another	  dimension	  is	  given	  to	  the	  explored	  theories	  and	  debates	  by	  
examining	  their	  position	  within	  a	  global	  economy	  of	  knowledge	  production	  and	  
circulation.	  Embedding	  historicity	  and	  geo-­‐temporal	  context-­‐specificity	  as	  crucial	  
parameters,	  chapter	  two	  suggests	  the	  necessary	  epistemological	  gestures	  which	  
will	  materialise	  in	  the	  next	  parts	  of	  the	  thesis	  in	  order	  to	  accommodate	  an	  analysis	  
that	  takes	  these	  parameters	  into	  account	  when	  utilising	  theories	  imported	  from	  
different	  contexts.	  	  	  
Additionally,	  this	  first	  part	  has	  offered	  a	  nexus	  of	  legal	  theories	  and	  concepts	  that	  
will	  be	  used	  in	  the	  analysis	  throughout	  the	  thesis.	  Chapter	  three	  starts	  from	  the	  
concept	  of	  trans	  rights,	  which	  is	  the	  most	  commonly	  used	  framework	  for	  
conceptualising	  contemporary	  entanglements	  of	  gender	  variance	  and	  the	  law.	  
Some	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  paradoxical	  workings	  of	  the	  rights	  framework	  will	  be	  discussed	  
in	  Part	  C	  that	  appraises	  contemporary	  trans-­‐related	  legislation.	  Apart	  from	  trans	  
rights,	  this	  part	  introduced	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  concepts.	  Specifically,	  critiques	  of	  
classical	  categorisation	  were	  interwoven	  with	  theories	  of	  modern-­‐state	  governance.	  
Moreover,	  seemingly	  neutral	  processes	  such	  as	  civil	  registration,	  sex	  classification	  
and	  legal	  interpretation	  were	  problematised	  and	  repositioned	  in	  a	  critical	  frame.	  
These	  complex	  notions	  will	  be	  utilised	  in	  the	  next	  part	  in	  order	  to	  analyse	  the	  
workings	  of	  sex	  classification	  in	  the	  law	  during	  the	  previous	  century	  and	  the	  central	  
role	  of	  categorisation	  and	  legal	  interpretation	  in	  this	  process.	  
Lastly,	  Part	  A	  closes	  by	  explaining	  in	  detail	  the	  epistemological	  principles	  according	  
to	  which	  the	  research	  was	  conducted	  and	  its	  specific	  methodological	  route.	  The	  
feminist	  call	  for	  partiality,	  situatedness	  and	  accountability	  and	  the	  way	  it	  has	  
transferred	  into	  trans	  writings	  has	  effected	  the	  ethical	  and	  broader	  epistemological	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choices	  across	  all	  stages	  of	  the	  present	  research.	  After	  a	  brief	  reflection	  and	  self-­‐
positioning,	  chapter	  four	  takes	  the	  reader	  through	  the	  various	  sources	  analysed.	  
Texts	  from	  the	  previous	  century,	  many	  of	  which	  were	  found	  through	  archival	  
research,	  are	  analysed	  in	  the	  next	  part	  in	  an	  almost	  archaeological	  manner	  in	  order	  
to	  compose	  a	  fragmented	  archive	  of	  regulatory	  frameworks	  for	  gender	  variance.	  
Moreover,	  a	  variety	  of	  contemporary	  legal	  and	  other	  texts	  are	  combined	  with	  a	  set	  
of	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  in	  order	  to	  facilitate	  a	  critical	  multi-­‐level	  appraisal	  of	  
all	  contemporary	  trans-­‐related	  legislation	  in	  Greece.	  Overall,	  with	  the	  conclusion	  of	  
this	  first	  part,	  the	  theoretical,	  disciplinary	  and	  methodological	  premises	  of	  the	  
thesis	  have	  been	  set	  and	  Part	  B,	  which	  follows,	  will	  utilise	  several	  of	  the	  analysed	  
concepts	  to	  explore	  legal	  sex	  classification	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century.	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Part	  B.	  Sex	  (Re)Classification	  in	  the	  Twentieth	  Century	  
As	  Part	  Α	  of	  the	  thesis	  has	  been	  concluded,	  I	  have	  framed	  the	  current	  project	  both	  
in	  terms	  of	  disciplinary	  and	  theoretical	  environment.	  Moreover,	  I	  have	  described	  
the	  epistemological	  premises	  of	  the	  research	  and	  explained	  the	  methodological	  
route	  taken	  to	  materialise	  it.	  With	  this	  foundation	  laid,	  in	  Part	  B,	  I	  proceed	  to	  
organise	  a	  critical	  but	  fragmented	  genealogy	  of	  the	  regulation	  of	  legal	  gender,	  or	  
rather	  sex	  (see	  Appendix	  A	  for	  terminology),	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century	  Greek	  legal	  
order.	  	  
Sex	  classification	  and	  the	  management	  of	  “doubtful	  sex”	  have	  been	  historically	  in	  
the	  hands	  of	  “men	  of	  medicine	  and	  science”	  or	  “medical	  and	  scientific	  men”,	  in	  
Dreger’s	  terms	  (Dreger	  1998:	  10).	  In	  the	  two	  chapters	  that	  constitute	  Part	  B,	  I	  focus	  
on	  texts	  produced	  by	  Greek	  men	  of	  legal	  science76	  during	  the	  twentieth	  century	  
concerning	  sex	  classification	  and	  the	  management	  of	  “doubtful	  sex.”	  The	  fact	  that	  
the	  Greek	  civil	  legislation	  did	  not	  have,	  until	  recently,	  an	  explicit	  provision	  
regulating	  sex	  (re)classification	  issues	  does	  not	  indicate	  that	  such	  issues	  were	  
absent	  from	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order.	  As	  is	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  studied	  texts,	  
national	  courts	  have	  been	  confronted	  with	  claims	  for	  sex	  re-­‐classification	  decades	  
before	  any	  relevant	  legislation	  appeared.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  lack	  of	  an	  explicit	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  Dreger’s	  labelling	  of	  “men	  of	  science”	  emphasises	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  scientists	  were	  indeed	  all	  
men,	  which	  is	  “a	  point	  of	  obvious	  significance	  given	  that	  this	  is	  a	  history	  of	  the	  negotiation	  of	  the	  
nature	  of	  sex”	  (Dreger	  1998:	  10).	  Similarly,	  the	  texts	  that	  are	  analysed	  below,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  sources	  
and	  points	  of	  reference,	  are	  the	  works	  of	  men	  and	  men	  only.	  Although,	  the	  first	  woman	  lawyer	  in	  
Greece	  is	  registered	  in	  the	  Athens	  Bar	  Association	  in	  1925,	  the	  Greek	  legal	  theory	  and	  practice	  
remained,	  for	  decades,	  almost	  exclusively	  male.	  Subsequently,	  even	  if	  outside	  the	  scientific	  terrain	  
new	  political	  claims	  had	  started	  to	  be	  articulated,	  the	  negotiation	  of	  sex/gender	  within	  legal	  theory	  
during	  entire	  twentieth	  century	  remained	  mostly	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  “men	  of	  sciences”.	  	  
Even	  throughout	  the	  last	  part	  of	  the	  century,	  while	  feminist	  -­‐and	  later	  LGBT-­‐	  legal	  theory	  and	  
jurisprudence	  were	  radically	  influencing	  the	  legal	  paradigm	  in	  Euro-­‐American	  legal	  orders,	  within	  
Greek	  legal	  theory	  there	  is	  a	  notable	  absence	  of	  such	  critique	  (Rethymniotaki	  et	  al	  2015	  :	  10,	  12;	  
Tsoukala	  2007).	  A	  rare	  exception	  is	  the	  Women’s	  Studies	  Group	  of	  the	  Aristotle	  University	  of	  
Thessaloniki	  (1983-­‐2003)	  whose	  work	  both	  within	  and	  outside	  the	  academia	  was	  very	  important	  
(Mihopoulou	  2006a;	  Tsoukala	  2007).	  Although	  the	  group	  embraced	  interdisciplinarity	  and	  later	  on	  
included	  members	  from	  different	  fields,	  all	  its	  founding	  members	  were	  alumni	  of	  the	  Law	  School,	  
which	  remained	  its	  base	  until	  the	  end	  (Mihopoulou	  2006a).	  Among	  the	  legal	  scholars	  who	  founded	  
the	  group	  was	  the	  late	  Giota	  Kravaritou,	  whose	  brave	  work	  (such	  as	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  book	  
“Gender	  and	  the	  Law”	  in	  1996)	  stands	  out	  in	  the	  male-­‐dominated	  Greek	  legal	  theory	  of	  that	  period.	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definition	  of	  sex	  or	  sex	  classification	  criteria	  in	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order	  suggests	  that	  
sex	  as	  an	  abstract	  legal	  category	  has	  been	  employed	  according	  to	  historical	  
interpretations	  of	  its	  premises.	  
By	  reading	  these	  texts,	  I	  will	  trace	  the	  debate	  over	  sex	  classification	  in	  the	  law,	  its	  
points	  of	  reference	  and	  turning	  points	  but	  also	  the	  work	  performed	  by	  the	  
interpretation	  of	  sex	  as	  a	  category	  and	  the	  power	  this	  interpretation	  entails.	  This	  
part	  will	  demonstrate	  that,	  throughout	  the	  century,	  overlapping	  interpretative	  
workings	  have	  created	  a	  nexus	  of	  categories	  and	  practices	  that	  aim	  to	  naturalise	  
the	  gender	  status	  quo	  while	  erasing	  trans	  subjectivity	  with	  immense	  conviction.	  In	  
this	  process,	  “hermaphroditism”	  becomes	  a	  key	  concept,	  whose	  role	  and	  
conceptualisation	  will	  be	  interrogated	  in	  both	  chapters.	  
Overall,	  this	  part	  utilises	  the	  analysis	  offered	  in	  chapter	  three	  concerning	  civil	  
registration,	  and	  critical	  approaches	  to	  categories	  and	  classification,	  as	  well	  as	  
interpretation	  as	  a	  modality	  of	  power.	  Moreover,	  it	  builds	  upon	  the	  background	  
that	  has	  been	  set	  down	  in	  chapter	  three	  concerning	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  
“hermaphroditism”	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  “transsexual”	  in	  medico-­‐legal	  
discourses.	  As	  described	  in	  chapter	  four,	  this	  part	  transfers	  into	  the	  legal	  field	  the	  
incitement	  to	  critically	  do	  history	  concerning	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  in	  Greece	  “not	  as	  
a	  parallel	  undertaking	  to	  contemporary	  queer	  politics,	  but	  as	  its	  inescapable	  yet	  
productive	  hauntology”	  (Papanikolaou	  2018c:	  180).	  My	  aim	  in	  this	  part	  is	  not	  to	  
fulfil	  the	  (admittedly	  ambitious)	  political	  potential	  of	  this	  incitement	  but	  to	  open	  up	  
to	  critical	  inquiry	  a	  part	  of	  legal	  history	  in	  Greece	  that	  remains	  either	  ignored	  or	  
settled	  within	  its	  dominant	  narration.	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Chapter	  5. Sex	  Classification	  in	  the	  Twentieth	  Century	  	  
(I)	  
Chapter	  five	  opens	  by	  critically	  positioning	  sex	  as	  a	  significant	  legal	  category	  within	  
processes	  of	  civil	  registration	  in	  Greece	  and	  its	  connection	  with	  modern	  techniques	  
of	  governance.	  Following	  that,	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  chapter	  attempts	  a	  critical	  reading	  of	  
Civil	  law	  texts	  dated	  approximately	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  century.	  The	  analysis	  of	  
these	  texts	  and	  case	  law	  will	  establish	  how	  “doubtful	  sex”,	  under	  the	  label	  of	  
hermaphroditism,	  was	  managed	  theoretically	  and	  practically	  in	  the	  legal	  realm	  
during	  this	  period.	  	  
It	  will	  be	  suggested	  that	  Civil	  law	  scholars	  managed	  the	  tension	  between	  the	  
supposed	  “givenness”	  of	  sex	  and	  the	  demand	  for	  medico-­‐legal	  methods	  for	  its	  
clarification	  and	  assignment	  through	  a	  series	  of	  interpretative	  manoeuvres.	  
Through	  the	  naturalisation	  of	  the	  upheld	  categories	  and	  the	  standardisation	  of	  any	  
diverging	  experience,	  Civil	  law	  jurists	  insisted	  on	  a	  simplified	  depiction	  of	  an,	  
according	  to	  a	  natural	  taxonomy,	  evenly-­‐sexed	  population.	  In	  this	  schema	  and,	  
unlike	  in	  the	  Legal	  Medicine	  canon,	  exceptions	  were	  underplayed	  and	  categories	  
were	  subsumed	  by	  one	  another	  in	  order	  to	  complete	  the	  vision	  of	  citizen	  legibility	  
in	  legal	  terms.	  	  
5.1. Civil	  Registration	  in	  the	  Modern	  Greek	  State	  
My	  mother	  and	  my	  mother’s	  mother	  have	  the	  same	  birthday.	  A	  fact	  which	  I	  found	  
thrilling	  as	  a	  child.	  Growing	  up,	  I	  realised	  that	  actually	  my	  grandmother,	  Rousa,	  born	  
during	  a	  different	  era	  in	  a	  village	  of	  Western	  Greek	  Macedonia,	  did	  not	  go	  through	  
the	  same	  registration	  processes	  that	  might	  now	  appear	  self-­‐evident	  in	  order	  to	  
become	  a	  legible	  citizen	  (i.e.,	  a	  civil	  registration	  act	  and	  a	  birth	  certificate).	  When,	  in	  
an	  older	  age,	  it	  became	  necessary	  for	  her	  to	  register	  officially	  for	  bureaucratic	  
purposes,	  she	  had	  to	  provide	  an	  exact	  date	  of	  birth	  -­‐	  a	  piece	  of	  data	  that	  could	  be	  
seen	  nowadays	  as	  central	  to	  one’s	  official	  identification	  as	  “this	  or	  that	  person”	  
(Caplan	  2001).	  However,	  this	  date	  was	  a	  piece	  of	  data	  that	  her	  12-­‐sibling	  family	  had	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not	  marked	  as	  a	  substantial	  fraction	  of	  information	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  recorded	  or	  
remembered.	  A	  piece	  of	  data	  that,	  since	  she	  simply	  did	  not	  possess	  it,	  when	  asked,	  
she	  (re)created	  on	  the	  spot	  by	  giving	  the	  date	  of	  birth	  of	  her	  youngest	  daughter	  (my	  
mother).	  In	  such	  instances,	  which	  might	  seem	  insignificant	  at	  first	  glance,	  it	  
becomes	  evident	  that	  that	  the	  ways	  we	  describe	  and	  recognise	  ourselves	  at	  an	  
official	  and	  unofficial	  level	  are	  not	  ahistorical	  practices.77	  Furthermore,	  it	  becomes	  
clear	  that	  the	  means	  and	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  citizen-­‐state	  connection	  are	  dependent	  
on	  various	  cultural,	  socio-­‐political	  and	  other	  parameters.	  Finally,	  it	  serves	  as	  a	  
reminder	  that,	  for	  the	  modern	  Greek	  State,	  the	  documentation	  of	  citizens	  and	  their	  
official	  identification	  through	  civil	  registration	  is	  a	  relatively	  recent	  endeavour.	  	  
Currently,	  civil	  registration	  in	  Greece	  is	  conducted	  and	  managed	  through	  the	  
register	  offices,	  which	  are	  special	  offices	  in	  every	  administrative	  region	  assigned	  
with	  the	  task	  of	  keeping	  vital	  public	  records	  (Skiadas	  2005).	  These	  records	  serve	  to	  
verify,	  by	  means	  of	  state	  authority,	  the	  civil	  status	  of	  citizens,	  that	  is,	  birth,	  marriage	  
(or	  recently	  registered	  partnership)	  and	  death	  (Skiadas	  2005:14).	  Before	  the	  
establishment	  of	  a	  state	  sanctioned	  civil	  registration	  system,	  the	  Orthodox	  Church	  
of	  Greece	  (OCG)	  kept	  local	  (less	  systematic)	  records	  of	  the	  Christian	  population	  in	  
every	  parish	  (Skiadas	  2005:	  15).	  The	  institution	  of	  register	  offices	  as	  it	  exists	  today	  
was	  introduced	  in	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order	  in	  1836	  with	  a	  Royal	  Decree	  “On	  
Registration	  Books”	  (R.D.	  20/10/1836),	  which	  remained	  inactive	  until	  its	  
replacement	  by	  the	  Greek	  Civil	  Law	  in	  1856	  (GG	  75/15-­‐10-­‐1856).	  The	  Greek	  Civil	  
Law	  of	  1856	  included	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  issue	  of	  civil	  registration	  (60	  articles)	  
and	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  Royal	  Decree	  (R.D.	  31/10/1856)	  mandating	  its	  application	  
and	  providing	  prototypes/examples	  of	  register	  forms.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  several	  
government	  issued	  circulars	  threatening	  penalties,	  none	  of	  the	  above	  laws	  
produced	  the	  desired	  results.	  Less	  than	  half	  of	  the	  births	  were	  recorded	  in	  the	  city	  
of	  Athens,	  while,	  in	  rural	  areas,	  the	  percentages	  were	  lower	  to	  non-­‐existent	  
(Skiadas	  2005:	  31-­‐33).	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  See	  for	  example	  Scott’s	  fascinating	  account	  on	  the	  rather	  recent	  creation	  of	  surnames	  (Scott	  
1998:	  64-­‐71).	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As	  Scott	  points	  out,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  obstacles	  that	  must	  be	  tackled	  by	  
modern	  states	  during	  standardisation	  processes	  is	  the	  resistance	  of	  the	  managed	  
population	  to	  the	  new	  administrative	  policies	  (Scott	  1998:	  80).	  Civil	  registration	  and	  
social	  legibility	  projects	  are	  usually	  followed	  by	  an	  elevated	  level	  of	  control	  and	  
various	  burdens	  such	  as	  taxes,	  and	  obligatory	  military	  services	  etc.	  (Scott	  1998:	  68).	  
The	  resistance	  to	  new	  policies	  might	  not	  necessarily	  be	  formed	  as	  a	  conscious	  
collective	  decision	  or	  a	  willing	  act	  of	  civil	  disobedience	  but,	  in	  any	  case,	  convincing	  a	  
population	  to	  abandon	  traditional	  structures	  and	  legitimisation	  processes	  in	  favour	  
of	  a	  new	  central	  administrative	  system	  is	  no	  easy	  task.	  	  
Most	  of	  the	  registration	  acts	  of	  this	  period	  refer	  to	  deaths,	  since	  the	  formalities	  
surrounding	  the	  death	  of	  a	  citizen	  would	  compel	  both	  the	  authorities	  and	  the	  
families	  to	  follow	  the	  official	  procedure.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  births	  and	  marriages	  
could	  remain	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  traditional	  rites	  without	  any	  bureaucratic	  mediation	  
(Skiadas	  2005:	  56).	  Meanwhile,	  the	  Orthodox	  Church	  maintained	  its	  parish-­‐level	  
system	  of	  population	  register,	  which	  was	  often	  used	  by	  state	  authorities	  when	  
faced	  with	  a	  lack	  of	  any	  other	  source	  of	  documentation78	  (Skiadas	  2005:	  32).	  The	  
number	  of	  registration	  acts	  increased	  significantly	  when,	  after	  the	  amendment	  of	  
the	  1856	  Law,	  the	  certificates	  issued	  by	  the	  register	  offices	  became	  the	  sole	  and	  
exclusive	  means	  of	  verifying	  the	  facts	  they	  pertained	  to	  (Skiadas	  2005:	  62).	  The	  
institution	  of	  register	  offices	  finally	  started	  to	  operate	  systematically	  in	  1925	  after	  
the	  voting	  of	  Law	  2430/1920	  and	  a	  corresponding	  Royal	  Decree	  in	  1924	  (R.D.	  
14/08/1924).	  The	  new	  legislation	  introduced	  an	  easier79	  and	  costless	  procedure	  for	  
the	  civil	  registration	  of	  citizens	  while	  maintaining	  the	  penalties	  for	  both	  citizens	  and	  
public	  servants	  who	  omitted	  mandatory	  registration	  acts.	  	  
As	  Dean	  Spade	  notes,	  a	  safe	  way	  to	  substitute	  a	  local	  custom	  with	  a	  state	  mediated	  
practice	  is	  to	  make	  it	  impossible	  for	  citizens	  to	  get	  by	  without	  complying	  with	  the	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For	  example,	  the	  military	  services	  used	  databases	  of	  the	  Church	  to	  draft	  the	  adult	  male	  citizens	  
(Skiadas	  2005:	  41). 	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  For	  example,	  Law	  2430/1920	  established	  register	  divisions	  according	  to	  the	  administrative	  
divisions	  (municipalities	  and	  communities	  at	  the	  time),	  thus,	  providing	  easier	  access	  to	  residents	  of	  
smaller	  towns	  and	  rural	  areas.	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official	  policies	  (Spade	  2008:	  741).	  Specifically,	  the	  application	  of	  the	  1920s	  
legislation	  coincides	  with	  the	  granting	  of	  rights	  to	  social	  security,	  family	  allowances,	  
food	  distributions,	  etc.	  The	  beneficiaries	  were	  required	  to	  provide	  official	  
certificates	  from	  the	  registration	  offices	  to	  verify	  their	  civil	  status	  and	  their	  
entitlement	  to	  any	  of	  those	  amenities	  (Skiadas	  2005:	  72)	  and	  “in	  this	  way,	  
caretaking	  and	  surveillance	  are	  married”	  (Spade	  2008:	  743).	  Although	  the	  
threatened	  penalties	  did	  not	  manage	  to	  enforce	  the	  civil	  registration	  laws	  at	  a	  
catholic	  level,	  social	  welfare	  and	  other	  similar	  policies	  concerning	  the	  distribution	  of	  
resources,	  especially	  in	  times	  of	  extreme	  poverty,	  were	  able	  to	  achieve	  this.	  	  
According	  to	  Spade,	  such	  patterns	  are	  indicative	  of	  “the	  connection	  between	  data	  
collection	  devised	  in	  population-­‐level	  caretaking	  programs	  and	  systems	  of	  
surveillance”	  (Spade	  2008:	  766).	  Indeed,	  the	  application	  of	  Law	  2430/1920	  and	  the	  
systematisation	  of	  civil	  registration	  coincided	  also	  with	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  
General	  Statistical	  Service	  of	  Greece	  within	  the	  Ministry	  of	  National	  Economy	  in	  
1925.80	  	  
After	  the	  normalisation	  of	  the	  civil	  registration	  system,	  the	  character	  and	  
significance	  of	  registration	  acts	  changed	  considerably.	  Birth	  certificates,	  which	  can	  
be	  produced	  only	  through	  birth	  registration	  acts,	  became	  essential	  documents	  for	  
gaining	  access	  to	  public	  services	  (health,	  education,	  etc.)	  as	  well	  as	  to	  apply	  for	  an	  
ID	  card,	  which	  is	  the	  main	  means	  of	  identity	  verification	  at	  a	  national	  level.	  Through	  
this	  process,	  civil	  registration	  that	  once	  concerned	  only	  a	  small	  percentage	  of	  
wealthy	  families	  for	  inheritance	  reasons	  became	  essential	  for	  the	  wider	  population,	  
since	  the	  increasingly	  centralised	  administration	  was	  impossible	  to	  navigate	  without	  
civil	  registration	  certificates.	  Serving	  the	  dual	  purpose	  that	  Currah	  and	  Moore	  have	  
analysed	  for	  birth	  certificates	  (both	  as	  records	  of	  facts	  and	  as	  a	  means	  to	  
authenticate	  the	  identity	  of	  a	  citizen),	  registration	  acts	  had	  to	  include	  “fixed	  pieces	  
of	  data”	  that	  can	  serve	  as	  identity	  indicators	  in	  past,	  present	  and	  future	  (Currah	  &	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Although	  some	  statistical	  services	  were	  already	  in	  function,	  the	  General	  Statistical	  Service,	  
drawing	  upon	  the	  register	  offices’	  data,	  became	  the	  first	  institution	  responsible	  for	  the	  aggregation	  
of	  demographic	  data	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  official	  statistics	  on	  a	  national	  level.	  Until	  today,	  in	  the	  form	  
of	  an	  Independent	  Authority	  under	  the	  name	  Hellenic	  Statistical	  Authority	  (ELSTAT),	  it	  remains	  the	  
state’s	  main	  source	  for	  various	  kinds	  of	  population-­‐level	  data	  and	  measurements.	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Moore	  2009:	  126;	  Moore	  &	  Currah	  2015:	  63).	  Hence,	  any	  change	  to	  a	  birth	  
registration	  act	  was	  considered	  so	  exceptional	  and	  significant	  for	  state	  affairs	  that	  it	  
would	  be	  permitted,	  and	  this	  is	  still	  the	  case	  up	  until	  now,	  only	  through	  a	  Civil	  Court	  
procedure.	  	  
Already	  from	  the	  first	  attempt	  to	  establish	  national	  civil	  registration	  in	  1836,	  sex	  
was	  included	  in	  the	  main	  identification	  parameters,	  and	  these	  were	  considered	  self-­‐
evident	  as	  well	  as	  stable	  enough	  to	  guarantee	  accurate	  lifetime	  identification	  (R.D.	  
20/10/1836).	  The	  relevance	  of	  trans	  critiques,	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  three,	  to	  
categorisation	  as	  a	  normative	  process	  within	  state	  governance	  is	  evident	  (Hale	  
1998;	  Spade	  2008;	  Meadow	  2010;	  Currah	  &	  Moore	  2009).	  Introducing	  sex	  as	  one	  of	  
the	  indisputable	  and	  stable	  facts	  that	  characterise	  a	  person	  throughout	  their	  life	  
mirrors	  the	  norms	  and	  expectations	  concerning	  sex	  attributes.	  It	  also	  reveals	  the	  
conviction	  to	  present	  a	  symmetrically	  divided	  society	  along	  (among	  others)	  the	  axis	  
of	  sex,	  even	  when	  that	  is	  contradicted	  by	  the	  endlessly	  emerging	  bodies	  and	  
subjectivities	  that	  do	  not	  neatly	  fit	  into	  this	  schema.	  Accordingly,	  the	  classification	  
of	  ambiguously	  sexed	  individuals	  became	  a	  terrain	  of	  state	  interest	  and,	  by	  1856,	  
“doubtful	  sex”	  (Mak	  2012)	  was	  decided	  by	  specialists	  appointed	  by	  the	  local	  
registrar	  under	  the	  template	  of	  hermaphroditism	  (Tzanaki	  2018:	  204).	  
According	  to	  Dimitra	  Tzanaki,	  the	  regulation	  of	  “hermaphrodite	  life”	  becomes	  
central	  in	  a	  series	  of	  socio-­‐political	  processes	  occurring	  in	  nineteenth	  century	  
Greece,	  marking	  a	  paradigm-­‐shift	  in	  terms	  of	  population	  governance	  (Tzanaki	  
2018).	  Specifically,	  her	  analysis	  suggests	  that,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  century	  and	  with	  a	  
variety	  of	  socio-­‐political	  movements	  on	  the	  rise,	  the	  criminalisation	  of	  “moral	  
hermaphroditism”	  becomes	  central	  in	  new	  technologies	  of	  governance	  aiming	  to	  
classify,	  persecute	  and	  discipline	  all	  kinds	  of	  “degenerate”	  individuals	  who	  were	  
thought	  to	  represent	  a	  tangible	  danger	  for	  public	  health	  and	  morality	  (Tzanaki	  
2018).	  Tzanaki	  traces	  this	  paradigm-­‐shift	  through	  the	  study	  of	  Greek	  Legal-­‐Medicine	  
texts	  which	  have	  incorporated	  a	  variety	  of	  medico-­‐legal	  imperatives	  of	  European	  
(especially	  French)	  specialists	  in	  their	  formation	  of	  a	  new	  understanding	  of	  sexual,	  
moral	  and	  mental	  health	  (Tzanaki	  2018).	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The	  legal	  texts	  that	  pertain	  to	  these	  procedures	  crystallise	  some	  of	  the	  most	  
emblematic	  encounters	  of	  medical	  and	  juridical	  discourse.	  Tzanaki	  prioritises	  a	  
reading	  of	  this	  process	  mainly	  concerned	  with	  the	  “arbitrary	  morality”	  constructed	  
around	  and	  through	  a	  broader	  conceptualisation	  of	  “moral	  hermaphroditism”	  
(Tzanaki	  2018).	  Nonetheless,	  looking	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  and	  mostly	  the	  
twentieth	  century,	  I	  am	  more	  interested	  in	  the	  mundane	  tasks	  performed	  by	  Civil	  
law	  jurists.	  That	  is,	  in	  the	  way	  the	  feverish	  engagement	  of	  Legal-­‐Medicine,	  
Criminology	  and	  other	  fields	  with	  “doubtful	  sex”	  translated	  into	  the	  sex	  
classification	  practices	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order,	  Civil	  law.	  In	  this	  vein,	  
the	  rest	  of	  the	  chapter	  is	  dedicated	  to	  a	  critical	  reading	  of	  Civil	  law	  texts	  that	  
formed	  the	  dominant	  paradigm	  of	  the	  legal	  management	  of	  “doubtful	  sex”	  in	  the	  
law.	  	  
5.2. The	  Early	  Texts	  and	  the	  “Predominant	  Sex”	  Thesis	  
This	  section	  engages	  with	  some	  early	  texts	  that	  discussed	  the	  issue	  of	  sex	  
(re)classification	  within	  the	  frame	  of	  hermaphroditism,	  aligning	  mostly	  with	  the	  
“predominant	  sex”	  thesis	  as	  it	  has	  been	  described	  in	  chapter	  three.	  In	  these	  texts,	  
we	  can	  see	  the	  underlying	  tensions	  between	  the	  supposedly	  self-­‐evident	  character	  
of	  sex	  classification	  and	  the	  practical	  elusiveness	  of	  its	  categorical	  definitions.	  
Before	  engaging	  with	  the	  texts	  from	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  I	  will	  
parenthetically	  analyse	  an	  earlier	  text	  titled	  “Elements	  of	  Civil	  Law”	  (Economides	  
1877),	  as	  it	  was	  highly	  influential	  in	  the	  debate	  on	  sex	  classification.	  The	  author,	  
Vasilios	  T.	  Economides,	  was	  considered	  a	  prominent	  jurist	  of	  his	  time	  and,	  thus,	  this	  
text	  continues	  to	  be	  cited	  more	  than	  a	  century	  after	  its	  publication.	  In	  this	  volume,	  
in	  the	  “General	  Principles	  of	  Civil	  Law”	  section,	  there	  is	  a	  chapter	  concerned	  with	  
the	  definition	  of	  natural	  persons	  in	  the	  law,	  where	  sex	  is	  included	  amongst	  other	  
traits	  that	  constitute	  natural	  personhood.	  The	  text	  reads:	  
1)	  Sex.	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§17.	  Two	  genders81	  [γένη]	  exist,	  male	  and	  female;	  hermaphrodites,	  which	  
belong	  to	  both,	  are	  of	  the	  predominant	  on	  them	  gender.	  As	  a	  general	  rule	  
both	  sexes	  enjoy	  the	  same	  rights	  and	  are	  of	  equal	  capability,	  although	  in	  
some	  women	  are	  inferior	  (Economides	  1877:	  68-­‐69,	  my	  translation).	  	  
One	  of	  the	  footnotes	  attached	  to	  this	  short	  paragraph	  provides	  more	  information	  
about	  the	  meaning	  and	  origins	  of	  the	  used	  taxonomy.	  Economides	  cites	  the	  Roman	  
Digest	  (also	  known	  as	  Pandects),	  as	  well	  as	  later	  Greek	  codifications	  of	  other	  Roman	  
laws,	  as	  his	  primary	  sources	  (Economides	  1877:	  68,	  footnote	  1).	  The	  Digest,	  which	  is	  
quoted	  by	  Economides	  in	  its	  original	  form	  in	  Latin,	  states	  clearly	  that,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
hermaphrodites,	  the	  “predominant”	  sex	  prevails.82	  According	  to	  Economides,	  if	  
there	  is	  doubt	  about	  which	  the	  predominant	  sex	  is,	  a	  medical	  opinion	  is	  required	  in	  
order	  to	  decide83	  (Economides	  1877:	  69).	  Last,	  the	  author	  turns	  to	  the	  work	  of	  a	  
German	  jurist	  (Eduard	  Sienbehaar)	  to	  clarify	  what	  is	  to	  be	  done	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  
person	  born	  without	  external	  signifiers	  of	  any	  sex:	  	  
Some	  claim	  that	  the	  clergy	  should	  define	  the	  gender	  to	  be	  assigned!	  Some	  
claim	  that	  such	  a	  person	  should	  only	  have	  the	  rights	  assigned	  to	  the	  human	  
person	  in	  general	  and	  not	  those	  specifically	  given	  to	  men	  and	  women.	  The	  
second	  opinion	  is	  of	  course	  more	  reasonable	  (Economides	  1877:	  69,	  my	  
translation).84	  	  
Such	  declarations	  without	  any	  reasoning	  are	  common	  in	  these	  texts	  as	  the	  
invocation	  of	  an	  authority	  or	  the	  “givenness”	  of	  an	  idea	  is	  usually	  enough	  to	  justify	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  Economides	  (1877)	  uses	  “sex”	  and	  “gender”	  as	  interchangeable	  here,	  nonetheless	  the	  Greek	  
word	  for	  “gender”	  (γένος)	  does	  not	  carry	  the	  connotations	  that	  came	  with	  the	  sex-­‐gender	  distinction	  
of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  (see	  Appendix	  A	  for	  terminology).	  	  
82
	  Quaeritur	  hermaphroditum,	  cui	  comparamus?	  et	  majis	  puto	  ejus	  sexus	  aestimandum	  qui	  in	  eo	  
praevalet	  (Dig.	  1.5	  L.10	  as	  quoted	  by	  Economides).	  
83
	  An	  Austrian	  case	  is	  mentioned	  as	  an	  example	  of	  such	  a	  procedure	  (Economides	  1877:	  69).	  
84
	  Although,	  according	  to	  Tzanaki,	  the	  issue	  of	  “social	  and	  political	  death”	  of	  hermaphrodite	  life	  can	  
be	  approached	  through	  such	  provisions	  that	  create	  categories	  of	  lesser	  citizens,	  I	  will	  not	  explore	  
this	  argument	  as	  my	  focus	  here	  is	  on	  the	  definitional	  work	  of	  the	  text	  (Tzanaki	  2018:	  320).	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a	  statement.85	  Economides’	  text	  is	  important	  not	  only	  because	  of	  its	  continuous	  
influence	  but	  also	  because	  it	  combines	  two	  traditions	  that	  have	  been	  the	  pillars	  of	  
Greek	  Civil	  law,	  that	  is	  Roman	  and	  German	  law.	  Economides,	  having	  studied	  in	  
Germany	  himself,	  was	  using	  German	  elements	  in	  his	  work	  to	  complement	  the	  
Roman	  and	  Greek	  legal	  traditions.	  Drawing	  from	  texts	  of	  the	  Roman	  and	  German	  
legal	  system,	  this	  approach	  follows	  the	  “predominant	  sex”	  thesis,	  thus	  recognising	  
the	  existence	  of	  hermaphrodites	  in	  their	  early	  conceptualisation,	  that	  is,	  as	  a	  
mixture	  of	  the	  two	  sexes	  in	  a	  single	  body.	  The	  German	  civil	  law	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  
century,	  which	  is	  used	  by	  Economides	  as	  a	  source,	  follows	  a	  procedure	  similar	  to	  
that	  of	  Roman	  legal	  tradition.	  The	  individual	  was	  assigned	  with	  the	  “predominant	  
sex”	  as	  decided	  according	  to	  the	  advice	  of	  the	  experts.	  In	  cases	  where	  “the	  sex	  
characteristics	  are	  represented	  equally”,	  Bavarian	  Law	  allowed	  the	  individual	  to	  
choose	  between	  the	  two	  sexes	  under	  the	  precondition	  of	  permanence	  (Mak	  2005:	  
201-­‐202).	  In	  this	  text,	  as	  in	  most	  of	  this	  era,	  the	  character	  of	  sex	  seems	  to	  be	  
apparent	  and	  doubtful	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  This	  contradiction,	  to	  which	  we	  will	  
return,	  appears	  fundamental	  within	  sex	  classification	  in	  the	  law.	  
Moving	  into	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  in	  1907,	  the	  first	  longer	  study	  in	  Greek	  law	  is	  
published	  under	  the	  title	  “Hermaphrodites	  and	  pseudo-­‐hermaphrodites	  in	  the	  legal	  
science”	  by	  	  lawyer	  Alexandros	  N.	  Siatos	  (Siatos	  1907).	  Siatos’	  (1907)	  text,	  although	  
the	  most	  detailed	  of	  his	  time	  on	  the	  issue,	  did	  not	  have	  the	  effect	  or	  the	  citation	  
frequency	  that	  might	  be	  expected	  for	  the	  sole	  legal	  study	  on	  the	  issue,	  as	  he	  was	  
not	  a	  highly	  acknowledged	  scholar	  or	  judge.86	  Siatos	  structured	  the	  text	  in	  11	  short	  
parts	  (27	  pages	  in	  total),	  each	  of	  which	  dealt	  with	  different	  questions	  of	  Civil	  law	  
that	  could	  be	  posed	  by	  the	  existence	  of	  hermaphrodites.	  	  Although	  Siatos	  uses	  
Roman	  law	  as	  the	  legal	  base	  of	  his	  study,	  the	  taxonomy	  used	  is	  aligned	  with	  the	  
medico-­‐legal	  views	  of	  his	  period,	  which	  define	  as	  “true	  hermaphrodites”	  only	  the	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  A	  definition	  given	  in	  another	  footnote	  states	  that	  “the	  words	  man	  and	  woman	  in	  the	  law	  refer	  to	  
the	  male	  or	  female	  gender	  without	  a	  differentiation	  of	  age”	  (Economides	  1877:	  69).	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  On	  the	  contrary,	  Economides’	  text,	  is	  cited	  throughout	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  even	  
though	  it	  does	  not	  acknowledge	  the	  medico-­‐legal	  studies	  that	  already	  existed	  in	  Greece	  (see	  
Kritsotaki	  2013;	  Tzanaki	  2018)	  and	  is	  not	  aligned	  with	  the	  contemporary	  medical	  opinion	  about	  the	  
nature	  of	  hermaphrodites	  (that	  is	  the	  “true	  sex”	  dogma	  instead	  of	  the	  “predominant	  sex”	  dogma).	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rare	  cases	  of	  co-­‐existence	  of	  “male	  and	  female	  gonads”	  that	  is,	  testicular	  and	  
ovarian	  tissue,	  referring	  to	  the	  rest	  as	  “pseudo-­‐hermaphrodites”	  (Siatos	  1907:	  7).	  87	  	  
Siatos	  (1907)	  acknowledges	  some	  studies	  of	  Legal	  Medicine	  in	  his	  text	  and	  includes	  
some	  exemplary	  cases88	  along	  with	  other	  sources89	  in	  the	  first	  and	  longest	  part	  of	  
the	  text,	  which	  negotiates	  issues	  of	  marriage	  and	  engagement	  involving	  
hermaphrodites.	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  parts	  are	  challenges	  posed	  to	  Civil	  law	  by	  
hypothetical	  scenarios	  of	  legal	  complications	  due	  to	  hermaphroditism.	  Some	  of	  
these	  questions	  are	  inspired	  by	  Roman	  law	  provisions	  (e.g.	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  male	  
hermaphrodite	  to	  witness	  testaments)	  and	  others	  appear	  to	  be	  imagined	  by	  the	  
author	  as	  legal	  riddles.90	  In	  the	  part	  of	  the	  text	  which	  considers	  the	  birth	  
registration	  act	  of	  newborn	  hermaphrodites,	  Siatos	  engages	  with	  the	  category	  of	  
the	  legal	  monster	  and,	  although	  he	  does	  not	  name	  the	  hermaphrodite	  as	  such,	  he	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  Greek	  studies	  of	  Legal	  Medicine	  included	  various	  taxonomic	  orderings	  translated	  from	  the	  works	  
of	  European	  medical	  men	  but	  very	  few	  reported	  original	  cases,	  although	  they	  did	  include	  detailed	  
translations	  of	  famous	  foreign	  cases	  of	  hermaphroditism	  (Georgantas	  1885;	  Kallivokas	  &	  Potamianos	  
1899;	  Vafas	  1903).	  By	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  there	  had	  been	  only	  three	  official	  
publications	  reporting	  on	  Greek	  cases	  of	  hermaphroditism	  (in	  1896,	  1899	  and	  1903)	  in	  Legal	  
Medicine,	  although	  according	  to	  one	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  writers	  of	  the	  field	  (Georgios	  H.	  Vafas)	  
many	  cases	  have	  been	  examined	  without	  a	  following	  publication	  (Vafas	  1903:	  227).	  
88
	  For	  example,	  a	  case	  treated	  by	  Georgios	  Vafas,	  a	  leading	  expert	  in	  Legal	  Medicine.	  Vafas	  received	  
a	  letter	  by	  an	  Orthodox	  priest	  who	  was	  faced	  with	  the	  claim	  to	  re-­‐baptise	  as	  male,	  a	  person	  that	  had	  
already	  been	  baptised	  as	  female	  in	  childhood.	  The	  local	  doctor	  did	  not	  possess	  the	  expertise	  to	  
decide	  on	  an	  extremely	  rare	  case	  of	  anatomical	  ambiguity,	  which	  was	  described	  in	  Vafas	  writings	  in	  
detail	  (Vafas	  1903:	  244-­‐247).	  The	  person	  was	  classified	  as	  a	  hermaphrodite	  by	  Vafas	  without	  
clarifying	  the	  variation	  as	  “true”	  of	  “pseudo”	  since	  he	  was	  unable	  to	  verify	  the	  existence	  or	  absence	  
of	  ovarian	  tissue	  (Vafas	  1903:	  247).	  Paraskevas	  (as	  was	  the	  individual’s	  acquired	  name)	  was	  baptised	  
and	  raised	  as	  female	  but	  had	  very	  ambiguous	  genital	  anatomy	  and	  a	  declared	  attraction	  towards	  
women.	  When	  he	  turned	  twenty,	  he	  requested	  to	  be	  re-­‐baptised	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  a	  male	  name	  
and	  live	  as	  a	  man	  (Vafas	  1903:	  247).	  This	  case	  is	  unique	  for	  its	  time	  not	  only	  in	  medical	  terms	  but	  
also	  in	  terms	  of	  Orthodox	  dogmatic	  practices.	  After	  the	  expert	  opinion	  of	  Vafas,	  Paraskevas	  was	  
indeed	  re-­‐baptised	  making	  this	  the	  only	  official	  report	  of	  such	  a	  re-­‐baptising	  found	  during	  the	  
present	  research.	  
89
	  Such	  as	  the	  minutiae	  of	  the	  Holy	  Synod	  (1887),	  which	  discuss	  the	  application	  for	  marriage	  license	  
on	  the	  part	  of	  a	  man	  that	  “has	  lived	  until	  the	  age	  of	  thirty	  as	  a	  woman”	  (Siatos	  1907:	  8).	  	  
90	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  simultaneous	  death	  of	  parent	  and	  child,	  the	  hereditary	  rights	  depend	  
on	  the	  legal	  age	  of	  the	  child.	  If	  the	  child	  is	  preadolescent,	  its	  death	  is	  presumed	  prior	  to	  the	  parent’s	  
while	  if	  adolescent	  its	  death	  is	  presumed	  later	  than	  the	  parent’s	  death.	  Since	  the	  legal	  age	  for	  
adolescence	  varied	  depending	  on	  the	  child’s	  gender	  (twelve	  for	  girls	  and	  fourteen	  for	  boys),	  the	  
author	  considers	  what	  should	  be	  done	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  death	  of	  a	  parent	  and	  a	  hermaphrodite	  
child	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  this	  age	  limit	  (Siatos	  1907:	  16-­‐17).	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suggests	  that	  it	  is	  the	  same	  procedure	  that	  should	  be	  activated	  in	  case	  of	  any	  
“unnatural	  creation”	  (παρά	  φύσιν	  γέννημα)	  (Siatos	  1907:	  24).	  That	  is,	  the	  existing	  
legislation	  since	  1856	  (art.	  67	  of	  the	  1856	  Law	  on	  Registration	  Acts)	  allowed	  the	  
Registrar	  to	  assign	  Legal	  Medicine	  experts	  in	  case	  of	  doubt	  about	  the	  newborn’s	  
nature.	  Siatos	  suggests,	  following	  Economides,	  that	  in	  case	  Legal	  Medicine	  
professionals	  do	  not	  have	  a	  clear	  answer,	  the	  person	  should	  be	  granted	  only	  
general	  legal	  rights	  and	  not	  those	  specific	  to	  men	  and	  women.	  Finally,	  a	  correction	  
of	  the	  birth	  registration	  act	  is	  possible	  according	  to	  Siatos	  as	  it	  is	  a	  “matter	  of	  public	  
interest”	  (Siatos	  1907:	  25).	  
The	  last	  theoretical	  text	  from	  the	  field	  of	  Civil	  law	  (specifically	  Family	  law)	  that	  will	  
be	  presented	  in	  this	  part	  is	  found	  in	  a	  multi-­‐volume	  work	  of	  the	  highly	  respected	  
scholar	  Nicolaos	  P.	  Dimitrakopoulos	  (Dimitrakopoulos	  1912).91	  Dimitrakopoulos	  
engaged	  with	  the	  issue	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  marriage	  and	  specifically	  refers	  to	  
hermaphroditism	  as	  a	  form	  of	  physical	  flaw	  that	  might	  intervene	  with	  a	  person’s	  
capability	  to	  consummate	  a	  marriage	  (Dimitrakopoulos	  1912).	  Dimitrakopoulos	  
(1912)	  follows	  the	  “predominant	  sex”	  dogma	  and	  uses	  the	  distinction	  between	  
“true”	  and	  “apparent”	  (similar	  to	  pseudo)	  hermaphroditism	  as	  established	  by	  the	  
dominant	  medical	  discourse	  of	  his	  time.	  Like	  Economides,	  Dimitrakopoulos	  ignores	  
the	  Greek	  studies	  of	  Legal	  Medicine	  on	  the	  issue	  -­‐	  citing	  directly	  works	  of	  European	  
medical	  men	  -­‐	  as	  well	  as	  Siatos’	  work,	  but	  does	  cite	  Economides’	  text.	  Specifically,	  
he	  refers	  to	  other	  legal	  solutions	  (the	  1856	  provision	  on	  “unnatural	  creations”92	  or	  
a	  consultation	  from	  the	  clergy)	  but,	  finally,	  he	  takes	  upon	  Economides’	  suggestion	  
of	  granting	  general	  rights	  and	  not	  gender-­‐specific	  rights	  in	  case	  that	  the	  “diagnosis	  
of	  sex	  proves	  impossible”	  (Dimitrakopoulos	  1912:	  269).	  This	  re-­‐reading	  of	  
Economides’	  text	  completely	  changes	  the	  scope	  of	  its	  application,	  as	  the	  initial	  text	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  Dimitrakopoulos	  studied	  in	  the	  Athens	  Law	  School,	  worked	  as	  a	  lawyer,	  engaged	  in	  a	  political	  
career	  and	  served	  as	  a	  Minister	  of	  Justice.	  His	  legislative	  work,	  his	  political	  and	  ethical	  stance	  and	  his	  
very	  broad	  scope	  of	  legal	  knowledge	  gave	  him	  a	  “mythical”	  status	  within	  Greek	  legal	  theory	  
(Karamitzos	  2019).	  
92
	  He	  rejects	  this	  solution	  because	  be	  believes	  the	  apparent	  scope	  of	  the	  provision	  are	  monsters,	  
thus,	  confirming	  once	  again	  that	  hermaphroditism	  did	  not	  fall	  under	  the	  purview	  of	  teratology	  in	  this	  
era.	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referred	  to	  individuals	  “born	  without	  external	  signifiers	  of	  any	  gender”	  while	  
Dimitrakopoulos	  uses	  it	  to	  resolve	  the	  issue	  of	  extreme	  ambiguity	  or	  even	  “perfect	  
hermaphroditism”	  (Dimitrakopoulos	  1912:	  269).	  	  
Overall,	  what	  we	  see	  in	  these	  first	  texts	  is	  a	  general	  aligning	  with	  the	  “predominant	  
sex”	  thesis	  and	  a	  tendency	  to	  restrict	  the	  possibility	  for	  a	  mixture	  of	  sexes	  only	  to	  
rare	  cases	  of	  “true/perfect”	  hermaphroditism.	  The	  “givenness”	  of	  sex	  is	  the	  
underlying	  assumption	  that	  is	  preserved	  intact	  regardless	  of	  the	  demand	  for	  legal	  
response	  to	  a	  reality	  that	  appears	  somewhat	  different.	  Moreover,	  there	  is	  an	  
unsystematic	  and	  sporadic	  connection	  with	  Legal	  Medicine,	  which,	  as	  is	  explored	  in	  
the	  next	  section,	  resulted	  in	  a	  series	  of	  conflations	  and	  taxonomic	  ambiguities	  
within	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  the	  following	  years.	  
5.3. The	  Published	  Cases	  	  
and	  the	  Beginning	  of	  Taxonomic	  Conflations	  
In	  this	  section,	  by	  reading	  cases	  of	  sex	  (re)classification	  published	  in	  legal	  journals,	  I	  
follow	  the	  interpretative	  workings	  of	  Civil	  law	  scholars	  as	  they	  proceed	  to	  compose	  
a	  set	  of	  regulatory	  discourses	  concerning	  the	  law’s	  sex	  imperative.	  I	  suggest	  that	  
the	  undertaken	  taxonomies	  and	  analysis	  in	  the	  field	  of	  Civil	  law	  attempt	  to	  present	  
a	  simplified	  reality	  through	  the	  subsumption	  of	  individuals	  in	  categories	  of	  
standardised	  classification	  through	  a	  set	  of	  strategic	  (re)interpretative	  gestures.	  
The	  first	  case	  found	  in	  a	  Greek	  legal	  journal	  is	  a	  summary	  of	  a	  Swiss	  Civil	  court	  
decision	  concerning	  the	  change	  of	  legal	  status	  of	  an	  individual	  from	  male	  to	  female	  
(Themis	  1946:	  406).	  The	  decision,	  which	  accepted	  the	  applicant’s	  claim,	  is	  very	  
important,	  as	  through	  its	  translation	  and	  publication	  in	  Greek,	  it	  became	  the	  
precedent	  used	  by	  Greek	  Civil	  courts	  in	  this	  period.	  It	  was	  reprinted	  under	  the	  
description	  “Hermaphrodite	  -­‐	  sex	  change	  due	  to	  surgical	  procedure	  -­‐	  correction	  of	  
sex	  and	  name	  in	  civil	  registration	  act”.	  	  Nonetheless,	  going	  through	  the	  translated	  
decision,	  the	  individual	  is	  not	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  hermaphrodite	  in	  the	  text.	  Looking	  
into	  other	  sources,	  I	  confirmed	  that	  this	  is	  actually	  the	  case	  of	  Arlette	  Leber,	  known	  
as	  one	  of	  the	  first	  transsexual	  women	  in	  Europe	  to	  have	  her	  civil	  status	  changed	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after	  several	  surgical	  procedures	  (Meyerowitz	  2004:	  48,	  De	  Savitsch	  1958).	  The	  
labelling	  of	  Leber	  as	  a	  hermaphrodite	  in	  the	  Greek	  legal	  context	  is	  indicative	  of	  a	  
series	  of	  taxonomic	  conflations	  that	  begin	  in	  this	  period	  and	  continue	  in	  the	  legal	  
texts	  of	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  century.	  	  
The	  translated	  decision	  describes	  Leber	  as	  having	  “the	  body	  of	  a	  man	  and	  the	  
psychical	  condition	  of	  a	  woman”,	  thus,	  suffering	  from	  a	  great	  imbalance	  and	  an	  
inability	  to	  function	  normally	  in	  society	  (Themis	  1946:	  406).	  After	  a	  series	  of	  surgical	  
procedures,	  Leber	  acquired	  female	  physical	  appearance	  and	  applied	  for	  the	  
amendment	  of	  her	  legal	  status,	  which	  was	  granted	  by	  the	  competent	  court,	  
following	  what	  would	  now	  be	  considered	  a	  progressive	  approach:	  
This	  inclines	  us	  to	  attribute	  to	  the	  psychic	  element,	  in	  the	  determination	  of	  
sex,	  an	  importance	  at	  least	  equal	  to	  that	  of	  the	  physical	  element...	  It	  is	  not	  
only	  the	  body	  which	  determines	  the	  sex	  of	  the	  individual,	  it	  is	  also	  the	  mind.	  
When	  there	  is	  a	  discord	  between	  body	  and	  mind,	  one	  must	  see	  which	  of	  
these	  two	  elements	  predominates	  (Themis	  1946:	  406;	  English	  translation	  
from	  De	  Savitsch	  1958).	  
Here	  the	  power	  embedded	  within	  interpretation	  rises	  over	  the	  body	  of	  the	  text	  
towards	  two	  different	  directions.	  First,	  the	  Swiss	  judge	  (following	  specific	  
sexological	  imperatives)93	  re-­‐reads	  sex	  as	  having	  a	  different	  meaning	  compared	  to	  
other	  texts,	  which	  saw	  specific	  anatomical	  topologies	  as	  the	  sole	  truth-­‐bearers	  of	  
sex	  within	  a	  body.	  Even	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  sex	  assignment,	  the	  “predominant	  sex”	  
dogma,	  seems	  to	  be	  relativised	  here.	  The	  “predominance”	  that	  must	  be	  confirmed	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  The	  court	  found	  that	  Leber’s	  claim	  could	  be	  denied	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  being	  an	  “invert”	  if	  she	  had	  
been	  classified	  as	  “psychosexual	  hermaphrodite”	  (hermaphrodites	  psychosexuels).	  Since	  her	  
diagnosis	  defined	  her	  a	  “congenital	  invert”	  (invertis	  constitutionnels)	  it	  followed	  that:	  
(…)	  the	  female	  feelings	  have	  their	  source	  in	  the	  depths	  of	  their	  existence	  and	  are	  independent	  of	  
external	  factors.	  They	  appear	  in	  very	  early	  age	  and	  are	  so	  powerful	  that	  their	  [the	  individual’s]	  will	  is	  
unable	  to	  control	  them	  (Themis	  1946:	  406,	  my	  translation).	  
This	  taxonomy	  derives	  from	  the	  sexological	  studies	  of	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century	  whose	  main	  subject	  
until	  that	  moment	  has	  been	  the	  “sexual	  invert”	  in	  her/his	  numerous	  variations	  (Dreger	  1998:	  135;	  
Prosser	  1998:	  116).	  The	  emphasis	  of	  the	  “congenital”	  character	  of	  Leber’s	  “inversion”	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  
a	  trace	  of	  the	  -­‐later	  to	  become	  clear-­‐	  differentiation	  in	  the	  legal	  treatment	  of	  intersex	  (under	  the	  
label	  of	  hermaphrodite)	  and	  trans	  (under	  various	  labels)	  individuals	  (Sharpe	  2010:	  98).	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is	  between	  physical	  and	  psychical	  elements	  of	  sex	  identification	  and	  not	  between	  
conflicting	  anatomical	  signs.	  This	  idea,	  in	  a	  de-­‐medicalised	  version,	  echoes	  in	  
current	  legal	  conceptualisations	  of	  gender	  identity	  as	  a	  person’s	  “deeply	  felt	  
internal	  and	  individual	  experience	  of	  gender,	  which	  may	  or	  may	  not	  correspond	  
with	  the	  sex	  assigned	  at	  birth”	  (Yogyakarta	  Principles	  2006,	  introduction,	  footnote	  
2).	  	  
The	  second	  interpretative	  gesture	  is	  the	  Greek	  jurist’s	  translation	  of	  the	  decision	  
that	  re-­‐reads	  the	  (trans)	  identity	  of	  Leber,	  classifying	  her	  as	  a	  hermaphrodite.	  This	  
obviously	  implies	  a	  completely	  different	  concept	  of	  hermaphroditism	  (“a	  discord	  
between	  body	  and	  mind”)	  than	  the	  one	  found	  in	  previous	  texts	  but	  also	  shifts	  the	  
understanding	  of	  how	  a	  body	  is	  sexed:	  
We	  should	  classify	  L.,	  who	  is	  neither	  a	  perfect	  man	  nor	  a	  perfect	  woman,	  as	  
the	  sex	  to	  which	  he	  [sic]	  approximates	  the	  most	  (Themis	  1946:	  406,	  my	  
translation)	  
These	  gestures	  suggest	  that	  Leber’s	  case,	  and	  the	  way	  it	  was	  published	  and	  used	  in	  
the	  Greek	  legal	  order,	  is	  exemplary	  of	  the	  instability	  of	  sex	  classification	  in	  the	  law,	  
as	  well	  as	  of	  the	  power	  of	  the	  interpreter	  over	  the	  categories	  used	  in	  classification.	  	  
In	  the	  same	  year,	  a	  related	  Greek	  Civil	  Court	  decision	  (483/1946	  First	  Instance	  Court	  
of	  Serres)	  was	  reprinted	  in	  the	  same	  journal.	  In	  this	  decision,	  the	  Greek	  First	  
Instance	  judge	  came	  to	  accept	  the	  claim	  of	  a	  person,	  characterised	  as	  a	  
hermaphrodite,	  to	  change	  his	  legal	  status	  from	  female	  to	  male	  by	  amending	  the	  
birth	  registration	  act	  (Themis	  1947:	  27).	  The	  Leber	  case	  was	  not	  used	  as	  precedent	  
in	  the	  trial	  (it	  probably	  had	  not	  been	  published	  when	  this	  case	  was	  discussed)	  but	  it	  
is	  mentioned	  in	  the	  publication	  as	  a	  comment.	  In	  the	  same	  footnote,	  there	  is	  a	  
detailed	  description	  of	  the	  (unlike	  Leber’s)	  ambiguous	  genital	  anatomy	  of	  the	  
applicant,	  which	  was	  “perfected”	  by	  surgical	  intervention	  at	  the	  age	  of	  twelve.	  	  
Accordingly,	  in	  cases	  of	  pseudo	  or	  true	  hermaphroditism	  (…)	  the	  
hermaphrodite	  is	  classified	  according	  to	  his	  [sic]	  predominant	  sex	  (“qui	  in	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eo	  prevalet”),	  as	  anyway	  applied	  until	  now,	  according	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  
Roman	  Law	  (Themis	  1947:	  27,	  my	  translation).	  
Even	  with	  Roman	  law	  safely	  paving	  the	  way	  concerning	  how	  to	  regulate	  
hermaphroditism,	  in	  this	  historical	  encounter	  of	  a	  Greek	  judge	  with	  an	  ambiguously	  
sexed	  individual,	  the	  question	  of	  sex	  definition	  in	  the	  law	  seemed	  inevitable.	  	  	  
The	  current	  Civil	  Code	  (2250/1940)	  does	  not	  introduce	  anywhere	  in	  its	  
provisions	  an	  explicit	  division	  of	  genders	  [γενών]	  (namely	  a	  sex	  division	  of	  
natural	  persons	  as	  defined	  by	  articles	  34-­‐60),	  nonetheless	  from	  its	  overall	  
spirit	  it	  is	  clearly	  deduced	  that	  only	  two	  natural	  sexes	  are	  accepted	  by	  it	  
(Themis	  1947:	  27,	  my	  translation).	  	  
This	  sentence,	  which	  will	  be	  repeated	  verbatim	  in	  later	  legal	  texts,	  is	  emblematic	  of	  
the	  work	  that	  is	  performed	  by	  interpretation	  but,	  even	  more	  so,	  of	  the	  way	  a	  legal	  
order	  is	  gendered	  according	  the	  norm	  it	  codifies.	  As	  suggested	  in	  chapter	  three,	  the	  
gender	  status	  quo	  as	  part	  of	  the	  set	  of	  norms,	  which,	  following	  Foucault’s	  thought,	  
is	  connected	  with	  each	  legal	  system	  does	  not	  rely	  necessary	  on	  explicit	  invocations	  
within	  the	  text	  of	  the	  law	  (Foucault	  2003:	  55).	  Nonetheless,	  with	  this	  sentence,	  the	  
judge	  pulls	  the	  norm	  from	  the	  background	  to	  the	  foreground,	  not	  to	  question	  it	  but	  
to	  reify	  its	  omnipresence	  and	  to	  create	  with	  his	  own	  text	  a	  new,	  more	  stable,	  grip	  
for	  future	  readings	  of	  gender	  as	  a	  category	  in	  the	  law.	  	  
In	  the	  following	  years,	  two	  similar	  cases	  were	  published	  following	  the	  legal	  path	  of	  
decision	  483/1946.	  Decisions	  7116/1948	  First	  Instance	  Court	  of	  Athens	  (Themis	  
1948:	  840)	  and	  186/1949	  First	  Instance	  Court	  of	  Ioannina	  (EEN	  1950:	  217)	  accepted	  
the	  claims	  of	  two	  applicants	  to	  amend	  their	  birth	  registration	  acts,	  and,	  thus,	  
change	  their	  civil	  status	  from	  female	  to	  male.	  The	  applicants	  are	  characterised	  as	  
hermaphrodites	  but	  neither	  of	  the	  published	  decisions	  incudes	  details	  about	  their	  
bodily	  anatomy,	  which	  was	  discussed	  in	  court	  and	  “proved”	  by	  the	  means	  of	  
medical	  reports.	  Both	  judges	  use	  decision	  483/1946	  as	  precedent,	  as	  well	  as	  highly	  
respected	  Civil	  law	  volumes	  (e.g.	  Economides’	  text)	  to	  establish	  a	  legal	  justification.	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Once	  again,	  there	  is	  a	  justification	  not	  only	  concerning	  the	  management	  of	  
hermaphroditism	  but	  also	  the	  gender	  imperative	  of	  the	  Greek	  Civil	  law	  in	  principle.	  
Concerning	  gender,	  the	  Civil	  Code	  recognises	  only	  two	  sexes,	  man	  and	  
woman,	  as	  it	  can	  be	  deduced	  from	  its	  overall	  spirit	  (Themis	  1948:	  840,	  my	  
translation)	  	  
Indirectly,	  from	  the	  articles	  34-­‐60	  of	  the	  Civil	  Code	  on	  civil	  status,	  it	  can	  be	  
concluded	  that	  it	  (…)	  recognises	  two	  sexes,	  those	  of	  male	  and	  female	  (EEN	  
1950:	  217,	  my	  translation)	  
This	  conclusion	  is	  carried	  in	  the	  texts	  of	  Civil	  law	  throughout	  the	  century	  usually	  
citing	  several	  previous	  texts	  (such	  as	  these	  two	  decisions)	  that	  have	  used	  the	  same	  
argument.	  Again,	  all	  of	  them	  find	  their	  grounding	  in	  earlier	  texts	  of	  Civil	  law,	  where	  
other	  men	  of	  science	  have	  declared	  their	  equally	  self-­‐evident	  truth	  about	  the	  world	  
(Dreger	  1998).	  These	  truths	  are	  declared	  in	  a	  simple,	  straightforward	  way,	  as	  seen	  
above	  without	  any	  hint	  of	  doubt	  or	  need	  for	  further	  analysis.	  After	  all,	  one	  the	  most	  
important	  sources	  used	  as	  justification	  in	  these	  decisions	  is	  Economides’	  “Elements	  
of	  Civil	  Law”	  and	  its	  solid	  argument:	  “Two	  genders	  exist,	  male	  and	  female”	  
(Economides	  1877:	  68).	  	  
What	  should	  be	  noted	  is	  that	  these	  texts	  are	  situated	  in	  a	  period	  marked	  by	  an	  
acceleration	  of	  “sexual	  science”	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  new	  identities	  within	  and	  across	  the	  
fields	  of	  Sexology	  and	  Psychology	  (Prosser	  1998b).	  These	  new	  types	  of	  individuals,	  
as	  Foucault	  has	  shown,	  emerged	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  juridico-­‐medical	  and,	  
especially,	  through	  the	  incorporation	  of	  psychosexual	  orderings	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  
Criminology,	  Legal	  Medicine,	  Medical	  Jurisprudence	  etc.	  (Foucault	  1978).	  In	  this	  
process,	  Foucault	  names	  interpretation	  as	  one	  of	  the	  methods	  of	  sexual	  science	  to	  
constitute	  the	  “sexual	  confession”	  of	  the	  individual	  in	  scientific	  terms	  (Foucault	  
1978:	  67).	  According	  to	  Foucault,	  the	  truth	  about	  the	  subject’s	  sex	  was	  “constituted	  
in	  two	  stages”	  -­‐	  that	  of	  the	  confession	  and	  later	  its	  “decipherment”,	  which	  
completed	  the	  truth	  through	  interpretation	  (Foucault	  1978:	  67).	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The	  one	  who	  listened	  was	  not	  simply	  the	  forgiving	  master,	  the	  judge	  who	  
condemned	  or	  acquitted;	  he	  was	  the	  master	  of	  truth.	  He	  was	  a	  
hermeneutic	  function.	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  confession,	  his	  power	  was	  not	  
only	  to	  demand	  it	  before	  it	  was	  made,	  or	  decide	  what	  was	  to	  follow	  after	  it,	  
but	  also	  to	  constitute	  a	  discourse	  of	  truth	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  decipherment	  
(Foucault	  1978:	  67).	  
The	  power	  here	  resides	  largely	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  interpreter,	  who,	  in	  this	  case,	  
would	  be	  the	  sexologist,	  the	  psychologist	  or	  some	  other	  medical	  or	  medico-­‐legal	  
professional.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  the	  “truth”	  that	  reaches	  the	  Civil	  court,	  as	  there	  are	  
different	  hermeneutic	  workings	  to	  be	  performed	  there.	  	  
The	  “deciphered”	  experience,	  now	  dressed	  in	  medicalised	  terms	  and	  assorted	  in	  
proper	  categories	  by	  the	  medical	  scientist,	  has	  to	  be	  re-­‐read	  by	  the	  jurist	  to	  enter	  
the	  field	  of	  Civil	  law.	  The	  Civil	  law	  jurist	  engages	  in	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  interpretation	  
of	  previous	  legal	  texts,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  given	  diagnosis,	  according	  to	  demands	  of	  his	  
field.	  This	  is	  the	  core	  of	  my	  argument	  concerning	  sex	  classification	  in	  the	  law	  during	  
this	  era.	  The	  seeming	  contradiction,	  mentioned	  earlier,	  between	  the	  “given”	  
character	  of	  sex	  and	  the	  demand	  for	  judicial	  resolution	  over	  increasingly	  more	  
cases,	  which	  implies	  ambiguity	  and	  instability,	  was	  tackled	  by	  Civil	  Law	  jurists	  in	  a	  
very	  specific	  way.	  What	  we	  see	  in	  the	  published	  cases	  and	  texts	  of	  this	  period	  is	  
that,	  while	  the	  corresponding	  studies	  of	  medico-­‐legal	  sciences	  are	  “discovering”	  all	  
kinds	  of	  “sexual	  inverts”,	  the	  Civil	  Law	  logic	  is	  on	  a	  parallel	  path	  of	  simple	  truths	  and	  
common	  knowledges.	  Namely,	  there	  seemed	  to	  be	  no	  intention	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  
First	  Instance	  Civil	  courts	  to	  enter	  the	  labyrinthine	  field	  of	  sexology	  and	  engage	  in	  
explicit	  classifications	  of	  “sexual	  inverts”.	  Similarly,	  in	  Civil	  Law	  theory,	  the	  line	  that	  
dominated	  was	  one	  aiming	  to	  preserve	  the	  supposed	  simplicity,	  even	  with	  its	  
supposedly	  rare	  exceptions,	  of	  sex	  classification.	  The	  brief,	  if	  any,	  reference	  to	  
Greek	  or	  foreign	  medico-­‐legal	  literature	  served	  mostly	  to	  provide	  the	  jurist	  with	  the	  
appropriate	  nomenclature	  and	  the	  impression	  of	  an	  issue	  that	  can	  be	  confidently	  
resolved.	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This	  also	  confirms	  the	  value	  of	  my	  methodological	  suggestion	  to	  study	  the	  issue	  of	  
sex	  classification	  in	  the	  law	  with	  a	  field	  focus	  different	  than	  Legal	  Medicine,	  
Criminology	  and	  similar	  fields.	  In	  doing	  so,	  I	  offer	  a	  complementary	  view	  of	  the	  
complex	  image	  within	  which	  we	  see	  two	  different	  tasks	  executed	  by	  men	  of	  
medical/medico-­‐legal	  science,	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  Civil	  law	  jurists	  on	  the	  other.	  As	  
implied	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  former	  corpus	  by	  contemporary	  scholars,	  Greek	  Legal	  
Medicine	  and	  Criminology	  describe	  individuals	  as	  fascinating	  and	  dangerous	  in	  their	  
anomaly	  and	  its	  moral,	  political	  and	  psycho-­‐sexual	  expression	  (Kritsotaki	  2013;	  
Tzanaki	  2018).	  Holding	  a	  microscope	  to	  their	  irregularities	  in	  order	  to	  classify	  them	  
in	  complex	  orderings,	  these	  fields	  perform	  a	  gesture	  a	  lot	  like	  pinning	  an	  insect	  in	  a	  
display	  case.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Civil	  law	  scholars	  describe	  individuals	  as	  easily	  read	  
and	  identified,	  constructing	  a	  population	  manageable	  in	  its	  regularity.	  Much	  like	  
holding	  a	  kind	  of	  homogenising	  filter	  over	  them,	  it	  allows	  for	  the	  transfer	  of	  a	  
complex	  reality	  in	  an	  evenly	  gendered	  legal	  order	  aligning	  with	  the	  Greek	  state’s	  
need	  for	  standardisation	  and	  citizen	  legibility.	  
In	  any	  case,	  whether	  choosing	  to	  ignore	  or	  scrutinise	  doubtful	  sex,	  the	  conviction	  
that	  the	  givenness	  and	  simplicity	  of	  sex	  classification	  of	  individuals	  (and	  
populations)	  in	  two	  mutually	  exclusive	  categories	  was	  never	  thought	  to	  be	  failing.	  
As	  Dreger	  writes	  about	  the	  management	  of	  hermaphroditism	  in	  the	  medical	  
sciences:	  
It	  is	  truly	  remarkable	  that	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  all	  the	  swarming	  doubt	  and	  sexual	  
slippage,	  medical	  men	  -­‐	  even	  those	  intimately	  familiar	  with	  
hermaphroditism	  -­‐	  managed	  to	  maintain	  the	  unflagging	  belief	  that	  there	  
were	  two	  well-­‐delineated	  sexes.	  Yet,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  paradoxically,	  the	  
whole	  medical	  approach	  to	  hermaphroditism	  was	  imbued	  with	  the	  
assumption	  that	  there	  did	  exist	  two	  distinct	  sexes	  and	  only	  two	  sexes,	  and	  
that,	  accordingly,	  each	  body	  ought	  to	  be	  limited	  to	  one,	  in	  theory	  and	  
practice	  (Dreger	  1998:	  109).	  	  
Similarly,	  in	  the	  Greek	  legal	  sciences,	  hermaphrodites	  and	  their	  cases	  are	  described	  
in	  a	  way	  that	  came	  to	  sooth	  the	  reader/jurist	  that	  we	  can	  still	  all	  be	  divided	  by	  the	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axon	  of	  the	  two	  anatomical	  sexes.	  To	  that	  end,	  the	  slight	  hiccup	  of	  
hermaphroditism	  or	  other	  gender-­‐crossing	  experience	  could	  be	  managed	  within	  the	  
current	  gender	  classification	  system	  without	  causing	  serious	  friction	  in	  the	  
foundations	  of	  the	  paradigm.	  	  
This	  chapter	  has	  provided	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  engagement	  of	  Civil	  law	  jurists	  
with	  sex	  classification	  as	  part	  of	  civil	  registration	  during	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  
twentieth	  century.	  Civil	  registration	  has	  been	  analysed	  as	  a	  process	  that	  claims	  to	  
depict	  individuals	  and	  populations	  and,	  though	  this	  claim,	  proceedes	  to	  construct	  
them.	  In	  this	  vein,	  one	  of	  the	  main	  aspects	  I	  have	  stressed	  is	  the	  tention	  between	  
the	  self-­‐evident	  character	  of	  sex	  taxonomies	  and	  its	  interuption	  by	  the	  reality	  of	  
gender	  variance,	  which,	  in	  this	  period,	  is	  understood	  only	  in	  the	  frame	  of	  
hermaphroditim	  (“true”	  or	  “pseudo/apparent”).	  My	  main	  argument	  is	  that	  this	  
tention	  was	  overcome	  in	  the	  field	  of	  Civil	  law	  by	  a	  series	  of	  interpretative	  gestures	  
that	  supposedly	  allowed	  a	  more	  accurate	  registration	  of	  individuals	  as	  parts	  of	  a	  
natural	  taxonomy.	  Civil	  law	  scholars,	  following	  the	  “predominant	  sex”	  dogma,	  
regardless	  of	  the	  absolute	  vagueness	  of	  its	  criteria,	  created	  a	  simplified	  version	  of	  
gendered	  identifications.	  Embarking	  on	  an	  entirely	  different	  route	  than	  Legal	  
Medicine,	  they	  upheld	  the	  “givenness”	  of	  sex	  classification	  in	  the	  law,	  achieving	  the	  
standardisation	  of	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  experiences	  (as	  seen	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Arlette	  
Leber)	  under	  the	  paradigm	  of	  hermaphroditism.	  	  
These	  juridical	  interpretations	  of	  both	  medico-­‐legal	  terms	  and	  foundational	  
concepts	  by	  Civil	  law	  jurists	  continued	  to	  constitute	  a	  significant	  set	  of	  regulatory	  
discourses	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  century.	  The	  beginning	  of	  the	  taxonomic	  
conflations	  and	  porousness	  witnessed	  in	  the	  early	  texts	  of	  the	  century	  (wherein	  the	  
limits	  of	  hermaphroditism	  vary	  to	  significant	  degrees	  depending	  on	  the	  interpreter)	  
became	  more	  intense	  and	  produced	  tangible	  results	  in	  the	  following	  years.	  In	  the	  
second	  part	  of	  the	  century,	  as	  will	  be	  established	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  the	  increasing	  
visibility	  of	  cross-­‐gender	  identification	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  trans	  subjects	  (under	  
different	  nomenclature	  such	  as	  transsexual,	  travesti	  etc.)	  in	  the	  social	  realm	  was	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followed	  by	  an	  intensification	  of	  the	  hostility	  within	  such	  discourses	  and	  an	  effort	  
towards	  the	  erasure	  of	  such	  subjects	  from	  the	  field	  of	  Civil	  law.	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Chapter	  6. Sex	  Classification	  in	  the	  Twentieth	  Century	  	  
(II)	  
The	  second	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  brought	  about	  many	  changes	  that	  
significantly	  influenced	  both	  theoretical	  legal	  engagement	  and	  judicial	  practice	  
concerning	  sex	  classification.	  On	  an	  international	  level,	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  
gender	  identities	  as	  well	  as	  the	  development	  of	  new	  medical	  technologies	  changed	  
the	  landscape	  of	  disciplines	  engaging	  with	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  (e.g.	  Sexology,	  
Psychology,	  Medical	  law,	  etc.).	  Moreover,	  on	  a	  politico-­‐legal	  level,	  the	  creation	  of	  
the	  European	  Community/Union	  and	  its	  institutions	  (especially	  the	  European	  
courts)	  structurally	  changed	  the	  modes	  of	  legislating	  and	  litigating	  about	  issues	  of	  
gender	  and	  sexuality	  on	  an	  international	  level.	  At	  a	  national	  level,	  various	  historico-­‐
political	  factors	  that	  could	  not	  be	  listed	  here	  in	  detail	  influenced	  sexual	  politics	  
during	  this	  historically	  dense	  period.94	  By	  the	  1980s	  and	  especially	  in	  the	  1990s,	  
trans-­‐feminine	  individuals95	  (under	  the	  nomenclature	  of	  the	  era)	  were	  increasingly	  
visible	  in	  underground	  subcultures,	  popular	  culture	  and,	  to	  some	  degree,	  in	  
activism	  and	  political	  groups	  (Papanikolaou	  2018).	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  Painting	  with	  a	  very	  broad	  brush,	  during	  the	  Civil	  War	  (1946-­‐1949)	  that	  followed	  the	  Second	  
World	  War	  and	  the	  German	  Occupation,	  any	  radical	  movements	  formed	  in	  the	  previous	  years	  (such	  
as	  women’s	  militant	  groups	  within	  the	  Resistance)	  were	  violently	  dispersed	  (Stamiris	  1986:	  105).	  
After	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Civil	  War,	  new	  mobilisations	  of	  radical	  politics	  with	  gender	  claims	  formed	  
slowly,	  only	  to	  be	  violently	  supressed	  once	  more	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Colonel	  Junta	  in	  1967.	  The	  
seven-­‐year	  Colonel	  Junta	  (1967-­‐1974)	  and	  its	  politico-­‐legal	  aftermath,	  suffocated	  feminist	  and	  
sexual-­‐minority	  expression	  and	  organising	  in	  times	  of	  an	  international	  explosion	  of	  such	  
mobilisations	  and	  theorising.	  After	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  first	  post-­‐Junta	  government,	  a	  variety	  of	  
political	  actors	  claimed	  breathing	  space,	  among	  which	  the	  Liberation	  Movement	  of	  Greek	  
Homosexuals	  (known	  with	  its	  Greek	  acronym	  AKOE)	  created	  in	  1976	  that	  marked	  the	  first	  steps	  of	  
the	  sexual	  minorities’	  movements	  in	  Greece	  (Theodorakopoulos	  2005).	  The	  1980s	  saw	  a	  re-­‐birth	  of	  
radical	  feminist	  and	  –in	  a	  somewhat	  lesser	  degree-­‐	  sexual	  minorities’	  politics	  as	  well	  as	  a	  parallel	  
presence	  of	  institutional	  feminism	  in	  parliamentary	  politics.	  This	  period	  was	  followed	  by	  another	  
decline	  in	  feminist	  and	  LGBT	  political	  presence	  during	  the	  1990s	  (Mihopoulou	  2006b).	  	  
For	  more	  discussion	  on	  the	  history	  of	  feminist	  movements	  in	  Greece,	  see	  Avdela	  &	  Psara	  1985;	  
Stamiris	  1986;	  Mihopoulou	  2006b;	  Salimba	  2019.	  For	  more	  discussion	  on	  the	  history	  of	  LGBTQ+	  
politics	  in	  Greece,	  see	  Faubion	  1993;	  Theodorakopoulos	  2005;	  Riedel	  2005;	  Antonopoulos	  2019;	  
Apostolleli	  &	  Halkias	  (eds.)	  2012;	  Eleftheriadis	  2015,	  2017.	  For	  a	  description	  of	  the	  socio-­‐political	  and	  
legal	  life	  of	  travestis	  in	  Athens	  during	  that	  era	  see	  Revenioti	  2011;	  Vakalidou	  2011.	  
95
	  Trans	  men	  were	  not	  visible	  in	  the	  socio-­‐political	  sphere	  at	  the	  time	  as	  such.	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Chapter	  six	  follows	  the	  debate	  on	  sex	  classification	  in	  the	  legal	  terrain	  during	  this	  
period.	  The	  first	  section	  covers	  the	  debate	  within	  the	  field	  of	  Civil	  law	  concerning	  
gender	  (re)classification	  as	  part	  of	  a	  person’s	  civil	  status	  and	  a	  substantive	  
requirement	  for	  legal	  marriage.	  Hermaphroditism	  continues	  to	  play	  a	  significant	  
role	  in	  facilitating	  the	  refusal	  of	  the	  dominant	  legal	  discourse	  to	  recognise	  emerging	  
trans	  identities	  but	  also,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  enabling	  gender-­‐variant	  individuals	  to	  
navigate	  legal	  reality	  under	  its	  categorical	  disguise.	  Entering	  an	  era	  wherein	  
“travestis”	  and	  “transsexuals”	  were	  increasingly	  socially	  legible,	  I	  examine	  the	  
negation	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Civil	  law	  scholars	  to	  include	  transsexuality	  in	  the	  sex	  
classification	  debate.	  This	  negation	  is	  engrafted	  with	  an	  increasing	  hostility	  that	  is	  
clearly	  articulated	  in	  some	  of	  the	  texts.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  confirm	  the	  intentionality	  and	  constructedness	  of	  this	  absence	  of	  
transsexuality	  and	  conceptualise	  it	  as	  a	  purposeful	  erasure,	  I	  read	  the	  Civil	  law	  
debate	  in	  proximity	  with	  texts	  from	  other	  legal	  fields	  that	  confirm	  the	  
entanglement	  of	  transsexuals/travestis	  with	  legal	  apparatuses.	  In	  this	  vein,	  the	  
second	  section	  is	  compiled	  by	  texts	  from	  Criminal	  and	  Medical	  law,	  such	  as	  criminal	  
cases	  found	  in	  the	  Hellenic	  Police	  journals.	  These	  archival	  fragments	  not	  only	  
further	  my	  argument	  about	  the	  intentionality	  of	  this	  erasure	  but	  also	  tap	  into	  the	  
debate	  concerning	  the	  legality	  of	  “sex	  change”	  surgical	  procedures.	  More	  
importantly,	  they	  suggest	  that,	  in	  this	  era,	  the	  sex-­‐changed-­‐person	  becomes	  a	  
subject	  placeholder	  in	  order	  to	  enable	  the	  regulation	  of	  transsexuality	  without	  
commanding	  its	  legal	  acknowledgement.	  	  
Finally,	  in	  the	  last	  section	  of	  the	  chapter,	  I	  will	  engage	  with	  two	  alternative	  
approaches	  concerning	  legal	  issues	  of	  cross-­‐gender	  identification,	  which,	  at	  the	  
time,	  were	  cast	  to	  the	  margins	  of	  the	  main	  debate.	  The	  work	  of	  two	  Greek	  legal	  
scholars	  (Giorgos	  Dokoumetzidis	  and	  Theophano	  Papazisi)	  is	  analysed	  not	  only	  as	  a	  
precursor	  of	  contemporary	  discussions	  on	  gender	  identity	  but	  also	  as	  an	  indicator	  
of	  the	  political	  nature	  of	  the	  response	  to	  sex	  membership	  claims	  within	  a	  legal	  
order	  (Hale	  1997a;	  Bettcher	  2014).	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6.1. Civil	  law	  	  
6.1.a. Sex	  Classification	  –	  Civil	  Registration	  
As	  seen	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  publication	  of	  Arlette	  Leber’s	  case	  (as	  a	  
hermaphrodite	  case)	  was	  of	  crucial	  importance	  for	  the	  management	  of	  legal	  
gender.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  argument	  of	  the	  Swiss	  court	  (that	  the	  psychic	  element	  can	  
overrule	  anatomy)	  lived,	  even	  shortly,	  as	  precedent	  within	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order	  
seems	  almost	  like	  an	  accidental	  “slip”.96	  This	  section	  traces	  the	  overall	  stance	  of	  
Civil	  law	  scholars	  on	  sex	  classification	  and	  the	  way	  it	  moved	  away	  from	  this	  
argument	  and	  solidified	  into	  a	  more	  strict	  traditional	  model.	  	  
The	  first	  text	  I	  consider	  important	  for	  its	  input	  on	  the	  matter	  is	  found	  in	  a	  multi-­‐
volume	  work	  titled	  “Interpretation	  of	  the	  Civil	  Code”	  (1952)	  which	  consisted	  of	  
contributions	  from	  many	  prominent	  scholars	  of	  Civil	  law	  (Poulitsa	  et	  al	  1952).97	  The	  
issue	  of	  hermaphroditism	  is	  once	  more	  examined	  within	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  
articles	  describing	  personhood.	  Although	  the	  author	  (Pr.	  Ioannis	  Sontis)	  follows	  the	  
path98	  of	  previous	  texts,	  he	  chooses	  to	  emphasise	  his	  distancing	  from	  some	  of	  the	  
principles	  of	  these	  texts:	  
Which	  one	  is	  the	  predominant	  gender	  should	  be	  judged	  based	  on	  bodily	  
constitution	  and	  only	  in	  the	  alternative	  on	  the	  psychical	  disposition	  of	  the	  
hermaphrodite	  (the	  published	  [...]	  decision	  of	  a	  Swiss	  court	  is	  not	  
sufficiently	  accurate	  in	  this	  aspect)	  (Sontis	  1952:	  Ι	  Α	  Δ2,	  my	  translation).	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  One	  that	  was	  possibly	  allowed	  by	  taxonomic	  conflations,	  lack	  of	  experience	  on	  part	  of	  the	  Greek	  
Civil	  law	  scholars,	  as	  well	  as,	  from	  the	  no-­‐questions-­‐asked	  respect	  many	  of	  them	  showed	  towards	  
the	  authority	  of	  legal	  arguments	  imported	  by	  European	  legal	  orders.	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  There	  is	  an	  earlier	  text	  within	  a	  volume	  titled	  “Legislation	  Regarding	  Registration	  Acts”	  (1951),	  
which	  includes	  summaries	  of	  the	  earlier	  decisions	  mentioned	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  This	  text,	  as	  
others	  in	  its	  subfield,	  has	  less	  philosophical	  and	  more	  technical	  character	  compared	  to	  texts	  of	  
General	  Principles	  of	  Civil	  law.	  The	  author,	  thus,	  instead	  of	  making	  any	  declarations	  about	  the	  nature	  
of	  sex	  or	  gender,	  merely	  presents	  these	  decisions	  concluding	  that	  in	  such	  cases	  (that	  is,	  of	  
hermaphroditism)	  the	  provision	  used	  for	  the	  correction	  of	  mistaken	  age	  is	  by	  analogy	  applicable	  in	  
the	  amendment	  of	  mistaken	  sex	  classification	  (Karvelis	  1951:	  167).	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  Meaning	  a	  combination	  of	  references	  to	  Roman	  law,	  German	  law,	  the	  cases	  published	  in	  Greek,	  
the	  “predominant	  sex”	  dogma	  and	  the	  suggestion	  to	  grant	  only	  general	  rights	  in	  case	  of	  absence	  of	  
external	  sex	  characteristics	  (Sontis	  1952).	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After	  this	  text	  and	  the	  historical	  shift	  I	  claim	  it	  connects	  with	  -­‐	  that	  is,	  the	  
emergence	  of	  transsexuality	  as	  a	  culturally	  legible	  reality	  -­‐	  both	  legal	  theory	  and	  
practice	  would	  stay	  in	  line	  with	  Sontis’	  argument	  for	  decades.	  The	  argument	  of	  the	  
Swiss	  court	  in	  Leber’s	  case	  (that	  the	  psychical	  element	  is	  as	  important	  as	  the	  
physical	  when	  assigning	  gender)	  would	  not	  be	  accepted	  again	  throughout	  the	  rest	  
of	  the	  century.	  What	  has	  entered	  through	  the	  characterisation	  of	  the	  Swiss	  decision	  
as	  “not	  accurate”	  is	  a	  hint	  of	  suspicion,	  which	  would	  escalate	  to	  outright	  hostility,	  
concerning	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  psychical	  gender	  disposition	  that	  might	  lead	  to	  a	  
claim	  not	  properly	  grounded	  in	  a	  hermaphrodite	  bodily	  anatomy.	  In	  other	  words,	  
suspicion	  that	  hermaphroditism	  might	  be	  opening	  a	  window	  for	  transsexuality	  in	  
the	  law.	  
In	  the	  years	  that	  followed,	  more	  volumes	  of	  “General	  Principles	  of	  Civil	  law”	  
included	  similar	  interpretations	  of	  sex	  in	  the	  law	  (Tousis	  1962;	  Gazis	  1970;	  
Papahristou	  1979;	  Spyridakis	  1985).	  Following	  the	  same	  line	  on	  sex	  classification,	  
these	  texts	  remained	  generally	  aligned	  with	  the	  understanding	  of	  a	  self-­‐evident	  
sexual	  dichotomy	  within	  Civil	  law	  with	  the	  sole	  exception	  of	  hermaphroditism,	  
which	  was	  addressed	  through	  the	  “predominant	  sex”	  thesis.	  One	  text	  that	  stands	  
out	  in	  its	  absolute	  wording	  dates	  in	  1970	  and	  was	  written	  by	  Andreas	  Gazis	  who	  
was	  not	  only	  a	  much-­‐respected	  scholar,	  judge	  and	  politician	  but	  also	  was	  
considered	  to	  have	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  attempts	  for	  legal	  equality	  
between	  men	  and	  women	  in	  Civil	  law.99	  Gazis	  writes:	  
Hermaphrodites	  do	  not	  exist,	  and	  sex	  can	  never	  be	  altered,	  by	  natural	  or	  
surgical	  means.	  Only	  in	  case	  of	  mistakenly	  determined	  sex	  is	  it	  possible	  to	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  Gazis	  was	  placed	  as	  head	  of	  a	  legislative	  committee	  in	  1975	  (later	  known	  as	  “the	  Gazis	  
Committee”),	  which	  was	  assigned	  with	  the	  task	  of	  reforming	  traditional	  Greek	  Family	  law	  that	  was	  
until	  then	  heavily	  disadvantaging	  women	  and	  their	  position	  in	  the	  marriage.	  The	  reform	  came	  seven	  
years	  and	  two	  committees	  later	  (Law	  1329/1983)	  and	  was	  considered	  a	  great	  victory	  for	  the	  
women’s	  movement	  that	  had	  remained	  politically	  engaged	  throughout	  the	  years	  that	  the	  reform	  
was	  negotiated	  claiming	  structural	  changes	  that	  were	  not	  endorsed	  by	  the	  Gazis	  Committee	  
(Mihopoulou	  2006a).	  Viewing	  the	  Gazis	  Committee,	  which	  unlike	  the	  next	  committees	  did	  not	  
include	  representatives	  of	  women’s	  political	  groups,	  as	  the	  first	  step	  to	  the	  Family	  law	  reform,	  
fortified	  Gazis'	  reputation	  among	  other	  men	  of	  legal	  science	  as	  some	  kind	  of	  pioneer	  fighting	  for	  
gender	  equality.	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correct	  the	  name,	  registration	  act	  etc.	  The	  determination	  of	  sex	  is	  made	  
biologically,	  while	  the	  psychical	  disposition	  of	  the	  person	  is	  irrelevant	  (Gazis	  
1970:	  11,	  my	  translation	  and	  emphasis).	  	  
By	  the	  time	  this	  text	  is	  written,	  trans	  women	  (known	  under	  different	  nomenclature	  
at	  the	  time)	  are	  a	  recognisable	  figure	  in	  the	  Greek	  context	  (Dokoumetzidis	  1997)	  
and,	  by	  accessing	  medical	  procedures,	  they	  are	  redefining	  the	  meaning	  of	  
“predominant	  sex”	  or	  plain	  “sex”	  in	  the	  law.	  The	  paragraph	  is,	  thus,	  structured	  not	  
as	  a	  set	  of	  principles	  or	  a	  kind	  of	  taxonomy	  but	  as	  an	  emphatic	  negative	  response	  to	  
an	  emerging	  claim.	  I	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  a	  clearly	  articulated	  denial	  towards	  any	  
suggestion	  of	  gender	  transgression,	  not	  just	  in	  the	  law	  but	  also	  ontologically,	  in	  a	  
way	  that	  addresses	  specific	  legal	  and	  social	  claims.	  Although	  by	  denying	  the	  
existence	  of	  hermaphrodites,	  the	  text	  seems	  to	  sit	  rather	  oddly	  among	  other	  texts	  
of	  Civil	  law	  which	  seem	  to	  have	  common	  classifications,	  narratives	  and	  tone,	  and	  
this	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  exemplary	  of	  the	  change	  happening	  in	  this	  period	  within	  legal	  
theory	  and	  practice.	  That	  is,	  a	  turn	  towards	  an	  emphatic	  defence	  of	  the	  gender	  
order	  against	  increasingly	  visible	  social	  phenomena	  of	  sexual	  and	  gender	  variance.	  	  
In	  1973,	  decision	  68/1972	  First	  instance	  Court	  of	  Drama	  is	  published	  (Nomiko	  Vima	  
1972:	  1085)	  concerning	  the	  amendment	  of	  the	  civil	  status	  of	  a	  “female	  pseudo-­‐
hermaphrodite”,	  assigned	  male	  at	  birth.	  The	  judge	  granted	  the	  claim	  according	  to	  
the	  rationale	  of	  several	  texts	  that	  have	  already	  been	  analysed	  making	  an	  explicit	  
reference	  to	  the	  post-­‐operative	  genital	  anatomy	  of	  the	  claimant,	  which	  seems	  to	  be	  
an	  individual	  who	  would	  be	  described	  as	  intersex	  now.	  In	  the	  justification	  of	  the	  
decision,	  what	  becomes	  explicit	  is	  the	  acceptability	  of	  genital	  surgery	  (and	  by	  result,	  
sex	  re-­‐classification)	  only	  within	  a	  process	  of	  “naturalisation”	  of	  the	  body	  (Sharpe	  
2010:	  98):	  	  
Thus,	  it	  is	  not	  impossible	  to	  mistakenly	  register	  the	  predominant	  sex,	  a	  fact	  
that	  is	  revealed	  on	  a	  later	  age.	  In	  this	  case,	  even	  more	  so	  when	  one	  sex	  has	  
fully	  prevailed	  over	  the	  other,	  even	  by	  a	  surgical	  procedure	  corrective	  of	  
nature’s	  flaws,	  it	  is	  allowed	  to	  correct	  the	  possibly	  mistaken,	  regarding	  the	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sex	  reference,	  birth	  registration	  act	  […]	  (Nomiko	  Vima	  1972:	  1085,	  my	  
translation	  and	  emphasis).	  	  
As	  Alex	  Sharpe	  has	  noted,	  the	  legal	  treatment	  of	  the	  transsexual	  in	  many	  legal	  
orders	  would	  prove	  significantly	  different	  by	  the	  legal	  treatment	  of	  
hermaphroditism	  and,	  later,	  intersexuality	  (Sharpe	  2010:	  98).	  Although	  both	  
categories	  are	  thoroughly	  pathologised,	  their	  different	  legal	  treatment	  has	  been	  
established,	  as	  Sharpe	  claims,	  through	  the	  distinction	  “between	  an	  understanding	  
of	  sex	  reassignment	  surgery	  as	  artifice	  (transsexuality),	  and	  an	  understanding	  of	  sex	  
reassignment	  surgery	  as	  the	  correction	  of	  nature’s	  ‘error’	  (intersex)”	  (Sharpe	  2010:	  
98).	  That	  is,	  surgery	  is	  viewed	  as	  a	  means	  to	  “naturalise”	  doubtfully	  sexed	  bodies	  of	  
intersex	  individuals	  but	  also	  to	  “denaturalise”	  the	  originally	  normally	  sexed	  bodies	  
of	  trans	  individuals	  (Sharpe	  2010:	  98).	  Thus,	  through	  a	  single	  gesture,	  both	  the	  
forceful	  “corrective”	  surgeries	  on	  intersex	  individuals	  and	  the	  denial	  of	  trans	  (even	  
post-­‐operative)	  gender	  recognition	  can	  be	  justified	  in	  the	  dominant	  legal	  discourse.	  	  
Indeed,	  the	  reference	  to	  the	  ambiguous	  sex	  of	  the	  body	  as	  “nature’s	  flaw”	  is	  carried	  
into	  other	  texts,	  such	  as	  a	  monograph	  including	  the	  interpretation	  and	  litigation-­‐
analysis	  of	  the	  Civil	  Procedure	  Code,	  widely	  used	  by	  jurists	  (Vathrakokoilis	  1996)	  
and	  an	  interpretative	  volume	  on	  registration	  acts	  and	  other	  civil	  registration	  issues	  
(Soldatos	  1998).	  Under	  the	  titles	  “change	  of	  sex	  and	  name”	  and	  “amendment	  of	  
name	  in	  cases	  of	  sex	  change”	  accordingly,	  the	  two	  texts	  repeat	  verbatim	  the	  
sentence	  quoted	  above	  (Vathrakokoilis	  1996:	  506;	  Soldatos	  1998:	  116).	  What	  is	  
striking	  in	  both	  texts	  (as	  in	  all	  the	  texts	  analysed	  in	  this	  part)	  is	  the	  complete	  
absence	  of	  any	  reference	  to	  transsexuality	  as	  a	  contrast	  counterpart	  in	  the	  
implicitly	  invoked	  “intersex/transsexual	  dyad”	  (Sharpe	  2010:	  98).	  This	  is	  precisely	  
the	  core	  of	  what	  is	  argued	  here,	  that	  is,	  the	  hostility	  of	  the	  specific	  legal	  
environment	  towards	  trans	  subjectivity	  and	  the	  attempt	  to	  dissipate	  the	  reality	  of	  
trans	  experience	  from	  Civil	  law	  theoretical	  debates.	  	  
Notably,	  in	  1980,	  a	  German	  court	  decision	  (BVerfG	  49,	  286	  [11.10.	  1978])	  is	  
translated	  and	  published	  in	  a	  legal	  journal	  under	  the	  description	  “Gender	  alteration	  
of	  hermaphrodite	  -­‐	  Amendment	  of	  registration	  in	  birth	  registration	  books”	  (Nomiko	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Vima	  1981:	  612)	  As	  with	  the	  Swiss	  decision	  in	  1946,	  research	  shows	  that	  the	  Greek	  
jurist	  translated	  a	  piece	  of	  transsexual	  jurisprudence	  as	  a	  case	  of	  hermaphroditism.	  
It	  is	  the	  review	  of	  a	  petition	  brought	  by	  a	  post-­‐operative	  trans	  woman	  in	  front	  of	  a	  
Federal	  Constitutional	  Court	  in	  1978	  (Knott	  2010:	  1004-­‐5).	  After	  the	  First	  Instance	  
Court	  denied	  legal	  recognition	  of	  her	  gender,	  the	  German	  Constitutional	  Court	  
accepted	  her	  claim,	  which	  was	  considered	  a	  historical	  ruling	  as	  it	  led	  to	  the	  first	  
“Transsexual	  Law”	  in	  Germany	  two	  years	  later	  (Knott	  2010:	  1004).	  The	  translation	  
in	  Greek	  reads:	  	  
The	  claimant	  [the	  word	  is	  used	  in	  male	  grammatical	  form	  in	  Greek]	  works	  
as	  a	  hospital	  nurse	  and	  belongs	  to	  the	  group	  of	  individuals	  that,	  due	  to	  
(external)	  existing	  characteristics,	  are	  registered	  as	  male,	  but	  later	  feel	  in	  
every	  sense	  belonging	  to	  the	  female	  sex	  and	  already	  -­‐	  by	  adjusting	  their	  
external	  demeanour	  -­‐	  lead	  the	  life	  of	  a	  woman,	  but	  are	  legally	  recognised	  
as	  men	  (Männliche	  Transsexuelle)	  (Nomiko	  Vima	  1981:	  612,	  my	  
translation).	  	  
Regardless	  of	  the	  hint	  in	  the	  parenthesis	  (“Männliche	  Transsexuelle”)	  left	  
untranslated	  in	  the	  Greek	  text,	  the	  claimant	  is	  characterised	  throughout	  the	  
translation	  as	  a	  hermaphrodite,	  adding	  to	  the	  taxonomic	  conflation	  of	  this	  period	  in	  
Greek	  Civil	  law	  circles.	  As	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Arlette	  Leber	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  
transsexual	  is	  inserted	  in	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order	  transmuted	  into	  a	  hermaphrodite	  in	  
what	  seems	  like	  an	  almost	  stubborn	  tactic	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Civil	  law	  jurists.	  	  
Even	  if	  the	  international	  developments100	  on	  the	  issue	  were	  unintentionally	  ignored	  
or	  accidentally	  misinterpreted	  in	  the	  past,	  by	  the	  time	  these	  texts	  were	  written,	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By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  century	  and	  during	  these	  discussions	  were	  taking	  place	  within	  the	  Greek	  legal	  
theory,	  the	  international	  debate	  on	  legal	  gender	  recognition	  was	  intensifying.	  Driven	  by	  the	  refusal	  
of	  several	  national	  legal	  orders	  to	  recognise	  the	  post-­‐operative	  sex	  of	  trans	  litigants	  and	  under	  the	  
shadow	  of	  the	  Corbett	  vs	  Corbett	  case	  (see	  footnote	  115)	  that	  had	  become	  the	  rule	  for	  such	  non-­‐
recognition,	  a	  heated	  legal	  debate	  was	  taking	  place	  within	  the	  European	  courts.	  Although,	  this	  
debate	  transferred	  into	  the	  national	  legal	  orders	  and	  especially	  those	  of	  the	  litigants	  involved,	  it	  did	  
not	  seem	  to	  be	  reflected	  accordingly	  in	  the	  Greek	  legal	  theory	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  The	  vast	  
majority	  of	  the	  studied	  texts	  don’t	  seem	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  rulings	  of	  European	  courts	  throughout	  
the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  century.	  In	  the	  rare	  cases	  that	  Greek	  legal	  scholars	  tried	  to	  incorporate	  such	  
jurisprudence	  in	  their	  analysis	  (e.g.	  Vidalis	  1996)	  it	  was	  in	  a	  peripheral	  way	  and	  did	  not	  significantly	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transsexual	  women	  had	  gained	  notoriety	  in	  Greek	  popular	  culture	  and	  were	  visible	  
in	  the	  social	  sphere	  but	  remained	  conspicuously	  absent	  from	  this	  debate.	  In	  the	  
next	  section,	  I	  make	  a	  brief	  passing	  from	  Family	  law	  in	  order	  to	  further	  trace	  and	  
clarify	  the	  mechanics	  of	  this	  curated	  absence	  through	  the	  debate	  on	  marriage.	  
Although	  I	  will	  not	  engage	  with	  the	  right	  to	  marriage	  per	  se,	  I	  briefly	  engage	  with	  its	  
connection	  to	  sex	  (re)classification.	  	  
6.1.b. Marriage	  and	  the	  Person-­‐Who-­‐Changed-­‐Sex	  
Other	  than	  civil	  registration	  itself,	  sex	  classification	  has	  also	  been	  discussed	  for	  the	  
purposes	  of	  legal	  marriage	  as	  part	  of	  the	  debate	  within	  Family	  law	  concerning	  sex-­‐
difference	  as	  a	  marriage	  precondition.	  Although	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  is	  often	  studied	  
under	  the	  purview	  of	  the	  legal	  management	  of	  (homo)sexuality,	  it	  is	  the	  same	  field	  
that	  became	  a	  site	  of	  negotiation	  for	  gender	  variance.	  	  
In	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order,	  the	  consensus	  throughout	  the	  decades	  was	  that	  sex	  
difference	  is	  an	  omitted,	  but	  self-­‐evident,	  requirement	  for	  legal	  marriage	  (Balis	  
1962:	  42;	  Tousis	  1970:	  39;	  Kostaras	  1974:	  153	  and	  footnote	  7;	  Deligiannis	  1986:	  54;	  
Koumantos	  1988:	  39;	  Vathrakokoilis	  1990:	  48;	  Kounougeri-­‐Manoledaki	  1998:	  
65).101	  It	  should	  then	  follow	  that	  its	  lack	  would	  result	  in	  the	  marriage	  being	  void.102	  
Nonetheless,	  a	  plethora	  of	  authors	  supported	  (some	  very	  firmly)	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  sex	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
shift	  the	  overall	  discussion.	  In	  the	  Greek	  European	  law	  field	  itself,	  it	  is	  only	  by	  the	  end	  and	  during	  the	  
turn	  of	  the	  century	  that	  some	  of	  these	  rulings’	  echo	  reached	  the	  relative	  national	  literature.	  	  
101
	  Although	  the	  Greek	  Civil	  Code	  did	  not	  explicitly	  include	  sex	  difference	  in	  the	  substantive	  
requirements	  for	  legal	  marriage,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  Civil	  law	  scholars	  agreed	  (and	  still	  do)	  that	  the	  
requirement	  of	  sex	  difference	  can	  be	  deduced	  by	  the	  spirit	  and	  overall	  phrasing	  of	  Family	  law	  
provisions	  (Kounougeri-­‐Manoledaki	  2016:	  61-­‐62	  and	  footnotes	  1-­‐7).	  During	  that	  period,	  most	  of	  the	  
Civil	  scholars	  writing	  on	  the	  issue,	  with	  very	  rare	  exceptions	  such	  as	  Vidalis	  (1996),	  either	  had	  moral	  
and	  legal	  objections	  or	  just	  considered	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  as	  a	  paradox	  (Papazisi	  2000:	  125	  and	  
footnotes	  29-­‐30).	  The	  inability,	  to	  ground	  legal	  marriage	  without	  sex-­‐difference	  in	  the	  existing	  
legislation	  has	  been	  admitted	  even	  by	  authors	  who	  do	  not	  contest	  the	  idea	  of	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  on	  
principle	  (Papazisi	  2000:	  125).	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  Under	  Greek	  Family	  law,	  a	  legally	  flawed	  marriage	  might	  be	  void	  (null),	  voidable	  or	  non-­‐existent	  
(CC	  art.	  1372-­‐1385).	  A	  marriage	  is	  considered	  void	  if	  one	  of	  the	  substantive	  requirements	  (consent,	  
marriageable	  age	  and	  legal	  capacity)	  is	  flawed	  or	  not	  present	  (CC	  art.	  1372).	  Still,	  its	  nullity	  can	  be	  
remedied,	  under	  conditions,	  before	  it	  is	  declared	  void	  by	  court	  order.	  According	  to	  CC	  art.	  1374-­‐
1375	  a	  marriage	  is	  voidable	  in	  case	  it	  was	  conducted	  under	  threat	  or	  deceit	  (concerning	  the	  person’s	  
identity).	  Last,	  if	  a	  marriage	  lacks	  the	  proper	  ceremonial	  formalities	  (initially	  these	  could	  be	  only	  
religious)	  then,	  and	  only	  then,	  it	  is	  considered	  non-­‐existent,	  it	  produces	  no	  legal	  effects	  and	  requires	  
no	  official	  declaration	  of	  its	  nullity.	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difference	  leads	  to	  a	  non-­‐existent,	  instead	  of	  a	  void,	  marriage.	  This	  irregularity	  has	  
been	  justified	  in	  various	  ways,103	  but	  what	  is	  more	  important	  for	  the	  present	  
analysis	  is	  that	  some	  of	  the	  authors	  engaged	  directly	  with	  the	  effects	  of	  sex	  and	  
gender	  variance	  on	  the	  marriageability	  of	  the	  individuals.	  	  
Hermaphroditism	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  ground	  for	  possible	  nullity.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  
method	  of	  application	  of	  this	  principle	  remained	  overall	  vague	  (Tousis	  1970:	  40;	  
Vathrakokilis	  1990:	  48).	  Some	  authors	  concluded	  that,	  in	  such	  cases,	  the	  marriage	  is	  
valid	  if	  the	  predominant	  sex	  of	  the	  hermaphrodite	  is	  the	  opposite	  of	  the	  other	  
spouse’s	  (Deligiannis	  1986:	  181;	  Kounougeri-­‐Manoledaki	  1998:	  65).	  Nonetheless,	  if	  
the	  sex	  changed	  to	  that	  of	  the	  other	  spouse	  during	  the	  marriage,	  it	  has	  been	  
claimed	  that	  the	  marriage	  becomes	  non-­‐existent	  ex	  tunc	  (Kounougeri-­‐Manoledaki	  
1998:	  65).104	  	  
In	  trans	  legal	  theory,	  Sharpe	  has	  theorised	  legal	  marriage	  as	  a	  “limit”	  to	  the	  legal	  
recognition	  of	  trans	  legal	  gender,	  one	  that	  is	  dictated	  by	  the	  underlying	  
homophobia	  within	  the	  law	  and	  the	  “perceived	  proximity	  of	  transgender	  to	  the	  
homosexual	  body”	  (Sharpe	  2002:	  89-­‐119).	  In	  this	  debate,	  the	  legal	  anxiety	  caused	  
by	  the	  possibility	  of	  trans	  marriage	  needed	  to	  be	  dovetailed	  with	  the	  overall	  
practice	  of	  not	  naming	  transsexuality	  in	  the	  law,	  resulting	  in	  improvised	  theoretical	  
positionings.	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  The	  legal	  inconsistency	  of	  declaring	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  as	  non-­‐existent	  instead	  of	  void	  was	  
directly	  addressed	  in	  an	  article	  published	  in	  1974	  under	  the	  title	  “The	  non-­‐existent	  marriage	  of	  
persons	  of	  the	  same	  sex”	  (Kostaras	  1974:	  152).	  The	  author	  (G.	  Kostaras)	  recognises	  that	  this	  
position,	  with	  which	  he	  obviously	  agrees	  firmly,	  is	  not	  backed	  up	  by	  the	  letter	  of	  the	  law	  and	  has	  
been	  supported	  in	  the	  literature	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  “logical	  and	  moral”	  but	  not	  actually	  legal	  (Kostaras	  
1974:	  153).	  By	  referring	  to	  Canon	  law	  and	  its	  clear	  references	  to	  “man	  and	  woman”	  in	  marriage	  
ceremonial	  texts	  (civil	  marriage	  was	  not	  yet	  an	  option	  in	  Greece),	  the	  author	  concludes	  that	  lack	  of	  
sex	  difference	  constitutes	  a	  flaw	  in	  the	  ceremonial	  formalities,	  which	  constitutes	  anyway	  the	  only	  
reason	  in	  the	  law	  leading	  to	  a	  non-­‐existent	  marriage.	  	  
Other	  authors	  supported	  that	  sex	  difference	  is	  a	  substantive	  element	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  marriage	  as	  
it	  is	  founded	  in	  the	  law,	  thus,	  making	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  simply	  not	  a	  marriage	  (Deligiannis	  1986:	  54;	  
Koumantos	  1988:	  39).	  Alternatively,	  in	  other	  texts	  the	  non-­‐existence	  of	  such	  a	  marriage	  is	  not	  
justified	  in	  legal	  terms	  (Vathrakokoilis	  1990:	  48)	  or	  is	  just	  grounded	  on	  its	  own	  givenness	  (Balis	  1961:	  
42).	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  This	  difference	  becomes	  crucial	  when	  the	  couple	  has	  had	  children	  (Kounougeri-­‐Manoledaki	  
2016:	  62	  and	  footnote	  4).	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Problems	  for	  the	  marriage	  can	  be	  created	  in	  cases	  wherein	  the	  morphology	  
of	  the	  body	  classifies	  a	  person	  as	  one	  sex,	  resulting	  in	  the	  corresponding	  
registration	  act,	  but	  their	  psyche	  classifies	  them	  as	  the	  other	  sex	  
(transsexualité).	  In	  these	  cases,	  which	  often	  are	  followed	  by	  surgeries	  to	  
alter	  some	  of	  the	  external	  body	  traits,	  the	  question	  raised	  is	  whether	  this	  
person	  can	  be	  considered	  to	  have	  changed	  sex	  and	  whether	  they	  can	  be	  
married	  with	  a	  person	  of	  the	  sex	  they	  previously	  belonged	  to.	  According	  to	  
the	  present	  legislation	  of	  our	  country,	  such	  a	  sex	  change	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  
be	  possible	  other	  than	  in	  cases	  of	  hermaphroditism	  and	  the	  initially	  
mistaken	  registration	  act.	  Hence,	  the	  marriage	  of	  a	  person,	  which	  feels	  as	  
belonging	  to	  a	  sex	  different	  than	  the	  one	  indicated	  from	  the	  beginning	  by	  
their	  bodily	  traits,	  with	  a	  person	  of	  their	  “initial”	  sex	  is	  impossible	  since	  it	  
would	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  marriage	  between	  persons	  of	  the	  same	  sex	  
(Koumantos	  1988:	  39,	  my	  translation).	  
Although	  the	  French	  term	  “transsexualité”	  in	  the	  parenthesis,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
distinction	  from	  hermaphroditism,	  make	  clear	  that	  the	  issue	  discussed	  is	  
transsexuality,	  the	  author	  refuses	  to	  articulate	  the	  term	  in	  Greek,	  thus,	  resorting	  to	  
this	  long	  paraphrasing	  definition.	  Even	  so,	  this	  can	  be	  claimed	  as	  an	  almost	  clear	  
recognition	  of	  transsexuality	  as	  a	  legal	  reality.	  Contrary	  to	  what	  is	  suggested	  
theoretically	  in	  the	  above	  excerpt	  and	  while	  other	  European	  legal	  orders	  were	  not	  
allowing	  marriages	  after	  sex	  change	  at	  the	  time	  (Sharpe	  2002),	  it	  appears	  that	  such	  
marriages	  were	  conducted	  within	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order.	  Note	  how	  this	  is	  described	  
in	  Family	  law	  scholarship:	  
If	  a	  person	  changes	  sex	  through	  a	  surgical	  procedure	  before	  getting	  
married,	  it	  should	  be	  accepted	  that	  they	  are	  able	  afterwards	  to	  enter	  a	  
valid	  marriage	  with	  a	  person	  of	  different	  -­‐	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  present	  
condition	  -­‐	  sex	  (Kounougeri-­‐Manoledaki	  1998:	  65,	  my	  translation).	  
A	  categorical	  twist	  takes	  place	  here	  with	  both	  hermaphroditism	  and	  transsexuality	  
being	  evaded	  and	  the	  subject	  in	  question	  gradually	  becoming	  the	  person-­‐who-­‐
changed-­‐sex.	  The	  practice	  of	  “sex	  change”	  itself,	  and	  not	  the	  diagnosed	  “condition”	  
Part	  B	   	   	  Chapter	  6	  
	   157	   	  
it	  supposedly	  comes	  to	  resolve,	  embodies	  here	  the	  categorical	  imperative	  of	  the	  
subject	  in	  the	  law.	  	  
Indeed,	  in	  1997,	  Article	  14(6)	  of	  Law	  2503/1997	  “On	  civil	  status	  acts”,	  which	  
included	  the	  first	  explicit	  reference	  to	  such	  an	  issue	  in	  a	  legislative	  text	  was	  
articulated	  the	  same	  way.	  That	  is,	  allowing	  the	  amendment	  of	  the	  birth	  registration	  
act	  in	  the	  case	  of	  “sex	  change,”	  without	  any	  further	  explanation.	  The	  centrality	  of	  
the	  “sex	  change”	  operation	  instead	  of	  the	  diagnosis	  (transsexuality,	  
hermaphroditism	  etc.)	  provided	  a	  loose	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  that	  allowed	  
transsexuality	  not	  to	  be	  named	  but	  to	  be	  included	  within	  the	  regulatory	  scope	  of	  
the	  law.	  The	  unstable	  definition	  of	  the	  subject	  in	  the	  law	  throughout	  these	  texts	  
shows	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  concept	  of	  “sex	  change”	  levitated	  between	  
hermaphroditism,	  as	  a	  recognised	  condition	  by	  the	  law,	  and	  transsexuality,	  as	  the	  
imprint	  of	  a	  phantasmatic	  presence,	  a	  legal	  echo	  of	  an	  unwanted	  (for	  most	  legal	  
scholars)	  reality.	  	  
In	  other	  words,	  my	  argument	  in	  this	  section	  has	  been	  that	  the	  absence	  of	  trans	  
identities,	  as	  such,	  in	  Civil	  law,	  does	  not	  reflect	  a	  literal	  absence	  of	  trans	  
engagement	  with	  the	  law	  but	  an	  unwillingness	  of	  Civil	  law	  scholars	  to	  introduce	  
trans	  identities,	  which	  circulated	  in	  the	  social	  sphere,	  in	  legal	  discourse.	  This	  
argument	  can	  be	  grounded	  even	  more	  firmly	  by	  a	  methodological	  detour	  through	  
Penal	  sciences	  that	  will	  confirm	  the	  ordinary	  encounter	  of	  gender	  variant	  -­‐	  and	  
more	  specifically	  trans-­‐feminine	  -­‐	  individuals	  with	  Criminal	  law	  appendages	  and,	  
subsequently,	  with	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order	  as	  a	  whole.	  
6.2. Criminal	  law	  
6.2.a. Criminal	  Cases	  –	  Police	  Periodicals	  
In	  this	  section,	  in	  order	  to	  confirm	  and	  further	  my	  argument	  about	  the	  systematic	  
concealment	  of	  the	  transsexual/travesti	  identities	  by	  Civil	  law	  scholars,	  I	  turn	  to	  
specific	  parts	  of	  Criminal	  law	  processes	  that	  reveal	  traces	  of	  the	  casual	  interaction	  
between	  state	  apparatuses	  and	  gender-­‐variant	  individuals.	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The	  structural	  violence	  and	  exclusion	  of	  gender	  non-­‐conforming	  individuals	  in	  
various	  socio-­‐legal	  contexts	  has	  often	  led	  not	  only	  to	  a	  criminalisation	  of	  such	  
identities	  per	  se	  but	  also	  to	  a	  marginalisation	  and,	  therefore,	  an	  increased	  
implication	  in	  illegal	  or	  risky	  practices	  (Spade	  [2009]	  2015).	  The	  Greek	  context	  is	  no	  
exception	  in	  this	  aspect.	  Although	  information	  is	  scarcer	  about	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  
period,	  by	  the	  1970s	  the	  majority	  of	  trans	  women	  were	  working	  as	  sex	  workers	  and	  
were	  engaging	  with	  other	  illegal	  activities	  within	  broader	  outlaw	  networks	  
(Dokoumetzidis	  1997).	  For	  the	  most	  part	  of	  this	  decade,	  police	  raids	  and	  the	  
harassment	  of	  trans	  and	  cross-­‐dressing	  sex	  workers	  were	  a	  daily	  phenomenon	  as	  
well	  as	  violent	  assaults	  by	  johns,	  verbal	  harassment	  and	  stigmatisation	  
(Theodorakopoulos	  2005:	  42;	  Paola	  Revenioti	  2011).	  In	  order	  to	  find	  legal	  traces	  of	  
this	  reality,	  I	  take	  a	  brief	  detour	  into	  the	  archive	  of	  police	  journals	  from	  this	  
period.105	  	  
The	  passing	  from	  this	  archive	  uncovers	  that	  specific	  gender	  crossing	  identities	  had	  
an	  involuntary	  familiarity	  with	  police	  agencies	  and	  a	  regular	  degree	  of	  interaction	  
with	  criminal	  courts.	  Looking	  at	  the	  Hellenic	  Police	  journal	  archives	  there	  are	  
mentions	  of	  “travestis”	  (τραβεστί),	  sometimes	  in	  quotation	  marks,	  or	  
“homosexuals”	  (ομοφυλόφιλοι)	  -­‐	  referring	  still	  to	  cross-­‐dressing	  and	  cross-­‐gender	  
identification	  -­‐	  and	  the	  tone	  is	  often	  openly	  derogatory	  or	  even	  derisive.	  For	  
example,	  in	  a	  1978	  issue	  of	  the	  journal	  Police	  Chronicles,	  a	  case	  reported	  in	  the	  
“successes	  of	  our	  agencies”	  section	  reads:	  
“Travesti”	  crooks:	  The	  wallet	  of	  the	  Syrian	  sailor	  [male	  name]	  has	  been	  
stolen	  by	  “Sonia”	  and	  “Leta”,	  after	  they	  promised	  him	  “orgies”.	  The	  crooks,	  
known	  to	  the	  police,	  are	  [male	  name]	  19	  years	  old	  (Sonia)	  and	  [male	  name]	  
25	  years	  old	  (Leta).	  The	  two	  “girls”,	  dressed	  in	  women’s	  clothes	  of	  the	  
latest	  fashion,	  (…)	  (Astynomika	  Chronika	  1978:	  326,	  my	  translation).	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  According	  to	  the	  Hellenic	  Police	  website,	  City	  Police	  and	  the	  Hellenic	  Gendarmery	  each	  had	  their	  
own	  journal	  (“Police	  Chronicles”	  and	  the	  “Hellenic	  Gendarmery	  Review”	  accordingly)	  since	  1953.	  
After	  the	  merging	  of	  the	  two	  forces	  in	  1984,	  the	  two	  journals	  merged	  as	  well	  under	  the	  name	  
“Hellenic	  Police	  Review”	  that	  remains	  the	  official	  police	  journal	  until	  today	  (Hellenic	  Police	  website,	  
date	  n/a).	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The	  report	  continues	  in	  the	  same	  tabloid-­‐like	  tone	  to	  give	  an	  account	  of	  what	  
happened	  in	  the	  form	  of	  an	  anecdote,	  with	  direct	  dialogues	  included	  in	  the	  text.	  
Moreover,	  the	  text	  is	  accompanied	  by	  the	  mug-­‐shot	  of	  one	  of	  the	  women,	  subtitled	  
“the	  ‘travesti’	  ‘Sonia’”.106	  The	  quotation	  marks	  and	  exclamation	  marks	  along	  with	  
the	  title	  and	  the	  overall	  wording	  create	  a	  mocking	  tone.107	  	  
In	  a	  similar	  tone,	  during	  the	  mobilisation	  against	  the	  infamous	  decree	  for	  sexually	  
transmitted	  diseases108	  and	  the	  international	  support	  campaign	  it	  sparked,109	  the	  
Police	  Chronicles	  journal	  writes	  in	  its	  “police	  news	  from	  abroad”	  section:	  
The	  fraternal	  support	  of	  Swedish	  “travestis”:	  A	  voice	  of	  support	  from	  
Sweden.	  We	  received	  it	  on	  28.9.1978	  and	  it	  refers	  to	  the	  movement	  of	  
“Travestis”	  in	  our	  country,	  which	  did	  not	  have	  the	  reception	  expected	  by	  
international	  organisations	  of	  the	  kind,	  by	  the	  Greek	  authorities.	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  Sonia	  was	  one	  of	  the	  most	  famous	  transsexuals	  of	  her	  time,	  notorious	  in	  the	  underground	  
Athenian	  scene	  as	  a	  radical	  in	  the	  artistic	  and	  political	  sense.	  Sonia	  was	  found	  strangled	  in	  1982	  and	  
although	  her	  death	  shook	  this	  scene	  and	  made	  headlines,	  it	  remained	  unsolved.	  Paola	  Revenioti	  
wrote	  a	  powerful	  text	  in	  Kraximo	  for	  Sonia’s	  murder	  titled	  “Sonia.	  A	  lifetime	  in	  hell”	  including	  a	  
picture	  of	  Sonia’s	  naked	  strangled	  body	  (Revenioti	  [1981-­‐1993]	  2007:	  54).	  The	  anarchist	  Katerina	  
Gogou,	  the	  darkest	  Greek	  poetess	  of	  this	  time,	  included	  a	  poem	  (titled	  “Sonia”)	  for	  Sonia’s	  murder	  in	  
her	  poem	  collection	  “The	  Absentees”	  (Gogou	  1986:	  26;	  for	  English	  translation	  taxikipali	  2010:	  online,	  
page	  n/a).	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  Notably,	  this	  tone	  is	  not	  reserved	  just	  for	  such	  themes	  but	  is	  used	  in	  many	  of	  the	  articles	  and	  
reports	  of	  cases,	  which	  are	  written	  in	  the	  journal	  in	  an	  almost	  comical	  manner.	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  The	  Colonel	  Junta	  (1967-­‐1974)	  bequeathed	  the	  next	  governments	  with	  a	  decree	  titled	  
“Concerning	  the	  protection	  from	  sexually	  transmitted	  diseases	  and	  the	  regulation	  of	  similar	  issues”,	  
which	  criminalised	  cruising	  and	  threatened	  homosexuals	  (at	  that	  time,	  that	  included	  trans	  women)	  
with	  imprisonment	  and	  displacement	  (Theodorakopoulos	  2005:	  18-­‐19).	  While	  the	  decree	  was	  
processed	  in	  order	  to	  be	  voted	  in	  a	  new	  form	  by	  the	  parliament,	  an	  unprecedented	  campaign	  
against	  it	  took	  place	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s.	  Trans	  sex-­‐workers	  were	  already	  harassed	  on	  a	  
daily	  basis	  by	  the	  police	  for	  soliciting	  sex	  (Paola	  Revenioti,	  2011).	  In	  view	  of	  this	  additional	  threat	  
they	  organised	  and	  worked	  together	  with	  the	  newly	  formed	  Liberation	  Movement	  of	  Greek	  
Homosexuals	  and	  other	  allies	  (such	  as	  some	  left-­‐wing	  groups)	  to	  resist	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  bill	  
(Theodorakopoulos	  2005:	  42).	  The	  protest	  of	  500	  trans	  women,	  homosexuals	  and	  allies	  in	  front	  of	  
the	  Greek	  Parliament	  in	  1981	  remains	  a	  historical	  moment	  for	  the	  Greek	  LGBT+	  movements.	  
Although,	  this	  struggle	  prevented	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  bill	  and	  is	  considered	  the	  birthing	  moment	  
of	  the	  Greek	  LGBT	  movement,	  cruising	  spots	  continued	  to	  be	  raided	  and	  trans	  women	  that	  worked	  
the	  streets	  continued	  to	  be	  rounded	  up	  and	  harassed	  by	  the	  police	  for	  many	  years	  to	  come	  
(Theodorakopoulos	  2005:	  44;	  Paola	  Revenioti,	  2011).	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  A	  public	  letter	  of	  protest	  against	  the	  bill	  published	  in	  1978	  was	  signed	  by	  250	  intellectuals	  and	  
artists	  including	  Simon	  De	  Beauvoir,	  Jean-­‐Paul	  Sartre,	  Louis	  Althusser,	  Rolland	  Barthes,	  Costas	  
Gavras,	  Michel	  Foucault,	  Felix	  Guattari,	  Nikos	  Poulantzas	  and	  many	  others	  (Theodorakopoulos	  2005:	  
36).	  	  	  	  	  
RESERVING	  THE	  RIGHT	  TO	  BE	  COMPLEX	  
	   160	   	  
In	  the	  statement	  of	  support	  -­‐	  that	  was	  sent	  to	  us	  by	  the	  representative	  
body	  of	  the	  homosexual	  movement	  of	  Sweden	  -­‐	  after	  mentioning	  that	  the	  
unacceptable	  fact	  of	  the	  persecution	  (!)	  goes	  against	  Article	  2	  of	  the	  
Declaration	  of	  the	  Rights	  of	  the	  Man	  and,	  no	  more	  no	  less,	  of	  the	  Helsinki	  
Accords,	  it	  points	  out:	  [part	  of	  the	  statement	  quoted]!	  And	  the	  protest	  
statement,	  which	  signed	  by	  ‘madame’	  President	  [name]	  and	  the	  
‘homosexuella	  socialister’	  [name],	  concludes:	  We	  support	  the	  struggle	  of	  
the	  Liberation	  Movement	  of	  Greek	  Homosexuals	  against	  the	  fascism	  of	  
androcracy”!	  (Police	  Chronicles	  1979:	  129,	  my	  translation).	  	  
Once	  more,	  the	  quotation	  marks	  and	  overall	  tone	  of	  this	  report	  point	  to	  mockery	  
but	  also	  reveal	  a	  familiarity	  with	  trans	  women	  and	  a	  very	  specific	  way	  of	  addressing	  
them.	  That	  is,	  although	  the	  lack	  of	  respect	  is	  obvious,	  unlike	  the	  Civil	  law	  texts,	  the	  
existence	  of	  the	  transsexual/travesti	  is	  neither	  denied	  nor	  concealed.	  Although	  
these	  individuals	  are	  identified	  with	  their	  official	  (thus,	  male)	  names,	  at	  the	  same	  
time,	  the	  female	  names	  are	  present	  too	  and,	  for	  instance,	  the	  mugshot	  carries	  only	  
the	  female	  name	  of	  the	  arrested	  person.	  Moreover,	  there	  is	  no	  trace	  of	  
hermaphroditism	  as	  a	  category,	  which	  overlaps	  with	  transsexuality.	  The	  
transsexual/travesti	  is	  present	  in	  this	  archive	  as	  a	  clear	  image.	  This	  is	  not	  claimed	  to	  
constitute	  at	  any	  point	  a	  respectful	  positioning	  on	  part	  of	  the	  police,	  but	  it	  is	  still	  a	  
testimony	  to	  an	  understanding	  formed	  through	  the	  banality	  of	  daily	  interaction.	  	  
Criminalised,	  sexualised	  and	  misrepresented	  as	  she	  may	  appear,	  the	  figure	  of	  the	  
transsexual/travesti	  is	  nonetheless	  inscribed	  within	  police	  journals	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  
city’s	  daily	  grind.110	  The	  reality	  of	  the	  daily	  interaction	  of	  trans	  women	  with	  the	  
appendages	  of	  the	  law	  creates	  a	  sharp	  contrast	  with	  the	  complete	  omission	  of	  the	  
transsexual/travesti	  as	  a	  category	  in	  the	  Civil	  law	  sex	  classification	  debate.	  In	  the	  
next	  decades,	  more	  cases	  including	  trans	  women	  are	  published	  in	  the	  same	  form	  in	  
the	  journal	  of	  the	  Hellenic	  Police	  (Astynomika	  Chronika	  1983:	  600;	  Astynomiki	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  On	  a	  couple	  of	  cases,	  travestis	  are	  mentioned	  also	  as	  victims	  in	  reports	  of	  arrests	  of	  violent	  
criminals,	  in	  which	  case	  the	  wording	  is	  neutral	  lacking	  the	  aggressive	  or	  mocking	  tone	  (Astynomiki	  
Epitheorisi	  1989:	  56;	  Astynomiki	  Epitheorisi	  1992:	  531).	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Epitheorisi	  1988:	  643;	  Astynomiki	  Epitheorisi	  1998:	  189).	  Although	  it	  appears	  that	  
some	  cases	  probably	  made	  it	  to	  the	  criminal	  courts,	  they	  did	  not	  enter	  the	  debate	  
of	  legal	  scholars	  on	  sex	  classification	  and	  the	  meaning	  of	  sex	  in	  the	  law.	  The	  sole	  
judicial	  text	  from	  this	  field	  that	  became	  part	  of	  this	  debate	  was	  decision	  400/1986	  
of	  the	  Athens	  Military	  Court	  (it	  was	  not	  a	  final	  decision	  but	  the	  court’s	  resolution	  
concerning	  an	  objection	  raised	  during	  a	  criminal	  trial),	  which	  touched	  upon	  some	  
key	  issues	  and,	  thus,	  will	  be	  presented	  in	  more	  detail	  (Poinika	  Chronika	  1986).	  	  
The	  defendant	  in	  this	  trial	  was	  an	  aircraftman	  of	  the	  National	  Air-­‐force	  (hence	  the	  
military	  court)	  who	  met	  the	  complainant	  in	  a	  “house”	  where	  she	  legally	  worked	  as	  a	  
sex-­‐worker.	  The	  complainant,	  a	  woman	  who	  had	  amended	  her	  legal	  gender	  from	  
male	  to	  female,	  had	  been	  a	  licensed	  (by	  the	  police)	  sex-­‐worker	  for	  four	  years	  when	  
she	  met	  the	  defendant.	  The	  two	  became	  romantically	  involved	  and	  soon	  acquired	  
official	  permission	  to	  get	  married	  and	  set	  a	  date	  for	  their	  wedding.111	  A	  few	  months	  
later,	  the	  planned	  wedding	  was	  cancelled	  after	  the	  insistence	  of	  the	  familial	  
environment	  of	  the	  accused,	  a	  fact	  that	  led	  to	  the	  deterioration	  and	  resolution	  of	  
the	  relationship.	  During	  the	  time	  that	  the	  couple	  was	  together,	  the	  accused	  “after	  
having	  created	  an	  environment	  of	  trust”	  led	  a	  frivolous	  and	  luxurious	  life	  by	  
extorting	  a	  big	  part	  of	  the	  complainant’s	  income	  (Poinika	  Chronika	  1986:	  953).112	  
The	  lawsuit	  brought	  in	  front	  of	  the	  court	  by	  the	  claimant	  was	  grounded	  in	  the	  Penal	  
Code,	  which	  punishes	  “the	  man	  that	  is	  wholly	  or	  in	  part	  supported	  by	  a	  woman	  who	  
works	  as	  a	  prostitute	  and	  by	  the	  exploitation	  of	  her	  immoral	  earnings”	  (Art.	  350	  
P.C.).	  When	  the	  case	  was	  introduced	  for	  discussion,	  the	  accused	  raised	  an	  objection	  
about	  the	  applicability	  of	  the	  law,	  which	  explicitly	  requires	  a	  female	  victim	  (“a	  
woman	  who	  works	  as	  a	  prostitute	  […]”),	  while,	  according	  to	  him,	  the	  complainant	  
was	  not	  to	  be	  considered	  legally	  as	  a	  woman.	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  It	  is	  mentioned	  in	  the	  case	  that	  the	  complainant	  had	  been	  married	  to	  another	  man	  before	  the	  
defendant,	  confirming	  that	  marriages	  after	  legal	  gender	  amendment	  were	  taking	  place.	  	  	  
112
	  It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  some	  of	  the	  trans	  sex-­‐workers	  of	  that	  time	  could	  earn	  very	  satisfying	  
amounts	  of	  money,	  which	  is	  not	  the	  case	  anymore.	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The	  final	  outcome	  of	  the	  trial	  is	  not	  part	  of	  the	  published	  text,	  only	  the	  outcome	  of	  
the	  discussion	  of	  this	  objection.	  Due	  to	  the	  taxonomic	  conflations	  unravelling	  within	  
legal	  theory,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  from	  the	  text	  if	  the	  complainant	  is	  an	  intersex	  or	  trans	  
person.	  More	  specifically,	  when	  her	  medical	  history	  is	  given,	  she	  is	  described	  as	  
“being	  born	  in	  a	  hermaphrodite	  condition”	  and	  having	  an	  ambiguous	  genital	  
anatomy.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  summary	  that	  is	  given	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  
publication	  reads:	  	  
Can	  someone	  be	  the	  victim	  of	  this	  crime	  if	  he	  was	  born	  a	  man	  but,	  after	  
having	  undergone	  surgical	  operations,	  changed	  sex	  (…)	  (Poinika	  Chronika	  
1986:	  952,	  my	  translation).	  	  	  
Since	  the	  Civil	  law	  field	  would	  acknowledge	  only	  hermaphroditism	  as	  a	  legitimate	  
reason	  to	  recognise	  a	  change	  in	  civil	  status,	  gender	  variant	  individuals,	  even	  lacking	  
genital	  ambiguity,	  presented	  as	  hermaphrodites	  to	  navigate	  the	  legal	  terrain.	  For	  
example,	  commenting	  on	  the	  sex	  distinction	  in	  Article	  350	  P.C.	  that	  requires	  a	  
female	  victim,	  the	  text	  reads:	  
Anyway,	  considering	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  current	  social	  reality	  has	  started	  to	  
tolerate,	  but	  also	  to	  accept,	  sex	  changes	  that	  are	  made	  through	  successful	  
surgical	  procedures,	  with	  more	  frequent	  being	  the	  case	  of	  men	  that,	  due	  to	  
the	  phenomenon	  of	  hermaphroditism,	  accede	  to	  the	  female	  gender	  
through	  the	  intervention	  of	  Medical	  Science	  (…)	  (Poinika	  Chronika	  1986:	  
953,	  my	  translation).	  
From	  such	  passages,	  it	  is	  safe	  to	  assume	  a	  categorical	  overlapping	  of	  
hermaphroditism	  and	  transsexuality	  within	  legal	  theory	  and	  other	  fields	  at	  that	  
time.	  Moreover,	  the	  taxonomic	  conflations	  echoing	  the	  works	  of	  Legal	  Medicine,	  
made	  the	  limits	  of	  such	  categories	  porous	  and	  unstable	  (Prosser	  1998b).	  Whatever	  
the	  anatomical	  “truth”	  of	  the	  claimant	  had	  been	  at	  birth,	  after	  the	  performed	  
surgeries,	  her	  physical,	  psychical	  and	  emotional	  condition	  as	  well	  as	  her	  social	  
behaviour	  was,	  according	  to	  the	  opinion	  accepted	  by	  the	  Court,	  beyond	  any	  doubt	  
that	  of	  a	  woman.	  What	  sets	  this	  decision	  apart	  from	  all	  the	  other	  studied	  texts	  is	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the	  realisation	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  jurists	  involved	  that	  deciding	  upon	  claimant’s	  
categorisation	  as	  a	  “woman”	  would	  necessarily	  entail	  not	  only	  the	  verification	  of	  
the	  person’s	  sex	  status	  but	  also	  a	  definition	  of	  the	  category	  itself.	  	  
From	  the	  summary	  of	  the	  decision,	  it	  is	  already	  apparent	  that	  the	  main	  objective	  of	  
the	  published	  analysis	  is	  the	  “interpretation	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘woman’	  in	  Article	  
350	  P.C.”	  (Poinika	  Chronika	  1986:	  952,	  my	  translation).	  The	  main	  point	  of	  the	  jurist	  
is	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  “woman”	  in	  this	  provision	  should	  be	  dictated	  by	  the	  
purpose	  of	  the	  provision,	  which	  is	  to	  prevent	  a	  specific	  kind	  of	  exploitation.	  Thus,	  a	  
distinction	  between	  a	  “‘natural’	  woman-­‐prostitute	  and	  one	  whose	  gender	  identity	  
was	  later	  confirmed	  and	  constituted	  even	  through	  corrective	  surgeries”	  is	  not	  in	  
accordance	  with	  a	  teleological	  interpretation	  of	  the	  protective	  scope	  of	  the	  
provision	  (Poinika	  Chronika	  1986:	  955).	  This	  argument	  is	  in	  direct	  dialogue	  with	  
critiques	  on	  classical	  theories	  of	  categorisation	  as	  analysed	  in	  chapter	  three.	  Being	  
the	  only	  text	  that	  openly	  engages	  with	  the	  interpretation	  of	  such	  a	  category,	  its	  
detailed	  rationale	  deserves	  our	  attention:	  
Nonetheless,	  other	  than	  the	  substantial	  (through	  the	  surgical	  procedures)	  
and	  the	  legal	  (amendment	  of	  birth	  registration	  act	  –	  granting	  of	  new	  id)	  
alteration	  of	  her	  sex,	  it	  should	  not	  be	  overlooked	  that	  her	  entire	  social	  
presence	  and	  behaviour	  (female	  attire	  and	  speaking	  manner,	  sexual	  
relations	  with	  men,	  being	  married	  to	  a	  man	  before	  meeting	  the	  accused,	  
working	  as	  a	  prostitute)	  is	  such	  that	  not	  only	  confirmed	  her	  existence	  as	  a	  
woman	  but	  also	  made	  her	  inclusion	  to	  the	  female	  gender	  imperative.	  Of	  
course,	  the	  accused	  claims	  that	  the	  “complainant”,	  regardless	  of	  the	  
performed	  surgeries,	  does	  not	  have	  from	  a	  biological	  and	  medical	  point	  of	  
view	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  female	  sex,	  meaning,	  obviously,	  the	  internal	  
reproductive	  organs	  (ovaries,	  fallopian	  tube,	  uterus)	  that	  a	  woman	  has	  
since	  birth.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  provision	  of	  Article	  350	  P.C.	  does	  not	  mean	  as	  
a	  “woman”	  only	  the	  one	  that	  biologically	  and	  anatomically	  has	  all	  the	  
genital	  organs	  (internal	  and	  external)	  since	  birth.	  It	  definitely	  includes	  the	  
one	  that	  has,	  even	  if	  acquired	  by	  corrective	  surgeries,	  external	  female	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organs	  and	  characteristics	  (vagina	  and	  other	  apparent	  features	  of	  the	  sex	  
such	  as	  breasts,	  buttocks	  etc.)	  which	  give	  her	  the	  ability	  to	  normally	  
engage	  in	  intercourse	  with	  men	  and	  be	  considered	  by	  them	  as	  a	  woman	  
during	  the	  intercourse	  or	  other	  sexual	  acts.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  complainant’s	  
lack	  of	  internal	  genital	  organs,	  which	  are	  necessary	  only	  for	  reproduction,	  
definitely	  do	  not	  deprive	  her	  of	  the	  capability	  have	  intercourse	  and	  perform	  
all	  sexual	  acts	  with	  men	  (…).	  Anyway,	  the	  sheer	  fact	  that	  the	  complainant	  
professionally	  solicits	  sex	  to	  men	  in	  exchange	  for	  money	  confirms	  and	  
fortifies	  her	  position	  as	  a	  woman	  (…).	  The	  real	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  
“woman”	  that	  is	  provided	  above,	  is	  in	  our	  opinion	  perfectly	  in	  accordance	  
with	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  provision	  (…)	  (Poinika	  Chronika	  1986:	  954,	  my	  
translation).	  	  	  
This	  passage	  is	  revealing	  in	  various	  ways	  both	  for	  the	  role	  of	  the	  jurist	  and	  the	  
underlying	  gender	  norms	  that	  form	  the	  ideological	  background	  of	  the	  law.	  The	  role	  
of	  the	  jurist	  as	  an	  interpreter	  of	  the	  letter	  of	  the	  law	  is	  indicative	  of	  the	  power	  that	  
lies	  within	  interpretation.	  The	  legislator	  might	  have	  composed	  the	  text,	  but	  it	  is	  in	  
the	  power	  of	  the	  reader/judge	  to	  explain	  what	  is	  really	  meant	  by	  the	  term	  
“woman”,	  which,	  in	  most	  cases,	  is	  considered	  self-­‐evident.	  The	  power	  that	  
crystallises	  in	  this	  instance	  is	  multi-­‐faceted.	  It	  is	  not	  just	  the	  power	  of	  restricting	  or	  
broadening	  the	  protective	  scope	  of	  the	  law,	  which,	  in	  this	  case,	  is	  applied	  in	  favour	  
of	  the	  complainant	  (even	  if	  it	  later	  will	  be	  contested	  in	  other	  texts),	  but	  also	  the	  
power	  to	  make	  claims	  about	  the	  category	  “woman”.	  These	  claims	  consequently	  
turn	  into	  claims	  about	  sex	  as	  a	  category,	  a	  set	  of	  criteria	  worded	  out	  by	  the	  
authoritative	  interpreter	  and	  his	  understanding	  of	  reality.	  	  
The	  issue	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  category	  itself,	  as	  it	  has	  been	  analysed	  in	  chapter	  three,	  
resurfaces	  in	  the	  jurist’s	  methodological	  handling	  of	  the	  category	  “woman.”	  The	  
givenness	  of	  sexual	  categories	  claimed	  by	  legal	  scholars	  corresponds	  to	  classical	  
theories	  of	  categorisation	  that	  assume	  categories	  to	  have	  clear	  and	  set	  boundaries	  
holding	  in	  all	  the	  “things”	  that	  share	  specific	  common	  properties	  (Lakoff	  1987:	  6;	  
Taylor	  2003	  [1989]:	  20-­‐21,	  Jacob	  2004:	  520).	  Nonetheless,	  the	  jurist	  in	  this	  case	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performs	  a	  Wittgensteinian	  reading113	  of	  gender	  categories	  in	  the	  law,	  thus	  
reaching	  a	  conclusion	  which	  was	  later	  challenged	  by	  legal	  scholars.	  Accordingly,	  the	  
rationale	  behind	  the	  decision	  hints	  towards	  the	  non-­‐uniformity	  within	  “woman”	  as	  
a	  category.	  As	  was	  established	  in	  chapter	  three,	  critical	  approaches	  to	  
categorisation	  have	  emphasised	  that	  different	  members	  of	  a	  category	  might	  occupy	  
more	  or	  less	  central	  positions	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  conceptual	  core	  of	  the	  category	  
(Lakoff	  1987:	  17).	  Thus,	  some	  members	  might	  be	  perfectly	  exemplary	  of	  the	  
category	  while	  others	  being	  less	  representative	  are	  easier	  to	  exclude	  in	  case	  of	  
restrictive	  shift	  of	  the	  boundaries	  that	  mark	  the	  inside	  from	  the	  outside	  of	  a	  
category.	  The	  complainant	  is	  granted	  here	  the	  status	  of	  a	  woman	  “even	  if”	  her	  
female	  anatomy	  was	  acquired	  by	  surgical	  means.	  This	  “even	  if”	  speaks	  to	  the	  
hierarchy	  within	  the	  category	  and	  is	  aligned	  with	  the	  argument	  of	  the	  earlier	  civil	  
case	  used	  by	  Greek	  scholars,	  in	  which	  Arlene	  Leber	  was	  classified	  as	  female	  in	  Civil	  
law	  but,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  was	  declared	  that	  she	  “is	  neither	  a	  perfect	  man	  nor	  a	  
perfect	  woman”	  (Themis	  1946:	  406).	  The	  complainant,	  thus,	  is	  woman	  enough	  for	  
Article	  350	  P.C.	  but	  would	  be	  more	  of	  a	  woman	  or	  would	  simply	  be	  a	  woman	  if	  her	  
sex	  were	  not	  surgically	  constituted,	  and	  if	  she	  had	  internal	  reproductive	  organs	  etc.	  	  
What	  becomes	  clear	  by	  the	  interpretation	  task	  at	  work	  is	  that	  sexual	  categories	  
have	  shifting	  boundaries	  depending	  on	  the	  criteria	  used	  and	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  
categorisation.	  Even	  if	  bodily	  characteristics	  were,	  at	  the	  time,	  the	  undisputable	  
measure	  to	  assign	  sex,	  the	  further	  specification	  of	  which	  bodily	  traits	  possess	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  Interestingly,	  Jacob	  Hale	  (1998)	  has	  suggested	  the	  usefulness	  of	  such	  a	  reading	  of	  gender	  
categories	  within	  trans	  theory:	  
None	  of	  these	  thirteen	  characteristics	  is	  necessary	  or	  sufficient	  for	  membership	  in	  the	  category	  
“woman.”	  Rather,	  these	  characteristics	  are	  best	  understood	  as	  Wittgensteinian	  family	  resemblances:	  
resemblances	  that	  some	  women,	  to	  greater	  and	  lesser	  degrees,	  share	  with	  some	  other	  women,	  just	  
as	  I	  share	  some	  resemblances	  
with	  some	  members	  of	  my	  biological	  family	  to	  greater	  or	  lesser	  degrees	  and	  fail	  to	  share	  some	  other	  
resemblances	  that	  some	  of	  my	  biological	  family	  members	  share	  with	  others	  in	  my	  biological	  family.	  
On	  this	  view	  of	  the	  logical	  type	  of	  definition	  adequate	  to	  contemporary	  gender	  categories,	  developed	  
more	  generally	  by	  Wittgenstein	  in	  his	  Philosophical	  Investigations,	  things	  within	  one	  category	  bear	  
numerous	  resemblances	  to	  other	  things	  within	  that	  category,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  things	  in	  other	  categories.	  
(…)	  Borders	  between	  gender	  categories,	  then,	  are	  zones	  of	  overlap,	  not	  lines	  (Hale	  1998:	  323).	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decisive	  roles	  in	  the	  sexing	  of	  the	  body	  has	  led	  to	  various	  conclusions.114	  
Nonetheless,	  the	  overall	  coherency	  of	  the	  underlying	  gender	  paradigm	  does	  not	  
seem	  to	  be	  conflicted	  by	  the	  arbitrariness	  of	  the	  chosen	  criteria,	  which	  have	  
produced	  conflicting	  results.	  For	  example,	  navigating	  international	  trans	  
jurisprudence,	  only	  three	  years	  prior	  to	  the	  examined	  case,	  the	  British	  courts	  had	  
reached	  a	  directly	  opposite	  ruling	  in	  a	  case	  regarding	  charges	  of	  living	  off	  
prostitution	  earnings	  (s	  30	  of	  the	  Sexual	  Offences	  Act	  1956	  and	  s	  5	  of	  the	  Sexual	  
Offences	  Act	  1967).	  In	  this	  case	  (R	  v.	  Tan),	  the	  court	  had	  to	  tackle	  the	  question	  of	  
whether	  the	  accused	  trans	  women	  were	  to	  be	  considered	  as	  women	  or	  men,	  since	  
sex	  was	  an	  essential	  element	  for	  the	  charges.	  The	  court	  ruled	  that	  the	  accused	  were	  
to	  be	  considered	  male	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  these	  provisions	  following	  the	  rationale	  
of	  Corbett	  v	  Corbett.115	  Returning	  to	  the	  Greek	  decision	  of	  the	  Military	  Tribunal,	  
although	  probably	  unaware	  of	  the	  international	  debate,116	  the	  judge	  considered	  as	  
decisive	  the	  combination	  of	  genital	  post-­‐operative	  anatomy,	  “psychical	  and	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  Katherine	  O’Donovan	  organises	  judicial	  approaches	  to	  sex	  classification	  in	  two	  groups	  according	  
to	  the	  criteria	  chosen	  as	  crucial,	  the	  essentialist	  and	  the	  cluster-­‐concept	  approaches	  (O’Donovan	  
1985:	  64).	  The	  essentialist	  approaches	  decide	  upon	  which	  feature	  is	  decisive	  and	  then	  classify	  all	  
individual	  along	  that	  axis	  and	  the	  cluster	  approaches	  consider	  a	  set	  of	  similar	  traits	  (“a	  cluster	  of	  
concepts”),	  which	  suggest	  that	  the	  individual	  belongs	  in	  one	  of	  the	  two	  sexes	  (O’Donovan	  1985:	  64-­‐
65).	  As	  Whittle	  has	  shown,	  while	  cluster-­‐concept	  approaches	  might	  be	  more	  inclusive	  (as	  seen	  in	  the	  
studied	  case	  too),	  nonetheless	  both	  lines	  of	  thought	  prove	  problematic	  as	  in	  both	  “the	  law	  operates	  
on	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  two	  sexes	  are	  separate	  entities	  with	  distinct	  sites”	  (Whittle	  2002:	  12).	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  In	  Corbett,	  the	  sex	  of	  April	  Ashley	  (a	  post-­‐operative	  trans	  woman)	  was	  to	  be	  decided	  for	  the	  
purpose	  of	  marriage	  after	  her	  husband’s	  petition	  for	  nullity	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  April	  Ashley	  
remained	  male	  and,	  thus,	  the	  marriage	  was	  void	  and,	  additionally,	  that	  the	  marriage	  was	  never	  
consummated	  due	  to	  the	  respondent’s	  incapacity.	  Lord	  Ormrod	  decided	  that	  indeed	  the	  respondent	  
remained	  male	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  case	  and	  that	  “normal”	  intercourse	  was	  not	  compatible	  with	  
Ashley’s	  post-­‐operative	  anatomy,	  thus,	  the	  marriage	  was	  not	  consummated.	  The	  test	  that	  was	  
devised	  to	  decide	  upon	  the	  sex	  classification	  of	  the	  respondent	  regarded	  chromosomal,	  gonadal	  and	  
genital	  characteristics	  at	  the	  time	  of	  birth,	  over	  not	  only	  psychological	  and	  social	  factors	  but	  also	  
post-­‐operative	  anatomy.	  The	  Corbett	  case	  (1971),	  which	  has	  been	  thoroughly	  analysed	  within	  trans-­‐
related	  scholarship,	  became	  a	  reference	  point	  for	  the	  next	  approximately	  thirty	  years	  (until	  the	  shift	  
marked	  by	  Goodwin	  v.	  UK	  2002),	  not	  only	  for	  English	  courts	  but	  also	  for	  other	  legal	  orders	  that	  
turned	  to	  the	  Corbett	  rationale	  in	  search	  for	  a	  “safe”	  set	  of	  criteria	  for	  sex	  classification	  (Sharpe	  
2002;	  Greenberg	  &	  Herald	  2005;	  Whittle	  &	  Turner	  2007;	  Hines	  2009;	  Herald	  2009;	  Meadow	  2010;	  
Tao	  2015;	  Hutton	  2019).	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  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  some	  Greek	  civil	  scholars	  tried	  to	  follow	  the	  international	  debate	  but	  since	  
the	  Greek	  legal	  order	  was	  traditionally	  influenced	  by	  German	  jurists,	  the	  cases	  that	  were	  translated	  
were	  German	  and	  Swiss	  while	  British	  jurisprudence	  was	  often	  ignored.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  criminal	  
case	  studied	  here	  does	  not	  mention	  any	  of	  the	  translated	  civil	  cases	  as	  the	  two	  fields	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  
be	  in	  dialogue.	  Obviously	  then,	  the	  Greek	  Military	  judge	  is	  (luckily)	  not	  aware	  of	  the	  Corbett	  case	  and	  
its	  international	  impact.	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psychological	  feeling”	  and	  social	  behaviour,117	  	  thus,	  reaching	  the	  opposite	  
conclusion	  than	  in	  the	  cases	  above	  and	  still	  while	  remaining	  within	  the	  broad	  
concept	  of	  hermaphroditism	  (Poinika	  Chronika	  1986:	  952).	  	  
Another	  point	  that	  stands	  out	  in	  decision	  400/1986	  is	  the	  centrality	  of	  heterosexual	  
intercourse,	  which	  is	  recognised	  as	  a	  crucial	  criterion	  for	  the	  inclusion	  in	  the	  
category	  “woman”.	  (Hetero)Sexuality	  as	  proof	  of	  one’s	  sex	  or	  gender	  is	  very	  
common	  in	  both	  sexological	  and	  legal	  texts	  during	  the	  nineteenth	  and	  twentieth	  
century	  (Bolin	  1996:	  454;	  Cromwell	  1999:	  110;	  Sharpe	  2002:	  32-­‐33).	  This	  coupling	  
fed	  the	  continuing	  conflation	  of	  sex,	  gender	  and	  sexuality,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
naturalisation	  of	  heterosexual	  desire	  and	  practice.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  returning	  to	  
Prosser’s	  (1998b)	  argument,	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  three,	  about	  the	  historicity	  of	  
those	  concepts,	  it	  allowed	  for	  the	  erasure	  of	  trans	  narratives	  within	  critical	  readings	  
of	  sexological	  texts	  and	  its	  reduction	  to	  a	  vehicle	  for	  the	  expression	  of	  homosexual	  
desire.	  For	  the	  judge	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  complainant	  is	  a	  woman	  because	  she	  can	  
“achieve”	  heterosexual	  intercourse	  with	  men,	  because	  she	  is	  perceived	  as	  a	  woman	  
by	  these	  men	  during	  intercourse,	  and,	  last,	  because	  she	  solicits	  sex	  to	  men	  
professionally.118	  The	  “prostitute”	  as	  a	  figure,	  regardless	  of	  her	  perceived	  
immorality	  and	  criminal	  disposition,	  becomes	  in	  this	  case	  a	  vehicle	  of	  conceivability.	  
It	  allows	  the	  complainant	  to	  be	  classified	  as	  a	  woman	  through	  her	  subsumption	  in	  
“one	  of	  the	  different	  categories	  of	  women	  such	  as	  the	  wife,	  the	  mother,	  the	  widow,	  
the	  prostitute,	  the	  employee	  etc.”	  which	  can	  grant	  legibility	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  law	  
(Kravaritou	  1996:	  145).	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  In	  other	  words,	  this	  court	  applied,	  in	  Katherine	  O’Donovan’s	  terms,	  the	  cluster-­‐concept	  
approach	  in	  a	  criminal	  case	  during	  a	  period	  when	  O’Donovan	  was	  noting:	  
However,	  the	  cluster-­‐concept	  approach	  has	  not	  been	  accepted	  in	  any	  jurisdiction	  for	  sex-­‐
determination	  in	  relation	  to	  marriage,	  or	  other	  legal	  areas	  where	  sex	  has	  been	  found	  to	  be	  an	  
essential	  element	  (O’Donovan	  1985:	  68-­‐69).	  	  
This	  is	  indicative	  not	  only	  of	  the	  inconsistency	  within	  and	  among	  fields	  but	  also	  of	  the	  particularities	  
of	  different	  national	  legal	  orders	  and	  the	  varying	  paths	  they	  have	  followed.	  
118
	  The	  last	  point,	  which	  is	  articulated	  in	  such	  a	  unique	  way	  (“the	  sheer	  fact	  that	  the	  complainant	  
professionally	  solicits	  sex	  to	  men	  in	  exchange	  for	  money	  confirms	  and	  fortifies	  her	  position	  as	  a	  
woman”	  Poinika	  Chronika	  1986:	  954)	  might	  appear	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  acknowledgement	  of	  male	  and	  
transvestite	  prostitution	  earlier	  in	  the	  decision.	  Nonetheless,	  it	  is	  not	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  overall	  gender	  
imperative	  of	  the	  law,	  which	  demands	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  legibility	  in	  order	  to	  “read”	  a	  person	  as	  a	  
woman	  or	  a	  man.	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Overall,	  decision	  400/1986	  of	  the	  Military	  Court	  of	  Athens	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  
detailed	  and	  surprising	  legal	  texts	  of	  its	  time	  in	  Greece.	  Applying	  a	  rationale	  that	  
resembles	  what	  O’Donovan	  (1985)	  characterised	  as	  “cluster-­‐concept	  approach”	  
(see	  footnote	  114),	  the	  court	  found	  that	  post-­‐operative	  genital	  anatomy	  along	  with	  
psychosocial	  factors	  are	  enough	  to	  classify	  the	  complainant	  as	  a	  woman	  for	  the	  
purposes	  of	  this	  specific	  criminal	  provision.	  Contra	  the	  Corbett	  thesis	  for	  sex	  
classification,	  which	  prevailed	  in	  many	  legal	  orders	  at	  the	  time,	  this	  case	  recognises	  
post-­‐operative	  sex	  in	  a	  blurry	  frame	  between	  hermaphroditism	  and	  (implicitly)	  
transsexuality.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  remains	  faithful	  to	  the	  narrative	  that	  naturalises	  
heterosexuality	  as	  a	  trait	  or	  a	  proof	  of	  sex,	  feeding	  into	  their	  conceptual	  conflation.	  	  
The	  next	  section	  continues	  the	  methodological	  detour	  outside	  Civil	  law	  in	  search	  of	  
a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  workings	  of	  classification	  and	  interpretation	  with	  
regards	  to	  both	  the	  regulation	  and	  the	  erasure	  of	  transsexuality	  in	  the	  law.	  This	  
time,	  I	  turn	  to	  a	  narrow	  area	  of	  Medical	  law	  and,	  more	  specifically,	  the	  debate	  over	  
potential	  criminal	  liability	  of	  doctors	  performing	  gender	  confirming	  surgeries.	  
6.2.b. Medical	  Law	  –	  Criminal	  Liability	  
Within	  Medical	  law,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  parallel	  discussion	  that	  touched	  upon	  sex	  
taxonomies	  in	  the	  law	  engaging	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  legal	  nature	  of	  “sex-­‐change	  
operations”	  and	  the	  possible	  criminal	  liability	  of	  the	  doctors	  performing	  them.	  As	  in	  
the	  discussions	  analysed	  in	  the	  previous	  sections,	  the	  selective	  erasure	  of	  cross-­‐
gender	  practices	  plays	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  this	  debate	  as	  well.	  As	  it	  will	  be	  
established,	  the	  (de)legitimisation	  and	  (il)legalisation	  of	  medical	  transition	  
processes	  depends	  on	  the	  used	  taxonomies	  and	  the	  interpretative	  workings	  
performed	  around	  their	  categorical	  limits.	  	  
In	  1972,	  the	  Athens	  Medical	  Association	  requested	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  First	  Instance	  
Public	  Prosecutor	  (V.	  Pappas)	  regarding	  the	  legality	  of	  “sex	  change”	  surgeries.	  The	  
inquiry	  of	  the	  Athens	  Medical	  Association	  drew	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  surgical	  
procedures	  that	  were	  not	  “socially	  conducive”	  were	  forbidden	  and,	  thus,	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punishable	  by	  Medical	  law	  regardless	  of	  the	  patient’s	  consent.	  The	  summary	  of	  the	  
Public	  Prosecutor’s	  4820/1972	  opinion	  reads:	  
The	  surgical	  procedure	  of	  sex	  change	  on	  a	  person	  of	  ambiguous	  physiology	  
and	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  predominant	  sex	  in	  them	  is	  not	  contrary	  to	  the	  law	  or	  
the	  accepted	  principles	  or	  morality	  –	  The	  justification	  for	  the	  non-­‐
punishment	  of	  the	  surgical	  procedures	  [is]	  their	  purpose	  and	  
presuppositions	  (…)	  (Poinika	  Chronika	  1972:	  645,	  my	  translation).	  	  	  
According	  to	  the	  issued	  opinion,	  the	  right	  to	  one’s	  body,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  right	  to	  one’s	  
personality,	  is	  to	  be	  exercised	  in	  relation	  to	  not	  only	  the	  individual	  but	  also	  the	  
society	  as	  a	  whole.	  It	  then	  follows	  that	  surgical	  procedures	  which	  are	  not	  
“objectively”	  necessary	  for	  saving	  or	  preserving	  the	  life	  and	  well-­‐being	  of	  the	  
individual	  and	  are	  contrary	  to	  the	  “social	  well-­‐being	  and	  healthy	  cultural	  tradition”	  
should	  not	  be	  permitted	  (Poinika	  Chronika	  1972:	  645).	  With	  this	  principle	  in	  mind,	  
the	  Public	  Prosecutor	  sets	  out	  to	  examine	  if	  “sex	  change	  operations”	  are	  legal	  or	  if	  
there	  should	  be	  criminal	  liability	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  surgeons	  involved.	  	  
The	  opinion	  takes	  a	  rather	  positive	  stance	  in	  interpreting	  the	  purpose	  of	  an	  
operation	  as	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  treatment	  of	  a	  disease	  stricto	  sensu.	  Following	  the	  
rationale,	  which	  legitimised	  plastic	  surgeries	  on	  World	  War	  II	  trauma	  patients	  as	  
part	  of	  a	  broadly	  interpreted	  “therapeutic	  cause”,	  the	  Prosecutor	  concludes	  that	  
the	  interest	  of	  the	  patient	  should	  include	  a	  moral	  and	  psychological	  aspect.	  In	  that	  
sense,	  it	  should	  be	  thought	  to	  include	  the	  remediation	  of	  “anything	  that	  opposes	  
the	  natural	  order	  and	  the	  normality	  of	  nature”	  (Poinika	  Chronika	  1972:	  646).	  
Accordingly,	  sexual	  ambiguity	  is	  described	  as	  a	  source	  of	  “personal	  misery”	  that	  
leads	  to	  antisocial	  behaviour,	  mental	  illness	  and	  the	  “creation	  of	  perverse	  
individuals”	  (Poinika	  Chronika	  1972:	  646).	  Through	  this	  line	  of	  thought,	  sex	  
confirmation	  through	  surgery	  becomes	  “socially	  conducive”	  and,	  thus,	  legally	  
permitted	  under	  the	  preconditions	  in	  place	  for	  every	  other	  surgery,	  that	  is:	  the	  
patient’s	  consent,	  the	  scientific	  suitability	  of	  the	  method	  employed,	  and	  the	  
established	  and	  conscientious	  diagnosis	  of	  the	  treated	  case	  (Poinika	  Chronika	  1972:	  
646).	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The	  importance	  of	  this	  text,	  other	  than	  the	  overall	  conclusion,	  lies	  in	  two	  parts.	  The	  
first,	  which	  is	  of	  interest	  here,	  is	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  cases,	  the	  surgeries	  and	  
subjects	  that	  fall	  under	  its	  purview	  and,	  thus,	  are	  legitimised.	  The	  second,	  which	  will	  
not	  be	  further	  analysed	  as	  it	  pertains	  to	  the	  medical	  part	  of	  transitioning,	  is	  the	  
drawing	  of	  an	  official	  path	  for	  gender	  reassignment	  procedures	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  
specific	  provisions	  in	  the	  law.119	  As	  to	  the	  former,	  the	  text	  plays	  into	  the	  conflation	  
of	  hermaphroditism	  and	  transsexuality,	  which	  is	  part	  of	  the	  scientific	  debate	  of	  this	  
period:	  	  
The	  surgical	  procedure	  changing	  the	  sex	  of	  flawed	  individuals,	  called	  
hermaphrodites	  (intersexues,	  transsexuals)	  [this	  parenthesis	  is	  not	  
translated	  or	  written	  in	  Greek	  characters],	  on	  which	  the	  sex	  determined	  
during	  fertilisation	  was	  later	  reversed	  partially	  or	  in	  whole	  due	  to	  various	  
causes	  (endogenous	  or	  exogenous),	  if	  objectively	  targeted	  to	  the	  assistance	  
of	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  prevailing	  sex	  or	  generally	  the	  remediation	  of	  the	  
demonstrated	  flaw	  or	  defect	  or	  deviation	  of	  nature	  -­‐	  that	  is,	  not	  of	  a	  purely	  
experimental	  character	  -­‐	  and	  if	  scientifically	  suggested	  as	  a	  surgical	  
procedure	  for	  the	  achievement	  of	  such	  a	  result,	  it	  does	  not	  contravene,	  
according	  to	  our	  opinion,	  any	  legal	  provision	  or	  the	  dominant	  values	  of	  our	  
cultural	  tradition	  or	  the	  accepted	  principles	  of	  morality	  (Poinika	  Chronika	  
1972:	  645-­‐646,	  my	  translation).	  
As	  seen	  in	  the	  text	  above,	  which	  is	  another	  example	  of	  the	  taxonomic	  conflation,	  
transsexuality	  completely	  collapses	  into	  hermaphroditism.	  The	  untranslated	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  In	  the	  section	  that	  states	  the	  general	  conditions	  that	  render	  legal	  any	  surgical	  procedure,	  within	  
the	  third	  condition	  (“established	  and	  conscientious	  diagnosis”),	  the	  text	  concludes:	  
We	  have	  the	  opinion	  that	  for	  the	  appropriate	  and	  safe	  diagnosis	  of	  the	  reversal	  of	  the	  sex	  definition	  
of	  a	  person,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  ability	  to	  be	  treated	  through	  surgery,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  have	  the	  
approbation	  of	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  expert	  doctors,	  that	  is,	  a	  surgeon,	  an	  endocrinologist	  and	  a	  
neuropsychiatrist	  (Poinika	  Chronika	  1972:	  647).	  
This	  has	  great	  practical	  significance,	  as	  it	  marks	  the	  diagnostic	  preconditions	  that	  are	  to	  this	  day	  
necessary	  to	  proceed	  to	  surgical	  alteration	  of	  genital	  anatomy.	  According	  to	  the	  Public	  Prosecutor,	  
these	  diagnoses	  are	  also	  to	  be	  produced	  in	  front	  of	  civil	  courts	  in	  order	  to	  change	  the	  civil	  status	  of	  
the	  person.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  entire	  text	  is	  based	  upon	  texts	  of	  Legal	  Medicine,	  mainly	  
from	  France,	  and	  does	  not	  draw	  from	  any	  of	  the	  legal	  (civil	  or	  penal)	  texts	  of	  Greek	  legal	  theory	  or	  
Greek	  litigation	  or,	  for	  that	  matter,	  Greek	  Legal	  Medicine	  on	  the	  issue.	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parenthesis	  that	  comes	  from	  foreign	  literature	  refers	  to	  “intersexues”	  [sic]	  and	  
“transsexuals”,	  only	  to	  be	  translated	  (or	  interpreted)	  in	  Greek	  as	  “hermaphrodites”.	  
Moreover,	  the	  apposition	  of	  phrases	  used	  by	  the	  jurist	  to	  define	  the	  range	  of	  legally	  
accepted	  surgeries	  (“targeted	  to	  the	  assistance	  of	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  prevailing	  
sex	  or	  generally	  the	  remediation	  of	  the	  demonstrated	  flaw	  or	  defect	  or	  deviation	  of	  
nature”)	  allows	  a	  generous	  margin	  of	  discretion	  concerning	  the	  boundaries	  of	  
hermaphroditism	  and,	  thus,	  the	  legitimation	  of	  genital	  surgeries.	  	  
This	  blurring	  of	  category	  limits	  contributed	  to	  the	  erasure	  of	  trans	  cases	  as	  such,	  
collapsing	  them	  into	  hermaphroditism,	  but	  also,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  enabled	  trans	  
individuals	  to	  navigate	  the	  hostile	  medico-­‐legal	  field	  on	  a	  practical	  level.	  Reading	  
the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  opinion	  (“we	  have	  the	  opinion	  that	  surgical	  procedure,	  for	  the	  
alteration	  of	  sex	  on	  hermaphrodite	  individuals,	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  prevailing	  sex”),	  one	  
could	  conclude	  that	  it	  concerns	  only	  cases	  of	  anatomical	  ambiguity.	  Nevertheless,	  
as	  it	  has	  been	  demonstrated,	  a	  careful	  reading	  reveals	  that,	  through	  the	  author’s	  
interpretation	  of	  hermaphroditism,	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  text	  includes	  trans	  individuals	  
so	  long	  as	  they	  would	  be	  subsumed	  in	  the	  legible	  category	  of	  hermaphroditism.	  The	  
Public	  Prosecutor’s	  opinion,	  thus,	  resolves	  the	  issue	  of	  legitimate	  medical	  
procedure	  and	  disperses	  the	  Medical	  Association’s	  fears	  concerning	  criminal	  
liability	  without,	  once	  more,	  introducing	  the	  transsexual	  as	  a	  figure	  in	  the	  discursive	  
legal	  terrain.	  The	  author	  performs	  the	  same	  rouge	  detected	  in	  several	  other	  texts	  
wherein	  the	  transsexual	  is	  hidden	  in	  the	  text,	  to	  be	  lost	  or	  found	  at	  will.120	  This	  
feeds	  not	  only	  into	  this	  chapter’s	  argument	  about	  the	  erasure	  of	  transsexual	  gender	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  This	  rouge	  becomes	  blatant	  in	  another	  text	  on	  the	  same	  topic	  within	  a	  volume	  concerning	  
Medical	  law	  and	  doctors’	  liability	  (Hortareas	  1975).	  The	  text	  follows	  the	  Public	  Prosecutor’s	  rationale	  
both	  concerning	  the	  choice	  of	  classification	  and	  the	  justification	  of	  surgeries	  as	  “socially	  conducive”	  
due	  to	  their	  ability	  to	  integrate	  “formerly	  completely	  useless	  individuals”	  in	  the	  society	  (Hortareas	  
1975:	  103).	  Other	  than	  the	  arguably	  derogatory	  wording,	  the	  author	  takes	  it	  up	  to	  himself	  to	  literally	  
erase	  the	  transsexual	  in	  the	  text.	  After	  the	  first	  few	  paragraphs,	  quotation	  marks	  open	  and	  the	  rest	  
of	  the	  text	  consists	  of	  the	  entire	  (approx.	  five	  pages	  long)	  rationale	  of	  the	  Public	  Prosecutor’s	  
opinion.	  The	  opinion	  is	  embedded	  verbatim	  in	  quotation	  with	  only	  one	  alteration	  as	  shown	  below	  in	  
a	  comparison	  of	  the	  two	  texts:	  	  
The	  surgical	  procedure	  changing	  the	  sex	  of	  flawed	  individuals,	  called	  hermaphrodites	  (intersexues,	  
transsexuals),	  on	  which	  (…)	  (Poinika	  Chronika	  1972	  p.	  645,	  my	  translation).	  
The	  surgical	  procedure	  changing	  the	  sex	  of	  flawed	  individuals,	  called	  hermaphrodites	  
(INTERSEXUALS),	  on	  which	  (…)	  (Hortareas	  1975:	  104,	  my	  translation,	  emphasis	  in	  the	  original).	  	  
And	  like	  that,	  the	  transsexual	  is	  (literally)	  erased.	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identities	  from	  certain	  areas	  of	  legal	  theory	  but	  also	  into	  the	  broader	  
epistemological	  argument	  of	  this	  entire	  part	  of	  the	  thesis.	  That	  is,	  the	  importance	  of	  
a	  critical	  legal	  genealogy	  in	  order	  to	  acquire	  a	  fuller	  understanding	  of	  the	  chaotic	  
paths	  gender	  identity	  regulation	  has	  taken	  historically.	  	  
The	  phantasmatic	  status	  of	  trans	  experience	  in	  these	  debates,	  which	  was	  enabled	  
by	  taxonomic	  manipulations	  and,	  to	  some	  extent,	  allowed	  informal	  legitimation	  of	  
medico-­‐legal	  transitioning,	  was	  directly	  contested	  in	  1982	  by	  a	  text	  published	  in	  the	  
Hellenic	  Gendarmery	  Review	  under	  the	  title	  “Sex	  Change	  Is	  Scientifically	  
Impossible”	  (Giamarellos	  1982).121	  The	  author,	  who	  is	  a	  scholar	  of	  Legal-­‐Medicine,	  
suggested	  a	  detailed	  classification	  of	  hermaphrodites	  in	  female	  pseudo-­‐
hermaphrodites,	  male	  pseudo-­‐hermaphrodites	  and	  true	  hermaphrodites.	  Sex	  
determination	  according	  to	  the	  author	  depends	  on	  chromosomal	  and	  gonadal	  
agents.	  Genital	  surgeries,	  then,	  serve	  to	  “externalise”	  and	  not	  change	  sex.	  
And	  that	  means	  -­‐	  we	  emphasise	  again	  -­‐	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  perform	  a	  
sex	  change.	  It	  is	  anyway	  indisputable	  that	  for	  any	  person	  to	  be	  a	  real	  
woman,	  after	  whichever	  surgery	  performed	  –	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  have	  XX	  
chromosomes.	  Additionally,	  ovaries,	  fallopian	  tube	  and	  uterus.	  And,	  
contrarily,	  for	  a	  person	  to	  be	  a	  real	  man	  -­‐	  after	  whichever	  surgery	  
performed	  -­‐	  they	  should	  have	  necessarily	  XY	  chromosomes	  and	  testicles	  
(Giamarellos	  1982:	  494,	  my	  translation).	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  Although	  the	  text	  belongs	  in	  the	  field	  of	  Legal	  Medicine,	  I	  have	  chosen	  to	  include	  it	  in	  my	  
analysis	  because	  its	  content	  along	  with	  the	  high	  rank	  and	  scientific	  status	  of	  the	  author	  P.	  
Giamarellos	  (who	  was	  the	  Chief	  of	  the	  Medico-­‐Legal	  Agency	  of	  Athens	  and	  remained	  an	  emeritus	  
Chief	  of	  the	  National	  Medico-­‐Legal	  Agency	  until	  his	  recent	  death)	  allowed	  it	  to	  enter	  the	  debate	  
about	  the	  legality	  and	  consequences	  of	  genital	  surgeries.	  Moreover,	  with	  a	  bitterly	  sarcastic	  
paragraph	  that	  is	  emphasised	  by	  the	  author,	  the	  text	  claims	  a	  place	  in	  the	  broader	  debate	  around	  
sex	  classification	  within	  legal	  theory:	  
The	  definition	  of	  a	  person’s	  sex	  is	  exclusively	  in	  the	  authority	  of	  Legal	  Medicine’s	  professionals	  and	  no	  
one	  else.	  	  
The	  sex	  of	  a	  person	  never	  changes,	  neither	  by	  court	  judgements,	  nor	  by	  administrative	  actions.	  
Neither	  by	  issuing	  new	  identity	  cards	  nor	  by	  weddings	  or	  baptisms	  is	  it	  possible	  to	  change	  the	  sex	  of	  
person.	  Any	  of	  the	  above	  actions	  of	  changing	  sex	  is	  void	  due	  to	  its	  lack	  of	  grounding	  on	  scientific	  facts	  
(Giamarellos	  1982:	  495,	  my	  translation,	  emphasis	  in	  the	  original).	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Other	  than	  setting	  an	  explicit	  bodily	  topology122	  of	  sex	  definition	  (similar	  to	  the	  
Corbett	  test),	  Giamarellos	  added	  a	  fourth	  category	  in	  his	  taxonomy	  of	  
hermaphroditism:	  
4.	  There	  is	  also	  the	  case	  of	  individuals	  that	  are	  neither	  pseudo	  nor	  true	  
hermaphrodites,	  but	  passive	  homosexual	  individuals	  (…)	  (Giamarellos	  
1982:	  494).	  
In	  this	  category	  he	  proceeds	  to	  describe	  a	  male-­‐to-­‐female	  transition	  (including	  
medical	  intervention)	  in	  a	  rather	  vulgar	  wording,	  thus,	  explicitly	  shifting	  from	  a	  
collapse	  of	  transsexuality	  into	  hermaphroditism	  to	  its	  collapse	  into	  homosexuality.	  
A	  shift	  that,	  if	  followed,	  could	  de-­‐legitimise	  operations	  that	  do	  not	  strictly	  respond	  
to	  cases	  of	  ambiguous	  genital	  anatomy.	  Indeed,	  it	  appears	  that,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  field	  
of	  Medical	  law,	  the	  fervent	  positioning	  of	  Giamarellos	  had	  a	  serious	  impact	  on	  the	  
formation	  of	  the	  legal	  debate	  of	  its	  time	  as	  it	  was	  repeated	  and	  adopted	  by	  other	  
authors	  engaging	  with	  the	  same	  issue	  (Iakovou	  1987:	  479;	  Karabelas	  1988;	  
Karageorgos	  1996).123	  Nonetheless,	  the	  approach	  of	  the	  Public	  Prosecutor	  still	  
carried	  weight	  and	  was	  preferred	  by	  some	  of	  the	  authors,	  which	  remained	  closer	  to	  
the	  categorical	  collapse	  of	  transsexuality	  with	  hermaphroditism	  rather	  than	  
homosexuality	  (Kokolakis	  1994).124	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The	  practice	  of	  detailing	  bodily	  anatomy	  throughout	  the	  text,	  is	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  practices	  
of	  Legal	  Medicine	  and	  similar	  fields	  that,	  unlike	  Civil	  law,	  engaged	  in	  explicit	  portrayals	  and	  
typologies.	  As	  in	  other	  countries,	  these	  competing	  typologies	  exist	  simultaneously	  for	  decades	  
resulting	  in	  conflicting	  legal	  approaches	  (Sharpe	  2002:	  26).	  
123
	  For	  example,	  another	  text	  in	  the	  discussion	  on	  criminal	  liability	  of	  doctors	  performing	  “sex	  
change	  operations,”	  the	  author	  (D.	  N.	  Iakovou)	  fully	  adopts	  Giamarellos	  taxonomy	  (hermaphrodites	  
and	  homosexuals)	  and	  rationale	  (Iakovou	  1987:	  479).	  In	  this	  text,	  the	  medico-­‐legal	  thesis	  of	  
Giamarellos	  is	  translated	  into	  specific	  Penal	  and	  Civil	  law	  results	  (Iakovou	  1987:	  479).	  Specifically,	  it	  
is	  supported	  that	  “sex	  change	  operations”	  performed	  on	  individuals	  other	  than	  the	  “pathological”	  
cases	  of	  hermaphroditism,	  are	  “socially	  unjustified”	  and	  dangerous	  for	  the	  individuals,	  and,	  thus,	  
punishable	  by	  law	  (Iakovou	  1987:	  480).	  Military	  court	  resolution	  400/1986	  (Poinika	  Chronika	  1986)	  is	  
mentioned	  along	  with	  the	  comment	  that	  it	  is	  “entirely	  mistaken”	  in	  its	  conclusion	  to	  recognise	  post-­‐
operative	  sex	  as	  the	  legal	  sex	  of	  the	  person	  (Iakovou	  1987:	  480).	  The	  text	  closes	  with	  a	  plead	  
towards	  the	  State	  and	  judicial	  authorities	  to	  take	  action	  in	  order	  to	  terminate	  this	  harmful	  and	  
dangerous	  phenomenon	  (Iakovou	  1987:	  480).	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  For	  example,	  a	  text	  published	  in	  1994	  titled	  “The	  criminal	  evaluation	  of	  surgical	  procedures”	  
follows	  the	  Prosecutor’s	  opinion	  (Kokolakis	  1994).	  The	  author,	  E.	  Kokolakis,	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  
drawn	  to	  the	  study	  of	  sexual	  deviance	  contributing	  to	  its	  grotesque	  depiction	  within	  Criminology	  on	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The	  shift	  from	  a	  taxonomic	  conflation	  of	  transsexuality	  with	  hermaphroditism	  to	  a	  
conflation	  with	  homosexuality	  introduces	  different	  kinds	  of	  legal	  anxiety.	  125	  The	  
preoccupation	  with	  the	  ability	  of	  “individuals	  with	  XY	  chromosomes”	  to	  marry	  that	  
was	  analysed	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  is	  exemplary	  of	  such	  an	  anxiety	  and,	  according	  
to	  Sharpe,	  should	  be	  read	  against	  the	  homophobia	  in	  the	  law	  (Sharpe	  2002:	  118).	  
Sharpe’s	  analysis	  helps	  to	  create	  an	  understanding	  of	  texts	  as	  aggressive	  as	  the	  one	  
by	  Giamarellos	  that	  insist	  on	  the	  “truth”	  of	  sex	  being	  unchangeable	  as	  it	  is	  inscribed	  
deep	  within	  the	  genetic	  history	  of	  the	  body.	  Although	  the	  argument	  of	  the	  text	  is	  
grounded	  in	  the	  scientific	  insubstantiality	  of	  any	  notion	  of	  “sex	  change,”	  the	  
intensity	  of	  the	  language	  used	  (along	  with	  exclamation	  marks	  and	  other	  emphatic	  
means)126	  creates	  a	  polemic	  that	  escapes	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  medical.	  Hale’s	  (1997a)	  
characterisation	  of	  the	  decision	  regarding	  how	  to	  view	  gender	  identification	  claims	  
as	  a	  political	  decision	  provides	  a	  frame	  of	  understanding	  for	  such	  openly	  hostile	  
discourses,	  regardless	  of	  their	  self-­‐proclaimed	  scientific	  objectivity	  (Hale	  1997a:	  
234).	  
Indeed,	  the	  entire	  text	  is	  written	  in	  a	  very	  aggressive	  tone	  with	  versions	  of	  the	  
phrase	  “sex	  change	  is	  impossible”	  or	  “sex	  never	  changes,”	  repeated	  every	  few	  
sentences.	  The	  hostility	  of	  the	  author	  is	  openly	  directed	  to	  this	  fourth	  category	  and	  
the	  main	  purpose	  of	  the	  text	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  clarification	  of	  the	  conflation	  that	  
allowed	  trans	  individuals	  (trans	  women	  specifically)	  to	  unofficially	  navigate	  the	  
medico-­‐legal	  terrain	  and	  even	  gain	  recognition	  of	  their	  civil	  status	  through	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
separate	  occasions,	  such	  as	  his	  monographs	  “The	  Psychically	  Perverse	  Criminals”	  (Kokolakis	  1971)	  
and	  “Homosexuality	  as	  a	  Cause	  of	  Crime”	  (Kokolakis	  1976).	  This	  kind	  of	  engagement	  explains	  the	  
fact	  that	  the	  text	  in	  hand,	  includes	  detailed	  accounts,	  examples	  and	  pictures	  from	  Greek	  and	  foreign	  
works	  of	  Legal-­‐Medicine.	  Nonetheless,	  in	  this	  text,	  homosexual	  desire,	  along	  with	  “gender	  
dysphoria,”	  is	  described	  as	  a	  symptom	  of	  hermaphroditism	  and	  not	  the	  contrary	  (Kokolakis	  1994:	  
73).	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  Another	  issue	  that	  appears	  in	  these	  texts	  is	  the	  preoccupation	  with	  “sex	  change”	  as	  a	  means	  to	  
escape	  military	  service,	  which	  in	  the	  Greek	  context	  was	  -­‐and	  still	  remains-­‐	  compulsory	  for	  male	  
citizens	  (Karabelas	  1988;	  Politis	  1999).	  Fast	  forward	  into	  the	  future,	  this	  will	  be	  one	  of	  the	  most	  
common	  arguments	  in	  the	  discussion	  on	  the	  legal	  recognition	  of	  gender	  identity	  regardless	  of	  
medical	  intervention	  in	  2017.	  This	  point,	  which	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  part	  of	  the	  broader	  reading	  of	  trans	  
identity	  as	  fraudulent	  (Bettcher	  2007;	  Sharpe	  2018)	  will	  be	  revisited	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  debate	  of	  
the	  recent	  change	  in	  legislation	  as	  this	  is	  when	  it	  was	  mostly	  invoked.	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  It	  is	  even	  characterised	  as	  “silly	  and	  childish”	  to	  accept	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  actual	  sex	  change	  
when	  the	  chromosomes	  and	  gonads	  of	  the	  other	  sex	  cannot	  be	  acquired	  (Giamarellos	  1982:	  495).	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route.	  Accordingly,	  the	  stakes	  with	  respect	  to	  upholding	  this	  taxonomy	  and	  not	  the	  
one	  used	  in	  the	  Public	  Prosecutor’s	  opinion,	  wherein	  hermaphroditism	  is	  
interpreted	  as	  containing	  transsexuality,	  are	  remarkably	  high.	  The	  power	  of	  the	  
legal	  interpreter	  here	  is	  connected	  with	  the	  body	  of	  the	  legal	  subject	  in	  a	  direct	  
way:	  it	  regulates	  the	  (il)legality	  of	  its	  surgical	  alteration,	  thus	  commanding	  the	  
sexual	  anatomy	  itself.	  It	  becomes	  an	  instance	  that	  confirms	  Cover’s	  claim	  that	  “the	  
normative	  worldbuilding	  which	  constitutes	  ‘Law’	  is	  never	  just	  a	  mental	  or	  spiritual	  
act”	  and,	  more	  specifically,	  his	  understanding	  of	  legal	  interpretation	  as	  something	  
that	  is	  “realized,	  indeed,	  in	  the	  flesh”	  (Cover	  1986:	  1605).	  
The	  methodological	  departure	  of	  the	  last	  sections	  from	  the	  strict	  limits	  of	  the	  
discussion	  on	  sex-­‐classification	  in	  Civil	  law	  has	  allowed	  a	  solid	  grounding	  of	  this	  
debate	  through	  inputs	  from	  other	  sources	  and	  debates.	  The	  next	  and	  final	  section	  
of	  this	  chapter,	  looks	  at	  the	  work	  of	  two	  scholars,	  whose	  analysis	  is	  underpinned	  by	  
an	  alternative	  set	  of	  politics	  regarding	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  (as	  well	  as	  knowledge	  
production	  for	  that	  matter),	  thus	  resulting	  in	  a	  foundationally	  different	  approach	  
which	  was	  not	  picked	  up	  by	  those	  conducting	  the	  main	  debate	  on	  sex-­‐classification.	  	  
6.3. Alternative	  Frameworks	  	  
During	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  century	  and	  while	  the	  dominant	  Euro-­‐American	  legal	  
paradigm	  was	  being	  challenged	  by	  feminist	  and	  LGBTI+	  legal	  scholarship,	  Greek	  
legal	  theory	  remained	  male	  dominated	  and	  strictly	  traditional	  concerning	  gender	  
and	  sexuality	  issues	  (Rethymniotaki	  et	  al	  2015:	  10,	  12).	  Within	  such	  a	  suffocating	  
context,	  the	  attempts	  to	  introduce	  feminist	  or	  other	  critical	  analyses	  were	  rare	  (e.g.	  
the	  Women’s	  Study	  Group	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Thessaloniki)	  and	  gained	  little	  
recognition.	  In	  this	  vein,	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  authors	  presented	  in	  this	  section	  
(Giorgos	  Dokoumentzidis	  in	  Public	  Law	  and	  Theofano	  Papazisi	  in	  Civil	  Law)	  not	  only	  
sets	  them	  apart	  from	  the	  main	  debate	  on	  sex	  classification	  and	  its	  effects	  (thus,	  
methodologically	  dictating	  the	  separate	  presentation	  of	  their	  work)	  but	  also	  serves	  
as	  a	  reminder	  for	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  political	  principles	  underpinning	  legal	  
analysis.	  Situated	  in	  approximately	  the	  1990s,	  these	  texts	  demonstrate	  how	  a	  legal	  
debate	  that	  would	  welcome	  alternative	  gender	  and	  sexual	  identities	  might	  have	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looked	  like.	  Moreover,	  the	  limitations	  of	  these	  analyses	  point	  towards	  my	  
suggestion	  for	  a	  legal	  genealogy	  of	  gender	  identities	  that	  is	  attentive	  to	  the	  
porousness	  of	  different	  categories	  used	  by	  legal	  texts.	  	  
The	  work	  of	  the	  first	  scholar,	  Giorgos	  Dokoumetzidis	  (1997),	  an	  Athens’	  Law	  School	  
graduate	  spans	  only	  from	  the	  late	  1980s	  to	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  and	  is	  concerned	  with	  
the	  management	  of	  sexuality	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  establishing	  sexual	  freedom	  
within	  a	  frame	  of	  Public	  law.	  The	  foundation	  of	  his	  theory,	  which	  was	  largely	  
influenced	  by	  French	  theorists,	  was	  already	  written	  and	  presented	  by	  his	  third	  year	  
of	  undergrad	  studies	  at	  the	  Athens	  Law	  School	  and	  was	  published	  as	  an	  article	  in	  
the	  year	  of	  his	  graduation	  (1988)	  (Dokoumetzidis	  1997).	  He	  continued	  this	  task	  with	  
two	  more	  texts	  and	  undoubtedly	  would	  have	  created	  a	  greater	  body	  of	  critical	  legal	  
theory	  on	  sexuality	  if	  it	  were	  not	  for	  his	  untimely	  death	  in	  1995	  at	  the	  age	  of	  thirty.	  
Dokoumetzidis’	  work,	  as	  it	  will	  be	  established,	  is	  unique	  within	  Greek	  legal	  
scholarship,	  not	  only	  due	  to	  the	  radical	  content,	  given	  its	  time	  and	  place,	  but	  also	  
for	  its	  methodological	  attributes.127	  	  
Dokoumetzidis	  (1997)	  theorised	  the	  management	  of	  sexuality	  within	  the	  Greek	  
constitutional	  order	  and	  suggested	  the	  concept	  of	  sexual	  freedom	  as	  a	  right	  
protected	  not	  only	  by	  international	  texts	  but	  also	  indirectly	  by	  the	  Greek	  
constitution.	  His	  analysis	  comments	  on	  the	  role	  of	  law	  in	  the	  formation	  and	  
preservation	  of	  sexual	  morals	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  reproductive	  heterosexuality	  as	  
the	  only	  legally	  protected,	  hence	  morally	  accepted,	  choice.	  One	  of	  his	  bold	  
methodological	  practices	  was	  retaining	  the	  sexual	  within	  the	  fabric	  of	  his	  text.	  It	  
should	  be	  noted	  that,	  even	  when	  engaging	  with	  issues	  of	  sexuality,	  contemporary	  
(legal)	  scholarship	  in	  Greece	  addresses	  those	  issues	  through	  the	  language	  of	  family,	  
kinship	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  institutional	  reflection	  of	  sexuality	  but	  not	  through	  the	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  It	  is	  unclear	  if	  his	  methodological	  choices	  and	  unorthodox	  analysis	  would	  have	  allowed	  his	  
theory	  to	  be	  accepted	  in	  the	  rigid	  legal	  academic	  community	  of	  that	  time.	  Indeed,	  his	  work	  is	  cited	  
rarely	  (e.g.	  Papahristou	  1997:	  35)	  but	  this	  can	  be	  attributed,	  other	  than	  his	  approach,	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  
within	  the	  strict	  academic	  hierarchies	  not	  many	  of	  the	  prominent	  scholars	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  
ground	  their	  analysis	  on	  a	  student’s	  work	  (Dokoumetzidis	  died	  before	  completing	  his	  PhD).	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language	  of	  the	  sexual	  per	  se.128	  The	  fact	  that	  Dokoumetzidis’	  language	  does	  not	  
shy	  away	  from	  the	  explicit,	  maintaining	  the	  sexual	  body	  as	  the	  epicentre	  of	  the	  text,	  
constitutes	  a	  methodological	  choice	  that	  would	  be	  as	  daring	  in	  today’s	  Greek	  legal	  
theory	  as	  it	  was	  in	  the	  Public	  law	  field	  of	  the	  1980s.	  Other	  methodological	  
attributes	  that	  set	  apart	  his	  analysis	  are	  the	  use	  of	  activist	  texts	  as	  well	  as	  of	  
unofficial	  personal	  accounts	  as	  sources	  of	  information	  regarding	  the	  daily	  
entanglement	  of	  sexuality	  with	  the	  law	  (Dokoumetzidis	  1997).	  Using	  activist	  texts	  as	  
references	  appealed	  to	  an	  open	  admission	  of	  the	  political	  character	  of	  any	  legal	  
analysis	  of	  gender	  and	  sexuality.	  This	  practice	  is	  in	  contrast	  with	  the	  dominant	  
scientific	  paradigm	  of	  his	  time	  wherein	  the	  ideological	  background	  of	  other	  
approaches	  receded	  from	  view	  by	  being	  presented	  as	  a	  set	  of	  natural	  facts	  under	  
the	  illusion	  of	  scientific	  objectivity.	  	  
Although	  Docoumetzidis’	  theoretical	  construction	  of	  sexual	  freedom	  as	  a	  right	  
through	  the	  use	  of	  both	  International	  and	  Constitutional	  law	  tools	  is	  a	  mission	  
worthy	  of	  a	  thorough	  review,	  such	  a	  task	  cannot	  be	  undertaken	  in	  the	  present	  
study	  without	  diverting	  entirely	  from	  the	  set	  research	  purposes.	  Nonetheless,	  it	  is	  
crucial	  to	  navigate	  the	  trans-­‐specific	  points	  of	  his	  analysis.	  In	  his	  first	  text	  published	  
in	  1988	  (“Reference	  and	  Foundation	  of	  Sexual	  Freedom	  in	  the	  Present	  Law”),	  
Dokoumetzidis	  engages	  with	  the	  legal	  management	  of	  trans	  subjectivity	  under	  the	  
label	  of	  “transvestism”.	  Although	  he	  clearly	  sets	  this	  concept	  apart	  from	  
homosexuality,	  it	  is	  classified	  as	  a	  category	  of	  sexual	  practice	  and	  not	  gender	  
identification	  and,	  hence,	  is	  studied	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  sexual	  freedom.	  The	  
relevant	  section	  reads:	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  This	  can	  be	  attributed	  not	  only	  to	  the	  hostile	  environment	  that	  Greek	  law	  and	  legal	  scholarship	  
have	  shaped	  towards	  the	  sexual	  (Vitoros	  2008)	  but	  also	  to	  the	  transdisciplinary	  systematic	  (and	  
systemic)	  de-­‐valuation	  of	  sexuality	  (beyond	  the	  domestic	  model)	  and	  sexual	  practices	  as	  a	  subject	  
within	  the	  Greek	  academia.	  Rare	  exceptions	  within	  this	  absence,	  are	  the	  works	  of	  authors	  such	  as	  
Yanakopoulos	  (1998;	  2005;	  2006;	  2010)	  and	  Chalkidou	  (2013;	  2018)	  in	  the	  field	  of	  Social	  
Anthropology	  and	  Canakis	  (2007;	  2009;	  2011)	  in	  the	  field	  of	  Socio-­‐Linguistics.	  	  
As	  Aspa	  Chalkidou	  patiently	  explained	  to	  me,	  the	  lack	  of	  sexuality	  studies	  as	  a	  field	  within	  the	  Greek	  
context	  led	  to	  the	  absorption	  of	  sexuality	  researchers	  into	  neighboring	  subfields	  of	  their	  disciplines.	  
This	  resulted	  to	  work	  that	  adopts	  the	  framework	  and	  insights	  of	  sexuality	  studies	  in	  areas	  that	  have	  
been	  often	  de-­‐sexualised	  within	  academic	  discourses	  internationally	  (e.g.	  kinship	  studies).	  For	  an	  
example	  of	  such	  a	  “pirate”	  kind	  of	  work	  see	  Chalkidou’s	  (2018)	  analysis	  of	  parenthood	  as	  an	  
inherently	  sexual	  category.	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Transvestism,	  as	  a	  complete	  and	  overt	  impeachment	  of	  the	  male	  
archetype,	  is	  implicitly	  and	  emphatically	  condemned	  by	  the	  traditional,	  
masculinist	  -­‐	  more	  precisely:	  phallocentric	  -­‐	  ethics.	  This	  of	  course	  does	  not	  
deprive	  travestis	  from	  their	  clientele.	  In	  our	  country,	  transvestism	  has	  
indeed	  been	  identified	  with	  prostitution	  (only	  four	  out	  of	  approximately	  
one	  thousand	  travestis	  in	  Greece	  have	  not	  worked	  in	  this	  profession).	  
Nonetheless,	  that	  is	  not	  a	  logical	  necessity.	  It	  is	  rather	  a	  result	  of	  social	  
conditions.	  As	  far	  as	  transvestism	  itself	  is	  concerned,	  it	  is	  not	  persecuted	  by	  
the	  law.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  our	  country	  is	  one	  of	  the	  very	  few	  in	  the	  world	  
where	  there	  is	  a	  judicial	  and	  administrative	  route	  that	  allows	  for	  the	  
change	  of	  the	  sex	  indicator	  and	  name	  on	  the	  birth	  registration	  act	  and	  
identity	  card,	  so	  long	  as	  the	  travesti	  has	  had	  a	  surgical	  sex	  change	  
(Dokoumetzidis	  1997:	  98-­‐99,	  my	  translation).	  
The	  overtly	  political	  tone	  and	  the	  open	  criticism	  of	  the	  dominant	  sexual	  paradigm	  is	  
consistent	  throughout	  the	  whole	  body	  of	  the	  text.	  This	  discourse	  along	  with	  the	  
analysis	  of	  trans-­‐related	  issues	  (such	  as	  the	  engagement	  in	  sex-­‐work)	  as	  socio-­‐
political	  rather	  than	  medical	  is	  indicative	  of	  the	  distance	  between	  Dokoumetzidis’	  
analysis	  and	  his	  contemporary	  legal	  scholars.	  Although	  his	  framework	  of	  sexual	  
freedom	  is	  not	  precisely	  concerned	  with	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  person’s	  sex	  in	  the	  law	  
and,	  thus,	  cannot	  be	  seen	  as	  part	  of	  the	  debate	  that	  was	  taking	  place	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  
Civil	  and	  Criminal	  law,	  it	  still	  provides	  the	  most	  accurate	  depiction	  of	  the	  reality	  of	  
changing	  legal	  sex	  during	  that	  era.	  	  
In	  his	  second	  text	  (“Sexual	  Freedom”),	  which	  is	  written	  in	  1990	  within	  a	  
postgraduate	  program	  of	  International	  Law	  at	  Paris	  II	  University,	  the	  theoretical	  
framework	  remains	  almost	  identical.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  terminology	  and	  
classification	  are	  more	  detailed,	  with	  transsexuality,	  which	  is	  the	  point	  of	  his	  
interest	  with	  cross-­‐gender	  identities,	  being	  carefully	  distinguished	  not	  only	  from	  
homosexuality	  but	  also	  from	  transvestism	  and	  hermaphroditism.	  The	  classification	  
is	  followed	  by	  this	  statement:	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Obviously,	  this	  categorisation	  is	  schematic.	  In	  practice,	  there	  are	  always	  
cases	  hard	  to	  classify	  (Dokoumetzidis	  1997:	  158,	  my	  translation).	  	  
Once	  more,	  methodologically,	  this	  statement	  is	  all	  that	  his	  contemporary	  scholars	  
were	  working	  against.	  The	  admission	  that	  classifications	  are	  not	  given	  and	  absolute,	  
not	  perfect	  but	  schematic,	  reveals	  a	  different	  underlying	  view	  of	  law,	  knowledge	  
and	  the	  scientific	  method	  itself.	  In	  this	  text,	  his	  focus	  on	  International	  and	  European	  
texts	  and	  jurisprudence	  as	  well	  as	  the	  significantly	  broader	  access	  granted	  through	  
the	  Paris	  University,	  led	  Dokoumetzidis	  to	  engage	  with	  issues	  debated	  on	  an	  
international	  level.129	  In	  this	  vein,	  writing	  about	  transsexuality,	  he	  commented	  on	  
foreign	  legislation	  and	  judicial	  practice	  but	  also	  reviewed	  European	  litigation	  (e.g.	  
Van	  Oosterwijck	  v.	  Belgium,	  Rees	  v.	  the	  United	  Kingdom)	  under	  the	  internationally	  
used	  frameworks	  (anti-­‐discrimination,	  right	  to	  private	  life,	  marriage	  and	  family)	  but	  
not	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  theoretical	  discussions	  that	  were	  unfolding	  in	  Greece.	  	  
The	  third	  and	  last	  of	  Dokoumetzidis’	  texts	  dealing	  with	  sexual	  freedom	  (“Sexual	  
Minorities	  in	  Greece”)	  was	  a	  paper	  presented	  in	  1990	  at	  a	  human	  rights	  conference	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  At	  the	  time,	  there	  were	  a	  few	  relevant	  texts	  of	  European	  institutions	  that	  had	  been	  translated	  in	  
Greek.	  One	  route	  that	  brought	  European	  trans	  jurisprudence	  within	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order	  was	  the	  
annual	  European	  courts’	  Reports	  that	  according	  to	  the	  Rules	  of	  Procedure	  were	  to	  be	  translated	  in	  
all	  official	  European	  languages	  and	  published	  in	  paper.	  The	  publication	  of	  the	  Reports	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  
Justice	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (at	  that	  period	  known	  as	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  the	  European	  
Communities)	  allowed	  for	  the	  translation	  of	  relevant	  cases	  in	  Greek	  (C-­‐13/94	  P.	  v	  S.	  and	  Cornwall	  
County	  Council,	  C-­‐117/01	  K.B.	  v	  National	  Health	  Service	  Pensions	  Agency	  and	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  
Health).	  As	  important	  as	  such	  cases	  were,	  their	  transfer	  in	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order	  remained	  merely	  a	  
pro	  forma	  fulfillment	  of	  the	  Rule	  of	  Procedure	  of	  the	  Court	  without	  playing	  at	  that	  moment	  a	  
significant	  role	  in	  the	  legal	  management	  of	  trans	  and	  intersex	  identities	  within	  the	  various	  fields	  of	  
Greek	  law.	  	  
Another	  route	  that	  enabled	  the	  transfer	  of	  trans	  jurisprudence	  from	  European	  courts	  was	  through	  
the	  translation	  and	  commentary	  of	  such	  cases	  by	  Greek	  scholars.	  In	  1998	  and	  1999,	  a	  review	  of	  the	  
jurisprudence	  of	  ECHR	  by	  two	  legal	  scholars,	  who	  were	  affiliated	  with	  the	  Maragopoulos	  Foundation	  
of	  Human	  Rights,	  included	  summaries	  of	  two	  cases	  concerning	  “transsexual	  rights”	  (Kastanas	  &	  
Ktistakis	  1998:	  963;	  Kastanas	  &	  Ktistakis	  1999:	  1140).The	  cases	  were	  X,	  Y	  and	  Z	  v	  UK	  Govt.	  (1997)	  
and	  Sheffield	  and	  Horsham	  v	  UK	  (1998)	  and	  both	  their	  summary	  and	  short	  inserted	  comments	  by	  the	  
writers	  were	  respectful	  in	  tone	  as	  well	  as	  content.	  The	  discourse	  invoked	  by	  the	  authors	  did	  not	  bare	  
any	  similarities	  with	  that	  used	  in	  the	  Greek	  legal	  fields	  of	  that	  time.	  This	  is	  a	  precursor	  of	  the	  next	  
era	  in	  the	  legal	  management	  of	  gender	  identity	  in	  which	  the	  role	  of	  international	  and	  European	  legal	  
notions	  will	  accelerate	  and	  transform	  the	  discussions	  around	  trans	  identities.	  Nonetheless,	  at	  that	  
moment,	  such	  publications	  were	  ignored	  by	  scholars	  of	  Greek	  Civil	  and	  Criminal	  law	  even	  when	  they	  
engaged	  with	  the	  very	  issues	  regulated	  within	  these	  decisions	  and	  overall	  failed	  to	  uphold	  a	  
significant	  role	  in	  the	  ongoing	  debate	  on	  sex	  classification	  and	  similar	  issues.	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in	  Athens.	  The	  paper	  drew	  from	  his	  previously	  published	  texts	  and,	  as	  in	  the	  
excerpts	  above,	  used	  unofficial	  estimations	  regarding	  the	  population	  and	  legal	  
issues	  of	  transsexuals	  in	  Greece.	  Through	  this	  route,	  Dokoumetzidis	  reached	  
opposite	  conclusions	  compared	  to	  some	  of	  the	  prominent	  Civil	  law	  scholars	  of	  his	  
time.	  
In	  Greece,	  although	  there	  is	  no	  relevant	  provision	  in	  the	  law,	  jurisprudence	  
has	  accepted	  the	  amendment	  of	  the	  sex	  indicator;	  the	  correction	  of	  birth	  
registration	  act	  takes	  place	  after	  an	  application	  in	  Civil	  courts	  according	  to	  
voluntary	  jurisdiction	  procedure.	  Since	  the	  previous	  “corrected”	  sex	  does	  
not	  appear	  anywhere,	  there	  is	  no	  practical	  obstacle	  for	  the	  solemnisation	  
of	  a	  marriage	  (Dokoumetzidis	  1997:	  210,	  my	  translation).	  	  
As	  shown	  earlier,	  by	  reading	  the	  official	  letter	  of	  the	  law,	  scholars	  that	  dominated	  
the	  relevant	  scholarship	  concluded	  that	  changes	  in	  legal	  sex	  and	  subsequent	  
marriages	  are	  possible	  within	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order	  only	  in	  the	  rare	  cases	  of	  
hermaphrodites.	  Dokoumetzidis,	  based	  on	  less	  official	  sources	  (personal	  accounts,	  
newspaper	  articles	  and	  his	  own	  knowledge	  of	  legal	  reality	  for	  trans	  individuals	  in	  
Greece)	  provides	  a	  more	  accurate	  understanding	  of	  the	  practices	  undertaken	  by	  
trans	  individuals	  during	  that	  time.	  	  
Nonetheless,	  although	  Dokoumetzidis	  has	  proven	  more	  insightful	  on	  trans	  issues	  
than	  the	  majority	  of	  his	  contemporary	  scholars,	  he	  failed	  to	  make	  the	  connection	  of	  
the	  issue	  of	  transsexuality	  with	  the	  legal	  treatment	  of	  hermaphroditism.	  In	  his	  
analysis,	  he	  dismissed	  hermaphroditism	  as	  a	  somewhat	  straightforward	  condition	  
that	  “creates	  no	  serious	  legal	  problems”	  and	  can	  be	  managed	  by	  “simply”	  
establishing	  the	  predominant	  sex	  (Dokoumetzidis	  1997:	  207).	  By	  disregarding	  the	  
common	  legal	  history	  of	  hermaphroditism,	  homosexuality	  and	  transsexuality,	  his	  
depiction	  of	  legal	  reality,	  although	  true-­‐to-­‐life,	  retains	  this	  gap,	  thus	  presenting	  
Greek	  judicial	  practice	  as	  an	  unexplained	  mystery.	  Specifically,	  Dokoumetzidis	  
appeared	  in	  1992	  on	  a	  TV	  show	  hosted	  by	  gay	  journalist,	  activist	  and	  later	  politician	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Grigoris	  Vallanatos,	  and	  gave	  an	  interview	  that	  has	  been	  transcribed	  and	  published	  
under	  the	  title	  “Law	  and	  Sex”,	  wherein	  we	  can	  clearly	  see	  this	  gap:130	  	  
	  […]	  There	  is	  nevertheless	  a	  legal	  issue:	  whether	  after	  the	  medical	  sex-­‐
change	  there	  can	  be	  an	  amendment	  of,	  firstly,	  the	  birth	  registration	  act	  
and,	  consequently,	  the	  identity	  card.	  In	  Greece	  this	  happens	  without	  any	  
problem.	  I	  don’t	  know	  how	  come	  that	  happens.	  It’s	  a	  miracle.	  The	  judge	  
does	  not	  wonder	  at	  all	  whether	  he	  should	  allow	  it.	  He	  just	  does;	  I	  know	  
they	  [transsexuals]	  do	  change	  their	  sex	  marker	  without	  any	  problem.	  In	  
France,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  where,	  as	  well,	  there	  is	  no	  provision,	  there	  is	  
conflicting	  jurisprudence	  (Dokoumetzidis	  1995:	  246,	  my	  translation	  and	  
emphasis).	  	  
Of	  course,	  in	  reality	  there	  were	  no	  miracles	  or	  mysteries	  in	  the	  Greek	  judicial	  
practice.	  Contrary	  to	  other	  scholars,	  Dokoumetzidis	  realises	  the	  divergence	  
between	  official	  legal	  theories	  and	  judicial	  practice.	  Nonetheless,	  without	  an	  
understanding	  of	  the	  work	  that	  has	  been	  performed	  by	  such	  categories	  and	  their	  
historical	  conceptualisation,	  this	  distance	  is	  presented	  as	  a	  legal	  mystery,	  a	  judicial	  
whim	  that	  unexplainably	  grants	  a	  kind	  of	  recognition,	  which	  was	  not	  provided	  yet	  
by	  many	  of	  the	  “more	  advanced”	  legal	  orders.	  Despite	  this	  shortcoming,	  which	  
hopefully	  the	  present	  analysis	  has	  remedied,	  Dokoumetzidis’	  work	  remains	  
exceptional	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Greek	  legal	  theory	  scholarship	  on	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  
issues.	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  In	  the	  same	  TV	  appearance	  in	  1992,	  he	  notes	  concerning	  “sex	  change”:	  
Vallianatos:	  Greece,	  surprisingly	  seems	  to	  have	  a	  special	  sensitivity	  towards	  that.	  	  
Dokoumetzidis:	  In	  Greece	  there	  is	  no	  such	  provision.	  It	  is	  not	  foreseen	  by	  the	  law.	  Nonetheless,	  
surgeries	  do	  take	  place	  in	  Greece	  and	  maybe	  not	  in	  the	  way	  they	  should,	  precisely	  because…	  
Vallianatos:	  In	  a	  rather	  shammy	  way.	  
Dokoumetzidis:	  Yes,	  unfortunately.	  And	  in	  a	  way	  somehow	  dangerous	  for	  those	  who	  undergo	  the	  
surgeries.	  In	  any	  case,	  since	  it	  is	  cheaper	  than	  having	  it	  in	  another	  country,	  they	  take	  place	  here	  in	  a	  
definitely	  illegal	  way,	  since	  there	  are	  not	  any	  provisions	  made	  by	  the	  law	  (Dokoumetzidis	  1995:	  245).	  
The	  obvious	  connection	  and	  insider	  knowledge	  of	  the	  practices	  of	  sexual	  minority	  communities	  of	  
his	  time,	  speak	  to	  different	  paradigm	  of	  knowledge-­‐production	  compared	  to	  the	  work	  of	  other	  legal	  
scholars	  writing	  on	  the	  issue.	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The	  second	  scholar	  whose	  approach	  sets	  her	  apart	  from	  the	  main	  body	  of	  
scholarship	  concerning	  trans	  issues	  is	  Theofano	  Papazisi	  who	  was	  one	  of	  the	  
founders	  of	  the	  Women’s	  Studies	  Group,	  and,	  thus,	  one	  of	  the	  first	  researchers	  and	  
writers	  that	  attempted	  to	  introduce	  feminist	  epistemological	  tools	  in	  Greek	  legal	  
theory	  (Mihopoulou	  2006a).	  In	  1998,	  a	  one-­‐day	  conference	  was	  held	  at	  the	  
University	  of	  Thessaloniki,	  bringing	  together	  speakers	  from	  different	  fields	  under	  
the	  title:	  “Gender	  reassignment:	  Medical,	  legal,	  social	  and	  anthropological	  aspects	  
of	  transsexualism”.	  Papazisi	  (2000),	  who	  was	  one	  of	  the	  organisers	  of	  the	  
conference,	  presented	  a	  paper	  exploring	  the	  legal	  issues	  concerning	  the	  status	  and	  
relations	  of	  natural	  persons	  after	  the	  amendment	  of	  their	  official	  legal	  gender.	  The	  
text	  is	  the	  first	  trans-­‐friendly	  effort	  to	  systematically	  address	  a	  variety	  of	  issues	  that	  
trans	  individuals	  confront	  in	  their	  legal	  reality.	  Focusing	  on	  Civil	  law,	  the	  text	  
engages	  with	  questions	  of	  Civil	  Procedure	  (for	  the	  amendment	  of	  identity	  
documents),	  Family	  law,	  Inheritance	  law	  and	  some	  additional	  issues	  of	  Public	  law,	  
such	  as	  the	  question	  of	  military	  service.	  The	  importance	  of	  the	  text	  lies	  less	  in	  the	  
specific	  legal	  solutions	  suggested	  since	  they	  were	  not	  practically	  reflected	  on	  the	  
legal	  practice	  of	  the	  time,	  and	  more	  in	  the	  epistemological	  and	  socio-­‐political	  
framework	  that	  informs	  its	  reasoning	  and	  positioning.	  After	  a	  number	  of	  decades	  of	  
the	  legal	  debate	  around	  sex	  classification	  being	  male	  dominated	  and	  thoroughly	  
pathologising,	  this	  text	  introduces	  a	  feminist	  legal	  analysis	  of	  the	  questions	  in	  hand.	  	  
Firstly,	  the	  terminology	  introduced	  indicates	  at	  first	  glance	  the	  distance	  and	  the	  
structural	  differences	  from	  previous	  texts.	  The	  term	  “sex	  change”	  is	  replaced	  by	  
“sex	  reassignment”	  and	  the	  sex-­‐gender	  distinction	  is	  used	  as	  a	  theoretical	  vehicle	  to	  
describe	  as	  individuals	  with	  “gender	  dysphoria”	  those	  who	  “don’t	  identify	  
psychologically	  with	  their	  apparent	  sex	  (…)	  and,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  want	  to	  be	  
somatically	  and	  socially	  of	  the	  other	  sex”	  (Papazisi	  2000:	  122).	  The	  issue	  is	  framed	  
within	  the	  concept	  of	  “gender	  identity	  disorder”,	  as	  there	  was	  no	  other	  path	  
(meaning	  non-­‐medical)	  available	  that	  could	  officially	  legitimise	  any	  procedure	  of	  
gender	  transgressing	  in	  the	  law.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  minimum	  space	  (a	  couple	  of	  
paragraphs)	  dedicated	  to	  the	  medical	  description	  of	  the	  “disorder”,	  along	  with	  the	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overall	  tone,	  which	  is	  openly	  supportive,	  reveals	  a	  gesture	  of	  dispassion	  towards	  
the	  pathologising	  and	  hostile	  discourses	  used	  by	  men	  of	  science	  up	  to	  then.131	  	  
In	  terms	  of	  legal	  theoretical	  framework,	  Papazisi	  brings	  the	  debate	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  
human	  rights.	  She	  connects	  her	  analysis	  of	  gender	  reassignment	  and	  the	  law	  with	  
gender	  equality	  and	  other	  constitutionally	  protected	  rights	  that	  are	  inspired	  by	  the	  
Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  the	  invocation	  of	  dignity	  and	  equality	  as	  
fundamental	  values.	  	  
These	  persons	  have	  the	  right	  to	  be	  able	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  social,	  
economic,	  political,	  cultural	  life	  of	  the	  country,	  as	  any	  other	  citizen	  without	  
discrimination	  due	  to	  sex,	  gender	  dysphoria	  or	  sexual	  preferences	  different	  
from	  the	  usual	  (Papazisi	  2000:	  120).	  	  
Papazisi	  re-­‐positions	  the	  issue	  as	  a	  socio-­‐legal	  and	  not	  medico-­‐legal	  matter.	  More	  
importantly,	  she	  acknowledges	  the	  affected	  persons	  and	  voices	  a	  claim	  for	  them.	  
The	  author	  does	  not	  engage	  with	  the	  medico-­‐legal	  discussion	  and	  its	  endless	  
taxonomies	  but	  does	  attempt	  a	  systematic	  approach	  to	  Civil	  law	  issues	  as	  they	  are	  
mapped	  out	  in	  this	  new	  paradigm.	  Her	  legal	  analysis,	  which	  appears	  a	  lot	  more	  
coherent	  and	  mature	  than	  the	  arbitrary	  declarations	  about	  sex	  classification	  
saturating	  most	  of	  the	  texts,	  seems	  to	  be	  informed	  by	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  struggles	  for	  
women	  and	  sexual	  minorities’	  rights	  and	  their	  transnational	  circulation.	  Throughout	  
the	  text,	  it	  becomes	  obvious	  that	  its	  rhetoric,	  rationale	  and	  suggestions	  situate	  it	  
within	  a	  different	  debate	  than	  the	  one	  taking	  place	  in	  Greek	  legal	  theory	  on	  sex	  
classification.	  It	  is	  rather	  a	  precursor	  of	  the	  current	  legal	  debates	  on	  gender	  identity	  
and	  trans	  rights	  that	  use	  similar	  rights	  frames.	  
Last,	  Papazisi	  avoids	  the	  conflation	  of	  her	  text’s	  subjects	  with	  both	  hermaphrodites	  
and	  homosexuals.	  This	  gesture	  is	  crucial	  to	  enabling	  the	  emergence	  of	  trans,	  
intersex	  and	  homosexual	  narratives	  as	  distinct.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  disregarding	  the	  
historical	  porousness	  of	  these	  categories	  and	  its	  effect	  on	  their	  legal	  management,	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  Indeed,	  in	  a	  much	  later	  text,	  when	  the	  space	  had	  been	  opened	  for	  such	  an	  endeavour,	  Papazisi	  
followed	  the	  emergence	  of	  gender	  identity	  recognition	  as	  a	  non-­‐pathologising	  claim	  by	  trans	  
movements	  (Papazisi	  2014:	  800).	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she	  misses	  a	  part	  of	  their	  joined	  legal	  history.	  As	  already	  mentioned	  concerning	  
Dokoumetzidis’	  analysis,	  such	  connections	  are	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  
how	  trans	  identities	  have	  been	  conceptualised	  and	  (il)legitimised	  in	  and	  through	  
the	  medico-­‐legal	  regime.132	  With	  that	  in	  mind,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  a	  thorough	  
exploration	  of	  trans	  legal	  issues,	  such	  as	  the	  one	  attempted	  by	  Papazisi,	  would	  not	  
re-­‐appear	  for	  approximately	  another	  fifteen	  years	  and	  against	  a	  completely	  
different	  background	  compared	  to	  the	  fin	  de	  siècle	  socio-­‐legal	  context.	  	  
In	  this	  section,	  by	  presenting	  the	  works	  of	  two	  legal	  scholars	  that	  divert	  from	  the	  
dominant	  legal	  theory	  of	  their	  era,	  I	  have	  showed	  that	  there	  were	  alternative	  
frames	  available	  in	  order	  to	  conceptualise	  issues	  of	  legal	  gender.	  The	  fact	  that	  they	  
remained	  marginal	  is	  a	  result	  of	  the	  ideological	  underpinnings	  of	  the	  dominant	  legal	  
paradigm.	  Furthermore,	  these	  approaches	  are	  a	  testimony	  to	  my	  claim	  that	  the	  lack	  
of	  critical	  historicity	  of	  legal	  gender	  has	  functioned	  as	  a	  limitation.	  That	  is,	  without	  
an	  understanding	  of	  the	  multiple	  categorical	  conflations	  and	  the	  hidden	  realities	  in	  
the	  legal	  texts,	  the	  remaining	  legal	  history	  fails	  to	  account	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  trans	  
subjectivities	  and	  their	  entanglement	  with	  Greek	  Civil	  law.	  The	  present	  analysis	  
functions	  reparatively	  to	  this	  limitation	  by	  combining	  Civil	  law	  texts	  with	  other	  
sources	  and	  also	  by	  reading	  between	  their	  lines	  allowing,	  thus,	  an	  alternative	  legal	  
history	  to	  emerge.	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  Note	  how	  this	  limitation	  manifests	  and	  reproduces	  itself:	  In	  the	  Opinion	  of	  the	  Advocate	  General	  
Tesauro	  in	  P.	  v	  S.	  and	  Cornwall	  County	  Council	  there	  is	  a	  part	  that	  mentions	  the	  national	  European	  
orders	  that	  allow,	  even	  through	  court	  proceedings,	  the	  change	  of	  civil	  status	  in	  cases	  of	  
transsexuality.	  The	  text	  reads:	  
This	  is	  the	  case	  in	  France,	  Belgium,	  Spain,	  Portugal,	  Luxembourg	  and	  Greece	  (although	  in	  
Greece	  only	  hermaphrodites	  have	  until	  now	  been	  permitted	  to	  change	  their	  civil	  status)	  (P.	  v	  S.	  
Opinion	  of	  AG	  Tesauro,	  para	  10).	  	  
This	  reading,	  is	  based	  upon	  solely	  a	  narrative	  of	  black	  letter	  law	  or	  other	  official	  accounts	  regardless	  
of	  parameters	  such	  as	  the	  interpretive	  work	  performed	  around	  these	  texts,	  the	  historical	  
manoeuvring	  of	  medical	  and	  legal	  concepts	  and	  their	  strategic	  use	  by	  the	  subjects	  under	  their	  
purview.	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Closing	  Part	  B	  
Part	  B,	  which	  closes	  here,	  has	  created	  a	  critical	  genealogy	  of	  legal	  frameworks	  
concerning	  gender	  variance	  in	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  By	  
doing	  so,	  it	  offers	  an	  essential	  and	  lacking	  historical	  depth	  to	  the	  currently	  emerging	  
scholarship	  on	  issues	  of	  gender	  identity	  and	  the	  law.	  In	  the	  two	  preceding	  chapters,	  
a	  partial	  and	  somewhat	  chaotic	  archive	  has	  been	  composed	  corresponding	  to	  the	  
porousness	  and	  complexity	  of	  the	  analysed	  debates.	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  introduction,	  
this	  is	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  twofold	  contribution	  of	  the	  thesis.	  	  
Specifically,	  drawing	  from	  theories	  explored	  in	  Part	  A,	  chapter	  five	  recognises	  the	  
role	  of	  sex,	  within	  the	  modern	  Greek	  bureaucratic	  state,	  as	  a	  legal	  category	  that	  
naturalised	  the	  gendered	  status	  quo	  through	  processes	  of	  civil	  registration,	  legal	  
categorisation	  and	  juridical	  interpretation	  of	  gender	  categories.	  Focusing	  on	  sex	  
classification	  in	  Civil	  law	  and	  the	  role	  of	  “hermaphroditism”	  within	  it,	  it	  makes	  the	  
argument	  that,	  in	  alignment	  with	  the	  broader	  state-­‐project	  of	  standardisation	  and	  
citizen	  legibility,	  Civil	  law	  scholars	  have	  strived	  for	  a	  simplified	  depiction	  of	  gender	  
variance	  in	  the	  law.	  That	  is,	  through	  interpretative	  maneuvers,	  taxonomic	  
conflations	  and	  naturalising	  discourses,	  they	  have	  presented	  an	  evenly	  sexed	  
society	  assorted	  by	  a	  natural	  taxonomy.	  	  
Following	  the	  debate	  on	  sex	  (re)classification	  into	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  
century,	  chapter	  six	  articulates	  some	  additional	  points	  concerning	  the	  increasingly	  
emerging	  gender	  variant	  identities	  of	  that	  era	  (“transsexuals,”	  “travestis”,	  etc.).	  
Specifically	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  the	  insistence	  on	  the	  “hermaphrodite”	  as	  a	  key	  
category	  for	  the	  management	  of	  gender	  variance	  in	  the	  law	  was	  largely	  motivated	  
by	  the	  hostility	  of	  Civil	  law	  scholars	  towards	  these	  emerging	  identities	  and	  their	  
conviction	  not	  to	  substantiate	  them	  in	  the	  law.	  A	  hostility	  that,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  was	  
carried	  through,	  albeit	  occasionally	  transformed,	  into	  the	  next	  century	  and	  which	  
will	  be	  discussed	  in	  Part	  C.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  daily	  interaction	  of	  
gender-­‐variant	  individuals	  (especially	  trans-­‐feminine	  sex	  workers)	  with	  legal	  
apparatuses	  and	  state	  authorities	  was	  established	  by	  the	  methodological	  detour	  
through	  Criminal	  law	  fields,	  which	  juxtaposes	  the	  reality	  presented	  by	  Civil	  law	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scholars.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  through	  the	  side-­‐stepping	  and	  persistent	  erasure	  of	  
emerging	  identities	  by	  the	  law,	  gender-­‐variant	  individuals	  were	  able	  to	  navigate	  this	  
hostile	  terrain	  under	  the	  categorical	  disguise	  of	  “hermaphroditism.”	  Moreover,	  by	  
utilising	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  “sex-­‐changed	  subject,”	  which	  is	  not	  named	  as	  anything	  
further,	  the	  regulation	  of	  transsexuality	  in	  Civil	  law	  took	  place	  without	  a	  preceding	  
recognition	  of	  its	  existence	  by	  Civil	  law	  scholars.	  	  
Last,	  two	  Greek	  legal	  scholars,	  Giorgos	  Dokoumetzidis	  (1997)	  and	  Theophano	  
Papazisi	  (2000)	  analyses	  of	  the	  issue	  were	  reviewed	  as	  the	  sole	  work	  in	  that	  era,	  
and	  not	  only	  recognised	  trans	  identities	  but	  also	  unfolded	  towards	  a	  direction	  of	  
depicting	  the	  hostility	  against	  them	  as	  a	  form	  of	  social	  inequality	  and	  claiming	  their	  
legal	  protection	  under	  different	  frameworks.	  Although	  their	  analysis	  was	  
marginalised	  by	  the	  dominant	  debates	  and	  did	  not	  have	  a	  practical	  effect	  at	  that	  
moment,	  it	  served	  as	  a	  precursor	  for	  new	  legal	  debates	  that	  would	  emerge	  in	  the	  
next	  century	  and	  its	  review	  offers	  a	  variety	  of	  valuable	  conclusions	  concerning	  the	  
ideological	  and	  epistemological	  premises	  of	  this	  debate.	  Most	  importantly,	  its	  
limitations,	  which	  derive	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  a	  critical	  overview	  of	  the	  historicity	  of	  the	  
categories	  involved,	  exemplify	  my	  argument	  for	  the	  necessity	  of	  critical	  historical	  
depth	  and	  specificity.	  This	  is	  precisely	  the	  reason	  for	  which	  I	  prioritised	  such	  an	  
analysis	  before	  engaging	  with	  contemporary	  frames	  of	  gender	  identity	  regulation.	  
Its	  complementary	  and	  reparative	  function	  provides	  depth	  and	  nuance	  to	  any	  
debate	  concerned	  with	  legal	  gender	  in	  Greece.	  The	  next	  part	  of	  this	  thesis	  moves	  
away	  from	  the	  historicity	  of	  gender	  variance	  regulation	  towards	  more	  recent	  
discussions	  concerning	  trans-­‐related	  legislation	  and	  trans	  legal	  realities.	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Part	  C.	  Contemporary	  Legislation	  on	  Gender	  Identity	  
Part	  B	  of	  the	  thesis	  explored	  in	  two	  chapters	  the	  development	  of	  the	  legal	  debate	  
around	  issues	  of	  sex	  (re)classification	  throughout	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  Moving	  
from	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  century	  and	  the	  medico-­‐legal	  quest	  for	  the	  
hermaphrodites’	  “true	  sex”	  (chapter	  five)	  to	  the	  second	  half	  and	  the	  social	  
emergence	  and	  legal	  concealment	  of	  the	  transsexual	  (chapter	  six),	  it	  has	  been	  
established	  that	  such	  a	  regulatory	  archive	  proves	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  
the	  conceptualisation	  of	  legal	  gender	  categories	  and	  their	  management	  on	  a	  
national	  level.	  By	  the	  change	  of	  the	  century,	  the	  judicial	  practice	  concerning	  gender	  
reclassification	  had	  informally	  stabilised,	  gradually	  incorporating	  diagnostic	  
categories	  that	  clearly	  refer	  to	  trans	  identities.	  Court	  decisions	  on	  such	  applications	  
became	  codified	  in	  their	  reasoning,	  avoiding	  the	  long	  philosophical	  quests	  
undertaken	  during	  earlier	  trials	  and	  creating	  an	  unofficial	  standardisation	  of	  the	  
procedure	  for	  both	  applicants	  and	  judges.133	  	  
The	  thread	  of	  the	  legal	  negotiation	  of	  gender	  variance	  is	  picked	  up	  in	  this	  part	  
within	  the	  contemporary	  frame	  of	  trans	  rights,	  as	  it	  has	  been	  analysed	  in	  chapter	  
three.	  In	  the	  three	  chapters,	  which	  constitute	  this	  part,	  three	  different	  legislative	  
pieces	  concerning	  gender	  identity	  are	  analysed	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  historico-­‐
political	  context	  that	  produced	  them,	  the	  state-­‐level	  goals	  and	  political	  projects	  
they	  served	  and	  their	  influence	  on	  trans	  lives	  as	  it	  is	  appraised	  through	  interviews	  
and	  other	  sources.	  Three	  vastly	  different	  political	  contexts	  within	  a	  short	  period	  of	  
accelerating	  developments	  showcase	  the	  different	  workings	  that	  can	  be	  performed	  
by	  such	  legislation.	  	  
Specifically,	  anti-­‐discrimination	  in	  employment,	  racist	  crime	  (a	  Greek	  legal	  
equivalent	  of	  hate	  crime,	  see	  footnote	  151)	  and	  gender	  identity	  recognition	  
legislation	  are	  the	  focus	  points	  of	  this	  part	  of	  the	  thesis.	  Following	  the	  overarching	  
argument	  analysed	  in	  chapter	  three	  about	  conflicting	  legal	  gender	  regulation	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  Decision	  6843/2007	  First	  Instance	  Court	  of	  Athens,	  Decision	  430/2013	  First	  Instance	  Court	  of	  
Patras,	  Decision	  175/2006	  First	  Instance	  Court	  of	  Rethymno.	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practices,	  “which	  reflect	  different	  state	  projects	  -­‐	  recognition,	  security,	  surveillance,	  
distribution,	  reproduction,”	  I	  undertake	  a	  critical	  reading	  of	  this	  legislation	  (Currah	  
2013:	  5).	  A	  reading	  that	  instead	  of	  relying	  on	  the	  legislator’s	  statement	  about	  what	  
this	  law	  does,	  seeks	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  complex	  and	  often	  contradicting	  
workings	  that	  are	  performed	  on	  different	  levels	  by	  the	  introduction	  of	  such	  
legislation	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  socio-­‐political	  surroundings	  it	  is	  connected	  with.	  	  
Lastly,	  other	  than	  state-­‐level	  goals	  and	  processes,	  these	  chapters	  rely	  also	  on	  the	  
daily	  negotiation	  of	  legal	  reality	  by	  trans	  individuals.	  Through	  the	  insights	  provided	  
by	  my	  interlocutors	  during	  the	  empirical	  part	  of	  the	  research	  I	  present	  the	  tangible	  
results	  of	  these	  specific	  legislative	  pieces	  (not	  of	  trans-­‐related	  legislation	  on	  a	  
generic	  theoretical	  level)	  in	  the	  particular	  time	  and	  place	  they	  were	  introduced.	  
Moreover,	  by	  discussing	  the	  daily	  interaction	  with	  state-­‐apparatuses,	  and	  
public/private	  sector	  services,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  aspects	  of	  trans	  legal	  reality,	  
practices	  beyond	  or	  against	  the	  law	  emerge	  as	  tactics	  of	  survival.	  By	  incorporating	  
this	  parameter	  in	  my	  text,	  I	  attempt	  to	  avoid	  a	  rigid	  reading	  of	  not	  only	  rights,	  but	  
broader	  legal	  concepts	  and	  discourses.	  My	  aim	  is	  to	  grasp	  “how	  people	  negotiate	  
these	  limits	  and	  opportunities	  in	  everyday	  life”,	  and	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  larger	  
scale	  socio-­‐political	  analysis	  of	  legal	  provisions,	  to	  produce	  a	  complex	  
multidimensional	  understanding	  of	  trans-­‐related	  legislation	  (West	  2013:	  17).	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Chapter	  7. (Anti)Discrimination	  in	  Employment:	  Legal	  
and	  Political	  Imaginaries	  and	  the	  Forgotten	  Provisions	  	  
The	  present	  chapter	  traces	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  first	  trans-­‐relevant	  legislation	  
(employment	  anti-­‐discrimination	  legislation)	  that	  was	  transferred	  from	  the	  
European	  into	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order.	  Its	  effects,	  within	  the	  given	  socio-­‐political	  
landscape,	  are	  appraised	  both	  on	  a	  juridical	  and	  social,	  even	  molecular	  level.	  To	  
that	  end,	  insights	  from	  the	  conducted	  interviews	  are	  deployed	  to	  enable	  an	  
understanding	  of	  trans	  employability	  issues	  and	  their	  connection	  with	  structural	  
injustices	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  life	  resources.	  Finally,	  in	  view	  of	  the	  disconnection	  
with	  social	  and	  legal	  reality,	  the	  chapter	  explores	  the	  political	  workings	  of	  the	  
legislation	  on	  a	  state	  level	  and	  its	  interconnection	  with	  political	  processes	  of	  
Europeanisation	  and	  its	  ideological	  underpinnings.	  	  
7.1. Forgetting	  the	  Law	  
This	  section	  presents	  the	  legislative	  route	  through	  which	  employment	  anti-­‐
discrimination	  legislation	  (on	  grounds	  of	  gender	  identity)	  was	  introduced.	  This	  
legislation	  was	  transferred	  a	  decade	  ago	  in	  the	  national	  legal	  order	  as	  part	  of	  the	  
Greek	  state’s	  international	  obligations	  and	  was	  not	  followed	  by	  any	  structural	  
reforms,	  thus,	  remaining	  largely	  inactive,	  almost	  forgotten,	  and	  definitely	  at	  odds	  
with	  the	  reality	  of	  gender	  variance	  and	  employability.	  	  
In	  2010,	  the	  Greek	  parliament	  voted	  for	  Law	  3896/2010	  (GG	  A	  207/8.12.2010)	  in	  
adaptation	  of	  the	  2006/54/EC	  directive	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  
Council	  of	  5	  July	  2006	  on	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  equal	  opportunities	  
and	  equal	  treatment	  of	  men	  and	  women	  in	  matters	  of	  employment	  and	  
occupation.	  Law	  3896/2010	  states	  that	  “discrimination	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  sex	  is	  also	  
any	  less	  favourable	  treatment	  of	  a	  person	  due	  to	  sex	  change”	  (article	  3	  par.	  2b,	  my	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translation).134	  Six	  years	  later	  and	  under	  vastly	  different	  political	  circumstances,	  
Law	  4443/2016	  (GG	  A	  232/9.12.2016)	  was	  voted	  in	  adaptation	  of	  European	  
Parliament	  and	  Council	  directive	  2014/54/EU.	  This	  law	  came	  to	  amend	  Law	  
3304/2005	  (GG	  Α	  16/27.01.2005)	  which	  had	  transferred	  into	  national	  law	  Council	  
directives	  2000/78/EC	  and	  2000/43/EC,	  known	  as	  the	  Employment	  Equality	  
Directive	  and	  Racial	  Equality	  Directive	  respectively,	  and	  included	  sexual	  
orientation135	  among	  the	  protected	  characteristics.	  Law	  4443/2016	  added	  “gender	  
identity	  or	  characteristics”136	  (article	  1	  par.	  2b)	  as	  grounds	  upon	  which	  
discrimination	  is	  prohibited.137	  
Fast	  forward	  to	  2018,	  the	  results	  of	  anti-­‐discrimination	  legislation	  were	  appraised	  
by	  specialists	  at	  the	  international	  conference	  “Applying	  Non-­‐Discrimination	  
Law.”138	  The	  introduction	  of	  the	  conference	  publication	  offers	  a	  comprehensive	  
summary	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  anti-­‐discrimination	  legislation	  in	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order	  
several	  years	  after	  its	  introduction.	  The	  editors	  describe	  Greek	  reality	  as	  an	  
“endless	  and	  constantly	  renewed”	  compilation	  of	  various	  forms	  of	  discrimination	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  The	  reference	  to	  a	  “sex	  change”	  is	  indicative	  of	  the	  overall	  lack	  of	  in-­‐depth	  legal	  engagement	  
with	  trans	  issues.	  The	  original	  English	  text	  of	  the	  2006/54/EC	  directive	  (recital	  3)	  used	  the	  term	  
“gender	  reassignment”	  that	  was	  translated	  then	  in	  Greek	  as	  “sex	  change”	  (αλλαγή	  φύλου/allagi	  
fylou).	  
135
	  Γενετήσιος	  προσανατολισμός/genetisios	  prosanatolismos	  was	  the	  rather	  problematic	  phrasing	  in	  
Greek	  that	  does	  not	  translate	  exactly	  to	  sexual	  orientation.	  This	  was	  amended	  with	  Law	  4443/2016	  
to	  an	  accurate	  translation.	  	  
136
	  The	  explanatory	  memorandum	  of	  law	  4443/2016	  states	  that	  gender	  identity	  as	  a	  characteristic	  is	  
added	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  transgender	  individuals	  (διεμφυλικά	  άτομα/diemfylika	  atoma)	  defined	  
as	  the	  individuals	  whose	  gender	  identity	  is	  different	  from	  their	  sex	  at	  birth.	  The	  term	  gender	  
characteristics	  refers	  to	  intersex	  individuals	  (διαφυλικά	  άτομα/diafylika	  atoma)	  defined	  as	  the	  
individuals	  who	  present	  since	  birth	  with	  sexual	  characteristics	  that	  do	  not	  fully	  fulfil	  their	  anatomical	  
classification	  as	  male	  or	  female	  (Law	  4443/2016,	  explanatory	  memorandum,	  part	  B2)	  	  
137
	  This	  choice	  of	  the	  legislator	  has	  been	  critically	  appraised	  by	  Greek	  legal	  theorists	  who	  suggest	  
that	  the	  special	  reference	  of	  gender	  identity	  and	  characteristics	  by	  this	  law	  might	  limit	  the	  broader	  
protection	  awarded	  to	  trans	  and	  intersex	  individuals	  under	  the	  sex-­‐equality	  principle	  and	  anti-­‐
discrimination	  legislation	  (Papadopoulou	  2018:	  198-­‐199).	  Papadopoulou	  suggests	  a	  reading	  of	  both	  
sources	  of	  protection	  as	  cumulative	  legal	  bases	  and	  the	  application	  of	  the	  stronger	  and	  broader	  one,	  
which	  is	  the	  one	  provided	  by	  the	  interpretation	  of	  sex-­‐equality	  by	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  (e.g.	  
P	  v	  S	  and	  Cornwall	  County	  Council)	  to	  include	  discrimination	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  gender	  identity	  
(Papadopoulou	  2018:	  199).	  
138
	  For	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  legal	  premises	  of	  anti-­‐discrimination	  in	  Greece,	  see	  the	  European	  
Equality	  Law	  Network	  country	  reports	  on	  non-­‐discrimination	  and	  gender	  equality	  (Theodoridis	  2018;	  
Koukoulis-­‐Spiliotopoulou	  updated	  by	  Petroglou	  2018).	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on	  a	  social	  but	  also	  institutional	  level	  (Goulas	  &	  Kofinis	  2018:	  11).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  
anti-­‐discrimination	  law	  as	  a	  field	  of	  theory	  but	  also	  as	  a	  body	  of	  litigation	  is	  depicted	  
as	  vastly	  underdeveloped	  with	  some	  exceptions	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  sex-­‐discrimination	  
(meaning	  between	  cis	  men	  and	  cis	  women).	  Specifically,	  the	  writers	  suggest	  that	  
“although	  the	  European	  directives	  that	  prohibit	  discrimination	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  
race,	  disability,	  religion	  etc.	  have	  already	  been	  incorporated	  in	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order	  
since	  2005,	  the	  court	  decisions	  that	  invoke	  them	  can	  be	  counted	  on	  the	  fingers	  of	  
one	  hand”	  (Goulas	  &	  Kofinis	  2018:	  12,	  my	  translation).	  Indeed,	  since	  2010,	  Law	  
3896/2010	  has	  produced	  no	  litigation	  or	  any	  other	  significant	  policy	  changes	  
concerning	  trans	  employability.139	  
Apart	  from	  suggesting	  that	  anti-­‐discrimination	  legislation	  might	  not	  have	  deep	  
roots	  in	  some	  national	  legal	  orders	  of	  continental	  Europe,	  Goulas	  and	  Kofinis	  
(2018),	  who	  are	  both	  legal	  professionals	  (lawyer	  and	  First	  Instance	  judge	  
respectively),	  also	  make	  another	  distinction.	  According	  to	  their	  analysis,	  the	  sex	  
discrimination	  prohibition	  (again,	  meaning	  between	  cis	  men	  and	  cis	  women)	  came	  
to	  reflect	  a	  decades	  long	  socio-­‐political	  claim	  and	  was	  accompanied	  by	  institutional	  
changes	  in	  administration	  and	  judicial	  authorities,	  structural	  legal	  reforms	  (e.g.	  the	  
Family	  Law	  reform)	  and	  various	  supportive	  actions	  by	  the	  state	  and	  civil	  society	  
(Goulas	  &	  Kofinis	  2018:	  12).	  That	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  Greece	  has	  managed	  to	  come	  
close	  to	  gender	  equality	  but	  to	  describe	  how	  this	  legislation	  has	  been,	  at	  least	  to	  
some	  extent,	  a	  functional	  part	  of	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  reality.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  
prohibition	  of	  discrimination	  on	  other	  grounds	  (including	  “sex	  change”	  even	  if	  it	  
was	  part	  of	  the	  sex	  equality	  principle)	  was	  simply	  transferred	  from	  the	  European	  
order	  without	  any	  form	  of	  anchoring	  on	  a	  juridical	  and	  social	  level.	  	  
These	  directives	  were	  transferred	  to	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order	  through	  Law	  
3304/2005,	  that	  is,	  long	  after	  the	  expiration	  of	  their	  three-­‐year	  deadline.	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  The	  Greek	  Transgender	  Support	  Association	  referred	  to	  this	  legislation	  in	  their	  press	  release	  
concerning	  a	  case,	  which	  involved	  a	  trans	  man	  who	  transitioned	  while	  being	  employed	  in	  the	  police	  
and	  made	  headlines	  in	  2014	  (GTSA	  2014).	  While	  the	  person	  did	  manage	  to	  maintain	  his	  job,	  this	  case	  
can	  hardly	  be	  indicative	  as	  it	  involves	  an	  openly	  trans	  person	  working	  in	  the	  public	  sector,	  which	  is	  in	  
itself	  extremely	  rare.	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This	  transfer	  could	  be	  characterised	  as	  a	  transplant	  into	  non-­‐hospitable	  
ground:	  for	  reasons	  different	  in	  each	  case,	  Greek	  society	  […]	  was	  not	  
prepared	  to	  welcome	  these	  new	  grounds	  of	  discrimination	  and	  the	  Greek	  
state,	  respectively,	  did	  not	  appear	  particularly	  willing	  to	  proceed	  to	  radical	  
institutional	  changes	  that	  would	  signal	  a	  change	  in	  beliefs.	  The	  then	  new	  
legislative	  framework	  was	  introduced	  within	  a	  state	  of	  overall	  indifference	  
and	  lived	  its	  life	  almost	  completely	  lost	  in	  oblivion.	  To	  such	  an	  extent,	  that	  
when	  its	  time	  came	  to	  be	  replaced	  by	  Law	  4443/2016,	  the	  parliamentary	  
and	  media	  discussions	  unraveled,	  taking	  more	  or	  less	  as	  a	  fact	  that	  this	  
was	  the	  first	  introduction	  of	  these	  prohibitions	  of	  discrimination	  in	  the	  
Greek	  legal	  order	  (Goulas	  &	  Kofinis	  2018:	  13,	  my	  translation).	  	  
This	  passage	  is	  rather	  indicative	  of	  the	  process	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  transferring	  this	  
legislation	  but	  also	  of	  the	  position	  of	  anti-­‐discrimination	  and	  minority	  rights	  politics	  
(let	  alone	  LGBTI+	  politics)	  in	  the	  mainstream	  political	  agenda	  of	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  
century.	  It	  is	  precisely	  this	  position	  that	  might	  offer	  further	  insight	  as	  to	  the	  
material	  failure	  of	  the	  transferred	  directives	  in	  the	  national	  legal	  and	  political	  
terrain.	  	  
According	  to	  Nico	  Beger	  “any	  talk	  of	  discrimination	  is	  held	  up	  against	  liberal	  
political,	  social,	  and	  legal	  discourses	  of	  acceptability	  in	  equal	  treatment”	  (Beger	  
[2004]	  2009:	  112).	  That	  is,	  the	  claim	  against	  discrimination	  on	  new	  grounds	  is	  
articulated	  in	  close	  proximity	  with	  the	  perceived	  (not	  necessarily	  factual,	  according	  
to	  Beger)	  social	  unacceptability	  of	  discrimination	  on	  other	  grounds.	  Beger	  follows	  
the	  argumentation	  of	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  activists	  in	  the	  European	  lobbying	  arena	  
mobilising	  such	  schemas	  of	  unacceptability	  as	  they	  forward	  claims	  against	  
discrimination	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  sexual	  orientation.	  In	  this	  gesture,	  “the	  ideological	  
reward	  anti-­‐discrimination	  legislation	  promises	  is	  to	  fit	  homosexuality	  -­‐	  and	  
potentially	  transgenderism	  -­‐	  into	  the	  perceived	  social	  and	  political	  climate”	  (Beger	  
[2004]	  2009:	  112,	  emphasis	  in	  the	  original).	  If	  we	  take	  up	  Beger’s	  suggestion	  that	  
“the	  task	  of	  arguing	  discrimination	  can	  be	  successful	  only	  if	  it	  fits	  the	  generally	  
perceived	  social	  and	  political	  climate”,	  then	  the	  infelicity	  of	  the	  transferred	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directives	  is	  rather	  unsurprising	  as	  they	  landed	  in	  a	  setting	  where	  each	  and	  every	  
one	  of	  these	  grounds	  were	  widely	  normalised	  and	  considered	  mundane	  occasions	  
of	  social	  injustice	  in	  the	  Greek	  context	  (Beger	  [2004]	  2009:	  112).	  	  
Indicative	  of	  the	  socio-­‐political	  climate	  within	  which	  these	  provisions	  have	  existed	  
for	  years	  is	  a	  recent	  incident	  involving	  a	  cross-­‐dressing	  individual.	  In	  2016,	  a	  (legally	  
recognised	  as)	  male	  driver	  for	  the	  hospice	  “The	  Smile	  of	  the	  Child”	  was	  spotted	  in	  
their	  parked	  car	  dressed	  in	  female	  attire	  by	  a	  resident	  of	  the	  area.	  This	  image	  was	  
apparently	  so	  alarming	  that	  a	  resident	  called	  the	  police	  and,	  along	  with	  other	  
residents,	  trapped	  the	  driver	  until	  the	  police	  arrived	  on	  the	  scene	  and	  proceeded	  to	  
arrest	  the	  driver	  (Limnios	  2016).	  Although	  no	  charges	  could	  be	  brought	  against	  the	  
driver,	  the	  case	  was	  made	  public	  by	  the	  tabloids	  in	  a	  moral	  frenzy	  fuelled	  by	  
titillating	  articles	  (Papanikolaou	  2018c:	  168).	  The	  president	  of	  the	  hospice	  that	  had	  
employed	  the	  driver	  claimed	  to	  be	  shocked	  and	  proceeded	  to	  reassure	  the	  public	  
that	  there	  had	  been	  absolutely	  no	  interaction	  between	  the	  driver	  and	  any	  of	  the	  
children	  (Limnios	  2016).	  Furthermore,	  as	  the	  article	  explained,	  after	  thorough	  
police	  investigation,	  including	  a	  search	  of	  the	  individual’s	  house,	  it	  was	  safe	  to	  say	  
that	  it	  was	  a	  case	  of	  a	  psychologically	  disturbed	  person	  and	  not	  a	  paedophile,	  which	  
of	  course	  was	  the	  assumption	  in	  the	  public	  discourse	  about	  the	  case	  (Limnios	  2016).	  	  
The	  outcome	  of	  the	  case	  concerning	  the	  driver’s	  employment	  is	  not	  known	  
(although	  it	  is	  rather	  safe	  to	  assume	  their	  dismissal),	  as,	  after	  the	  sensationalised	  
story	  was	  consumed	  and	  put	  aside	  by	  the	  media,	  the	  driver	  did	  not	  come	  forward	  in	  
protest.	  Unsurprisingly,	  this	  person	  chose	  not	  to	  utilise	  the	  political	  support	  that	  
was	  expressed	  by	  political	  actors140	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  a	  case	  of	  legal	  redemption	  
that	  would,	  nonetheless,	  attract	  more	  publicity	  in	  an	  already	  hostile	  social	  
environment	  (Papanikolaou	  2018b).	  Instead,	  as	  in	  many	  cases,	  the	  gender/sexual	  
non-­‐conforming	  individual	  “often	  vanishes,	  as	  in	  this	  case,	  not	  only	  after	  being	  
exposed	  through	  a	  shaming	  machine	  and	  being	  the	  object	  of	  institutionalised	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  See	  for	  example	  GTSA’s	  press	  release	  “No	  Transphobic	  Smile	  will	  be	  Tolerated”	  (GTSA	  2016a)	  as	  
well	  as	  SVEMKO’s	  (Base	  Union	  for	  NGO	  workers)	  announcement	  “When	  the	  Smile	  is	  Whipped	  off…”	  
(SVEMKO	  2016).	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homophobia	  but	  also	  as	  a	  political	  subject	  demanding	  rights,	  voice	  and	  public	  
presence”	  (Papanikolaou	  2018c:	  169).	  	  
Papanikolaou	  (2018c)	  accurately	  poses	  a	  series	  of	  questions	  that	  emerge	  
concerning	  the	  outcome	  of	  this	  incident:	  	  
Was	  this	  a	  set-­‐up	  in	  the	  first	  place?	  Was	  the	  man	  summarily	  dismissed	  
from	  his	  job	  because	  of	  this	  unfortunate	  confrontation	  with	  the	  inhabitants	  
of	  Zofria	  and	  the	  police?	  Did	  he	  face	  a	  dismissal	  panel?	  Were	  all	  proper	  
procedures	  followed	  in	  his	  contact	  with	  the	  police,	  media	  and	  his	  
employers?	  What	  are	  ‘proper	  procedures’	  today	  in	  a	  country	  like	  Greece	  
and	  on	  an	  occasion	  like	  this?	  (Papanikolaou	  2018c:	  168).	  
When	  placed	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  a	  legal	  study,	  these	  questions	  hint	  towards	  
the	  limits	  of	  a	  solely	  black	  letter	  legal	  analysis	  concerning	  such	  issues	  within	  certain	  
contexts	  and	  the	  demand	  for	  a	  more	  complex	  understanding	  of	  how	  injustice	  and	  
oppression	  are	  legitimised.	  Firstly,	  the	  logic	  of	  anti-­‐discrimination	  legislation	  itself	  
needs	  to	  be	  interrogated	  here.	  Indeed,	  even	  in	  the	  birthing	  legal	  orders	  of	  LGBTI+	  
equality	  legislation	  there	  have	  been	  critical	  voices	  commenting	  both	  on	  the	  
underpinning	  rationale	  of	  anti-­‐discrimination	  legislation,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  perception	  
of	  formal	  equality	  as	  a	  remedy	  for	  social	  injustices	  (Brown	  1995;	  Spade	  [2009]	  2015;	  
Beger	  [2004]	  2009).	  	  
Staying	  in	  the	  European	  terrain,	  Nico	  Beger	  analyses	  the	  “implicit	  problems”	  of	  the	  
underlying	  logic	  of	  anti-­‐discrimination	  legislation	  as	  an	  investment	  in	  the	  European	  
liberal	  legal	  tradition	  and	  its	  politics	  of	  hope	  for	  change	  and	  progress	  (Beger	  [2004]	  
2009:	  106-­‐114).	  	  
The	  logic	  of	  hope,	  then,	  runs	  approximately	  like	  this:	  through	  anti-­‐
discrimination	  legislation,	  the	  hegemony	  of	  the	  juridical	  in	  European	  
political	  culture	  will	  assure	  equal	  treatment	  and,	  thus,	  reap	  ideological	  
rewards	  and	  material	  change	  for	  those	  suffering	  from	  discrimination	  
(Beger	  [2004]	  2009:	  109).	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Beger	  proceeds	  to	  scrutinise	  the	  steps	  of	  this	  logic	  as	  a	  mechanism	  that	  cements	  
the	  political	  hegemony	  of	  the	  juridical	  by	  centralising	  the	  legal	  arena	  as	  the	  terrain	  
wherein	  historically	  dense	  social	  injustices	  and	  prejudice	  can	  be	  imagined	  to	  resolve	  
through	  a	  legal	  prohibition.141	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  definitional	  power	  of	  what	  
constitutes	  discrimination	  still	  lies	  with	  the	  powerful	  side	  of	  the	  equation.	  
Accordingly,	  the	  discriminated	  subject,	  although	  present	  in	  the	  debate	  as	  a	  victim,	  
can	  never	  rise	  to	  the	  same	  agentic	  status	  as	  the	  other	  players	  in	  the	  game	  of	  
meaning-­‐production	  about	  discrimination	  (Beger	  [2004]	  2009:	  116).	  More	  
importantly,	  the	  anti-­‐discrimination	  schema	  not	  only	  re-­‐affirms	  the	  hegemony	  of	  
the	  juridical	  and	  re-­‐legitimises	  state	  power	  itself	  but	  also	  renders	  invisible	  the	  law’s	  
(or	  the	  liberal	  state’s)	  own	  role	  in	  the	  formation	  and	  perpetuation	  of	  social	  
injustices	  (Beger	  [2004]	  2009).	  Indeed,	  according	  to	  Brown,	  “the	  state	  achieves	  a	  
good	  deal	  of	  its	  power	  through	  its	  devious	  claims	  to	  resolve	  the	  very	  inequalities	  
that	  it	  actually	  entrenches	  by	  depoliticizing”	  (Brown	  1995:	  109).	  The	  effects	  of	  such	  
structural	  inequalities	  are	  then	  ascribed	  to	  individual	  perpetrators	  as	  unacceptable	  
behaviours	  through	  the	  consensus	  of	  what	  is	  perceived	  to	  be	  acceptable	  in	  the	  
given	  socio-­‐political	  climate	  (Beger	  [2004]	  2009:	  112).	  	  
Secondly,	  if	  in	  its	  “natural”	  legal	  environment,	  which	  might	  not	  necessarily	  have	  
been	  welcoming	  ab	  initio,	  the	  anti-­‐discrimination	  logic,	  is	  faced	  with	  such	  political	  
impasses,	  in	  a	  social	  and	  legal	  environment	  that	  has	  not	  birthed	  but	  imported	  this	  
legislation,	  the	  main	  narrative	  that	  anti-­‐discrimination	  legislation	  holds	  for	  itself	  can	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  Furthermore,	  in	  this	  process,	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  anti-­‐discrimination	  claim	  is	  represented	  as	  fixed	  
and	  distinct	  in	  the	  social	  matrix	  and	  “in	  possession	  of	  an	  identity	  that	  is	  at	  least	  temporarily	  injured”	  
(Beger	  [2004]	  2009:	  114).	  The	  shared	  experience	  of	  the,	  perceived	  as	  pre-­‐existing,	  group	  that	  is	  
recognised	  under	  this	  identity	  is	  then	  assessed	  “in	  comparison	  with	  those	  presumed	  to	  be	  in	  the	  
possession	  of	  all	  available	  rights	  by	  virtue	  of	  belonging	  to	  the	  majority	  or	  the	  presumed	  average	  
normality”	  (Beger	  [2004]	  2009:	  114).	  	  
This	  gesture,	  according	  to	  Beger,	  not	  only	  performs	  a	  normative	  function	  “but	  also	  necessitates	  the	  
location	  of	  a	  discriminated	  subject”	  (Beger	  [2004]	  2009:	  114).	  In	  that	  sense,	  it	  contributes	  to	  the	  
perpetual	  re-­‐constitution	  of	  the	  protected	  subject	  as	  injured	  or	  discriminated	  against.	  Beger’s	  line	  of	  
argument	  echoes	  to	  some	  extent	  Wendy	  Brown’s	  (1995)	  query	  whether	  “the	  relationship	  of	  the	  
universal	  idiom	  of	  rights	  to	  the	  contingency	  of	  the	  protected	  identities	  [might]	  be	  such	  that	  the	  
former	  operates	  inadvertently	  to	  resubordinate	  by	  renaturalizing	  that	  which	  it	  was	  intended	  to	  
emancipate	  by	  articulating”	  (Brown	  1995:	  99).	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be	  completely	  overturned.	  That	  is,	  the	  underlying	  conviction	  of	  such	  a	  legal	  
declaration,	  according	  to	  Beger,	  is	  summarised	  as	  such:	  	  
The	  change	  of	  law	  is	  considered	  to	  have	  direct	  influence	  on	  everyday	  life	  in	  
that	  under	  certain	  circumstances	  victims	  of	  discrimination	  have	  access	  to	  
the	  courts	  to	  challenge	  injustice	  and	  access	  to	  legal	  recognition	  formerly	  
denied.	  Eventually,	  this	  access	  will	  persuade	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  population	  
to	  accept	  that	  discrimination	  is	  no	  longer	  acceptable	  (Beger	  [2004]	  2009:	  
113).	  	  
Nonetheless,	  as	  Shannon	  Woodcock	  notes	  for	  the	  import	  of	  LGBTI+	  European	  
legislation	  in	  Romania	  in	  a	  similar	  way,	  “this	  approach	  ignores	  and	  obfuscates	  the	  
particular	  reality	  of	  decades	  of	  homophobic,	  racist	  and	  sexist	  legislation”	  and	  
assumes	  that	  a	  simple	  aligning	  with	  European	  directives	  but	  also	  European	  
sexual/gender	  identities	  “will	  assure	  ‘rights’	  on	  the	  ground”	  (Woodcock	  [2011]	  
2016:	  67).	  	  
This	  pertinent	  critique	  commands	  an	  analysis	  that	  is	  aware	  not	  only	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  
the	  import	  of	  European	  legislation	  on	  a	  social,	  fiscal	  and	  political	  level	  but	  also	  of	  
the	  ways	  in	  which	  things	  unfold	  “on	  the	  ground”.	  In	  this	  vein,	  the	  next	  section	  
explores	  the	  issue	  of	  trans	  employability	  as	  it	  was	  discussed	  during	  the	  interviews	  
with	  my	  interlocutors.	  Having	  	  established	  in	  this	  section	  that	  the	  anti-­‐
discrimination	  legislation	  has	  led	  its	  legal	  life	  “almost	  completely	  lost	  in	  oblivion”,	  
the	  next	  section	  will	  claim	  that	  it	  has	  also	  remained	  marginal	  in	  the	  narratives	  of	  
trans	  lives	  affected	  by	  structural	  exclusionary	  mechanisms	  (Goulas	  &	  Kofinis	  2018:	  
13).	  	  
7.2. Remembering	  Reality	  
In	  this	  section,	  the	  appraisal	  of	  this	  anti-­‐discrimination	  legislation	  is	  complemented	  
by	  my	  interlocutors’	  intimate	  understanding	  of	  the	  impasses	  of	  trans	  legal	  reality	  in	  
Greece.	  Their	  scepticism	  towards	  anti-­‐discrimination	  legislation	  and	  its	  promise	  to	  
establish	  better	  conditions	  of	  employment	  for	  trans	  people	  suggests	  an	  
environment	  where	  employability	  often	  presents	  a	  priori	  as	  an	  impossibility.	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Discussing	  the	  perplexing	  effects	  of	  carrying	  identification	  documents	  in	  
contradiction	  with	  one’s	  gender	  identity,	  the	  issue	  of	  finding	  and	  maintaining	  a	  job	  
was	  the	  first	  to	  come	  up	  during	  the	  interviews.	  In	  case	  of	  such	  a	  discordance,	  the	  
navigation	  of	  this	  terrain	  was	  described	  by	  my	  interlocutors	  as	  an	  impossibility.	  For	  
trans	  women,	  this	  impossibility	  has	  been	  conceptualised,	  as	  seen	  in	  chapter	  six,	  as	  
part	  of	  the	  social	  conditioning	  that	  has	  connected	  trans	  femininity	  with	  sex-­‐work	  as	  
the	  sole	  viable	  option.142	  In	  the	  words	  of	  the	  Greek	  Transgender	  Support	  
Association:	  
In	  the	  workplace,	  transgendered	  individuals	  experience	  total	  exclusion.	  It	  is	  
only	  a	  tiny	  minority	  of	  trans	  people	  who	  manage	  to	  have	  access	  to	  
employment,	  once	  their	  identity	  is	  expressed	  outwardly.	  	  
Especially	  for	  trans	  women,	  their	  majority,	  being	  excluded	  from	  the	  
workplace,	  practices	  what	  is	  in	  effect	  enforced	  sex	  work.	  Trans	  men	  more	  
often	  resort	  to	  hiding	  their	  identity,	  to	  be	  able	  to	  exert	  their	  fundamental	  
and	  constitutional	  right	  to	  employment.	  (Galanou	  2011).	  
In	  the	  following	  excerpt,	  Lola	  insightfully	  demonstrates	  how	  the	  reality	  of	  searching	  
for	  a	  job	  in	  an	  openly	  transphobic	  social	  context	  often	  translates	  into	  a	  pre-­‐emptive	  
pause,	  a	  folding	  back:	  
Lola:	  Hmmm…now,	  in	  what	  concerns	  non-­‐sexual	  work,	  what	  I	  know	  from	  
the	  source	  and	  not	  from	  some	  theory	  is	  that	  there	  is	  very	  little	  chance	  for	  a	  
“normal”	  job,	  that	  is,	  to	  be	  employed	  somewhere.	  Ok,	  with	  rare	  exceptions	  
like	  [she	  names	  trans	  people	  that	  have	  “normal”	  jobs].	  
Me:	  I	  guess	  the	  part	  of	  having	  documents	  enters	  the	  picture	  again	  here?	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  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  until	  very	  recently,	  when	  it	  came	  to	  trans	  women,	  work	  meant	  almost	  
exclusively	  sex-­‐work	  (Dokoumetzidis	  1997;	  Galanou	  2011).	  This	  persists	  for	  trans	  women	  both	  as	  
reality,	  to	  some	  extent,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  stereotype	  that	  that	  performs	  “a	  particular	  kind	  of	  work	  of	  
legitimating	  violence	  and	  coextensively,	  institutional	  regulation	  and	  criminalization”	  (Aizura	  2014:	  
137).	  A	  stereotype	  so	  deeply	  rooted,	  to	  the	  point	  that,	  in	  different	  occasions,	  my	  interlocutors	  
recalled	  refraining	  from	  seeing	  themselves	  as	  trans	  (men	  or	  women)	  because	  they	  could	  not	  (or	  
would	  not)	  fit	  in	  the	  stereotypic	  profile	  of	  the	  trans	  feminine	  sex-­‐worker.	  	  
	  
RESERVING	  THE	  RIGHT	  TO	  BE	  COMPLEX	  
	   198	   	  
Lola:	  The	  part	  of	  having	  documents	  enters	  again	  a	  hundred	  percent!	  That	  
is,	  even	  I	  am	  fully	  qualified	  for	  an	  X	  position,	  the	  thing	  would	  get	  stuck	  on	  
the	  documents	  and	  probably	  never	  get	  unstuck.	  That	  is,	  I	  would	  not	  get	  
that	  position,	  which	  I	  could	  have	  gotten	  if	  my	  documents	  matched	  my	  
image	  and…well,	  everything	  else	  that	  comes	  with	  that.	  Cause	  this	  process	  
is	  not	  like	  “aww…that’s	  a	  shame	  [laughing]	  you	  don’t	  have	  what	  you	  
should	  on	  your	  ID	  card,	  we	  are	  terribly	  sorry	  but	  we	  cannot	  hire	  you.”	  The	  
actual	  process	  is	  far	  more	  brutal,	  far	  more	  insulting,	  far	  more	  degrading,	  
immensely	  transphobic	  and	  you	  can	  basically	  hear	  anything	  from	  anyone	  
and	  that’s	  something	  that	  I	  don’t	  think	  you	  need	  in	  a	  trans	  life,	  which	  is	  
already	  very	  difficult	  given	  what	  the	  facts	  are	  right	  now	  in	  this	  country,	  this	  
city	  etc.	  That	  is,	  it	  would	  seem	  to	  me	  very…I	  don’t	  know	  if	  I	  would	  advise	  a	  
trans	  woman	  that	  hasn’t	  changed	  her	  documents	  to	  go	  out	  on	  a	  daily	  
search	  for	  work	  and	  send	  out	  résumés	  every	  day	  and	  go	  for	  job	  interviews	  
every	  week.	  I	  believe	  it	  would	  be	  an	  immensely	  harrowing	  process	  and	  one	  
of	  these	  processes	  that	  more	  likely,	  let’s	  say,	  ruin	  instead	  of	  balancing	  or,	  
even	  less,	  improve	  the	  status	  of	  a	  trans	  life.	  [Interview	  with	  Lola	  in	  2014].	  	  
The	  solidity	  of	  the	  transphobia	  experienced	  on	  a	  regular	  basis,	  results	  in	  long	  
periods	  of	  abstinence	  from	  searching	  for	  a	  job.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  pervasiveness	  of	  
everyday	  transphobia,	  functioning	  on	  a	  pre-­‐emptive	  level,	  does	  not	  even	  allow	  for	  
what	  might	  be	  recognised	  as	  discrimination	  to	  unfold	  and	  potentially	  be	  
conceptualised	  as	  such.	  This	  can	  be	  a	  fertile	  starting	  point	  to	  interrogate	  the	  work	  
performed	  by	  this	  legislation	  within	  a	  context	  where	  transphobia	  prevails	  on	  the	  
ground	  and	  where	  no	  other	  support	  networks	  are	  in	  place.	  
Indeed,	  what	  is	  explained	  above	  by	  Lola	  was	  mentioned	  as	  a	  reflex	  in	  other	  
instances	  during	  the	  interviews.	  
Valeria:	  There	  is	  always	  the	  fear	  of	  what	  you	  can	  face	  in	  a	  job	  with	  that	  
[the	  ID	  documents].	  
Me:	  Would	  you	  tell	  me	  more	  about	  this?	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Valeria:	  Well,	  I	  won’t	  send	  out	  a	  résumé	  for	  this	  reason.	  At	  some	  point	  that	  
I	  was	  trying	  to	  get	  work	  as	  a	  server	  etc.,	  I	  put	  down	  my	  birth-­‐name	  in	  
female	  form	  but	  if	  someone	  hired	  me,	  I	  would	  have	  had	  to	  explain	  what’s	  
going	  on.	  And	  that	  is	  a	  stress,	  that	  is	  a	  thing	  like…gender	  identity	  stops	  you	  
on	  many	  levels.	  It	  stops	  you	  and	  it	  makes	  you	  think	  differently.	  (…)	  When	  it	  
comes	  to	  work	  I	  believe	  it‘s	  hard.	  Not	  just	  hard,	  it	  stops	  you;	  it	  discourages	  
you	  to	  search	  for	  a	  job.	  [Interview	  with	  Valeria	  in	  2017].	  
Nataly:	  The	  first	  reason	  that	  I	  won’t	  do	  it	  [apply	  for	  an	  internship]	  is	  that	  I	  
cannot	  show	  up	  with	  this	  ID.	  No	  way.	  (…)	  they	  could	  kick	  me	  out	  just	  for	  the	  
ID,	  just	  the	  idea	  makes	  me	  freak	  out!	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  expose	  myself	  to	  such	  
an	  extent	  (…)	  I	  should	  have	  searched	  again	  for	  a	  job	  to	  help	  myself	  and	  my	  
mum	  but	  I	  simply	  cannot	  introduce	  myself	  carrying	  this	  ID,	  that	  is	  to	  carry	  it	  
and	  tell	  them	  this	  classic	  line	  “eeehm…you	  know,	  there	  is	  an	  issue	  with	  my	  
ID”…it	  is	  so…mundane.	  [Interview	  with	  Nataly	  in	  2017].	  	  
In	  the	  excerpts	  above,	  the	  obstacle	  appears	  to	  lay	  in	  the	  official	  documents,	  which,	  
in	  the	  present	  legislation,	  can	  be	  amended	  more	  easily	  compared	  to	  the	  past.	  Is	  it,	  
thus,	  a	  simple	  problem	  that	  has	  met	  its	  legal	  solution?	  Following	  the	  discussion	  
closely,	  it	  becomes	  evident	  that	  what	  is	  implied	  is	  that	  the	  proper	  documentation	  
serves	  as	  a	  solution	  only	  when	  transness	  is	  not	  apparent	  in	  any	  other	  way.	  	  
Sandra:	  What	  stresses	  me…is	  of	  course	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  job…it	  is	  
embarrassing,	  I	  have	  been	  to	  so	  many	  jobs	  and	  sometimes	  I	  got	  so	  stressed	  
and	  all	  teared	  up	  and	  couldn’t	  even	  go	  in.	  I	  think	  of	  all	  these	  things…just	  
the	  thought	  of	  it	  is	  scaring	  me	  -­‐don’t	  you	  smoke?	  
Me:	  Yes,	  I	  smoke.	  Do	  you	  think	  changing	  your	  papers	  will	  help?	  
Sandra:	  I	  will	  be	  freer	  then	  to…I	  won’t	  have	  to	  explain	  to	  everyone.	  It’s	  still	  
stressful	  (...)	  I	  don’t	  know	  how	  it	  works	  abroad,	  you	  can	  tell	  me	  how	  it	  is	  in	  
England,	  but	  here	  if	  you	  are,	  let’s	  say,	  a	  trans	  girl	  with	  not	  such	  a…good	  
appearance	  you	  will	  still	  be	  treated	  like	  dirt	  anyway.	  In	  a	  job…no,	  that	  is	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very	  important	  here,	  I	  don’t	  know	  abroad	  how	  it	  is.	  [Interview	  with	  Sandra	  
2017].	  	  
Valeria:	  That	  [changing	  documents]	  won’t	  help	  you	  so	  much	  in	  Greece,	  
cause	  even	  if	  you	  show	  them	  a	  woman’s	  ID	  card	  how	  would	  anyone	  hire	  
you	  if	  you	  are	  not	  “passing”	  [in	  English]?	  [Interview	  with	  Valeria	  in	  2017].	  
For	  those	  that	  might	  be	  easily	  “read”	  (meaning	  recognised	  as	  trans),	  the	  promise	  of	  
the	  anti-­‐discrimination	  legislation	  to	  influence	  the	  (un)acceptability	  of	  their	  identity	  
and,	  in	  any	  case,	  provide	  them	  with	  equal	  treatment	  within	  the	  labour	  market	  
appears	  to	  be	  detached	  from	  their	  reality.	  Discussing	  with	  a	  legal	  professional,	  who	  
is	  actively	  engaging	  with	  human	  rights	  cases	  and	  has	  represented	  trans	  clients,	  she	  
notes:	  	  
Me:	  What	  about	  the	  issue	  of	  employment?	  Do	  you	  think	  it	  comes	  up…	  
Legal	  Professional	  1:	  …let	  me	  say,	  it	  is	  the	  biggest	  issue!	  It	  is	  not	  just	  a	  legal	  
issue,	  it	  is	  mainly	  a	  social	  issue	  and	  you,	  as	  a	  researcher,	  know	  this	  better	  
than	  me.	  That,	  first	  of	  all,	  trans	  people	  have	  great	  difficulty	  in	  accessing	  
employment.	  I	  have	  yet	  to	  see	  a	  trans	  person	  working	  at	  a	  public	  service.	  
Or	  in	  an	  office.	  I	  just	  haven’t	  seen	  that.	  So	  yes,	  there	  exists	  the	  legislation	  
that	  again	  in	  this	  case	  protects	  from	  discrimination	  but	  the	  reality	  is	  
that...they	  are	  not	  employed	  in	  other	  jobs	  other	  than	  sex-­‐work.	  That	  is	  not	  
to	  say	  that	  there	  aren’t	  any	  people	  with	  jobs	  it’s	  just	  that	  they	  are…it’s	  a	  
small	  percentage	  [Interview	  with	  Legal	  Professional	  1	  in	  2017]	  
During	  our	  discussions,	  lack	  of	  access	  to	  employment	  and	  unequal	  treatment	  often	  
(especially	  for	  trans	  women)	  became	  difficult	  to	  isolate,	  to	  pinpoint,	  to	  read	  
separately	  from	  being	  trans.143	  Even	  those	  incidents	  that	  were	  described	  to	  me	  
were	  not	  framed	  as	  disruptive	  instances	  of	  discrimination	  but	  as	  casual	  moments	  of	  
contact	  with	  the	  surrounding	  world,	  sometimes	  undistinguishable	  from	  life	  itself.	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  For	  more	  on	  lack	  of	  access	  to	  employment	  see	  Galanou	  2016;	  Theofilopoulos	  2016;	  GNCHR	  
2015.	  
Part	  C	   	   Chapter	  7	  
	   201	   	  
Incidents	  that	  were	  considered,	  as	  Nataly	  said,	  “so	  mundane”	  that	  their	  legal	  
prosecution	  seemed	  like	  a	  task	  not	  just	  impossible	  but	  also	  of	  no	  use.	  
Me:	  Did	  you	  think	  about	  doing	  something	  legally	  when	  that	  [she	  had	  just	  
described	  an	  incident	  of	  less	  favorable	  treatment	  in	  the	  workplace]	  
happened?	  	  
Nataly:	  You	  mean	  like	  the	  anti-­‐racism	  laws	  [meaning	  the	  legislation	  against	  
hate-­‐crimes]?	  I	  didn’t	  want	  to	  do	  that…144	  
Me:	  Wouldn’t	  you	  use	  any	  of	  these	  kind	  of	  laws?	  For	  work	  issues…	  
Nataly:	  Look,	  maybe	  if	  I	  was	  in	  physical	  danger.	  I	  mean	  I	  don’t	  think	  that	  I	  
would	  take	  the	  time	  if	  some	  jerk	  just	  didn’t	  like	  the	  way	  I	  am	  and	  has	  
stereotypes,	  to	  sue	  him	  because	  his	  mother	  didn’t	  teach	  him	  anything	  and	  
he	  has	  no	  hint	  of	  education	  in	  him.	  I	  cannot…I	  think	  you	  will	  do	  harm	  to	  
yourself	  if	  you	  do	  this	  all	  the	  time.	  Because	  it	  happens	  all	  the	  time,	  in	  ten	  
times	  won’t	  it	  be	  at	  least	  five	  times?	  Won’t	  it	  be	  at	  least	  half	  the	  times?	  
[Interview	  with	  Nataly	  in	  2017].	  
As	  the	  discussion	  about	  work	  and	  trans	  identity	  in	  Greece	  proceeded	  and	  I	  tried	  to	  
engage	  my	  conversation	  partners	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  anti-­‐discrimination	  legislation,	  
the	  very	  mention	  of	  this	  legislation	  often	  appeared	  alien.	  Although	  there	  were	  
moments	  when,	  in	  their	  responses,	  some	  of	  my	  interlocutors	  contemplated	  using	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  It	  became	  apparent	  during	  our	  discussions	  was	  that	  my	  interlocutors	  (other	  than	  the	  legal	  
professionals)	  were	  generally	  not	  aware	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  anti-­‐discrimination	  provision	  for	  trans	  
employment	  in	  Greece.	  Hence,	  our	  discussion	  is	  always	  about	  “anti-­‐racism	  law”	  meaning	  the	  legal	  
framework	  against	  hate	  crimes,	  whose	  existence	  is	  more	  widely	  known.	  This	  echoes	  Goulas	  and	  
Kofinis’	  (2018)	  argument	  about	  both	  authorities	  and	  the	  public	  having	  literally	  forgotten	  these	  
provisions.	  Indeed,	  according	  to	  the	  data	  of	  a	  research	  conducted	  in	  2012	  by	  the	  European	  Union	  
Agency	  for	  Fundamental	  Rights	  (FRA),	  only	  23%	  of	  2.760	  LGBT	  adults	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  
such	  a	  provision	  in	  Greece	  (Fra	  2014;	  Theofilopoulos	  2016).	  Taking	  into	  account	  that	  the	  participants	  
in	  such	  a	  study	  represent	  the	  most	  visible	  (thus,	  accessible)	  and	  active	  (thus,	  informed)	  part	  of	  the	  
LGBTQI	  communities,	  it	  is	  safe	  to	  assume	  that	  this	  percentage	  drops	  much	  lower	  in	  broader	  
gender/sexual	  non-­‐conforming	  populations.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  since	  the	  question	  of	  employability	  
emerged	  during	  the	  interviews	  as	  one	  of	  particular	  importance,	  this	  accentuates	  the	  dissonance	  
between	  reality	  and	  the	  legal	  imaginary.	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such	  a	  legal	  process,	  in	  the	  end,	  every	  other	  solution	  seemed	  more	  realistic	  and	  
tangible.	  
Philip:	  Maybe	  if	  I	  got	  very	  mad	  about	  something…maybe	  I	  would	  consider	  it	  
[using	  any	  legal	  process].	  (…)	  But	  I	  have	  never	  thought	  about	  this.	  
Me:	  How	  about	  when	  you	  discuss	  this	  with	  other	  [trans]	  guys?	  Is	  there	  the	  
concept	  that	  you	  know,	  I	  can	  ask	  protection	  from	  somewhere?	  	  
Philip:	  No…most	  of	  them	  are	  all	  about	  what	  they	  can	  do	  on	  their	  own	  to	  
face	  their	  problems,	  not	  like	  “what	  is	  there	  in	  the	  law	  that	  might	  help	  me…”	  
Me:	  Not	  even	  on	  a	  job	  level?	  
Philip:	  No,	  no…for	  example	  I	  know	  from	  a	  guy	  that	  hasn’t	  changed	  his	  ID	  
card	  and	  needed	  to	  get	  a	  job	  as	  a	  delivery	  guy	  or	  something,	  he	  just	  ended	  
up	  working	  at	  a	  job	  where	  they	  hired	  him	  without	  asking	  for	  ID	  or	  anything.	  
[Interview	  with	  Philip	  in	  2017].	  
The	  FRA	  research	  report	  on	  “Being	  trans	  in	  the	  EU”	  notes	  similar	  reasons	  given	  to	  
explain	  the	  respondents’	  hesitancy	  to	  report	  incidents	  of	  discrimination:	  
The	  reasons	  for	  not	  reporting	  are	  diverse.	  An	  overall	  large	  number	  of	  
respondents	  are:	  convinced	  that	  nothing	  would	  happen	  or	  change	  (62	  %);	  
feeling	  that	  it	  is	  not	  worth	  it	  (47	  %);	  concerned	  that	  the	  incident	  would	  not	  
be	  taken	  seriously	  (40	  %);	  or	  unwilling	  to	  reveal	  their	  sexual	  orientation	  
and/or	  gender	  identity	  (38	  %).	  Nearly	  one	  in	  three	  (30%)	  did	  not	  know	  
where	  to	  report	  their	  experience.	  Emotional	  reasons	  are	  also	  mentioned,	  
such	  as	  shame,	  fear	  and	  being	  emotionally	  upset	  (FRA	  2014:	  47-­‐48).	  
In	  the	  absence	  of	  all	  other	  means	  to	  support	  trans	  employability,145	  the	  reality	  
described	  went	  along	  the	  parameters	  of	  a	  structural	  social	  injustice	  that	  translated	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  The	  FRA	  research	  report	  on	  “Being	  trans	  in	  the	  EU”	  points	  out	  the	  connection	  of	  other	  positive	  
measures	  with	  the	  willingness	  to	  report	  instances	  of	  discrimination	  in	  employment:	  
The	  data	  show	  that	  in	  general,	  however,	  the	  different	  country	  reporting	  rates	  hinge	  on	  which	  
countries	  promote	  positive	  measures	  towards	  trans	  people,	  as	  indicated	  by	  the	  survey	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to	  a	  restricted	  access	  to	  life	  resources	  (Spade	  [2009]	  2015).	  That	  is,	  a	  reality	  where	  
trans	  people	  are	  often	  not	  able	  to	  complete	  their	  education,	  are	  not	  considered	  
part	  of	  the	  working	  force	  or	  even	  feel	  it	  is	  safe	  and	  meaningful	  to	  search	  for	  a	  job.	  
These	  and	  other	  similar	  restrictions	  compile	  the	  environment	  within	  which	  
transphobia	  becomes	  not	  an	  instance	  of	  discrimination	  but	  rather	  a	  catholic	  
condition	  working	  against	  the	  distribution	  of	  life	  resources.	  
Overall,	  it	  has	  been	  established	  in	  the	  last	  two	  sections	  that	  the	  introduction	  of	  
employment	  anti-­‐discrimination	  legislation	  did	  not	  produce	  institutional	  changes,	  
litigation	  or	  any	  significant	  shift	  in	  the	  socio-­‐political	  conditions	  of	  everyday	  life.146	  
The	  question	  then	  becomes:	  what	  is	  enabled	  in	  this	  context	  through	  the	  transfer	  of	  
such	  legislation	  into	  the	  national	  level?	  The	  next	  section	  closes	  this	  chapter	  by	  
thinking	  about	  this	  question	  in	  proximity	  to	  Europeanisation	  processes.	  	  
7.3. Making	  Sense	  of	  a	  “Success”	  	  
As	  has	  been	  demonstrated,	  almost	  a	  decade	  after	  the	  first	  employment	  anti-­‐
discrimination	  legislation,	  inclusive	  (even	  if	  problematically	  and	  partially)	  of	  trans	  
individuals,	  this	  kind	  of	  legislation	  continues	  to	  sit	  uneasy	  within	  the	  national	  legal	  
order.	  Unused	  and	  in	  blatant	  discordance	  with	  the	  social	  and	  legal	  reality	  of	  
transness	  in	  Greece,	  it	  raises	  questions	  about	  the	  process	  of	  its	  transfer	  and	  the	  
political	  work	  performed	  by	  it.	  This	  section	  closes	  the	  chapter	  by	  suggesting	  that,	  
other	  than	  the	  obvious	  reason	  of	  complying	  with	  its	  European	  obligations,	  the	  
Greek	  state	  adopted	  this	  legislation	  as	  part	  of	  the	  political	  project	  of	  placing	  itself	  
among	  modern	  European	  states.	  
As	  Carl	  Stychin	  notes,	  “rights	  to	  sexual	  equality	  in	  the	  workplace	  have	  been	  central	  
to	  the	  ‘social’	  dimension	  of	  Europe,	  and	  to	  the	  entrenchment	  of	  a	  discourse	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
respondents.	  When	  respondents	  recognize	  such	  positive	  measures	  as	  fairly	  or	  very	  widespread	  
in	  a	  country,	  the	  rate	  of	  reporting	  of	  discrimination	  experiences	  in	  the	  year	  preceding	  the	  
survey	  reaches	  23	  %.	  When	  positive	  measures	  are	  very	  or	  fairly	  rare	  in	  the	  country,	  reporting	  
rates	  remain	  at	  14	  %	  (FRA	  2014:47).	  	  
146
	  There	  is	  a	  discussion	  about	  the	  symbolic	  value	  of	  the	  legal	  recognition	  of	  an	  oppression	  (Williams	  
1991,	  Brown	  1995,	  Spade	  [2009]	  2015),	  which	  will	  not	  be	  explored	  here	  since	  the	  specific	  provision	  
did	  not	  have	  significant	  public	  coverage	  (in	  contrast	  with	  the	  legislation	  that	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  the	  
next	  chapters)	  and	  was	  not	  registered	  as	  one	  of	  the	  big	  “victories”	  of	  the	  wider	  LGBTQ	  communities.	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rights	  around	  gender	  issues”	  (Stychin	  1998:	  123).	  Initially	  having	  a	  narrower	  focus	  
on	  the	  principle	  of	  equal	  payment,	  the	  legal	  scope	  and	  the	  ideological	  discourse	  of	  
sex/gender	  equality	  in	  the	  workplace	  expanded	  throughout	  the	  years,	  becoming	  
salient	  in	  debates	  concerning	  European	  integration	  (Stychin	  1998:	  123).	  In	  recent	  
years,	  for	  countries	  in	  the	  margins	  of	  Europe,	  the	  adaptation	  of	  gender	  equality	  
legislation,	  and	  more	  recently	  LGBTI+	  rights,	  has	  been	  one	  of	  the	  ways	  of	  
establishing	  themselves	  as	  “civilised”,	  meaning	  European,	  states	  (Kulpa	  [2011]	  
2016;	  Binnie	  2004;	  Kahlina	  2015).	  This	  creates	  a	  complex	  weaving	  between	  
Europeanisation	  and	  modernisation	  discourses	  and	  the	  state-­‐specific	  historicities	  of	  
such	  discourses.	  	  
In	  Greece,	  “gender	  equality	  promotion	  appeared	  in	  GEP	  [Greek	  Employment	  
Policies]	  only	  after	  EU	  accession	  in	  1981”	  (Zartaloudis	  2015:	  534).	  Anti-­‐
discrimination	  and	  equal	  payment	  legislation	  were	  one	  of	  the	  main	  routes	  of	  this	  
promotion	  from	  a	  European	  to	  a	  national	  level.	  Nonetheless,	  this	  legislative	  transfer	  
was	  not	  mirrored	  in	  Greek	  employment	  policies	  for	  many	  years	  to	  come.	  Research	  
on	  employment	  policies	  shows	  that	  the	  organisational	  changes	  that	  finally	  
appeared	  in	  the	  late	  1990s	  “were	  linked	  to	  the	  need	  to	  improve	  the	  absorption	  of	  
ESF	  [European	  Social	  Fund]	  funds	  and	  not	  to	  the	  promotion	  of	  GM	  [Gender	  
Mainstreaming]	  in	  GEP	  [Greek	  Employment	  Policies]”	  (Zartaloudis	  2015:	  540).	  This	  
suggests	  that	  the	  introduction	  of	  anti-­‐discrimination	  and	  equality	  legislation	  has	  
often	  served	  the	  sole	  aim	  of	  not	  exposing	  the	  Greek	  state	  as	  non-­‐compliant	  to	  its	  
international	  obligations.	  Accordingly,	  its	  application	  and	  social	  impact,	  has	  varied	  
depending	  on	  political	  and	  fiscal	  strategies	  such	  as,	  in	  the	  example	  above,	  the	  
conditionality	  of	  European	  funds.	  	  
Nonetheless,	  unlike	  in	  recent	  years,	  during	  the	  time	  of	  Greece’s	  ascension	  in	  the	  EU	  
in	  1981,	  pressure	  from	  European	  institutions	  and	  organisations	  had	  not	  yet	  been	  
channelled	  towards	  LGBTI+	  issues	  and	  there	  were	  no	  relevant	  NGOs	  or	  research	  
bodies	  on	  a	  national	  level.	  The	  modernisation	  debate	  as	  it	  was	  founded	  during	  the	  
mid-­‐1990s	  mainly	  revolved	  around	  issues	  of	  financial	  and	  administrative	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rationalisation.147	  In	  this	  context,	  there	  was	  no	  political	  gain	  for	  parliamentary	  
politicians	  of	  the	  centre	  (the	  “modernisers”)	  in	  introducing	  this	  aspect	  of	  Western	  
liberalism	  to	  a	  society	  and	  a	  parliament	  that	  were	  already	  resisting	  modernisation	  
on	  many	  levels.148	  Although	  the	  political	  clashes	  around	  Europeanisation	  and	  
modernisation	  were	  dense	  in	  gender	  and	  sexual	  connotations	  (e.g.,	  through	  the	  
role	  of	  traditional	  family	  norms	  in	  nationalist	  rhetorics)	  LGBTI+	  politics	  per	  se	  had	  
no	  clout	  during	  this	  era	  (Papathanasiou	  &	  Apostolidis	  2014).	  Accordingly,	  LGBTI+	  
politics	  remained	  outside	  the	  main	  political	  agenda	  for	  years	  while	  the	  emergence	  
of	  an	  abundance	  of	  LGBTI+	  and	  queer	  political	  agents	  after	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century	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  During	  that	  period,	  “modernisation”	  became	  both	  a	  programme	  that	  included	  the	  rationalisation	  
of	  the	  Greek	  state	  economy,	  which	  at	  that	  point	  was	  far	  from	  being	  aligned	  with	  European	  capitalist	  
models,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  ideological	  trope	  that	  promoted	  the	  Europeanisation	  of	  Greek	  identity	  
(Stafylakis	  date	  n/a).	  The	  economic	  reforms	  of	  the	  period	  1996-­‐2004	  (including	  privatisations	  of	  
public	  services	  that	  caused	  intense	  reactions	  from	  trade	  unions	  and	  various	  political	  forces	  of	  the	  
left)	  coincided	  with	  the	  preparations	  for	  the	  Olympic	  Games	  of	  Athens	  2004.	  To	  that	  end,	  large-­‐scale	  
works	  that	  radically	  altered	  the	  country’s	  infrastructure	  were	  undertaken	  in	  those	  years	  relying	  on	  
foreign	  investments	  connected	  to	  the	  Olympic	  Games	  as	  well	  as	  National	  and	  EU	  funds,	  especially	  
since	  Greece	  joined	  the	  Eurozone	  in	  2001	  (Stafylakis	  date	  n/a;	  TPTG	  2011;	  Dalakoglou	  &	  Kallianos	  
2018).	  These	  “golden	  years”	  for	  Greece’s	  infrastructure,	  that	  would	  later	  contribute	  to	  the	  2008	  
economic	  collapse,	  led	  to	  an	  ideological	  embracement	  of	  modernisation	  from	  the	  parts	  of	  Greek	  
society	  that	  not	  only	  enjoyed	  financial	  gains	  from	  its	  administrative	  impact	  but	  also	  felt	  inclined	  to	  
form	  cultural	  ties	  with	  a	  European	  version	  of	  Greekness.	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  Conversely,	  passionate	  discourses	  against	  modernisation	  as	  well	  as	  against	  Europeanisation	  as	  
modernisation	  flourished	  across	  the	  political	  spectrum	  (Stafylakis	  date	  n/a).	  As	  in	  other	  Balkan	  
countries,	  modernisation	  and	  Europeanisation	  processes	  (oftentimes	  as	  one	  and	  the	  same)	  were	  
resisted	  both	  by	  right-­‐wing	  nationalism	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  cultural	  and	  religious	  national	  traditions	  but	  
also	  by	  left-­‐wing	  (communist	  and	  non-­‐communist)	  and	  other	  political	  forces	  as	  a	  project	  of	  
economic	  and	  political	  imperialism.	  Specifically,	  the	  conservative	  right	  wing	  along	  with	  the	  Orthodox	  
Church	  of	  Greece	  formed	  a	  common	  front	  of	  cultural	  traditionalism	  that	  opposed	  the	  integration	  
with	  European	  institutions	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  Greek	  national	  values	  (Stafylakis	  date	  n/a).	  Various	  
reforms	  were	  met	  with	  negative	  reactions	  by	  this	  front	  with	  the	  pinnacle	  being	  the	  notorious	  
standoff	  between	  the	  government	  and	  the	  Church	  concerning	  the	  declaration	  of	  religion	  on	  national	  
identity	  cards	  (Stavrakakis	  2003;	  Roudometof	  2005;	  Makrides	  2005;	  Fokas	  2006;	  Molokotos-­‐
Liederman	  2007).	  	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  crucial	  privatisations	  and	  other	  reforms	  that	  dismantled	  labour	  rights,	  which	  
have	  been	  secured	  by	  past	  working	  struggles,	  established	  modernisation	  and	  Europeanisation	  as	  
hostile	  processes	  for	  the	  Greek	  left	  wing	  as	  well.	  Parliamentary	  left-­‐wing	  opposition	  as	  well	  as	  extra-­‐
parliamentarian	  political	  movements	  opposed	  these	  processes	  on	  varying	  grounds,	  sometimes	  
leaning	  towards	  a	  left-­‐wing	  patriotism	  and	  other	  times	  trying	  to	  resist	  it	  (Stafylakis	  date	  n/a).	  Labour	  
rights,	  pensions	  and	  wages	  were	  a	  major	  aspect	  of	  this	  opposition	  but	  there	  were	  other	  points	  of	  
conflict	  concerning	  the	  multiple	  implications	  of	  the	  2000s	  modernisation	  agenda.	  Examples	  of	  such	  
points	  of	  friction	  might	  be	  found	  in	  the	  debates	  concerning	  the	  financial	  and	  political	  dependence	  of	  
Greece	  on	  external	  institutions,	  the	  participation	  in	  military	  operations	  due	  to	  international	  
agreements,	  the	  surveillance	  technologies	  that	  were	  forced	  upon	  (and	  strongly	  resisted	  by)	  the	  
Athenian	  population	  during	  the	  Olympic	  Games	  and	  others	  (TPTG	  2011;	  Dalakoglou	  &	  Kallianos	  
2018).	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was	  ignored	  by	  most	  political	  forces.149	  In	  other	  words,	  at	  that	  point	  and	  until	  very	  
recently,	  no	  one	  “needed”	  LGBTI+	  politics	  and	  legislation	  in	  Greece	  other	  than	  
those	  who	  actually	  needed	  it.	  
It	  was	  within	  this	  climate	  of	  political	  indifference,	  or	  rather	  the	  refusal	  of	  
political/legal/social	  acknowledgement,	  that	  the	  first	  trans-­‐related	  anti-­‐
discrimination	  legislation	  appeared	  in	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order.	  As	  I	  have	  
demonstrated	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  chapter,	  bound	  by	  its	  European	  obligations,	  
the	  Greek	  state	  has	  transferred	  the	  principles	  of	  non-­‐discrimination	  in	  employment	  
on	  the	  grounds	  of	  sex,	  sexual	  orientation	  and	  (later)	  gender	  identity	  into	  the	  
national	  legal	  order	  through	  overdue	  and	  half-­‐hearted	  adaptations	  of	  the	  
respective	  directives.	  On	  a	  state	  level,	  ticking	  the	  legislative	  boxes	  of	  gender	  
equality,	  while	  maintaining	  patriarchal	  gender	  values	  in	  everyday	  life	  and	  
institutional	  structures,	  has	  proven	  a	  win-­‐win	  scenario	  wherein	  both	  wins	  are	  for	  
the	  Greek	  state.	  Other	  than	  fulfilling	  any	  fund	  conditionality	  clauses,	  as	  described	  
earlier,	  this	  practise	  supported	  the	  Greek	  state’s	  self-­‐narration	  into	  a	  modern	  
European	  state	  within	  the	  European	  arena	  while,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  maintained	  its	  
ethnosexual	  imperatives	  in	  the	  national	  arena.	  	  
This	  can	  be	  comprehended	  within	  a	  broader	  project	  of	  national	  self-­‐narration	  
(Bhabha	  1990)	  wherein	  the	  Greek	  state	  attempts	  to	  situate	  itself	  away	  from	  geo-­‐
political	  regions	  that	  are	  not,	  in	  their	  own	  supposed	  belated	  temporality,	  able	  to	  
“catch	  up”	  with	  the	  “civilised”	  West.	  Historically,	  the	  constant	  effort	  to	  situate	  
Greece	  geopolitically	  in	  a	  modern	  time	  and	  place	  has	  been	  achieved	  by	  either	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  Other	  than	  the	  indifference	  of	  the	  “modernisers,”	  anti-­‐modernisation	  political	  discourses	  across	  
the	  political	  spectrum	  were	  not	  keen	  on	  promoting	  an	  LGBT	  angle	  either.	  On	  one	  hand,	  conservative	  
right-­‐wing	  powers	  are	  historically	  opposed	  to	  gender	  and	  sexual	  “deviance”	  and	  were	  anyway	  
resisting	  modernisation	  by	  folding	  back	  into	  traditionalism,	  Orthodoxy	  and	  nationalist	  populism.	  On	  
the	  other	  hand,	  left-­‐wing	  (communist	  and	  other)	  as	  well	  as	  extra-­‐parliamentarian	  groups	  chose	  to	  
ignore,	  marginalise	  and/or	  oppose	  this	  set	  of	  emerging	  political	  claims.	  Other	  than	  the	  resistance	  
within	  left-­‐wing	  and	  anti-­‐authoritarian	  analyses	  towards	  a	  critique	  of	  traditional	  sexual	  values,	  there	  
was	  also	  an	  unresolvable	  conflict	  of	  political	  strategies	  on	  an	  institutional	  level.	  That	  is,	  a	  turn	  
towards	  European	  policies	  and	  jurisprudence,	  which	  is	  the	  main	  political	  leverage	  LGBT	  activists	  
have	  used	  in	  the	  peripheries	  of	  Europe	  (especially	  acceding	  countries)	  to	  claim	  sexual	  minority	  rights	  
(Kahlina	  2015),	  would	  conflict	  anti-­‐modernisation	  and	  anti-­‐EU	  politics	  that	  were	  structural	  part	  of	  
the	  left-­‐wing	  agenda.	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distancing	  itself	  from	  regions	  that	  are	  marked	  as	  “delayed”	  and	  “backwards”,	  such	  
as	  Turkey	  and	  the	  “East”,	  or	  by	  assuming	  a	  leading	  role	  among	  the	  “less”	  European	  
countries	  of	  the	  Balkans	  (Huliaras	  &	  Tsardanidis	  2006;	  Rasku	  2007).150	  Nonetheless,	  
since	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  the	  liminal	  geopolitical	  location	  of	  the	  (then	  
newborn)	  Greek	  state	  and	  the	  contradicting	  character	  of	  the	  cultural	  and	  political	  
elements	  brought	  by	  classical,	  Byzantine	  and	  Ottoman	  traditions	  has	  complicated	  
the	  task	  of	  self-­‐narration	  posing	  the	  question	  of	  national	  identity	  as	  the	  “East”	  vs	  
“West”	  question	  (Molokotos-­‐Liederman	  2003;	  Rasku	  2007).	  
Greece	  is	  a	  particularly	  interesting	  example,	  having	  border-­‐countries	  that	  
are	  continuously	  placing	  themselves.	  It	  lies	  at	  one	  of	  the	  traditional	  
imaginary	  borders	  of	  East	  and	  West.	  Europe	  and	  Asia	  as	  continental	  
metaphors	  are	  regularly	  activated	  in	  the	  Greek-­‐Turkish	  relations	  and	  made	  
more	  intense	  because	  of	  the	  conflicting	  territorial	  disputes	  between	  the	  
countries.	  Greece’s	  southern	  sea-­‐border	  faces	  Africa,	  and	  therefore	  it	  is	  
also	  on	  the	  border	  between	  North	  and	  South.	  The	  country	  is	  a	  member	  of	  
the	  European	  Union	  and	  NATO,	  but	  there	  are	  still	  debates	  whether	  Greece	  
is	  truly	  European	  or	  not.	  Although	  Greece	  has	  been	  a	  member	  of	  the	  EU	  
since	  1981,	  it	  has	  always	  been	  perceived	  as	  a	  geopolitical	  island	  as	  it	  has	  
always	  been	  surrounded	  by	  states	  that	  are	  not	  members	  of	  the	  EU.	  […]	  
Greece	  is	  also	  the	  southernmost	  part	  of	  the	  Balkan	  area.	  That	  is	  why,	  from	  
time	  to	  time,	  the	  question	  has	  been	  raised	  whether	  Greece	  is	  a	  Balkan	  state	  
in	  Europe	  –	  or	  a	  European	  state	  in	  Balkans	  (Rasku	  2007:	  10).	  
In	  this	  project,	  the	  traditional	  ethnosexual	  narrative	  becomes	  a	  central	  trope	  for	  
establishing	  a	  selective	  way	  of	  belonging	  which	  shifts	  between	  East	  and	  West,	  
Balkan	  and	  European,	  claiming	  superiority	  to	  both.	  Eleni	  Varikas,	  commenting	  on	  
the	  formation	  of	  Greek	  national	  identity	  from	  the	  late	  18th	  and	  throughout	  the	  
19th	  century,	  writes:	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  Huliaras	  and	  Tsardanidis	  point	  out	  the	  rapid	  shifts	  in	  geopolitical	  codes	  within	  the	  Greek	  state’s	  
geopolitical	  vision	  and	  its	  understanding	  of	  the	  Balkans	  (Huliaras	  &	  Tsardanidis	  2006).	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National	  identity	  was	  thus	  constructed	  through	  a	  complex	  and	  often	  
contradictory	  process	  of	  differentiation	  that	  situated	  gender	  at	  the	  center	  
of	  national	  self-­‐definition	  and	  its	  (in)stability:	  differentiation	  from	  “the	  
Turk”,	  the	  barbarian	  par	  excellence,	  to	  whom	  the	  Greek	  opposed	  his	  
“western”	  identity;	  differentiation	  from	  the	  licentious	  and	  effeminate	  
aspects	  of	  “the	  Franc”	  (the	  European),	  to	  whom	  the	  Greek	  opposed	  his	  (sic)	  
healthy	  national	  traditions;	  differentiation	  between	  feminine	  and	  
masculine	  through	  association	  of	  the	  former	  with	  the	  negative	  aspects	  of	  
both	  the	  West	  (immodesty,	  luxury,	  moral	  levity)	  and	  the	  Orient	  (ignorance,	  
backwardness,	  irrationality)	  and	  of	  the	  latter	  with	  the	  positive	  aspects	  of	  
both	  western	  and	  national	  traditions	  (Varikas	  1993:	  271).	  
Varikas’	  (1993)	  analysis	  brings	  together	  gender	  norms	  and	  national	  identity	  in	  this	  
double	  play	  (too	  western	  for	  the	  Orient	  –	  too	  oriental	  for	  the	  West),	  which	  has	  
been	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  Greek	  citizenship	  and	  its	  inherent	  ambiguity	  (Rasku	  2007;	  
Carastathis	  2014).	  	  
In	  this	  sense,	  even	  if	  the	  Greek	  state	  was	  not	  invested	  specifically	  in	  LGBTI+	  rights,	  
the	  introduction	  of	  employment	  anti-­‐discrimination	  legislation,	  regardless	  of	  its	  
disconnection	  from	  social	  reality,	  was	  part	  of	  such	  a	  broader	  state	  project.	  That	  is,	  
the	  employment	  anti-­‐discrimination	  legislation	  not	  only	  played	  into	  its	  own	  
progressivist	  “logic	  of	  hope”	  but	  also	  it	  fulfilled	  the	  Greek	  state’s	  self-­‐narration	  as	  
European	  (Beger	  [2004]	  2009:	  109).	  What	  is	  marked	  as	  a	  “success”	  in	  this	  process	  of	  
Europeanisation	  does	  not	  necessarily	  translate	  into	  much	  more	  than	  reaping	  the	  
fruit	  of	  this	  success	  on	  a	  state	  level.	  Indeed,	  as	  has	  been	  established,	  this	  legislation	  
achieved	  its	  state-­‐level	  modernisation	  goals	  in	  the	  early	  2000s	  without	  any	  
structural	  change	  in	  the	  socio-­‐political,	  legal	  or	  administrative	  status	  quo.	  When	  
placed	  within	  such	  an	  analytical	  frame,	  it	  appears	  unsurprising	  that	  the	  anti-­‐
discrimination	  legislation	  had	  no	  effect	  on	  the	  conditions	  of	  trans	  employability,	  
thus,	  answering	  the	  question	  set	  out	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  section.	  	  
Throughout	  this	  chapter	  I	  have	  examined	  the	  (non)application	  of	  employment	  anti-­‐
discrimination	  legislation	  and	  its	  detachment	  from	  trans	  understandings	  of	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employability	  issues	  in	  Greece.	  A	  detachment	  which	  bears	  witness	  to	  the	  
dissonances	  between	  the	  (European)	  legal	  imaginary	  of	  anti-­‐discrimination	  and	  
localised	  social	  realities.	  Having	  framed	  a	  specific	  piece	  of	  legislation	  within	  broader	  
projects	  of	  Europeanisation	  and	  modernisation,	  I	  have	  managed	  to	  critically	  discuss	  
its	  particular	  workings	  on	  different	  levels.	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  the	  next	  chapter,	  traces	  
the	  introduction	  and	  effect	  of	  the	  Greek	  legal	  equivalent	  of	  hate-­‐crime	  legislation	  
within	  the	  dramatically	  changing	  socio-­‐political	  terrain	  of	  the	  last	  decade.
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Chapter	  8. Navigating	  the	  Crisis:	  (Legal)	  Violence	  	  
and	  (State)	  Racism	  by	  any	  Other	  Name	  	  
Following	  the	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2008-­‐2009,	  a	  new	  socio-­‐political	  terrain	  was	  formed	  
on	  a	  national	  and	  European	  level.	  The	  rise	  of	  social	  (including	  LGBTI+	  and	  queer)	  
movements	  that	  came	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  enforced	  measures	  of	  austerity	  was	  
followed	  by	  a	  backlash	  of	  state	  repression	  and	  right-­‐wing	  violence.	  As	  will	  be	  
established	  in	  the	  first	  two	  sections	  of	  the	  chapter,	  the	  deepening	  crisis	  established	  
a	  new	  political	  paradigm	  of	  a	  perpetual	  state	  of	  emergency	  that	  was	  enabled	  
through	  (state)	  racist	  discourses	  and	  the	  consolidation	  of	  an	  affective	  economy	  of	  
hostility	  for	  racial,	  gender,	  religious	  and	  sexual	  Others	  (Athanasiou	  2012;	  
Carastathis	  2015;	  Filippidis	  2018).	  	  
The	  third	  section	  of	  the	  chapter	  follows	  the	  much-­‐contested	  introduction	  of	  anti-­‐
racist	  legislation,151	  which	  also	  extended	  legal	  protection	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  sexual	  
orientation	  and	  gender	  identity.	  The	  introduction	  of	  this	  legislation	  initially	  might	  
appear	  rather	  paradoxical	  on	  the	  part	  of	  a	  governing	  regime,	  which	  -­‐	  as	  I	  will	  show	  
in	  a	  schematic	  way	  -­‐	  relied	  on	  the	  way	  “the	  managerial	  and	  technocratic	  logics	  of	  
ethno-­‐neoliberalism	  intertwines	  with	  the	  micropolitics	  of	  moral	  panic	  that	  
intensifies	  xenophobia,	  patriarchy	  and	  homophobia”	  (Athanasiou	  2012:	  38,	  my	  
translation).	  The	  paradoxical	  character	  of	  the	  reform	  is	  mirrored	  also	  in	  the	  
discussions	  with	  my	  interlocutors	  who,	  in	  section	  8.4,	  embark	  on	  an	  ambiguous	  and	  
aporetic	  hypothetical	  engagement	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  legal	  protection	  from	  racist	  
crime	  and	  specifically	  its	  transphobic	  aspect.	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  The	  concept	  of	  hate	  crime	  does	  not	  exist	  in	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order	  as	  such.	  Instead,	  the	  concepts	  
of	  “hate	  motivated	  crime”	  has	  been	  used	  and	  later	  that	  of	  “racist	  crime”	  or	  “crime	  with	  racist	  
characteristics”	  (omitting	  the	  affective	  element	  of	  hate	  on	  part	  of	  the	  perpetrator	  and	  focusing	  on	  
the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  victim),	  which	  echoes	  the	  common	  practice	  in	  Greek	  political	  culture	  to	  use	  
the	  term	  “racism”	  “as	  a	  superordinate	  or	  ‘umbrella’	  concept	  that	  includes	  ‘homophobic’	  and	  
‘transphobic’	  but	  also	  ‘misogynist,’	  ‘ageist,’	  ‘ableist,’	  and	  class-­‐	  or	  status-­‐	  based	  prejudice,	  
discrimination,	  and	  oppression,	  in	  addition	  of	  course,	  to	  that	  based	  on	  ‘race’	  or	  ‘ethnicity’”	  
(Carastathis	  2018b:	  265;	  Riedel	  2009).	  Accordingly	  the	  legislation	  discussed	  in	  this	  part,	  is	  known	  to	  
the	  public	  as	  “anti-­‐racist	  bill/law,”	  the	  term	  under	  which	  the	  public	  debate	  was	  framed	  and	  has	  
come	  to	  include	  all	  recognised	  discriminatory	  practices.	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In	  view	  of	  this	  paradox,	  in	  the	  last	  section	  of	  the	  chapter,	  I	  query	  the	  concrete	  work	  
performed	  by	  this	  legislation	  in	  the	  context	  it	  was	  introduced	  in.	  I	  will	  suggest	  that	  
the	  appraisal	  of	  such	  legislation	  needs	  to	  be	  informed	  by	  a	  critique	  of	  its	  potential	  
to	  re-­‐legitimise	  criminalising	  operations	  against	  marginalised	  populations.	  A	  critique	  
that	  traces	  back	  to	  a	  broader	  problematisation	  of	  any	  legal	  regime’s	  authority	  to	  
justify	  its	  own	  violence.	  Overall	  the	  chapter	  adds	  to	  the	  argument	  that	  gender	  
identity	  regulation	  by	  the	  state	  does	  not	  follow	  a	  unique	  and	  coherent	  rationale.	  On	  
the	  contrary,	  legislation	  on	  trans	  (among	  other	  minorities)	  issues	  can	  serve	  
different	  state-­‐projects,	  some	  of	  which	  might	  be	  directly	  opposed	  by	  the	  stated	  
imperatives	  of	  the	  introduced	  law.	  	  
8.1. The	  End	  of	  the	  World	  as	  We	  Know	  it	  
A	  full	  decade	  since	  the	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2008-­‐2009	  and	  its	  aftermath,	  it	  has	  become	  
rather	  tiresome	  to	  try	  capturing	  the	  Greek	  Crisis	  (with	  a	  capital	  C)	  in	  a	  few	  words,	  
whether	  for	  academic	  or	  other	  reasons.	  What	  is	  crucial	  for,	  even	  vaguely,	  
comprehending	  this	  period	  is	  that	  the	  term	  “Crisis”	  has	  come	  to	  include,	  other	  than	  
the	  financial	  crisis	  itself,	  the	  devastating	  effects	  of	  the	  management	  of	  the	  crisis	  
and,	  eventually,	  more	  than	  one	  crisis	  (the	  debt	  crisis,	  the	  “refugee	  crisis”,	  the	  
legitimation	  crisis	  of	  political	  parties	  and	  so	  on).	  A	  few	  of	  the	  instances	  marking	  the	  
last	  decade	  are	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  decades	  long	  political	  regime,	  the	  IMF	  
intervention,	  dramatic	  austerisation,	  multiplying	  percentages	  of	  unemployment,	  
thousands	  of	  unaccounted	  for	  deaths	  along	  the	  country’s	  borders,	  militarised	  police	  
operations	  against	  anomie,	  a	  surge	  in	  racist	  violence	  and	  the	  election	  of	  the	  neo-­‐
Nazi	  Golden	  Dawn	  party	  in	  the	  Parliament.152	  	  	  
Greek	  commentators	  have	  repeatedly	  noted	  that,	  as	  impressive	  as	  the	  quantitative	  
and	  statistical	  representation	  of	  the	  last	  decade	  of	  austerity	  might	  be,	  it	  proves	  
insufficient	  to	  describe	  the	  catholic	  nature	  of	  its	  political,	  financial,	  social	  and	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  For	  critical	  accounts	  of	  different	  periods	  and	  aspects	  of	  the	  Greek	  crisis	  see:	  Vradis	  &	  Dalakoglou	  
(eds.)	  2011;	  Athanasiou	  2012;	  Kaika	  2012;	  Athanasiou	  &	  Tsimouris	  (eds.)	  2013;	  Tsilimpounidi	  &	  
Walsh	  (eds.)	  2014;	  Brekke,	  Dalakoglou,	  Filippidis	  &	  Vradis	  (eds.)	  2014;	  Leontidou	  2014;	  Bratsis	  2016;	  
Tsilimpounidi	  2016;	  Dalakoglou	  &	  Agelopoulos	  (eds.)	  2018;	  Roufos	  2018;	  Brekke,	  Filippidis	  &	  Vradis	  
2018.	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emotional	  effect	  on	  a	  ground-­‐level	  (Tsilimpounidi	  2016:	  2;	  Roufos	  2018;	  Vaiou	  
2014b).	  With	  capital	  destruction	  climbing	  to	  levels	  equal	  to	  those	  faced	  by	  
European	  countries	  after	  World	  War	  II	  (Roufos	  2018)	  and	  no	  part	  of	  life	  in	  Greece	  
left	  untouched	  by	  the	  shifting	  conditions,	  “it	  is	  the	  first	  time	  in	  Europe	  that	  an	  
entire	  generation	  faces	  such	  catastrophic	  alterations	  to	  quality	  of	  life,	  in	  times	  of	  
peace”	  (Tsilimpounidi	  2016:	  84).	  Overall,	  for	  those	  living	  in	  Greece	  during	  this	  era,	  
“from	  the	  onset,	  the	  crisis	  forcefully	  illustrated	  how	  it	  would	  shake	  to	  the	  ground	  
our	  world	  as	  we	  knew	  it”	  (Brekke,	  Filippidis	  &	  Vradis	  2018:	  13).	  	  
By	  2010,	  the	  first	  memorandum153	  had	  been	  signed	  and	  the	  situation	  appeared	  
grim.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  period	  2008-­‐2012	  was	  also	  marked	  by	  the	  rise	  of	  social	  
movements	  that	  were	  resisting	  austerity	  and	  cultivating	  a	  radical	  culture	  of	  political	  
organisation	  (Bratsis	  2010;	  Vradis	  &	  Dalakoglou	  2011;	  Arampatzi	  &	  Nicholls	  2012;	  
Leontidou	  2012;	  Tsilimpounidi	  &	  Walsh	  2014;	  Athanasiou	  2014).	  Following	  the	  
polymorphous	  political	  mobilisations	  that	  made	  Greece	  a	  focus	  point	  for	  the	  
European	  and	  global	  Left,	  a	  new	  dogma	  of	  public	  order	  and	  security	  started	  
materialising	  through	  extreme	  policing	  techniques	  and	  militarised	  repressive	  
operations	  (Dalakoglou	  2013;	  Kotouza	  2018;	  Fillippidis	  2018).	  The	  perpetually	  re-­‐
constructed	  “state	  of	  emergency”	  became	  the	  discursive	  vehicle	  for	  the	  
introduction	  of	  the	  dogma	  of	  “zero	  tolerance”	  that	  became	  central	  in	  the	  
dismantling	  of	  political	  movements,	  the	  battling	  of	  civil	  disobedience,	  the	  
securitisation	  of	  public	  space	  and	  the	  biopolitical	  management	  of	  migrant	  
populations	  (Athanasiou	  2012;	  Filippidis	  2018).	  This	  new	  national	  narrative	  
eventually	  shaped	  into	  a	  set	  of	  discourses	  and	  ideological	  apparatuses	  that,	  in	  turn,	  
have	  materialised	  in	  various	  settings.	  That	  is,	  more	  than	  a	  fiscal	  impasse	  and	  an	  
occasion	  for	  structural	  reform,	  the	  crisis	  became	  a	  political	  paradigm	  and	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153
	  The	  term	  “memorandum”	  refers	  to	  the	  adjustment	  programme	  documents	  (Memorandum	  of	  
Understanding,	  MoU)	  signed	  by	  Greek	  governments	  as	  part	  of	  the	  bailout	  loans	  and	  financial	  
support	  by	  the	  European	  Commission,	  European	  Central	  Bank	  and	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  
(altogether	  known	  to	  the	  Greek	  public	  as	  the	  Troika).	  Within	  the	  crisis	  lexicon,	  the	  term	  
“memorandum”	  has	  become	  a	  metonymy	  for	  harsh	  austerity	  measures.	  Along	  this	  axis,	  political	  
powers	  have	  been	  conceptualised	  as	  “pro-­‐memorandum”	  and	  “anti-­‐memorandum”	  depending	  on	  
their	  stance	  towards	  European	  Institutions’	  terms	  of	  negotiation	  concerning	  the	  Greek	  debt	  and	  
structural	  reform.	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ideological	  framework	  that	  reconfigured	  drastically	  the	  socio-­‐political	  conditions	  
(Athanasiou	  2012;	  Brekke,	  Filippidis	  &	  Vradis	  2018).	  	  
Other	  than	  state	  policing	  and	  anti-­‐migrant	  operations,	  2012	  brought	  an	  
amplification	  of	  street-­‐level	  racist	  violence	  but	  also	  a	  broad	  legitimisation	  of	  its	  
mainstream	  political	  expression.	  Golden	  Dawn	  was	  elected	  in	  the	  parliament	  and	  
went	  from	  a	  small	  militaristic	  Nazi	  faction	  to	  being	  recognised	  as	  a	  socially	  accepted	  
power	  of	  parliamentary	  and	  street-­‐level	  politics	  (Dalakoglou	  2013;	  Ellinas	  2013;	  
Athanasiou	  2014).	  The	  increasing	  flows	  of	  people	  arriving	  along	  the	  south	  and	  east	  
borders	  of	  the	  country	  were	  used	  as	  pretext	  for	  the	  transformation	  of	  an	  openly	  
anti-­‐migrant	  sentiment	  to	  everyday	  violence.154	  Para-­‐militia	  groups	  of	  Golden	  Dawn	  
patrolled	  areas	  of	  Athens	  on	  a	  daily	  basis,	  “cleansing”	  them	  of	  migrants,	  destroying	  
non-­‐Greek	  owned	  shops,	  raiding	  houses	  and	  unofficial	  mosques,	  and	  beating	  and	  
stabbing	  migrants	  sometimes	  to	  death	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch	  2012;	  Dalakoglou	  
2013,	  Carastathis	  2015,	  Brekke	  2018).155	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  state	  launched	  a	  
series	  of	  anti-­‐migrant	  operations	  with	  the	  largest	  one	  being	  the	  -­‐	  staggering	  in	  its	  
size	  and	  violence	  -­‐	  operation	  “Xenios	  Zeus”	  (Filippidis	  2018).	  Right-­‐wing	  and	  
institutional	  racist	  violence	  on	  a	  massive	  scale	  were	  legitimised	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  
overlapping	  discourses	  concerning	  internal	  and	  external	  threats	  to	  the	  state’s	  
sovereignty	  and	  the	  nation’s	  health	  and	  homogeneity	  (Athanasiou	  2012).	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  That	  is	  not	  to	  say	  racist	  ideologies	  and	  violence	  did	  not	  exist	  before	  the	  crisis	  in	  Greece.	  
Carastathis	  (2015)	  notes	  that	  analyses,	  which	  establish	  a	  cause-­‐and-­‐effect	  relationship	  between	  the	  
crisis	  and	  racist	  imperatives	  tend	  to	  ignore	  not	  only	  the	  nationalist	  project	  that	  has	  constructed	  the	  
Greek	  nation	  as	  homogenous	  during	  the	  twentieth	  century	  (see	  footnote	  44)	  but	  also	  the	  
contemporary	  legacies	  of	  racism	  within	  the	  Greek	  society.	  Such	  examples	  are	  the	  racism	  against	  
migrants	  since	  the	  early	  1990s	  along	  with	  their	  systematic	  exploitation	  (including	  the	  sexual	  
exploitation	  of	  women	  migrants	  from	  CEE	  and	  later	  African	  countries),	  the	  rampant	  anti-­‐Albanian	  
discourses	  and	  violence	  as	  well	  as	  the	  socially	  legitimised	  anti-­‐Roma	  stance	  (Carastathis	  2015:	  81).	  
Nonetheless,	  the	  new	  ideological	  elements	  of	  the	  crisis	  political	  vocabulary	  and	  the	  rapid	  increase	  of	  
violence	  on	  the	  streets	  can	  be	  said	  to	  mark	  a	  paradigm	  shift	  within	  Greek	  racist	  legacies.	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  The	  project	  “X	  them	  out!	  A	  black	  map	  of	  Athens”	  (created	  by	  the	  Rosa	  Luxemburg	  Foundation-­‐
Office	  in	  Greece	  and	  the	  NGO	  HumanRights360)	  has	  generated	  an	  interactive	  map	  of	  Athens	  
wherein	  X	  marks	  the	  spot	  of	  racist	  attacks,	  whose	  brief	  description	  is	  accompanied	  by	  illustrations	  of	  
the	  incident	  designed	  by	  visual	  artists	  collaborating	  with	  the	  project.	  Although	  the	  project	  can	  
“visualise	  just	  a	  small	  part	  of	  this	  ‘topography	  of	  violence’”	  the	  stories	  and	  images	  achieve	  in	  
transmitting	  part	  of	  the	  affective	  imprint	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  fascist	  violence	  in	  the	  city	  (valtousX	  website).	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As	  feminist	  and	  other	  critiques	  have	  demonstrated,	  such	  violence	  and	  precarity	  
were	  distributed	  along	  (among	  others)	  the	  axes	  of	  nationality,	  race,	  gender	  and	  
sexuality	  producing	  intersections	  of	  intensified	  vulnerability	  (Athanasiou	  2012,	  
2014;	  Vaiou	  2014a,	  2014b;	  Carastathis	  2015;	  2018;	  Tsilimpounidi	  2016;	  Filippidis	  
2018).	  Racist,	  sexist	  and	  homo/transphobic	  rhetorics	  and	  practices	  flourished	  while	  
their	  relationship	  with	  the	  crisis	  was	  presented	  as	  causal,	  transferring	  the	  
responsibility	  to	  those	  who	  were	  deemed	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  national	  body	  
(Athanasiou	  2012;	  Carastathis	  2015).	  Moral	  panics	  and	  hostile	  discourses	  towards	  
racial	  and	  gender	  “others”	  became	  entangled	  with	  the	  technocratic	  crisis’	  
management	  in	  ideological	  formations	  that	  legitimised	  the	  “reinvigorated	  routine	  
of	  national	  masculinity”	  as	  a	  means	  of	  protection	  and	  resistance	  against	  internal	  
and	  external	  threats	  (Athanasiou	  2012:	  38;	  Carastathis	  2015;	  Papanikolaou	  2018c).	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  conditions	  of	  existence	  of	  LGBTI+	  and	  queer	  politics	  started	  
changing	  at	  an	  accelerated	  pace.	  That	  is,	  simultaneously	  with	  the	  unfolding	  of	  the	  
crisis	  and	  the	  rapid	  worsening	  of	  material	  conditions,	  ran	  a	  parallel	  process	  of	  
LGBTI+	  visibility	  in	  new	  terms	  (Papanikolaou	  2018c).	  While	  the	  political	  generation	  
of	  	  LGBTI+	  and	  queer	  groups	  of	  the	  period	  2000-­‐2010	  was	  characterised	  by	  the	  
effort	  to	  claim	  legitimisation	  and	  space	  within	  social	  movements	  and	  the	  public	  
sphere,	  these	  dynamics	  gradually	  started	  changing	  along	  the	  shifts	  in	  broader	  
political	  dynamics	  (Marinoudi	  2018).	  The	  eruption	  of	  social	  movements	  and,	  later	  
on,	  the	  emergence	  of	  NGOs	  and	  other	  civil	  society	  actors	  due	  to	  the	  “humanitarian	  
crisis”	  were	  rapidly	  transforming	  LGBTI+	  politics	  and	  its	  place	  in	  the	  national	  
political	  agenda.	  Moreover,	  new	  digital	  media	  platforms	  and	  the	  international	  
cultural	  and	  political	  currency	  of	  LGBTI+	  and	  queer	  identities	  had	  opened	  up	  a	  vast	  
horizon	  of	  possibilities.	  	  
In	  this	  time	  of	  proliferation	  of	  NGOs	  on	  a	  national	  level	  (Theofilopoulos	  2018),	  the	  
transnational	  mobilisation	  of	  policy-­‐oriented	  Greek	  LGBTI+	  groups	  and	  the	  
channelling	  of	  funds	  and	  institutional	  support	  towards	  LGBTI+	  issues	  on	  a	  European	  
Part	  C	   	   Chapter	  8	  
	   215	   	  
level	  formed	  a	  new	  political	  terrain.156	  With	  funds	  from	  European	  sources	  
channelled	  towards	  LGBTI-­‐related	  projects	  and	  groups,	  new	  political	  formations	  
emerged	  and	  already	  existing	  formations	  altered	  in	  close	  connection	  with	  a	  rapidly	  
expanding	  civil	  society.	  Overall,	  other	  than	  the	  space	  that	  was	  being	  established	  
through	  political	  action	  and	  social	  presence,	  LGBTI+	  groups	  started	  to	  claim	  space	  
as	  lobbying	  agents	  within	  law-­‐making	  procedures	  taking	  the	  first	  steps	  into	  a	  more	  
professionalised	  kind	  of	  politics.	  This	  means	  that	  in	  a	  complex	  collusion	  of	  socio-­‐
political	  currents,	  LGBTI+	  politics	  were	  gradually	  being	  institutionalised	  and	  
included	  in	  the	  mainstream	  political	  arena	  while,	  at	  the	  exact	  same	  time,	  the	  grim	  
political	  conditions	  were	  becoming	  fertile	  ground	  for	  a	  renewed	  investment	  on	  
gender	  hierarchies	  and	  a	  spectacular	  revitalisation	  of	  gender	  violence	  (Athanasiou	  
2012;	  Vaiou	  2014a;	  Papanikolaou	  2018b).	  
This	  was,	  in	  very	  broad	  lines,	  the	  overall	  socio-­‐political	  context	  within	  which	  the	  
much	  contested	  legislation	  against	  racist	  crime	  was	  repeatedly	  discussed	  until	  it	  
was	  finally	  passed	  in	  2012,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  later,	  by	  a	  mainly	  right-­‐wing	  
coalition	  government.	  With	  that	  in	  mind,	  the	  next	  part	  of	  the	  chapter	  has	  two	  aims.	  
The	  first	  is	  to	  exemplify	  some	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  processes	  described	  above	  
materialised	  on	  the	  ground	  through	  various	  state	  apparatuses	  and	  ideological	  
discourses.	  The	  second	  aim	  is,	  by	  analysing	  concrete	  instances	  of	  governance,	  to	  
sketch	  out	  the	  state	  agenda	  of	  that	  time,	  thus	  making	  obvious	  the	  paradoxical,	  at	  
first	  glance,	  choice	  of	  a	  right-­‐wing	  government	  and	  an	  overall	  racist	  state	  to	  
introduce	  the	  anti-­‐racist	  legislation.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  following	  section	  is	  a	  (rather	  
significant)	  parenthesis	  that	  will	  allow	  me	  to	  complicate	  and	  ground,	  politically	  and	  
even	  affectively,	  the	  analysis	  of	  “racist	  crime”	  as	  a	  concept	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  this	  
specific	  anti-­‐racist	  legislation	  within	  its	  context.	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  Reports	  on	  the	  issues	  of	  LGBT	  discrimination	  had	  already	  started	  to	  be	  commissioned	  and	  
published	  by	  European	  institutions	  (such	  as	  European	  Union	  Agency	  for	  Fundamental	  Rights)	  
reporting	  the	  lack	  of	  any	  infrastructure,	  research	  or	  legislation	  in	  Greece	  (Hatzopoulos	  2007;	  Pavlou	  
2009;	  Hatzopoulos	  2010).	  
RESERVING	  THE	  RIGHT	  TO	  BE	  COMPLEX	  
	   216	   	  
8.2. In	  Parenthesis	  
Can	  we	  read	  the	  workings	  of	  social	  power	  precisely	  in	  the	  delimitation	  of	  
the	  field	  of	  such	  objects,	  objects	  marked	  by	  death?	  And	  is	  this	  part	  of	  the	  
irreality,	  the	  melancholic	  aggression	  and	  the	  desire	  to	  vanquish,	  that	  
characterizes	  the	  public	  response	  to	  the	  death	  of	  many	  of	  those	  considered	  
“socially	  dead,”	  who	  die	  from	  AIDS?	  Gay	  people,	  prostitutes	  drug	  users,	  
among	  others?	  If	  they	  are	  dying	  or	  already	  dead,	  let	  us	  vanquish	  them	  
again.	  And	  can	  the	  sense	  of	  “triumph”	  be	  won	  precisely	  through	  a	  practice	  
of	  social	  differentiation	  in	  which	  one	  achieves	  and	  maintains	  “social	  
existence”	  only	  by	  the	  production	  and	  maintenance	  of	  those	  socially	  dead?	  
(Butler	  1997:	  27).	  	  	  
In	  2012	  and	  during	  a	  period	  of	  intense	  political	  instability	  in	  Greece,	  the	  provisional	  
coalition	  government	  of	  ND/PASOK/LAOS	  launched	  a	  series	  of	  nightmarish	  
“cleansing”	  operations	  against	  the	  “infectious”	  bodies	  of	  
racial/gender/sexual/national	  Others	  under	  the	  orders	  of	  the	  Minister	  of	  Health,	  
Andreas	  Loverdos	  (Mavroudi	  2013).	  Loverdos,	  a	  Constitutional	  Law	  expert	  himself,	  
as	  Minister	  of	  Health	  had	  been	  meticulously	  constructing	  for	  months	  the	  figure	  of	  
the	  “illegal	  immigrant”	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  public	  health,	  infamously	  known	  in	  the	  public	  
opinion	  as	  a	  “hygienic	  bomb”	  (Filippidis	  2018:	  79-­‐82).	  Furthermore,	  the	  Minister	  of	  
Health	  went	  one	  step	  further	  in	  gendering	  this	  discourse	  by	  declaring	  (against	  all	  
statistical	  evidence)	  that	  female	  migrant	  sex-­‐workers	  of	  African	  origin	  were	  
spreading	  HIV	  within	  Greek	  society	  and	  should,	  thus,	  be	  deported	  (Athanasiou	  
2012:	  31,	  Mavroudi	  2013).	  As	  Filippidis	  (2018)	  notes:	  
(…)	  using	  the	  safeguards	  offered	  to	  him	  by	  the	  dominant	  patriarchal	  
meanings	  he	  utilised	  the	  field	  of	  female	  sex	  work	  in	  particular	  in	  order	  to	  
construct	  the	  image	  of	  a	  biological	  enemy	  within;	  to	  construct,	  in	  other	  
words,	  only	  one	  of	  the	  crucial	  “testing	  grounds”	  upon	  which	  the	  
reconstruction	  of	  national	  unity	  would	  be	  attempted	  during	  that	  difficult	  
time	  of	  crisis	  -­‐	  and	  the	  nation-­‐rebuilding	  this	  required	  (Filippidis	  2018:	  82).	  	  
Part	  C	   	   Chapter	  8	  
	   217	   	  
After	  cultivating	  for	  several	  months	  racially	  oriented	  fear	  in	  its	  purest	  form	  (that	  of	  
physically	  invasive	  and	  biologically	  infectious	  Others),	  Loverdos,	  in	  a	  joint	  press	  
conference	  with	  the	  Minister	  of	  Public	  Order,	  Michalis	  Chrysohoidis,	  announced	  the	  
compulsory	  hygienic	  examination	  of	  migrant	  populations	  following	  all	  possible	  
procedural	  and	  discursive	  routes	  that	  could	  imply	  urgency	  (Filippidis	  2018:	  82-­‐83).	  
Sowing	  panic	  and	  reaping	  legitimation,	  Loverdos	  introduced	  on	  the	  same	  day	  the	  
notorious	  Public	  Health	  Decree	  39A	  (GG	  102/B/02.04.2012),	  which	  included	  
provisions	  introducing	  forceful	  hygienic	  controls	  on	  migrant	  populations,	  the	  
construction	  of	  migrant	  detention	  camps,	  health	  requirements	  for	  private	  houses	  
used	  by	  migrants,	  a	  health	  certificate	  issued	  for	  migrants	  and	  other	  similar	  
regulations	  (P.D.	  39A).157	  	  
This	  became	  the	  legal	  ground	  for	  the	  collaboration	  of	  public	  health	  and	  police	  
authorities	  in	  a	  medico-­‐legal	  mechanism	  of	  population-­‐control	  that	  expanded	  from	  
detention	  centres	  along	  the	  territorial	  borders	  of	  the	  country	  to	  the	  very	  centre	  of	  
Athens	  and	  all	  the	  way	  into	  the	  supposedly	  private	  space	  of	  migrant	  residencies.	  
Moreover,	  it	  became	  an	  additional	  political	  ground	  for	  the	  intensification	  of	  
racialised	  daily	  violence	  and	  the	  fortification	  of	  (state	  and	  other)	  discourses	  of	  
racism	  in	  its	  primordial	  form,	  that	  of	  biology.	  Through	  this	  nosology	  lexicon,	  that	  is,	  
through	  “the	  return	  to	  the	  political	  anatomy	  of	  the	  body:	  the	  governing	  of	  the	  body	  
in	  danger	  and	  the	  governing	  of	  the	  dangerous	  body,”	  medicalised	  racism	  and	  the	  
overall	  medicalisation	  of	  the	  crisis	  itself	  were	  established	  as	  a	  dominant	  governance	  
paradigm	  (Athanasiou	  2012:	  45).	  	  
Having	  set	  the	  ground	  for	  the	  exemplary	  biological	  enemy	  within,	  that	  is	  female,	  
African,	  allegedly	  seropositive	  sex-­‐workers,	  Loverdos	  orchestrated	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  
the	  public	  the	  worst-­‐case	  scenario	  for	  the	  national	  body.	  A	  few	  days	  before	  the	  
crucial	  national	  elections	  of	  2012,	  in	  a	  police-­‐hygienic	  operation	  that	  came	  in	  
waves,	  hundreds	  of	  female	  alleged	  sex-­‐workers	  were	  rounded-­‐up	  on	  the	  streets	  of	  
Athens	  and	  forcefully	  tested	  for	  HIV.	  Held	  under	  gruesome	  conditions,	  the	  women	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  Decree	  39Α	  was	  repealed	  in	  2013	  only	  to	  be	  reinstated	  later	  on	  the	  same	  year	  until	  2015	  when	  it	  
was	  abolished	  again.	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were	  tested	  (using	  what	  is	  called	  “rapid	  tests”)	  without	  or	  against	  their	  consent	  in	  
different	  locations	  such	  as	  vans	  or	  police	  cells.	  The	  outcome	  was	  blurted	  out	  to	  
them	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  police	  or	  by	  the	  police	  themselves	  (Mavroudi	  2013).158	  
Those	  found	  seropositive	  were	  arrested	  and	  prosecuted	  under	  the	  charges	  of	  illegal	  
prostitution	  and	  serial	  grievous	  bodily	  harm	  with	  intent	  combined	  with	  serial	  
attempts	  of	  the	  same	  act;	  a	  felony	  charge	  that	  lead	  to	  their	  pre-­‐trial	  imprisonment	  
without	  any	  evidence	  other	  than	  seropositivity,	  which	  was	  hence	  openly	  
criminalised	  (Mavroudi	  2013;	  Gkresta	  &	  Mireanu	  2016).	  The	  state	  prosecutor,	  in	  
collaboration	  with	  the	  Hellenic	  Centre	  for	  Disease	  Control	  and	  Prevention	  
(ΚΕΕΛΠΝΟ),	  ordered	  the	  publication	  of	  their	  photographs	  and	  personal	  information	  
in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  Greek	  family	  and	  public	  health	  and,	  more	  specifically,	  to	  
“protect	  the	  Greek	  family	  men”	  that	  might	  have	  been	  in	  contact	  with	  them	  (Psarra	  
2012a;	  Athanasiou	  2012;	  Mavroudi	  2013;	  Gkresta	  &	  Mireanu	  2016).	  	  
In	  a	  general	  atmosphere	  of	  emergency,	  the	  Minister	  announced	  to	  the	  Greek	  
society	  the	  verification	  of	  his	  gruesome	  prophecy:	  
The	  hygienic	  bomb	  of	  AIDS	  in	  no	  longer	  confined	  within	  the	  foreigners’	  
ghetto	  as	  it	  was	  the	  case	  until	  recently,	  it	  has	  now	  escaped	  the	  ghetto.	  Me	  
personally	  but	  also	  all	  the	  competent	  authorities	  have	  tried	  a	  lot	  for	  this,	  
for	  not	  allowing	  it	  to	  escape.	  That	  is	  why	  I	  kept	  shouting	  during	  the	  last	  
months:	  don’t	  sleep	  with	  foreign	  illegal	  prostitutes	  (Loverdos	  quoted	  in	  
Karlatira	  2012,	  my	  translation).	  	  
After	  every	  sweep,	  the	  photographs	  of	  the	  newly	  arrested	  women	  would	  be	  
displayed	  in	  the	  media	  in	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  “terror”	  along	  with	  hotline	  numbers	  
available	  for	  the	  “Greek	  family	  men”	  who	  were	  the	  imaginary	  collective	  victim	  of	  
the	  crime	  for	  which	  the	  women	  were	  being	  persecuted.159	  The	  media	  lead	  an	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  Of	  course,	  the	  entire	  procedure	  of	  non-­‐confidentiality	  or	  the	  performance	  of	  medical	  acts	  in	  
police	  stations	  goes	  against	  all	  relative	  protocols	  (Georgiou	  in	  Mavroudi	  2013).	  	  
159
	  Thousands	  of	  calls	  flooded	  the	  lines	  from	  worried	  customers	  that	  had	  paid	  a	  little	  extra	  (for	  
example	  10	  instead	  of	  5	  euros)	  for	  unprotected	  sex	  with	  the	  women	  they	  recognised	  on	  the	  media	  
while	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  “the	  health	  of	  these	  women	  themselves	  was	  of	  no	  concern	  at	  any	  point”	  
(Gkresta	  &	  Mireanu	  2016).	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extreme	  ethico-­‐hygienic	  panic	  campaign	  using	  the	  mugshots	  of	  the	  women,	  which	  
found	  themselves	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  an	  emblematic	  moment	  of	  biopolitical	  regulation	  
through	  a	  race-­‐	  and	  gender-­‐informed	  nosology	  (Athanasiou	  2012).160	  	  
In	  reality,	  none	  of	  the	  seropositive	  women	  arrested	  in	  the	  whole	  series	  of	  
operations	  was	  of	  African	  origin	  but	  most	  of	  them	  were,	  in	  fact,	  Greek	  users	  of	  
intravenous	  illegal	  substances	  (Mavroudi	  2013).	  Filippidis	  (2018)	  notes:	  	  
However,	  behind	  these	  imaginative	  spatial-­‐ideological	  constructions	  of	  
Loverdos	  we	  have	  to	  discern	  the	  facts	  and	  stand	  on	  two	  critical	  points.	  
Firstly,	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  if	  something	  should	  undoubtedly	  concern	  us	  about	  
its	  horrific	  extent	  that	  is	  none	  other	  than	  the	  promotion	  of	  sexism	  as	  the	  
basic	  condition	  of	  public	  discourse	  and,	  after	  all,	  of	  politics	  itself.	  Secondly,	  
on	  the	  very	  turn	  of	  the	  operation	  in	  question	  that	  would	  categorically	  
contradict	  the	  minister,	  proving	  that	  his	  statements	  were	  not	  characterised	  
by	  any	  prophetic	  quality;	  to	  the	  contrary,	  they	  were	  meticulously	  
constructing	  a	  field	  of	  police-­‐political	  intervention,	  attempting	  to	  
pathologise	  a	  priori	  the	  presence	  of	  migrants	  in	  Greece	  (Filippidis	  2018:	  
85).	  	  
Indeed,	  the	  racist	  and	  anti-­‐migrant	  elements	  of	  this	  debate	  were	  not	  in	  any	  way	  
relented	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  hypothesis	  of	  the	  Minister	  about	  migrant	  seropositive	  
sex-­‐workers	  was	  actually	  disproved	  by	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  operation.	  On	  the	  
contrary,	  the	  entire	  operation	  was	  considered	  a	  success,	  leading	  to	  the	  re-­‐election	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  Most	  of	  the	  women	  remained	  in	  prison	  for	  several	  months	  although	  none	  of	  their	  alleged	  clients	  
had	  come	  forward	  to	  press	  charges.	  All	  the	  women	  suffered	  great	  consequences	  in	  mental	  and	  
physical	  health	  as	  well	  as	  a	  complete	  annihilation	  of	  their	  social	  status	  (and	  their	  families)	  in	  public	  
and	  especially	  in	  their	  places	  of	  origin	  (Mavroudi	  2013).	  The	  authorities	  maintained	  that	  they	  acted	  
according	  to	  the	  law	  and	  did	  not	  violate	  any	  person’s	  rights,	  thus,	  discontinuing	  the	  complaint	  filed	  
on	  behalf	  of	  some	  of	  the	  persecuted	  women.	  By	  2016,	  all	  of	  them	  were	  pronounced	  innocent	  in	  
court.	  	  
Unfortunately,	  four	  of	  the	  women	  were	  not	  alive	  to	  witness	  the	  trial	  (Vovou	  2016).	  Two	  of	  the	  
women,	  Maria	  and	  Katerina,	  committed	  suicide	  (Protovoulia	  Allileggyis	  Diokomenon	  Orothetikon	  
Gynaikon	  2013;	  Mpotsi	  2014;	  Vovou	  2014).	  Katerina’s	  father	  had	  lost	  his	  job	  and	  had	  attempted	  
suicide	  himself	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  events.	  Katerina	  before	  her	  suicide	  had	  written	  in	  an	  
announcement	  concerning	  their	  case	  “the	  damage	  that	  was	  done	  to	  us	  will	  follow	  us	  and	  our	  
children	  forever”	  (quoted	  in	  Vovou	  2014:	  online,	  page	  n/a,	  my	  translation).	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of	  Nea	  Dimokratia	  and,	  specifically,	  of	  the	  politicians	  involved.	  Namely,	  this	  
operation	  formed	  part	  of	  the	  Greek	  State’s	  “continuous	  war	  on	  undocumented	  
immigration”	  (Gkresta	  &	  Mireanu	  2016:	  228)	  in	  which	  “these	  particular	  women	  lent	  
momentarily	  their	  face	  to	  the	  necessary,	  in	  view	  of	  the	  elections,	  internal	  enemy”	  
(Psarra	  2012b:	  online,	  page	  n/a).	  Indeed,	  the	  seropositive	  persecuted	  women	  
became	  the	  metonymy	  of	  the	  infectious	  Other	  for	  the	  Greek	  state,	  media	  and	  
society	  who	  were	  invested	  in	  their	  social	  death	  (Athanasiou	  2012).	  
As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  the	  “triumph”	  of	  this	  operation	  on	  the	  communicational	  front	  
assisted	  in	  the	  re-­‐election	  of	  the	  politicians	  involved	  and,	  most	  importantly,	  of	  Nea	  
Dimokratia	  who,	  relying	  on	  the	  social	  acceptance	  of	  its	  anti-­‐migrant	  agenda,	  formed	  
a	  new	  coalition	  government161	  and,	  only	  a	  couple	  of	  months	  later,	  launched	  one	  of	  
the	  most	  massive	  operations	  of	  population	  control	  in	  modern	  Greek	  history.	  This	  
pogrom-­‐like	  operation,	  officially	  named	  Xenios	  Zeus	  (Hospitable	  Zeus),	  was	  initiated	  
in	  August	  2012	  and	  amounted	  (among	  other	  things)	  to	  a	  series	  of	  police	  raids	  in	  
public	  and	  private	  spaces	  (including	  houses)	  that	  radically	  changed	  Athens	  as	  a	  
city.162	  During	  that	  period,	  Athens	  became	  an	  atrocity	  playground	  for	  the	  Hellenic	  
Police,	  which,	  along	  with	  Golden	  Dawn	  battalions,	  indulged	  in	  a	  racist	  power	  trip	  
that	  included	  racial	  profiling,	  physical	  violence,	  torture,	  disappearances,	  extortion,	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  The	  governing	  coalition	  of	  Antonis	  Samaras	  was	  formed	  in	  2012	  after	  Nea	  Dimokratia	  could	  not	  
secure	  the	  necessary	  majority	  to	  form	  a	  single-­‐party	  government.	  With	  the	  collaboration	  of	  PASOK	  
and	  the	  Democratic	  Left	  (DIM.AR)	  a	  coalition	  government	  was	  formed	  and	  stayed	  in	  power	  until	  
2015.	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  The	  extent	  of	  the	  operation	  itself	  is	  difficult	  to	  conceive:	  
This	  is	  the	  materialisation	  of	  a	  meticulous	  and	  patient	  pogrom,	  one	  that	  gradually	  turned	  into	  a	  
constitutive	  element	  of	  public	  space	  itself	  —	  and	  its	  conceptualisations.	  “Anyone	  who	  is	  identified,	  
whether	  on	  foot	  or	  moving	  via	  any	  medium	  of	  transportation,	  will	  be	  detained	  in	  the	  detention	  
centres,	  where	  they	  will	  be	  held	  temporarily,	  until	  their	  return	  to	  their	  country	  of	  origin,”	  the	  Greek	  
police	  spokesman	  would	  state	  characteristically.	  Until	  February	  23,	  2013,	  which	  was	  also	  the	  last	  
time	  when	  the	  Greek	  police	  published	  the	  number	  of	  detentions	  as	  part	  of	  the	  operation	  in	  question,	  
84,792	  migrants	  had	  been	  officially	  detained.	  The	  police	  announcements	  were	  no	  meretricious	  
exaggeration.	  The	  “Xenios	  Zeus”	  operation	  continued	  in	  central	  parts	  of	  Athens	  for	  almost	  two	  years,	  
having	  led	  to	  the	  arrest	  of	  5,	  611	  migrants	  in	  total	  who	  “did	  not	  meet	  the	  legal	  criteria	  for	  their	  stay	  
in	  the	  country”	  (Filippidis	  2018:	  86).	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illegal	  detention	  and	  other	  similar	  practices	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  July	  2012;	  
Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  June	  2013).163	  
Although	  the	  operation	  was	  mainly	  targeted	  towards	  migrant	  populations,	  the	  
normalisation	  of	  this	  control	  regime,	  as	  shown	  by	  the	  persecution	  of	  the	  
seropositive	  women,	  was	  largely	  invested	  in	  “(re)constructing	  national	  identity	  and	  
national	  integrity”	  against	  and	  through	  all	  Others	  in	  racial,	  gender,	  sexual,	  religious	  
and	  other	  terms	  (Filippidis	  2018:	  79;	  Athanasiou	  2012).	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  concept	  of	  
the	  enemy	  within	  was	  broadened	  in	  order	  to	  “include	  all	  vulnerable	  social	  groups	  
(migrant	  men/women,	  homeless	  men/women,	  drug	  users,	  trans	  people,	  male	  
prostitutes,	  female	  prostitutes),	  as	  it	  [was]	  exemplified	  by	  the	  mass	  arrests	  taking	  
place	  on	  an	  almost	  daily	  basis”	  (Protovoulia	  Allileggyis	  Diokomenon	  Orothetikon	  
Gynaikon	  2012:	  online,	  page	  n/a,	  my	  translation).	  In	  this	  context,	  during	  operation	  
Xenios	  Zeus	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2012,	  several	  trans	  women	  were	  also	  detained	  and	  
forcefully	  tested	  for	  HIV	  in	  a	  gender-­‐normative	  conceptual	  framework	  of	  moral-­‐
hygienic	  abjection	  (GTSA	  2012).	  As	  none	  of	  them	  was	  found	  seropositive,	  they	  were	  
released	  and	  did	  not	  suffer	  the	  public	  humiliation	  reserved	  for	  the	  seropositive	  
women.	  	  
With	  this	  legacy	  and	  within	  a	  similar	  context	  of	  urban	  cleansing,	  in	  May	  of	  2013,	  
more	  trans	  women	  were	  targeted	  and	  detained	  on	  different	  occasions	  in	  the	  city	  of	  
Thessaloniki	  (GTSA	  2013a,	  2013b;	  Galanou	  2013).	  As	  made	  clear	  by	  the	  reply	  of	  the	  
Minister	  of	  Citizen	  Protection,	  Nikos	  Dendias,	  to	  three	  relative	  parliamentary	  
questions	  (Parliamentary	  questions	  no	  11381/4.6.2013,	  11551/6.6.2013	  &	  
11530/6.6.2013),	  the	  targeting	  of	  these	  women	  was	  part	  of	  a	  police	  “Special	  
Operational	  Action	  Plan”	  of	  the	  public	  authorities	  (Document	  No	  7017/4/16499).	  
This	  plan	  aimed	  to	  “improve	  the	  image”	  of	  some	  areas	  of	  the	  city	  and	  “tackle,	  
among	  others,	  prostitution	  and	  exploitation	  of	  the	  sexual	  life	  of	  socially	  and	  
economically	  vulnerable	  individuals,	  to	  enhance	  citizens’	  feeling	  of	  safety	  and	  to	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  Additionally,	  for	  police	  violence	  in	  Greece	  see	  the	  Amnesty	  International	  report	  “Police	  Violence	  
in	  Greece:	  Not	  Just	  ‘Isolated	  Incidents’”	  (Eur	  25/005/2012)	  and	  the	  article	  “The	  Killing	  of	  Zak:	  The	  
Astonishing	  Violence	  and	  Impunity	  of	  Greek	  Police”	  (Alevizopoulou	  &	  Zenakos	  2018).	  	  
RESERVING	  THE	  RIGHT	  TO	  BE	  COMPLEX	  
	   222	   	  
improve	  the	  image	  of	  the	  above	  mentioned	  areas”	  (Dendias	  quoted	  in	  TGEU	  
12.07.2013).	  	  
This	  statement,	  which	  was	  repeatedly	  protested	  by	  various	  political	  agents,	  
confirmed	  the	  proposition	  that	  these	  women	  were	  “persecuted	  and	  prosecuted	  by	  
governmental	  authorities	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  gender	  identity”,	  which	  was	  implicitly	  
considered	  proof	  of	  illegal	  sex-­‐work	  and,	  thus,	  indirectly	  criminalised	  (Bouklis	  2013:	  
online).	  As	  one	  of	  the	  detained	  women	  explains	  in	  an	  interview	  with	  queer-­‐feminist	  
group	  Mov	  Kafeneio,	  referring	  to	  the	  reply	  of	  the	  Minister:	  	  
Κ:	  (…)	  Through	  the	  statement	  they	  published	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  they	  
think	  of	  us	  as	  trash.	  That	  is,	  when	  they	  say	  they	  want	  to	  clean	  up	  and	  
upgrade	  the	  area,	  it	  means	  they	  see	  us	  as	  trash.	  Clearly	  all	  this	  starts	  from	  
high	  up	  and	  not	  some	  officer	  on	  duty.	  Who	  is	  it	  that	  forbids	  me	  to	  be	  in	  a	  
specific	  part	  of	  the	  city,	  or	  in	  my	  car?	  And	  who	  might	  that	  be,	  who	  can	  stop	  
me,	  even	  in	  motion,	  in	  my	  car	  or	  while	  waiting	  at	  a	  gas	  station	  and	  halt	  me	  
and	  detain	  me	  without	  even	  explaining	  why?	  (Mov	  Kafeneio	  2014:	  9,	  my	  
translation).	  
The	  hunting	  down	  of	  trans	  women	  in	  Thessaloniki	  continued	  throughout	  the	  
summer	  of	  2013	  with	  police	  harassment	  and	  hours-­‐long	  detention	  becoming	  a	  daily	  
routine	  for	  many	  trans	  women,	  some	  of	  which	  were	  repeatedly	  picked-­‐up	  and	  
mistreated.	  With	  the	  support	  of	  the	  GTSA	  and	  after	  the	  reaction	  of	  several	  political	  
collectivities,	  NGOs	  and	  other	  actors,	  some	  of	  the	  women	  decided	  to	  file	  a	  group	  
lawsuit	  for	  their	  targeting	  and	  mistreatment	  (GTSA	  2015a).	  A	  separate	  but	  
correlated	  lawsuit,	  regarding	  her	  own	  mistreatment,	  was	  filed	  by	  the	  lawyer	  who	  
represented	  them,	  who,	  during	  one	  of	  the	  arbitrary	  detentions,	  was	  repeatedly	  
denied	  contact	  with	  her	  client	  and	  was	  finally	  illegally	  held	  as	  well	  (GTSA	  2017a).	  In	  
2015,	  both	  lawsuits	  were	  discontinued	  as,	  after	  conducting	  a	  Sworn	  Administrative	  
Inquiry,	  the	  public	  prosecutor	  of	  Thessaloniki	  considered	  the	  entire	  procedure	  lege	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artis	  (GTSA	  2015a).164	  What	  is	  clear	  is	  that	  whether	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  seropositive	  
or	  trans	  women	  or	  the	  case	  of	  undocumented	  migrants,	  the	  construction	  of	  Other	  
bodies	  as	  infectious	  and,	  thus,	  dangerous	  for	  the	  national	  body	  legitimised	  (and	  was	  
legitimised	  by)	  state	  practices	  that	  were	  informed	  and	  relied	  upon	  discourses	  of	  
racist,	  sexist	  and	  heteronormative	  dominance.	  	  
Utilising	  the	  insightful	  analyses	  of	  Greek	  feminist	  authors,	  one	  can	  draw	  lines	  from	  
the	  intensification	  of	  gendered	  and	  racialised	  hierarchies	  to	  discourses	  of	  crisis	  and	  
the	  materialisation	  of	  state	  projects	  of	  crisis	  management	  and	  austerity	  politics.	  Not	  
so	  much,	  as	  Carastathis	  notes,	  as	  a	  causal	  relationship	  within	  which	  Greece	  became	  
racist	  and	  phallocentric	  due	  to	  the	  crisis	  but	  as	  a	  way	  to	  secure	  the	  politics	  of	  
austerity	  through	  the	  affective	  economies	  of	  race	  and	  gender	  hierarchy	  (Carastathis	  
2015).	  In	  this	  vein,	  Athena	  Athanasiou	  (2012)	  analysed	  the	  neoliberal	  crisis	  
management,	  or	  more	  accurately	  the	  crisis	  as	  neoliberal	  management,	  by	  tracing	  
the	  connection	  of	  moral	  and	  affective	  economies	  with	  biopolitical	  regulation.	  
Athanasiou	  (2012)	  used	  Lauren	  Berlant’s	  concept	  of	  “national	  sentimentality”	  to	  
frame	  a	  series	  of	  identification-­‐strategies	  within	  the	  national	  narrative	  of	  crisis,	  
such	  as	  the	  folding	  back	  into	  politics	  of	  national	  intimacy	  and	  the	  warm	  patriotic	  
embrace	  of	  the	  Greek	  family.	  Austerity	  enforcement	  as	  well	  as	  anti-­‐migrant	  politics	  
and	  other	  marginalisation	  practices	  have	  been	  embedded	  with	  an	  overwhelming	  
sentimentality	  within	  the	  political	  discourse	  that	  not	  only	  nurtures	  the	  ‘love	  for	  our	  
own’	  (by	  national,	  financial	  and	  gendered	  criteria)	  but	  also	  facilitates	  a	  return	  to	  
familial	  and	  traditional	  gender	  values	  (Athanasiou	  2012:	  25).	  	  
Closing	  this	  section,	  it	  has	  hopefully	  been	  established	  that	  the	  anti-­‐racist	  legislation,	  
which	  is	  examined	  in	  the	  next	  sections,	  was	  introduced	  by	  and	  within	  an	  
institutional	  order	  wherein	  nosological	  discourses,	  state	  racism	  and	  gender	  
abjection	  were	  crucial	  instruments	  of	  governance.	  That	  is,	  not	  only	  for	  the	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  Last,	  in	  addition	  to	  all	  the	  above,	  the	  Thessaloniki	  Court	  of	  First	  Instance,	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  the	  
archiving	  of	  the	  case,	  partly	  accepted	  damage	  claims	  of	  5,000.00	  euros	  plus	  court	  expenses	  in	  favour	  
of	  the	  policeman	  who	  locked	  the	  lawyer	  in	  the	  cell	  (GTSA	  2017a).	  Following	  this	  turn	  of	  events,	  one	  
of	  the	  women	  along	  with	  the	  lawyer	  that	  was	  arbitrarily	  detained	  appealed	  to	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  
Human	  Rights	  where	  their	  case	  in	  pending	  (Koutra	  &	  Katzaki	  v.	  Greece,	  Application	  459/16).	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ideological	  re-­‐legitimation	  of	  national(ist)	  values	  and	  state	  sovereignty	  but	  also	  for	  
managing	  populations	  and	  distributing	  socio-­‐fiscal	  precarity	  (Athanasiou	  2012:	  31).	  
In	  other	  words,	  this	  section	  goes	  to	  show	  precisely	  which	  government	  and	  in	  which	  
historical	  moment	  graced	  (even	  unenthusiastically)	  vulnerable	  groups	  with	  legal	  
protection	  against	  racist	  crimes	  and	  why	  that	  raises	  various	  questions.	  The	  next	  
section	  traces	  how	  the	  anti-­‐racism	  legislation	  reform	  came	  about,	  hinting	  towards	  a	  
rather	  confounding	  relationship	  between	  the	  principles	  embedded	  in	  this	  
legislation	  and	  the	  political	  forces	  that	  utilised	  it.	  
8.3. Racist	  Crime	  
It	  was	  within	  the	  above-­‐described	  turbulent	  era	  of	  violence,	  precarity	  and	  
dispossession	  but	  also	  intense	  socio-­‐political	  mobilisation	  that	  a	  reform	  of	  the	  
Greek	  anti-­‐racist	  legislation	  was	  initiated.	  In	  2011	  and	  with	  anti-­‐migrant	  violence	  on	  
the	  rise,	  the	  Racist	  Violence	  Recording	  Network	  (RVRN)	  was	  founded	  as	  an	  initiative	  
of	  the	  National	  Commission	  for	  Human	  Rights	  and	  the	  UNHCR-­‐Greece	  with	  the	  
participation	  of	  various	  NGOs	  and	  other	  institutions.	  By	  2012,	  the	  mainly	  right	  wing	  
governing	  coalition	  was	  faced	  with	  international	  pressures	  concerning	  the	  rise	  of	  
Golden	  Dawn	  and	  the	  unprecedented	  surge	  of	  violence	  that	  was	  bringing	  negative	  
attention	  from	  international	  press	  and	  European	  institutions.165	  	  
In	  response,	  the	  government	  attempted	  to	  strengthen	  the	  legal	  framework	  
concerning	  the	  criminal	  prosecution	  of	  racist	  violence.	  Specifically,	  Law	  4139/2013	  
(GG	  Α	  74/20.03.2013)	  amended	  article	  79	  of	  the	  Criminal	  Code	  according	  to	  which	  
the	  commission	  of	  crimes	  motivated	  by	  hate	  towards	  specific	  characteristics	  
constituted	  aggravating	  circumstances	  and,	  under	  the	  amended	  provision,	  the	  
threatened	  penalties	  could	  not	  be	  suspended	  (Fountedaki	  2014).	  In	  this	  context,	  
the	  term	  “gender	  identity”	  (ταυτότητα	  φύλου),	  as	  such,	  was	  introduced	  for	  the	  first	  
time	  in	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order	  as	  a	  protected	  characteristic	  under	  this	  law.	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  See	  for	  example	  the	  2012	  BBC	  article	  “Greece	  Wrestles	  with	  Rise	  in	  Hate	  Crime”	  (Shevchenko	  &	  
Athanasoulia	  2012),	  the	  2012	  New	  York	  Times	  article	  “Greece's	  Epidemic	  of	  Racist	  Attacks”	  (Cosse	  
2012)	  and	  the	  99-­‐page	  report	  of	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  “Hate	  on	  the	  Streets:	  Xenophobic	  Violence	  in	  
Greece”	  (HRW	  2012).	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Nonetheless,	  the	  undisrupted	  increase	  in	  violent	  attacks	  (including	  stabbings,	  
arsons	  etc.)	  towards	  marginalised	  groups	  amplified	  the	  international	  outcry	  for	  the	  
lack	  of	  prosecution	  of	  racist	  crimes	  and,	  especially,	  of	  the	  activities	  of	  Golden	  Dawn.	  
In	  January	  2013,	  the	  murder	  of	  Shehzad	  Luqman,	  who	  was	  randomly	  targeted	  on	  
the	  street	  by	  supporters	  of	  the	  Golden	  Dawn	  due	  to	  his	  migrant	  origin,	  brought	  
some	  publicity	  to	  the	  reality	  of	  unresolved	  and	  unprosecuted	  murders	  of	  migrants	  
in	  Athens	  during	  that	  period.	  Following	  the	  murder	  of	  Luqman	  and	  its	  aftermath,	  
the	  Department	  to	  Combat	  Racist	  Violence	  was	  activated	  within	  the	  Hellenic	  Police	  
as	  well	  as	  a	  hotline	  for	  complaints.	  Only	  a	  few	  months	  later,	  a	  fascist	  attack	  leading	  
to	  the	  murder	  of	  anti-­‐fascist	  rapper	  Pavlos	  Fyssas	  by	  a	  Golden	  Dawn	  supporter	  
shook	  public	  opinion	  once	  more.	  The	  murder,	  nonetheless,	  of	  a	  Greek	  citizen	  
resonated	  differently	  with	  social	  and	  political	  actors	  compared	  to	  years	  of	  anti-­‐
migrant	  violence,	  mobilising	  intense	  protests	  on	  a	  national	  and	  international	  level,	  
as	  well	  as	  instigating	  the	  persecution	  of	  Golden	  Dawn	  and	  the	  arrest	  of	  its	  MPs	  for	  
organised	  criminal	  activity	  (Carastathis	  2015).	  
Even	  after	  the	  initiation	  of	  the	  monumental	  judicial	  process	  against	  Golden	  Dawn	  in	  
2013,	  the	  further	  strengthening	  of	  the	  legal	  framework	  against	  racist	  crime	  
remained	  a	  strongly	  articulated	  demand	  of	  international	  actors	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
national	  left	  wing	  powers.166	  Therefore,	  the	  government	  was	  forced	  to	  renegotiate	  
the	  introduction	  of	  the	  widely	  known	  “anti-­‐racist	  bill”	  that	  had	  already	  been	  
postponed	  in	  the	  past.	  In	  complete	  contrast	  to	  the	  silence	  and	  oblivion	  that	  
characterised	  the	  introduction	  of	  employment	  anti-­‐discrimination	  legislation	  
described	  in	  chapter	  seven,	  the	  public	  debate	  concerning	  the	  anti-­‐racist	  legislation	  
became	  a	  battlefield.	  The	  political	  crisis	  woven	  around	  the	  “anti-­‐racist	  bill”	  was	  so	  
severe	  that	  its	  introduction	  to	  the	  Parliament	  for	  voting	  was	  postponed	  several	  
times	  and	  the	  entire	  procedure	  lasted	  overall	  more	  than	  two	  years	  (Meliggonis	  
2013;	  Kitsantonis	  2013;	  Sotiropoulos	  2014).	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  See	  for	  example	  the	  2013	  Guardian	  article	  “Greek	  Coalition	  in	  Crisis	  Talks	  over	  Anti-­‐Racism	  Bill”	  
(Smith	  2013),	  the	  2013	  Economist	  article	  “The	  Greek	  Far	  Right.	  Racist	  Dilemmas:	  Greece	  Needs	  a	  
More	  Robust	  Anti-­‐Racism	  Law”	  (The	  Economist	  2013)	  and	  the	  2013	  report	  of	  the	  Commissioner	  for	  
Human	  Rights	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  Nils	  Muižnieks	  Following	  his	  visit	  to	  Greece	  from	  28	  January	  
to	  1	  February	  2013	  [CommDH(2013)6].	  	  
RESERVING	  THE	  RIGHT	  TO	  BE	  COMPLEX	  
	   226	   	  
Other	  than	  the	  overall	  anti-­‐migrant	  stance	  of	  several	  political	  powers,	  two	  of	  the	  
main	  points	  of	  conflict	  around	  which	  the	  political	  opposition	  to	  the	  bill	  was	  framed	  
were	  the	  perceived	  intention	  to	  supposedly	  protect	  homosexuality	  and	  the	  
criminalisation	  of	  the	  denial	  of	  the	  Holocaust,	  war	  crimes	  and	  genocide.167	  The	  
public	  debate	  concerning	  the	  “anti-­‐racist	  bill”	  was	  largely	  formed	  around	  the	  
resistance	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Golden	  Dawn	  and	  several	  conservative	  powers	  (Zoulas	  
2014).	  Racist,	  homophobic	  and	  anti-­‐Semitic	  discourses	  flooded	  the	  public	  debate	  
over	  the	  suggested	  legislation,	  adding	  to	  the	  systematic	  and	  systemic	  violence	  of	  
this	  period.168	  Finally,	  the	  bill	  passed	  after	  intensifying	  political	  pressure	  in	  the	  
aftermath	  of	  a	  government	  scandal	  including	  government	  and	  Golden	  Dawn	  
members.169	  	  
The	  resulting	  law,	  Law	  4285/2014	  (GG	  A	  191/10.9.2014),	  was	  voted	  for	  in	  
adaptation	  of	  the	  decision	  2008/913/JHA	  of	  28	  November	  2008	  on	  combating	  
certain	  forms	  and	  expressions	  of	  racism	  and	  xenophobia	  by	  means	  of	  criminal	  law,	  
and	  replaced	  article	  79	  of	  the	  Criminal	  Code	  with	  article	  81A.	  The	  revised	  provision	  
rendered	  more	  severe	  minimum	  penalties	  for	  what	  are	  characterised	  as	  “racist	  
crimes”	  while	  maintaining	  gender	  identity	  among	  the	  protected	  grounds.170	  
Moreover,	  article	  1	  of	  the	  same	  law	  criminalised	  the	  incitement	  to	  discrimination,	  
hatred	  or	  violence	  (but	  not	  hate	  speech	  per	  se)171,	  an	  issue	  that	  has	  given	  rise	  to	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  Specifically	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  historical	  crimes	  that	  have	  been	  recognised	  by	  the	  Greek	  
Parliament	  as	  genocides	  (such	  the	  systematic	  killing	  and	  exile	  of	  Christian	  populations	  by	  the	  
Ottoman	  Empire)	  would	  be	  considered	  as	  recognised	  genocides	  and,	  thus,	  protected	  under	  the	  law.	  	  
168
	  For	  such	  institutional	  “hate-­‐speech”	  during	  this	  period	  see	  ECRI	  report	  on	  Greece	  (fifth	  
monitoring	  cycle).	  Adopted	  on	  10	  December	  2014.	  Published	  on	  24	  February	  2015,	  pp	  17-­‐22.	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  The	  “Baltakos	  scandal,”	  which	  consisted	  in	  the	  public	  disclosure	  of	  secret	  communications	  
concerning	  the	  Golden	  Dawn	  prosecution	  between	  the	  General	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Government	  
Panayiotis	  Baltakos,	  who	  was	  forced	  to	  step	  down,	  and	  leading	  Golden	  Dawn	  member	  Ilias	  
Kasidiaris.	  For	  details	  and	  transcript	  of	  the	  published	  video,	  see	  the	  Eleutherotypia	  article	  “Samaras	  
Close	  Aide	  Resigns	  over	  Golden	  Dawn	  Contacts”	  (Mac	  Con	  Uladh	  2014).	  	  
170
	  Law	  4356/2015	  amended	  this	  article	  using	  the	  term	  “crime	  with	  racist	  characteristics”	  and	  
replacing	  the	  subjective	  ground	  of	  hate	  with	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  victim	  according	  to	  certain	  
characteristics.	  Recently	  the	  threatened	  penalties	  for	  such	  crimes	  were	  somewhat	  lowered	  by	  Law	  
4619/2019.	  	  
171
	  See	  the	  2014	  Guardian	  article	  “Greek	  Laws	  'Fall	  Short'	  as	  Racist	  and	  Homophobic	  Violence	  
Surges”	  (Smith	  2014).	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debates	  concerning	  free	  speech.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  Law	  4285/2014	  foresees	  
the	  liability	  of	  legal	  persons	  or	  groups	  of	  persons,	  thus,	  providing	  legal	  protection	  
from	  unities	  such	  as	  political	  parties	  (article	  5)	  as	  well	  as	  threatening	  harsher	  
penalties	  in	  cases	  of	  such	  crimes	  committed	  by	  public	  officials	  or	  employees	  (article	  
1).	  That	  was	  considered	  important	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  public	  comments	  that	  fall	  
under	  the	  purview	  of	  this	  provision	  were	  often	  made	  on	  the	  part	  of	  politicians	  and	  
clerics	  (ECRI	  2015).	  	  
As	  it	  becomes	  obvious,	  the	  legislation	  against	  racist	  crimes	  (with	  sexual	  orientation	  
and	  gender	  identity	  among	  the	  protected	  characteristics)	  was	  introduced	  into	  the	  
Greek	  legal	  order	  under	  vastly	  different	  circumstances	  compared	  to	  the	  
employment	  antidiscrimination	  legislation	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  The	  
anti-­‐racist	  legislation	  touched	  upon	  the	  very	  heart	  of	  the	  on-­‐going	  political	  conflicts	  
within	  Greek	  society	  and	  was	  placed	  on	  centre	  stage	  of	  the	  national	  political	  agenda	  
from	  the	  offset	  of	  its	  negotiation.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  turn	  to	  a	  critical	  
interrogation	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  legislation	  on	  trans	  realities	  led	  by	  my	  
interlocutors’	  engagement	  with	  its	  imperatives.	  	  
8.4. Violence	  and	  All	  “the	  Rest	  of	  it”	  
In	  this	  section	  of	  the	  chapter,	  the	  legal	  framework	  against	  racist	  crimes	  is	  analysed	  
along	  the	  points	  that	  were	  raised	  by	  my	  interlocutors	  during	  our	  discussions.	  Their	  
appraisal	  and	  understanding	  of	  this	  legal	  framework	  point	  towards	  a	  complex	  and	  
ambivalent	  engagement	  with	  its	  rationale.	  I	  will	  suggest	  that	  there	  are	  two	  
intertwining	  paradoxical	  conditions	  which	  account	  for	  much	  of	  this	  ambivalence.	  
The	  first	  one	  is	  the	  concept	  of	  relying	  for	  protection	  (from	  individual	  perpetrators)	  
on	  institutions	  that	  are	  central	  in	  the	  legitimisation	  of	  gendered,	  racialised	  and	  
other	  violence.	  The	  second	  condition	  that	  intensifies	  the	  aporetic	  engagement	  with	  
anti-­‐racist	  legislation	  is	  the	  experience	  of	  violence	  as	  simultaneously	  eruptive	  and	  
continuous	  (or	  exceptional	  and	  normalised)	  and	  the	  inability	  of	  this	  legal	  framework	  
to	  grasp	  the	  latter.	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Discussing	  with	  Valeria	  and	  after	  she	  had	  explained	  that	  she	  would	  not	  consider	  
seeking	  legal	  protection	  for	  discrimination	  in	  employment,	  I	  rephrased	  the	  question	  
towards	  seeking	  legal	  protection	  in	  instances	  of	  violence	  or	  verbal	  harassment.	  	  
Me:	  Would	  you	  bother	  then	  with	  such	  a	  process?	  
Valeria:	  Yes,	  I	  would,	  but	  bear	  in	  mind	  that	  all	  of	  this	  has	  some	  costs.	  That	  
is,	  imagine	  I	  go	  to	  a	  public	  service	  and	  someone	  says	  the	  worst	  about	  me	  
like,	  “get	  out	  you	  tranny”	  let’s	  say.	  First	  thing,	  you	  would	  need	  to	  have	  
witnesses	  because	  it	  is	  your	  word	  against	  a	  public	  employee.	  I	  mean	  I’m	  
trans	  and	  a	  foreigner	  and	  he	  is	  a	  public	  employee,	  right?	  Which	  counts!	  
And	  Greek!	  Well	  there	  you	  go.	  You	  need	  witnesses,	  you	  need	  a	  lawyer	  and	  
to	  pay	  100	  euros	  to	  press	  charges	  […]	  it’s	  this	  and	  that	  and	  the	  whole	  thing	  
I	  described	  together.	  […]	  
Me:	  So…would	  you	  actually	  be	  into	  such	  a	  thing?	  
Valeria:	  I	  would	  totally	  be	  into	  it!	  I	  would	  be	  into	  it	  totally,	  because	  
sometimes	  this	  whole	  thing	  chokes	  you	  but	  it	  is	  your	  word	  against	  someone	  
else	  and	  maybe	  they	  will	  say	  you	  made	  it	  up	  or	  I	  don’t	  know	  what.	  You	  
need	  to	  have	  proof,	  money	  and	  the	  mental	  disposition	  to	  push	  this	  and	  
definitely	  to	  have	  money.	  […]	  It’s	  not	  easy.	  [Interview	  with	  Valeria	  in	  2017].	  
It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  “100	  euros”	  mentioned	  here	  is	  a	  fee	  that	  was	  
traditionally	  (it	  has	  recently	  been	  lowered)	  charged	  for	  pressing	  charges	  in	  criminal	  
court,	  and,	  thus,	  initially	  for	  reporting	  a	  racist	  crime	  too.	  In	  2016,	  this	  fee	  was	  
waived	  for	  some	  categories	  of	  crimes	  such	  as	  domestic	  abuse	  and	  racist	  crimes	  
(Law	  4446/2016	  art.	  40).172	  The	  fact	  that	  Valeria	  was	  not	  aware	  of	  this	  change	  in	  
law	  is	  not	  noteworthy	  as	  she	  is	  not	  a	  legal	  professional	  nor	  had	  she	  had	  any	  relative	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  Nonetheless,	  as	  the	  Racist	  Crime	  Watch	  (an	  initiative	  of	  the	  Greek	  Helsinki	  Monitor)	  notes,	  it	  is	  a	  
standard	  practice	  for	  the	  Hellenic	  Police	  -­‐ignorant	  and	  hostile	  as	  to	  the	  whole	  procedure	  of	  reporting	  
racist	  crimes-­‐	  to	  demand	  this	  fee	  to	  file	  such	  complaints	  (Tsarnas	  2017b;	  Tsarnas	  2018;	  Dimitras	  
2019).	  In	  fact,	  ignorance	  and	  mistreatment	  on	  part	  of	  police	  and	  judicial	  employees	  came	  up	  
repeatedly	  in	  my	  discussions	  with	  both	  trans	  individuals	  and	  legal	  professionals.	  Overall,	  the	  issue	  of	  
mistrust	  towards	  state	  institutions	  is	  a	  stable	  factor	  in	  underreporting	  that	  has	  been	  documented	  
repeatedly	  and	  will	  not	  be	  further	  analysed	  here	  (RVRN	  2013,	  2014,	  2015).	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experience.	  Although	  the	  fee	  she	  mentions	  does	  no	  longer	  apply	  and	  although	  
racist	  motive	  theoretically	  is	  not	  impossible	  to	  prove,	  I	  suggest	  that	  what	  she	  
described	  touches	  upon	  complex	  qualities	  of	  legal	  reality.	  It	  has	  little	  to	  do	  with	  the	  
“100	  euros”	  or	  her	  misinformation	  of	  the	  legal	  process	  and	  more	  with	  her	  intimate	  
knowledge	  of	  how	  “economies	  of	  hostility”	  work	  on	  an	  everyday	  level	  (Carastathis	  
2015;	  2018b).	  	  
The	  picture	  she	  paints	  hints	  towards	  the	  intertwining	  of	  transphobia,	  
(trans)misogyny,	  racism	  and	  perceived	  respectability	  -­‐	  an	  intertwining	  that	  can	  be	  
easily	  fathomed	  within	  the	  socio-­‐political	  terrain	  described	  earlier	  in	  the	  chapter.	  In	  
this	  schema,	  the	  victims	  not	  only	  need	  to	  be	  recognised	  as	  protection-­‐worthy	  
(rights-­‐bearing,	  legally	  legible	  and	  law-­‐abiding	  citizens)	  but	  also	  as	  socially	  
respectable,	  as	  “proper”	  Greek	  citizens.	  Valeria	  herself,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  our	  
discussion	  and	  due	  to	  the	  complication	  of	  her	  trans	  and	  migrant	  status,	  lacked	  not	  
only	  the	  perceived	  respectability	  of	  a	  proper	  citizen	  (“I’m	  trans	  and	  a	  foreigner”)	  
but	  also	  the	  primary	  identification	  documents	  from	  Greece	  or	  her	  birth-­‐country	  
that	  would	  allow	  her	  to	  navigate	  any	  legal	  process.	  Even	  in	  its	  impossibility,	  this	  
legal	  scenario	  is	  imagined	  in	  Valeria’s	  excerpt	  as	  a	  revenge	  or	  redemption	  fantasy	  
towards	  that	  which	  “chokes	  you.”	  However,	  before	  the	  sentence	  is	  finished,	  it	  is	  
already	  cancelled	  once	  more	  (“it	  is	  your	  word	  against	  someone	  else	  and	  maybe	  
they	  will	  say	  you	  made	  it	  up	  or	  I	  don’t	  know	  what”).	  	  
Staying	  with	  the	  ambivalence	  and	  conflicting	  feelings	  for	  what	  this	  law	  represents	  
and	  how	  it	  functions,	  I	  want	  to	  look	  closely	  (hence	  the	  long	  excerpt)	  into	  our	  
discussions	  with	  another	  of	  my	  interlocutors.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  my	  first	  interview	  with	  
Lola	  in	  2014,	  the	  anti-­‐racist	  legislation	  had	  just	  been	  voted	  in	  and	  our	  discussion	  
was	  situated	  within	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  public	  debate	  about	  it.	  	  
Me:	  So	  with	  what	  you	  were	  saying	  just	  now	  about	  the	  lack	  of	  protection,	  I	  
am	  thinking	  that	  there	  is	  some	  recent	  legislation…	  
Lola:	  You’re	  talking	  the	  anti-­‐racist	  bill?	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Me:	  Yes.	  And	  in	  combination	  with	  what	  you	  said	  about	  what	  would	  happen	  
socially	  if	  the	  law	  recognised	  our	  existence	  from	  the	  beginning.	  I	  mean,	  I	  
guess	  this	  law	  is	  too	  recent	  but	  to	  what	  extent	  do	  you	  think	  that	  it	  will	  
mean	  socially	  and	  substantially	  that	  you	  are	  legally	  protected?	  
Lola:	  Look,	  first	  of	  all	  this	  law	  is	  in	  my	  opinion	  completely	  superficial	  and	  
completely	  perfunctory	  and	  not	  at	  all	  substantial	  and	  also	  the	  reasons	  that	  
it	  was	  made	  and	  it	  was	  voted	  were	  not	  political	  in	  the	  sense…it	  is	  
superficial.	  Nonetheless,	  there	  is	  the	  argument	  that,	  I	  don’t	  know…that	  
there	  is	  the	  fear	  on	  the	  other	  side	  that	  from	  now	  on	  against	  such	  
discrimination	  I	  can	  mobilise	  in	  a	  specific	  manner	  and	  not	  abstractly.	  That	  if	  
you	  insult	  my	  gender	  identity	  you	  won’t	  be	  on	  trial	  as	  if	  you	  called	  me	  a	  
“moron”	  on	  the	  street	  but	  you	  will	  be	  on	  trial	  under	  a	  specific	  framework,	  
which	  I	  really	  don’t	  know	  how	  it	  can	  actually	  function…	  I	  mean	  it’s	  very…I	  
really	  don’t	  know	  if	  this	  fear	  will	  mean	  something	  but	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  
this	  crumb,	  that	  this	  small,	  small	  something	  happened…on	  the	  other	  hand	  
who	  has	  the	  money	  for	  that?	  […]	  
Me:	  In	  my	  experience,	  less-­‐privileged	  people	  are	  often	  in	  positions	  that	  in	  
theory	  are	  not	  legally	  acceptable	  or	  let’s	  say	  shouldn’t	  be	  allowed	  by	  the	  
law,	  like,	  you	  know,	  migrants	  getting	  beaten	  up	  in	  police	  departments,	  
maybe	  in	  this	  sense	  a	  legal	  framework	  could	  be	  a	  kind	  of	  asset,	  no?	  
Lola:	  It’s	  a	  potential	  tool	  and	  you	  can’t	  expect	  in	  the	  society	  we	  live	  in,	  from	  
one	  day	  to	  the	  next,	  just	  because	  an	  itty	  bitty	  anti-­‐racist	  law	  
(αντιρατσιστικούλι)	  was	  voted	  for,	  that	  the	  mentality	  of	  the	  average	  cop	  
will	  change	  or	  the	  average	  driver	  or	  the	  average	  boss	  and	  so	  on.	  This	  is	  
impossible	  and	  we	  can’t	  believe,	  even	  with	  this	  tool,	  that	  this	  can	  happen.	  
It	  is	  impossible.	  […]	  Nonetheless,	  if	  we	  can	  manage	  to	  put	  it	  to	  use,	  even	  in	  
its	  formality,	  I	  believe	  that	  with	  time	  it	  will	  pass.	  Well…it	  won’t	  pass	  to	  the	  
degree	  that	  the	  cop	  won’t	  be	  transphobic,	  alright?	  It	  won’t	  pass	  to	  the	  
extent	  that	  my	  boss	  won’t	  fire	  me	  or	  I	  won’t	  be	  hassled	  or	  ridiculed	  on	  the	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street	  because	  this	  law	  exists	  but	  maybe	  with	  time	  somehow…I	  don’t	  know	  
maybe	  the	  publicity	  of	  such	  cases	  will	  help.	  […]	  At	  least	  for	  those	  who	  can	  
afford	  to	  pursue	  this.	  Because	  if	  it	  happened	  to	  me,	  I	  wouldn’t	  be	  able	  to	  
afford	  the	  lawsuit	  or	  the	  lawyer.	  And	  to	  be	  honest	  I	  don’t	  know	  if	  I	  would	  
like	  to	  be	  in	  a	  courtroom	  that	  people	  will	  be	  talking	  to	  me	  in	  male	  form	  and	  
be	  like	  “Mr	  so-­‐and-­‐so	  you	  are	  complaining	  that	  Mr	  so-­‐and-­‐so	  beat	  you	  up	  
after	  you	  had	  sex”	  for	  example.	  Ok	  now,	  I	  think	  we	  both	  know	  what	  I’m	  
talking	  about,	  no?	  
Me:	  Yes.	  Still,	  why	  do	  you	  say	  that	  this	  law	  is	  “superficial”?	  
Lola:	  Because	  it	  does	  not	  secure	  life	  in	  better	  terms.	  It	  is	  supposed	  to	  
protect	  after	  the	  attack.	  Hence,	  it	  is	  superficial.	  […]	  and	  you’ll	  say	  could	  
there	  be	  a	  law	  under	  the	  present	  circumstances	  that	  would	  prevent	  an	  
attack?	  I	  guess	  there	  couldn’t	  be,	  what	  do	  I	  know?	  However,	  if	  this	  whole	  
chain	  was	  right	  from	  the	  beginning	  up	  to…that	  is,	  I	  feel	  that	  this	  is	  the	  final	  
part	  of	  how	  things	  should	  be	  and	  not	  their	  substance.	  That’s	  it.	  […]	  So	  yes,	  
it’s	  a	  jewellery-­‐law	  [ένας	  νόμος-­‐κόσμημα]	  let’s	  say,	  a	  law	  like	  an	  earring	  
[ένας	  νόμος-­‐σκουλαρίκι],	  it’s	  not	  for	  any	  of	  the	  minorities	  it	  is	  supposed	  to	  
include	  and	  protect	  
Me:	  So	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  decided,	  in	  this	  moment,	  to	  protect…the	  
individuals	  that	  are…quote	  unquote….	  
Lola:	  …victims!	  To	  protect	  them	  after	  they	  made	  them	  into	  victims!	  ((We	  
both	  laugh)).	  
Me:	  Precisely.	  To	  protect	  trans	  people	  in	  this	  way	  although	  they	  haven’t	  
actually…	  
Lola:	  …recognised	  their	  existence!	  ((She	  laughs))	  	  
Me:	  Yes,	  I	  mean…	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Lola:	  Well,	  obviously,	  there	  was	  a	  lot	  of	  pressure,	  right?	  Obviously,	  there	  
was	  pressure	  to	  include	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  identity	  in	  the	  thing.	  […]	  And	  
so	  it’s	  not…	  maybe	  it’s	  a	  tool	  in	  cases	  of	  serious	  physical	  injury	  etc.	  […]	  For	  
the	  rest	  of	  it,	  it’s	  not.	  For	  not	  being	  able	  to	  rent	  a	  house	  or	  being	  fired	  or	  
not	  being	  hired	  or	  being	  forced	  to	  quit	  school…it’s	  not.	  [Interview	  with	  Lola	  
in	  2014]	  
During	  our	  entire	  conversation,	  Lola	  kept	  going	  back	  and	  forth	  in	  describing	  legal	  
protection,	  on	  one	  hand,	  as	  necessary	  and	  potentially	  effective	  in	  altering	  (even	  if	  
slightly)	  social	  conditions	  (“a	  tool”	  or	  in	  another	  case	  “a	  window”)	  and,	  one	  the	  
other	  hand,	  as	  useless	  or	  even	  decorative	  (“jewellery”	  or	  “an	  earring”).	  This	  
ambivalence	  is	  related	  to	  the	  empirically	  well-­‐grounded	  suspicion	  against	  state	  
institutions	  and	  the	  sudden	  “inexplicable”	  eagerness	  of	  the	  legislator	  (and	  even	  
more	  so	  a	  right	  wing	  government)	  to	  go	  out	  on	  a	  limb	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  groups	  of	  
people	  that	  are,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  systematically	  marginalised	  by	  it.	  	  
In	  contrast	  with	  employment	  anti-­‐discrimination	  laws,	  the	  anti-­‐racist	  legislation	  was	  
picked	  up	  by	  LGBTI+	  lobbying	  groups	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  produce	  litigation	  concerning	  
high	  publicity	  cases	  of	  homophobic	  and	  transphobic	  speech.	  To	  that	  end,	  various	  
activists	  and	  NGOs	  attempted	  to	  use	  anti-­‐racist	  provisions	  to	  mobilise	  judicially	  
against	  state	  and	  para-­‐state	  actors	  mainly	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  public	  incitement	  of	  
hatred	  and	  violence	  (Greek	  Helsinki	  Monitor,	  Athens	  Pride	  and	  Thessaloniki	  Pride	  
2017).	  Moreover,	  the	  introduction	  of	  structures	  for	  reporting	  racist	  crime	  lead	  to	  a	  
small	  number	  of	  individual	  complaints	  for	  violent	  attacks	  and	  other	  similar	  incidents	  
(RVRN	  2013,	  2014).173	  Not	  surprisingly,	  the	  outcome	  was	  usually	  disappointing	  as	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  Soon	  after	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Racist	  Violence	  Monitor	  Network,	  LGBT	  groups	  with	  legal	  
status	  joined	  it	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  produce,	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  official	  recordings	  of	  homophobic	  and	  
transphobic	  violence.	  Moreover,	  in	  lack	  of	  official	  reporting	  protocols,	  the	  NGO	  Colour	  Youth	  –	  
Athens	  LGBTQ	  Youth	  Community	  launched	  in	  2014	  the	  programme	  “Tell	  Us”	  (Pes	  to	  s’	  emas/Πες	  το	  
σ’	  εμάς),
	  
which	  aims	  to	  record	  incidents	  of	  violence	  and/or	  discrimination	  based	  on	  gender	  identity	  
gender	  expression	  and/or	  sexual	  orientation	  and	  provide	  professional	  and	  educational	  services	  
(Theofilopoulos	  2015b).	  “Tell	  us”	  was	  initially	  funded	  by	  the	  EEC	  Grants’	  NGO	  programme	  “We	  are	  
all	  citizens”	  through	  the	  Bodossaki	  Foundation	  (a	  major	  privately	  owned	  public-­‐benefit	  organisation)	  
who	  was	  the	  fund	  operator	  in	  Greece.	  Since	  2015,	  the	  programme	  operates	  under	  the	  funding	  of	  
Open	  Society	  Foundations	  (OSF).	  This	  is	  also	  exemplary	  of	  the	  fiscal	  routes	  that	  enabled	  this	  new	  
kind	  of	  LGBT	  lobbying.	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the	  institutions	  that	  were	  assigned	  to	  respond	  to	  requests	  for	  protection	  against	  
racist	  violence	  are	  themselves,	  as	  seen	  in	  section	  8.2,	  heavily	  invested	  in	  ethno-­‐
sexual	  hierarchies.	  	  
Indeed,	  in	  2017,	  a	  joint	  submission	  was	  made	  to	  the	  prosecutor	  of	  the	  highest	  
Greek	  court	  (Areios	  Pagos)	  by	  the	  Greek	  Helsinki	  Monitor	  (GHM),	  the	  Athens	  Pride	  
and	  the	  Thessaloniki	  Pride	  arguing	  a	  systematic	  lack	  of	  prosecution	  of	  homophobic	  
crimes	  regardless	  of	  the	  existing	  legislation	  (Dimitras	  2017).174	  In	  the	  same	  year,	  a	  
submission	  to	  the	  European	  Commission	  against	  Racism	  and	  Intolerance	  (ECRI)	  by	  
the	  GHM,	  the	  Minority	  Rights	  Group	  -­‐	  Greece	  (MRG-­‐G)	  and	  the	  Coordinated	  
Organisations	  and	  Communities	  for	  Roma	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Greece	  (SOKADRE)	  
made	  similar	  arguments	  for	  the	  non-­‐application	  of	  the	  anti-­‐racist	  legislation	  
regarding	  various	  affected	  groups	  (Tsarnas	  2017a).	  Both	  documents	  include	  
incidents	  wherein	  Orthodox	  Church	  representatives,	  politicians,	  the	  Hellenic	  Police	  
and	  prosecuting	  authorities	  and	  other	  institutions	  (civil	  courts	  among	  them)	  have	  
exercised	  behaviour	  that	  is	  blatantly	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  anti-­‐racist	  legislation.	  
Nonetheless,	  most	  of	  these	  cases	  either	  failed	  to	  be	  prosecuted	  or	  their	  
prosecution	  was	  discontinued	  by	  the	  authorities	  (“archived”),	  or	  they	  were	  
dismissed	  in	  court,	  thus	  intensifying	  the	  feeling	  of	  pointlessness	  expressed	  when	  
discussing	  the	  effect	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  legislation.	  	  
What	  is	  epitomised	  by	  the	  cases	  included	  in	  these	  documents	  is	  something	  that	  can	  
be	  considered	  common	  knowledge,	  especially	  within	  marginalised	  groups	  in	  
Greece.	  That	  is,	  that	  state	  and	  para-­‐state	  actors	  have	  a	  central	  role	  in	  establishing	  
and	  perpetuating	  racialised	  and	  gendered	  violence	  and	  hostility	  within	  Greek	  
society.	  A	  fact	  that	  is	  turned	  on	  its	  head	  by	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  anti-­‐racist	  legislation,	  
which	  relies	  on	  state-­‐institutions	  for	  countering	  the	  violence	  they	  exemplify.	  In	  this	  
vein,	  critical	  approaches	  to	  hate	  crime	  legislation	  have	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	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  The	  joint	  document	  also	  provides	  a	  distinction	  between	  secular	  officials,	  on	  one	  hand,	  which	  
(even	  if	  rarely)	  might	  be	  prosecuted	  for	  their	  public	  racist	  statements	  and	  religious	  officials,	  on	  the	  
other	  hand,	  which	  systematically	  cultivate	  anti-­‐homosexual,	  anti-­‐trans,	  anti-­‐migrant	  and	  anti-­‐Semitic	  
sentiment	  without	  legal	  consequences	  until	  then	  although	  numerous	  complaints	  had	  been	  filed	  
against	  them	  (Dimitras	  2017).	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investment	  in	  punitive	  mechanisms	  and	  the	  focus	  solely	  on	  interpersonal	  harm	  
does	  not	  work	  towards	  undoing	  social	  injustices	  and	  challenging	  the	  broader	  socio-­‐
political	  conditions	  that	  encourage	  and	  enable	  the	  violence	  covered	  by	  this	  
legislation	  (Spade	  [2009]	  2015];	  Lamble	  2013;	  Boukli	  &	  Renz	  2018).	  Anna	  
Carastathis	  in	  discussion	  with	  Greek	  LGBTQ	  activists	  notes:	  
Therefore,	  as	  we	  examine	  more	  closely	  in	  what	  follows,	  according	  to	  my	  
interlocutors,	  homophobic	  and	  transphobic	  violence	  should	  not	  be	  
considered	  only	  interpersonal	  but	  mainly	  social	  and	  institutional.	  	  
It	  appears	  within	  the	  educational	  system	  and	  other	  state	  institutions,	  which	  
my	  interlocutors	  describe	  as	  inimical	  and	  even	  hostile	  to	  LGBTQ	  people.	  
Indeed,	  this	  institutional	  and	  institutionalized	  hostility	  legitimates	  and	  even	  
encourages	  violent	  attacks	  occurring	  in	  streets,	  squares,	  and	  shops	  by	  
citizens,	  fascist	  assault	  battalions,	  and	  also	  by	  police	  and	  military	  officers	  
(Carastathis	  2018b:	  272).	  
Furthermore,	  focusing	  on	  interpersonal	  violence	  and	  appointing	  blame	  for	  gender	  
related	  violence	  onto	  “bad”	  individuals	  that,	  in	  turn,	  are	  punished	  by	  neutral	  state-­‐
mechanisms,	  works	  to	  obscure	  their	  own	  the	  role	  in	  the	  perpetuation	  of	  this	  very	  
violence.	  Wendy	  Brown’s	  analysis	  on	  rights,	  which	  was	  visited	  in	  chapter	  three,	  
echoes	  here	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  she	  has	  insightfully	  traced	  the	  processes	  of	  de-­‐
politicisation	  and	  individualisation	  that	  allow	  (neo)liberal	  states	  to	  appear	  as	  
defenders	  of	  injured	  individuals	  against	  social	  injustices,	  which	  nonetheless	  are	  a	  
sine	  qua	  non	  for	  the	  very	  existence	  and	  flourishing	  of	  these	  states	  (Brown	  1995).	  
Lola’s	  analysis	  in	  the	  discussed	  excerpt	  converses	  with	  such	  accounts	  to	  the	  degree	  
that	  she	  describes	  the	  “racist”	  punishable	  behaviour	  as	  the	  last	  part	  of	  a	  “whole	  
chain”	  that	  establishes	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  this	  violence.	  To	  that	  end,	  the	  institutions,	  
which	  are	  largely	  responsible	  for	  the	  entire	  chain,	  intervene	  right	  at	  the	  end	  of	  it,	  
establishing	  themselves	  as	  rightful	  protectors	  but	  not	  actually,	  as	  she	  noted,	  
“securing	  life	  in	  better	  terms.”	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The	  inability	  of	  such	  legislation	  to	  secure	  life	  in	  better	  terms	  has	  been	  noted	  by	  
feminist	  critiques	  along	  with	  the	  inaccessibility	  of	  many	  of	  these	  legal	  remedies	  to	  
the	  most	  vulnerable	  populations	  (Kahlina	  2015).	  Although	  these	  critiques	  are	  
salient,	  there	  is	  undeniably	  something	  produced,	  even	  if	  only	  on	  a	  symbolic	  level,	  by	  
having	  an	  identity	  pronounced	  by	  the	  legislator	  and	  protected,	  even	  if	  only	  on	  a	  
theoretical	  level,	  by	  the	  law.	  The	  very	  recent	  memory	  of	  homophobic	  (let	  alone	  
transphobic)	  violence	  not	  existing	  as	  a	  legally	  intelligible	  concept	  in	  Greece	  speaks	  
volumes	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  complete	  legal	  and	  official	  illegitimacy	  (Boukli	  2009).	  
Indeed	  as	  we	  read	  in	  the	  excerpt,	  Lola	  allows	  herself	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  law’s	  
politics	  of	  hope,	  as	  Beger	  describes	  it,	  and	  to	  entertain	  the	  promise	  of	  the	  law	  to	  
“teach	  the	  nation	  respect,	  forcing	  them	  to	  acknowledge	  and	  protect	  individual	  
expression”	  (Beger	  [2009]	  2013:	  113).	  This	  engagement,	  nonetheless,	  is	  momentary	  
and	  self-­‐refuting.	  It	  persists	  on	  valuing	  the	  law	  and	  undermining	  it	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  
As	  with	  Valeria,	  what	  is	  important	  here	  is	  not	  to	  read	  this	  ambivalence	  as	  an	  
expression	  of	  personal	  indecisiveness	  but	  as	  an	  accurate	  understanding	  of	  the	  
paradoxical	  nature,	  not	  only	  of	  rights	  in	  general,	  but	  also	  more	  specifically	  of	  the	  
accelerating	  improvement	  of	  the	  formal	  status	  of	  minorities	  in	  a	  (neo)liberal	  reality	  
of	  normalised	  violence,	  precarity	  and	  injustice	  (Papanikolaou	  2018c).	  	  
What	  is	  more,	  I	  suggest	  that	  both	  accounts	  create	  a	  link	  with	  another	  condition	  that	  
generates	  ambivalence	  towards	  legal	  protection	  against	  “racist”	  (in	  the	  Greek	  all-­‐
encompassing	  use	  of	  the	  term)	  violence	  –	  a	  condition	  directly	  related	  to	  the	  
limitations	  imposed	  by	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  this	  violence	  in	  such	  a	  legal	  
framework.	  To	  get	  a	  feel	  for	  this	  we	  need	  to	  ask	  insistently:	  when	  Lola	  posits	  that,	  
although	  this	  law	  might	  be	  a	  tool	  in	  case	  of	  an	  attack,	  it	  does	  not	  really	  protect	  
trans	  individuals	  from	  “the	  rest	  of	  it,”	  what	  exactly	  is	  she	  referring	  to?	  And	  how	  can	  
“the	  rest	  of	  it,”	  which	  is	  not	  an	  incident	  such	  as	  an	  attack,	  be	  understood	  as	  so	  
significant	  that	  it	  amounts	  to	  the	  appraisal	  of	  the	  law	  as	  superficial?	  She	  gives	  some	  
examples	  but	  none	  of	  them	  on	  its	  own	  seems	  to	  capture	  the	  weight	  of	  what	  she	  
describes,	  and	  which	  might	  be	  suggested	  to	  be	  the	  overall	  atmosphere	  around	  a	  
trans	  woman	  in	  Greece.	  As	  most	  of	  Lola’s	  and	  other	  of	  my	  interlocutors’	  lives	  take	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form	  within	  this	  atmosphere,	  within	  all	  “the	  rest	  of	  it,”	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  take	  a	  
moment	  and	  make	  more	  of	  an	  effort	  to	  compute	  this	  as	  a	  crucial	  parameter	  in	  this	  
debate.	  	  
Sara	  Ahmed	  (2012)	  in	  her	  work	  on	  racism	  in	  institutional	  life	  engages	  with	  the	  
“labor	  in	  attending	  to	  what	  recedes	  from	  view”	  (Ahmed	  2012:	  14)	  and,	  in	  that	  
sense,	  makes	  visible	  what	  is	  ever-­‐present	  for	  some	  but	  unacknowledged	  by	  others;	  
ever-­‐present	  for	  some	  also	  because	  it	  is	  unacknowledged	  by	  others.	  Ahmed	  (2014)	  
describes	  whiteness	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  surrounding,	  something	  that	  is	  just	  around,	  but	  
also,	  following	  Frantz	  Fanon,	  she	  conceptualises	  racism	  as	  “an	  atmosphere	  around	  a	  
black	  body”	  (Ahmed	  2014	  online).	  “An	  atmosphere,”	  Ahmed	  tells	  us,	  “can	  be	  how	  a	  
body	  is	  stopped,	  how	  some	  are	  barred	  from	  entry	  or	  stopped	  from	  staying”	  and	  in	  
that	  sense	  is	  a	  strategy	  of	  socially	  (and	  institutionally)	  imposing	  who	  is	  unwanted,	  
not	  necessarily	  by	  declaring	  so,	  but	  nonetheless	  by	  making	  inhibiting	  a	  space	  
unbearable	  (Ahmed	  2014	  online).	  Ahmed’s	  analysis	  is	  not	  employed	  to	  achieve	  a	  
race-­‐gender	  analogy	  but	  to	  offer	  a	  way	  of	  understanding	  the	  qualities	  that	  compose	  
an	  a	  priori	  non-­‐hospitable	  (or	  even	  unbearable)	  environment	  for	  some	  and,	  thus,	  
can	  “explain”	  much	  of	  the	  reluctance	  of	  my	  interlocutors	  towards	  legal	  action	  as	  a	  
means	  of	  substantially	  improving	  their	  daily	  interaction	  with	  the	  world.	  Her	  
methodological	  grace	  in	  describing	  what	  recedes	  from	  view	  allows	  (at	  least	  an	  
attempt)	  to	  recognise	  the	  atmospheric	  quality	  of	  what	  Lola	  calls	  “the	  rest	  of	  it”	  or	  
what	  Valeria	  refers	  to	  by	  “this	  and	  that	  and	  the	  whole	  thing.”	  
Understanding	  transphobia	  and	  gender	  violence	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  surrounding	  provides	  a	  
framework	  within	  which	  ambivalence	  towards	  a	  narrower	  conceptualisation	  of	  
these	  concepts	  should	  not	  just	  be	  expected	  but	  also	  welcomed.	  Regarding	  violence	  
in	  specific,	  Anna	  Carastathis	  (2018),	  drawing	  from	  Black	  feminist	  and	  transfeminist	  
theories,	  establishes	  an	  understanding	  of	  homo/transphobic	  violence	  in	  modern	  
Greece	  as	  atmospheric.	  Although	  Carastathis	  makes	  this	  point	  with	  broader	  
epistemological	  -­‐	  and	  not	  specifically	  legal	  -­‐	  convictions	  in	  mind,	  her	  analysis	  
enables	  a	  deeper	  reading	  of	  the	  law’s	  (in)ability	  to	  grasp	  the	  atmosphericity	  of	  
transphobic	  violence.	  According	  to	  Carastathis,	  the	  dominant	  model	  of	  engagement	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with	  gender-­‐related	  violence	  is	  based	  on	  a	  perception	  of	  violence	  as	  constituted	  by	  
events	  or	  incidents	  with	  clear	  spatio-­‐temporal	  limits	  that	  allow	  us	  to	  map	  out	  the	  
experience	  of	  violence	  by	  describing,	  charting	  and	  condemning	  such	  events	  
(Carastathis	  2018a).	  	  
This	  way,	  violence	  is	  reduced	  to	  the	  exceptionality	  of	  the	  event	  which	  constitutes	  a	  
“dysfunctional	  exception”	  that	  disrupts	  a	  smooth	  and	  non-­‐violent	  normality	  
(Carastathis	  2018a:	  6).	  This	  conceptualisation,	  even	  when	  it	  implies	  or	  recognises	  
the	  ever-­‐presence	  of	  violence,	  it	  does	  so	  in	  quantitative	  terms	  that	  suggest	  this	  
ever-­‐presence	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  increasing	  numbers	  of	  such	  incidents.	  Nonetheless,	  as	  
Carastathis	  notes,	  the	  difference	  between	  understanding	  violence	  as	  incidental	  or	  
atmospheric	  is	  more	  than	  a	  matter	  of	  proportions.	  The	  difference	  of	  the	  two	  
approaches	  is	  that	  “the	  dominant,	  incidental	  approach	  treats	  gendered	  violence	  in	  
epidemiological	  terms	  as	  outbursts	  of	  a	  disease,	  within	  a	  social	  body	  that	  is,	  besides	  
that,	  healthy”	  (Carastathis	  2018a:	  9,	  my	  translation).	  	  
Indeed,	  the	  legal	  concept	  of	  racist	  crime	  can	  target	  only	  the	  incident,	  the	  rupture,	  
the	  outburst	  of	  (transphobic)	  violence,	  obscuring	  its	  coherency,	  its	  atmosphericity	  
and,	  thus,	  establishing	  normality	  as	  non-­‐violent/racist/transphobic.	  	  
Paradoxically,	  the	  silencing	  of	  queer	  sexualities	  and	  gender	  identities	  
constructed	  as	  transgressive	  by	  an	  aggressively	  heteronormative	  society	  
becomes	  audible	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  “spectacular”	  outbreaks	  of	  violence	  -­‐	  
but	  also	  in	  and	  through	  political	  resistance	  to	  such	  violence	  -­‐	  the	  condition	  
of	  possibility	  of	  which	  is	  the	  banalized,	  institutionalized	  atmospheric	  
violence	  that	  structures	  everyday	  life	  for	  LGBTQ	  people	  (Carastathis	  2018b:	  
287)	  
On	  the	  contrary,	  perceiving	  transphobic	  violence	  as	  atmospheric	  accounts	  for	  
experiencing	  violence	  as	  simultaneously	  “surprisingly	  explosive”	  and	  “suffocatingly	  
banal”	  (or	  “so	  mundane”,	  to	  remember	  Nataly’s	  understanding	  of	  transphobia	  
mentioned	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter)	  (Carastathis	  2018a:	  7).	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The	  banalised	  character	  of	  transphobia	  and	  its	  dissemination	  throughout	  the	  social	  
fabric	  renders	  it	  self-­‐evident	  to	  such	  a	  degree	  that,	  in	  some	  of	  the	  interviews,	  my	  
interlocutors	  would	  reply	  that	  they	  do	  not	  encounter	  problems	  in	  the	  streets	  and	  a	  
few	  minutes	  later	  proceed	  to	  describe	  casually	  several	  motifs	  of	  aggressiveness	  or	  
hostility	  that	  they	  are	  (or	  have	  been)	  faced	  with.	  I	  use	  the	  words	  “aggressiveness”	  
and	  “hostility,”	  as	  it	  might	  be	  useful	  to	  utilise	  other	  concepts	  that	  go	  beyond	  “hate”	  
and	  “violence”	  in	  order	  to	  unearth	  what	  is	  obscured	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  incidental	  
and	  by	  silencing	  the	  atmospheric.	  In	  an	  article	  about	  austerity	  and	  racialised	  
gendered	  violence	  in	  crises,	  Carastathis	  uses	  the	  concept	  of	  “hostility”	  to	  describe	  
an	  affective	  economy	  organised	  not	  necessarily	  only	  by	  hate	  and	  physical	  violence	  
but	  also	  by	  “more	  mundane	  affects”	  (Carastathis	  2015:	  109).	  For	  trans	  people,	  and	  
especially	  those	  among	  them	  that	  do	  not	  pass,	  this	  economy	  of	  hostility	  is	  not	  only	  
misunderstood	  but	  also	  re-­‐legitimised	  by	  obscuring	  “more	  mundane”	  affects	  and	  
their	  catholic	  presence.	  In	  other	  words,	  my	  argument	  here	  is	  that	  continuous	  
conditions	  of	  tension,	  hostility,	  public	  scrutiny,	  hyper-­‐sexualisation	  (for	  trans	  
women),	  precarity	  and	  illegibility	  can	  be	  read	  as	  “the	  rest”	  that	  Lola	  refers	  to	  or	  
“this	  and	  that	  and	  the	  whole	  thing	  together”	  that	  Valeria	  tries	  to	  explain.	  This	  is	  the	  
normality	  that	  is	  understood	  as	  non-­‐violent	  through	  the	  given	  legal	  framework	  and,	  
thus,	  is	  legitimised	  as	  such	  and	  disconnected	  from	  incidents	  of	  violence	  that	  are	  not	  
recognised	  as	  integral	  but	  rather	  as	  exceptional	  in	  this	  normality.	  	  
In	  this	  section,	  I	  have	  explored	  the	  paradoxical	  effects	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  legislation	  on	  a	  
molecular	  level	  through	  an	  analytic	  lens	  enabled	  by	  the	  experience	  of	  transphobia	  
as	  discussed	  with	  my	  interlocutors.	  I	  have	  suggested	  two	  conditions	  (focusing	  on	  
the	  individual	  while	  obscuring	  the	  structural/institutional,	  understanding	  gender	  
violence	  as	  incidental/exceptional	  instead	  of	  atmospheric/normalised)	  as	  crucial	  in	  
accounting	  for	  my	  interlocutors’	  ambivalent	  engagement	  and	  aporetic	  disposition	  
towards	  anti-­‐racist	  legislation.	  The	  symbolic	  and	  practical	  potential	  of	  the	  law	  
competed,	  within	  my	  interlocutors’	  narratives,	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  futility	  in	  the	  face	  of	  
the	  catholic	  character	  of	  transphobic	  (institutional)	  violence.	  Additionally,	  turning	  
to	  state	  authorities	  for	  protection	  was	  depicted	  as	  pointless,	  not	  just	  because	  “the	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police	  does	  not	  give	  a	  damn”	  [Interview	  with	  Sandra	  in	  2017]	  but	  also	  because	  it	  is	  
public	  authorities	  themselves	  that	  have,	  historically	  and	  in	  the	  current	  moment,	  
orchestrated	  violent	  operations	  targeting	  the	  intersections	  of	  marginalised	  gender	  
identities.	  	  
Following	  this,	  here	  legitimate	  questions	  are	  raised	  regarding	  the	  conditions	  under	  
which	  a	  right-­‐wing	  government	  that	  institutionally	  embraced	  and	  relied	  upon	  racist	  
hostility	  and	  violence	  introduced	  this	  legislation.	  And,	  more	  importantly,	  questions	  
regarding	  the	  political	  work	  performed	  by	  this	  introduction	  on	  a	  higher	  political	  
level	  are	  raised.	  The	  next	  section	  attempts	  to	  tackle	  those	  questions	  in	  the	  same	  
rationale	  as	  the	  previous	  chapter	  interrogated	  the	  role	  of	  employment	  anti-­‐
discrimination	  legislation	  in	  the	  state	  political	  agenda.	  
8.5. 	  “Racism	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As	  noted	  earlier,	  in	  contrast	  with	  employment	  anti-­‐discrimination	  legislation,	  anti-­‐
racist	  legislation	  has	  been	  repeatedly	  evoked	  in	  court	  on	  various	  grounds.	  The	  
judicial	  resistance	  it	  was	  faced	  with,	  combined	  with	  the	  political	  imperatives	  of	  
social	  and	  institutional	  racism	  described	  in	  previous	  sections,	  pose	  once	  again	  the	  
same	  question:	  since	  obviously	  the	  protection	  of	  marginalised	  populations	  was	  not	  
a	  priority,	  what	  was	  enabled	  in	  that	  context	  through	  the	  introduction	  of	  this	  
legislation?	  If	  the	  employment	  anti-­‐discrimination	  legislation	  was	  introduced	  within	  
a	  certain	  political	  indifference	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  Europeanisation	  goals,	  how	  can	  
we	  account	  for	  the	  aporia	  concerning	  the	  introduction	  anti-­‐racist	  legislation?	  That	  
is,	  what	  were	  the	  stakes	  involved	  in	  introducing	  such	  a	  legislation	  for	  a	  government,	  
which	  dealt	  so	  much	  pain	  and	  violence	  across	  the	  axis	  of	  ethno-­‐sexual	  belonging	  
and	  whose	  own	  members	  openly	  opposed	  the	  antiracist	  bill	  on	  several	  occasions,	  
thus,	  repeatedly	  blocking	  its	  voting	  (Meliggonis	  2013;	  Sotiropoulos	  2014).	  This	  
section	  briefly	  engages	  with	  these	  questions,	  pointing	  towards	  a	  critical	  reading	  of	  
the	  anti-­‐racist	  legislation	  as	  a	  means	  to	  rename	  the	  intensifying	  Greek	  (and	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European)	  state	  racism	  and	  institutional	  violence	  through	  an	  instrumentalisation	  of	  
the	  concept	  and	  rhetorics	  of	  racist	  crime.	  
Just	  a	  glance	  at	  the	  media	  articles	  and	  reports	  that	  have	  been	  cited	  throughout	  this	  
chapter	  renders	  clear	  that	  the	  discussion	  concerning	  racist	  crimes	  and	  their	  penal	  
handling	  was	  openly	  centred,	  on	  both	  a	  national	  and	  international	  level,	  around	  
Golden	  Dawn’s	  politics	  and	  their	  social	  impact.	  In	  2013,	  the	  Greek	  government	  
replied	  to	  the	  report	  of	  the	  Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Rights	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  
Europe,	  which	  sketched	  out	  a	  grim	  image	  of	  raging	  street-­‐level	  racist	  violence,	  as	  
well	  as	  institutional	  racist	  violence	  -­‐	  especially	  within	  the	  aforementioned	  anti-­‐
migrant	  operations	  such	  as	  Xenios	  Dias	  (CommDH[2013]6).	  The	  government	  
explained	  in	  reply:	  
The	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  the	  Minister	  of	  Citizen	  Protection	  have	  never	  
expressed	  views	  implying	  a	  racist	  or	  xenophobic	  attitude	  to	  migrants.	  Such	  
an	  attitude	  is	  foreign	  to	  their	  political	  culture	  and,	  in	  general,	  to	  the	  
Government’s	  approach.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  words	  or	  phrases	  taken	  out	  of	  
their	  very	  context	  risk	  to	  produce	  false	  impressions,	  generate	  unfair	  
criticism	  and	  blur	  the	  overall	  picture.	  The	  Prime	  Minister’s	  statement	  about	  
the	  “recuperation”	  of	  the	  city	  centers	  from	  illegal	  immigrants	  should	  simply	  
be	  seen	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  Government’s	  firm	  will	  to	  effectively	  
enforce	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  capital.	  This	  (…)	  will	  deprive	  any	  
self-­‐styled	  “protectors	  of	  the	  law”	  of	  the	  tools	  they	  use	  in	  order	  to	  impose	  
their	  ugly	  theory	  and	  practices.	  (…)	  In	  a	  nutshell,	  racism	  is	  an	  enemy	  of	  all	  
of	  us	  and	  we	  are	  all	  on	  the	  same	  page	  on	  this.	  Similarly,	  the	  use	  of	  the	  
terms	  “invasion”	  or	  “bomb”	  by	  the	  Minister	  of	  Citizen	  Protection	  in	  
referring	  to	  the	  huge	  presence	  of	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  illegal	  
immigrants	  in	  the	  country	  should	  better	  be	  seen	  as	  only	  a	  dramatic	  
depiction	  of	  the	  country’s	  reality	  (Comment	  of	  the	  Government	  of	  Greece	  
on	  CommDH(2013)6:	  2).	  	  
Through	  this	  re-­‐naming	  practice,	  this	  spectacular	  exercise	  in	  inverting	  reality,	  
everything	  that	  was	  described	  in	  the	  previous	  sections	  is	  understood	  as	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ideologically	  neutral	  state-­‐operations,	  which	  were	  aimed	  at	  providing	  rational	  
solutions	  to	  practical	  issues.	  Although	  the	  racist	  violence	  of	  Golden	  Dawn	  has	  been	  
enabled	  by	  decades	  long	  state	  racism	  (Emmanouilidis	  &	  Koukoutsaki	  2013),	  after	  
the	  anti-­‐racist	  legislation	  reform	  and	  the	  criminal	  prosecution	  of	  Golden	  Dawn,	  this	  
violence	  is	  presented	  as	  the	  opposite	  of	  state	  rationalism.	  Indeed,	  the	  government	  
discursively	  framed	  the	  anti-­‐racist	  legislation	  as	  a	  struggle	  against	  specific	  forms	  of	  
violence	  that	  were	  defined	  as	  racist	  violence.	  And	  in	  doing	  so	  it	  reserved	  for	  itself	  
the	  right	  to	  establish	  certain	  actions	  and	  them	  alone	  as	  racist	  and	  violent.	  That	  is,	  by	  
conceptualising	  racist	  crime	  and	  racialised	  violence	  as	  either	  the	  purview	  of	  Golden	  
Dawn’s	  militia	  or	  an	  individual	  irrational	  behaviour,	  the	  Greek	  state	  re-­‐
conceptualises	  its	  own	  racist	  violence	  as	  non-­‐racist	  and	  non-­‐violent.	  Moreover,	  it	  
achieves	  a	  legitimation	  of	  its	  extended	  punitive	  function,	  which	  is	  introduced	  as	  a	  
necessity	  against	  the	  “zero	  tolerance	  common	  place”	  that	  Golden	  Dawn	  is	  
supposed	  to	  be,	  but	  is	  ultimately	  also	  reserved	  for	  all	  socio-­‐political	  actors	  that	  are	  
(or	  will	  be)	  declared	  as	  illegal	  or	  dangerous	  (Koukoutsaki	  2013).	  	  	  
Walter	  Benjamin’s	  problematisation	  of	  legal	  violence	  echoes	  here	  as	  it	  calls	  us	  to	  
consider	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  law	  legitimises	  its	  own	  violence,	  thus,	  allowing	  its	  
character	  as	  violent	  to	  recede	  from	  view	  (Benjamin	  [1920]	  1979).	  Judith	  Butler	  
notes	  that	  “in	  Benjamin’s	  view,	  legal	  violence	  regularly	  renames	  its	  own	  violent	  
character	  as	  justifiable	  coercion	  or	  legitimate	  force,	  but	  these	  terms	  sanitise	  the	  
violence	  at	  issue”	  (Butler	  2016:	  40.48’’).	  Using	  this	  tautological	  formula	  wherein	  
legal	  violence	  is	  legitimised	  because	  it	  is	  legal,	  the	  Greek	  government	  “outlawed”	  
Golden	  Dawn’s	  racism	  and	  violence	  as	  racist	  crime	  while	  re-­‐establishing	  its	  own	  
practices	  of	  racialised	  and	  gendered	  violence	  as	  legal,	  thus	  legitimate,	  and,	  thus,	  
non-­‐racist	  and	  non-­‐violent.	  Against	  the	  irrational	  racist	  violence	  of	  Golden	  Dawn,	  
the	  Greek	  state	  re-­‐names	  its	  own	  racist	  practices	  and	  violent	  operations	  as	  
necessary	  and	  “justifiable	  coercion”	  in	  a	  state	  of	  emergency.	  	  
Under	  this	  prism,	  another	  take	  on	  the	  international	  aspects	  of	  this	  debate	  is	  also	  
enabled.	  That	  is,	  the	  international	  articles	  and	  reports	  that	  have	  been	  cited	  
throughout	  this	  chapter	  which	  epitomise	  the	  criticism	  of	  European	  institutions’	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representatives	  towards	  the	  Greek	  state’s	  inability	  to	  battle	  racist	  violence	  and	  
institutional	  racism	  should	  be	  read	  within	  a	  similar	  schema	  of	  self-­‐justificatory	  
authority	  and	  re-­‐naming	  function.	  The	  abundance	  of	  European	  institutions’	  articles	  
and	  reports	  frowning	  upon	  the	  increase	  of	  hate-­‐crime,	  racist	  violence	  and	  
xenophobic	  rhetoric	  in	  Greece	  carefully	  side	  step	  the	  framework	  that	  dictated	  the	  
strengthening	  of	  border	  militarisation,	  the	  creation	  of	  detention	  camps	  and	  the	  
mass	  police	  operations	  in	  Greek	  cities.	  For	  example,	  the	  Commissioner	  stated	  in	  his	  
aforementioned	  report:	  
The	  Commissioner	  urges	  the	  authorities	  to	  put	  an	  end	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  
ethnic	  profiling	  by	  the	  police,	  reportedly	  widely	  used	  concerning	  Roma	  and	  
as	  part	  of	  the	  “Xenios	  Zeus”	  police	  operation	  under	  which	  the	  legal	  status	  
of	  migrants	  is	  verified.	  Racial	  profiling	  is	  discriminatory	  and	  seriously	  
undermines	  confidence	  in	  the	  police	  among	  the	  social	  groups	  targeted.	  
Drawing	  on	  ECRI’s	  General	  Policy	  Recommendation	  N°	  11	  on	  combating	  
racism	  and	  racial	  discrimination	  in	  policing,	  the	  authorities	  are	  invited	  to	  
introduce	  in	  the	  law	  enforcement	  rules	  a	  “reasonable	  suspicion	  standard”,	  
whereby	  powers	  relating	  to	  control,	  surveillance	  or	  investigation	  activities	  
can	  only	  be	  exercised	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  suspicion	  that	  is	  founded	  on	  
objective	  criteria	  (CommDH(2013)6:	  28).	  	  
In	  other	  words,	  the	  problem	  with	  the	  operation	  Xenios	  Zeus	  is	  that	  it	  was	  not	  
executed	  correctly	  or	  that	  there	  are	  more	  correct	  and	  humane	  ways	  of	  recognising	  
individuals	  on	  the	  street	  as	  foreigners,	  massively	  detaining	  populations,	  classifying	  
them	  as	  legal	  or	  illegal	  (refugees	  or	  migrants)	  and	  deciding	  accordingly	  their	  
detention/deportation/relocation,	  etc.	  The	  militarisation	  of	  European	  borders	  and	  
the	  securitisation	  of	  cities	  as	  a	  political	  project,	  along	  with	  the	  xenophobic	  
discourses	  that	  enabled	  it,	  recede	  from	  view	  here.	  	  
Nonetheless,	  as	  many	  commentators	  have	  pointed	  out	  in	  relation	  to	  this	  procedural	  
sensitivity,	  it	  was	  the	  European	  Union	  who	  funded	  operation	  Xenios	  Zeus	  and	  it	  was	  
a	  European	  political	  intervention	  which	  established	  the	  presence	  of	  FRONTEX	  on	  
Greek	  borders	  (resulting	  in	  hundreds	  of	  deaths)	  and	  which	  progressively,	  through	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the	  sealing	  of	  borders	  along	  the	  Balkan	  route,	  trapped	  thousands	  of	  people	  in	  slow	  
death	  conditions	  on	  the	  Greek	  periphery	  and	  in	  detention	  camps	  (HRW	  2011;	  
Martin	  2013;	  Carastathis	  2015).	  Overall,	  as	  Carastathis	  notes,	  it	  is	  the	  EU	  “which	  
funds	  the	  Greek	  state’s	  immigration	  practices	  -­‐	  enforcement,	  detention	  and	  
deportation	  even	  as	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  denounces	  them”	  
(Carastasthis	  2015:	  78).	  That	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  Hellenic	  Police	  and	  other	  
institutional	  agents	  do	  not	  demonstrate	  unapologetic	  cruelty.	  Rather	  to	  clarify,	  that	  
even	  without	  this	  aspect,	  these	  operations	  would	  still	  be	  founded	  upon	  racist	  
imperatives	  and	  the	  forceful	  materialisation	  of	  the	  “fortress	  Europe”	  dogma	  that	  
categorically	  deals	  racialised	  violence	  and	  death	  (Amnesty	  International	  2014).	  	  
Nonetheless,	  although	  the	  current	  European	  political	  project	  is	  inextricably	  linked	  
to	  racialised	  violence,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  investment	  in	  the	  depiction	  of	  Europe	  
as	  defender	  and	  provider	  of	  human	  rights	  leads	  to	  the	  condemnation	  of	  the	  
increasing	  racist	  violence	  in	  Greece.	  As	  hinted	  at	  earlier,	  the	  international	  political	  
pressure	  was	  of	  crucial	  importance	  for	  the	  unwilling	  reform	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  legislation	  
by	  the	  Nea	  Dimokratia	  government.	  Throughout	  the	  public	  debate	  concerning	  this	  
reform,	  which	  had	  already	  been	  attempted	  by	  previous	  governments,	  
representatives	  of	  European	  institutions	  had	  repeatedly	  called	  on	  the	  Greek	  state	  
to	  “do	  more”	  in	  order	  to	  combat	  racist	  violence	  within	  its	  territory.176	  Although	  
similar	  pressures	  had	  produced	  political	  results	  during	  the	  previous	  period	  (within	  
the	  dominance	  of	  the	  modernisation/Europeanisation	  debate),	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  
influence	  differs	  in	  the	  era	  discussed.	  	  
That	  is,	  if,	  as	  suggested	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  conditionality	  of	  European	  
funds	  was	  an	  initiative	  or	  a	  factor	  for	  policy	  reforms	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  2000s,	  the	  
post-­‐memorandum	  era	  is	  characterised	  by	  an	  extent	  of	  conditionality	  that	  marks	  a	  
paradigm-­‐shift	  in	  European	  governance	  and	  state	  sovereignty.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176
	  Such	  examples	  are	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Commissioner’s	  Nils	  Muižnieks	  report	  on	  the	  situation	  in	  
Greece	  (CommDH(2013)6),	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  submission	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  Committee	  
against	  Torture	  (HumanRightsWatch	  2014)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  repeated	  visits	  by	  the	  European	  Home	  
Affairs	  Commissioner	  Cecilia	  Malmstrom	  (Dabilis	  2013;	  ekathimerini	  2013).	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Financial	  assistance	  to	  Eurozone	  countries	  facing	  severe	  financial	  
difficulties	  gave	  the	  Union	  the	  opportunity	  to	  interfere,	  in	  sweeping	  and	  
incisive	  ways,	  with	  the	  financial	  and	  macroeconomic	  policies	  of	  the	  
recipient	  Member	  States.	  Common	  to	  all	  adjustment	  programmes	  was	  the	  
use	  of	  strict	  conditionality:	  all	  loans	  awarded	  were	  made	  dependent	  on	  the	  
recipient	  state’s	  compliance	  with	  strictly	  monitored	  economic	  policy	  
conditions.	  From	  the	  first	  bilateral	  assistance	  package	  to	  Greece,	  to	  the	  
EFSF	  and	  EFSM,	  and	  finally	  to	  the	  ESM,	  a	  similar	  scheme	  was	  followed	  
(Poulou	  2014:	  1147).	  
Poulou	  makes	  the	  argument	  that	  financial	  support	  conditionality	  interfered	  so	  
deeply	  in	  the	  national	  infrastructure	  that	  it	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  understood	  as	  solely	  
economic	  governance.	  Rather,	  she	  suggests	  a	  conceptualisation	  of	  such	  deep	  
intervention	  as	  a	  means	  of	  European	  social	  governance,	  which	  transcends	  a	  limited	  
fiscal	  agreement	  with	  a	  sovereign	  state.	  
(…)	  the	  concept	  of	  European	  social	  governance	  is	  suggested	  to	  describe	  the	  
newly	  introduced,	  indirect	  way	  the	  Union	  has	  found	  to	  dictate	  national	  
social	  policy,	  portraying	  its	  intervention	  as	  a	  financial	  assistance	  
prerequisite.	  In	  this	  governance	  pattern	  the	  social	  policy	  of	  Member	  States	  
receiving	  financial	  assistance	  is	  not	  directly	  assigned	  to	  the	  competences	  of	  
the	  Union,	  but	  is	  indirectly	  defined	  through	  the	  emergence	  of	  an	  extra-­‐
regulatory	  European	  institutional	  framework	  operating	  above	  national	  
structures.	  Domestic	  arenas	  are	  treated	  as	  spaces	  to	  be	  regulated	  and	  
supranational	  arenas	  as	  processes	  engaged	  in	  regulating.	  Decisions	  at	  the	  
European	  level	  have	  such	  a	  profound	  and	  widespread	  impact	  on	  the	  
national	  level	  of	  governance	  that	  domestic	  decisions	  on	  social	  policy	  
matters	  cannot	  be	  assessed	  separately	  (Poulou	  2014:	  1150).	  	  
At	  this	  historical	  moment	  in	  European	  politics	  and	  with	  feverish	  negotiations	  
concerning	  Greece’s	  financial	  support	  unfolding,	  we	  do	  not	  have	  to	  dig	  very	  deep	  to	  
see	  why	  negative	  attention	  from	  European	  institutions	  could	  not	  be	  ignored	  by	  any	  
government.	  To	  that	  end,	  the	  European	  Union’s	  legal	  violence,	  which	  materialised	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in	  Greece	  in	  both	  migrant	  population	  management	  and	  austerity	  politics	  
enforcement,	  re-­‐legitimised	  itself	  through	  the	  plight	  to	  combat	  hate-­‐crime	  as	  the	  
true	  form	  of	  racism	  and	  violence.	  In	  this	  vein,	  the	  reform	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  legislation	  
established	  on	  both	  national	  and	  European	  communicational	  fronts	  that	  European	  
political	  powers	  and	  states	  strive	  against	  racism	  and	  xenophobia	  while	  racist	  and	  
xenophobic	  political	  projects	  were	  being	  intensified.	  That,	  in	  turn,	  as	  explained	  
above,	  provided	  the	  means	  for	  the	  Greek	  state’s	  parallel	  process	  of	  re-­‐legitimising	  
its	  own	  legal	  violence	  along	  the	  axes	  of	  race,	  gender,	  national	  belonging	  and	  socio-­‐
economic	  status.	  	  
In	  this	  last	  section	  of	  the	  chapter,	  I	  teased	  out	  some	  threads	  that	  indicate	  the	  work	  
performed	  by	  the	  legislation	  against	  racism	  within	  exemplary	  moments	  of	  Greek	  
and	  European	  racist	  politics.	  I	  have	  suggested	  some	  points	  in	  this	  process	  that	  
account	  for	  the	  seemingly	  inexplicable	  coincidence	  of	  formal	  legal	  protection	  and	  
system(at)ic	  annihilation	  of	  the	  nation’s	  Others.	  I	  have	  argued	  that,	  precisely	  
through	  the	  investment	  in	  rhetorics	  against	  discrimination,	  racism	  and	  violence	  that	  
are	  materialised	  in	  specific	  forms,	  an	  entire	  set	  of	  practices	  and	  imperatives	  were	  
reconceptualised	  and	  legitimised	  as	  non-­‐racist	  and	  non-­‐violent.	  Continuing	  to	  
explore	  the	  complex	  workings	  of	  legislative	  pieces	  that	  engage	  to	  varying	  degrees	  
with	  gender	  identity	  issues,	  the	  next	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  the	  most	  specialised	  of	  
them,	  that	  is,	  the	  legislation	  on	  gender	  identity	  recognition	  and	  its	  recent	  paradigm-­‐
shift.	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Chapter	  9. Identity	  Documents,	  (Mis)Recognition	  	  
and	  the	  New	  Legislation	  on	  Gender	  Identity	  
As	  shown	  in	  chapter	  three,	  legal	  (mis)recognition	  and	  the	  amendment	  of	  identity	  
documents	  has	  been	  a	  central	  issue	  in	  both	  trans	  academic	  literature	  and	  trans	  
political	  struggles.	  The	  procedure	  and	  criteria	  under	  which	  a	  person	  is	  legally	  
gendered	  have	  been	  debated	  in	  different	  fora	  and	  have	  created	  a	  legacy	  of	  
trans/queer/feminist	  critical	  analyses,	  international	  jurisprudence	  and	  medico-­‐legal	  
analyses.	  In	  the	  Greek	  context,	  as	  shown	  in	  chapters	  five	  and	  six,	  this	  has	  similarly	  
constituted,	  historically,	  a	  central	  issue	  for	  the	  legal	  management	  of	  gender	  non-­‐
conformity.	  It	  has	  also	  been	  the	  legal	  focus	  point	  for	  contemporary	  trans	  
communities	  that	  have	  claimed	  an	  extra-­‐judicial,	  affordable	  and,	  most	  importantly,	  
de-­‐medicalised	  process	  for	  the	  amendment	  of	  legal	  gender	  (GTSA	  2015b;	  
QueerTrans	  2013).	  	  
In	  this	  vein,	  the	  present	  chapter	  presents	  the	  prominent	  issue	  of	  gender	  identity	  
(mis)recognition	  as	  it	  is	  negotiated	  on	  different	  levels.	  In	  the	  first	  section,	  I	  offer	  a	  
brief	  overview	  of	  the	  framework	  and	  judicial	  practice	  for	  the	  amendment	  of	  legal	  
gender	  on	  identity	  documents	  prior	  to	  the	  newly	  introduced	  legislation.	  From	  the	  
inaccessibility	  of	  the	  medico-­‐legal	  processes	  connected	  to	  transitioning	  to	  the	  
casual	  exchanges	  with	  state	  and	  private	  actors,	  trans	  individuals	  have	  been	  called	  to	  
engage	  with	  overlapping	  mechanisms	  of	  recognition	  that,	  as	  the	  second	  section	  will	  
show,	  offer	  no	  guarantees	  concerning	  the	  outcome	  of	  this	  interaction.	  Following	  
the	  threads	  of	  my	  interlocutors’	  discourse,	  I	  provide	  the	  space	  in	  the	  text	  for	  this	  to	  
be	  explored	  through	  the	  discussion	  of	  intimate	  instances	  of	  gender	  identity	  
(mis)recognition,	  survival	  strategies	  and	  informal	  practices	  within	  a	  context	  of	  
bureaucratic	  irregularity.	  	  
The	  second	  half	  of	  the	  chapter	  brings	  back	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  legislative	  terrain	  by	  
following	  the	  introduction	  of	  Law	  4491/2017,	  which	  marks	  a	  paradigm-­‐shift	  in	  the	  
legal	  regulation	  of	  gender	  identity.	  Law	  4491/2017	  was	  presented	  by	  the	  SYRIZA	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government	  as	  a	  legislative	  acknowledgement	  of	  trans	  citizens	  and	  a	  detailed	  
regulation	  of	  trans	  issues	  in	  concreto	  that	  came	  to	  replace	  the	  decades	  long	  
improvised	  judicial	  practice.	  The	  new	  legislation	  moved	  away	  from	  any	  medical	  
requirements	  for	  legal	  gender	  amendment,	  but,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  retained	  the	  
judicial	  process	  for	  amending	  legal	  gender	  (even	  if,	  on	  a	  declaratory	  level,	  it	  
prioritised	  self-­‐determination)	  and	  brought	  new	  limitations	  concerning	  age	  and	  
marital	  status.	  
Moreover,	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  law	  became	  a	  massive	  media	  operation,	  
establishing	  the	  public	  debate	  as	  an	  equally	  important	  legacy	  to	  its	  legal	  
contribution.	  The	  sudden	  overproduction	  of	  media	  and	  political	  discourses	  on	  
gender	  identity	  that	  flooded	  current	  affairs	  for	  several	  days	  produced	  an	  effect	  
unprecedented	  for	  Greek	  trans	  communities	  and	  caught	  many	  trans	  individuals	  by	  
surprise.	  Although	  I	  do	  not	  engage	  with	  the	  broader	  media	  debates	  that	  took	  place,	  
I	  analyse	  the	  common	  front	  of	  right-­‐wing	  and	  Orthodox	  opposition	  to	  the	  bill	  as	  it	  
was	  expressed	  during	  the	  parliamentary	  discussions	  of	  the	  legislation.	  The	  
connection	  between	  religious	  as	  well	  as	  nationalist	  imperatives	  and	  the	  regulation	  
of	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  have	  been	  well	  recorded	  in	  the	  past	  (Halkias	  2004;	  
Athanasiou	  2007;	  Canakis	  2013;	  Athanasiou	  2012;	  Apostolidou	  2014;	  Chalkidou	  
2018).	  On	  this	  basis,	  I	  examine	  the	  ideological	  premises	  upon	  which	  the	  
parliamentary	  opposition	  was	  organised	  in	  order	  to	  create	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  
way	  gender	  identity	  recognition	  entered	  the	  public	  debate	  as	  an	  issue	  of	  national	  
importance	  in	  reference	  to	  social	  morality	  as	  well	  as	  national	  sovereignty.	  Lastly,	  I	  
conclude	  this	  chapter	  by	  briefly	  interrogating,	  as	  in	  previous	  chapters,	  the	  work	  
performed	  on	  a	  government-­‐scale	  by	  the	  introduction	  of	  this	  law	  and,	  specifically,	  
the	  aims	  and	  effects	  of	  its	  exploitation	  on	  the	  communicational	  front.	  	  
9.1. Amending	  Legal	  Documents	  under	  the	  Previous	  Legal	  
Framework	  
The	  first	  explicit	  provision	  of	  the	  Greek	  lawmaker	  concerning	  the	  amendment	  of	  
gender	  in	  identity	  documents	  came	  in	  1997	  after	  several	  decades	  of	  non-­‐systematic	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relevant	  judicial	  practise.	  Law	  344/1976	  On	  Civil	  Status	  Acts,	  as	  amended	  by	  Article	  
14(6)	  of	  Law	  2503/1997	  and	  replaced	  by	  Law	  4144/2013	  states	  that:	  
Changes	  occurring	  to	  the	  status	  of	  an	  individual	  after	  the	  editing	  of	  the	  civil	  
registration	  acts	  due	  to	  […]	  changes	  in	  name,	  surname,	  sex	  are	  registered	  
in	  the	  field	  of	  the	  information	  system	  of	  Article	  8A,	  marked	  as	  "changes",	  
within	  a	  month	  of	  receiving	  the	  relative	  administrative	  act	  or	  certificate	  on	  
the	  finality	  of	  the	  relevant	  judicial	  ruling	  (Law	  4144/2013	  article	  4[5],	  my	  
translation).	  	  
The	  aforementioned	  legislative	  provision	  remained	  for	  several	  years	  the	  only	  
reference	  to	  trans	  people	  (not	  in	  such	  terms	  but	  under	  the	  purview	  of	  “sex	  
change”)	  in	  the	  totality	  of	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order.	  Given	  this	  brief	  and	  vague	  wording,	  
it	  has	  been	  a	  matter	  of	  judicial	  interpretation	  to	  define	  the	  supposedly	  self-­‐evident	  
content	  of	  the	  term	  “sex	  change”.	  Since	  the	  1990s,	  the	  judicial	  practise	  has	  settled	  
on	  a	  long	  and	  expensive	  procedure	  that	  requires	  various	  medical	  interventions	  
(Greek	  National	  Commission	  for	  Human	  Rights-­‐GNCHR	  2015;Kounougeri-­‐
Manoledaki	  2017b).	  The	  ruling	  judges	  have	  held	  that	  “sex	  change”	  occurs	  in	  cases	  
that	  begin	  with	  a	  diagnosis	  of	  “transsexualism/gender	  dysphoria”	  and	  end	  in	  a	  “sex	  
change	  operation”	  towards	  the	  genital	  anatomy	  of	  the	  opposite	  sex	  (Galanou	  2016:	  
50).177	  Until	  recently,	  only	  after	  the	  completion	  of	  this	  medical	  process,	  an	  
application	  could	  be	  submitted	  to	  the	  Civil	  Court	  of	  First	  Instance	  or	  a	  District	  Court	  
(similar	  to	  the	  Magistrate	  Court)	  requesting	  the	  correction	  of	  name,	  surname	  and	  
sex	  indicator	  on	  the	  birth	  certificate	  produced	  by	  the	  registrar	  (Galanou	  2016:	  49).	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  In	  practise,	  the	  diagnosis	  of	  transsexualism	  or	  gender	  dysphoria	  is	  made	  by	  a	  psychiatrist	  who	  
suggests	  that	  the	  person,	  after	  a	  series	  of	  sessions	  with	  a	  psychotherapist,	  	  should	  receive	  
hormonotherapy	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  an	  endocrinologist.	  If	  one	  can	  afford	  a	  private	  mental	  
health	  consultations	  and	  private	  hormone	  treatment	  this	  stage	  can	  be	  significantly	  shortened.	  Most	  
cases,	  nonetheless,	  go	  through	  public	  hospital	  psychiatrists	  and	  general	  hospitals	  that	  occasionally	  
stretch	  this	  period	  even	  more.	  After	  a	  significant	  time	  of	  hormone	  admission	  and	  psychotherapy,	  if	  
the	  person’s	  health,	  age	  and	  financial	  situation	  allow	  it,	  they	  can	  seek	  the	  services	  of	  a	  private	  plastic	  
surgeon	  to	  perform	  the	  chosen	  operations.	  There	  is	  no	  more	  than	  a	  couple	  of	  surgeons	  that	  perform	  
this	  kind	  of	  procedures	  in	  Greece,	  leading	  in	  many	  cases	  to	  the	  choice	  of	  travelling	  to	  specialist	  
clinics	  abroad,	  adding	  to	  the	  cost	  and	  difficulty	  of	  the	  procedure	  (GNCHR	  2015:	  10).	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Such	  an	  application	  had	  to	  contain	  written	  certification	  by	  the	  psychiatrist	  to	  assert	  
the	  diagnosis	  and	  the	  necessity	  of	  the	  undertaken	  treatment.	  Furthermore,	  written	  
confirmation	  by	  the	  endocrinologist	  and	  the	  surgeon	  were	  also	  required,	  
concerning	  the	  hormone	  therapy	  and,	  most	  importantly,	  the	  surgically	  modified	  
genital	  anatomy.	  After	  several	  months,	  the	  application	  would	  be	  tried	  under	  
voluntary	  jurisdiction	  procedure	  and	  usually	  with	  a	  witness	  on	  the	  applicant’s	  side	  
(GNCHR	  2015:	  15;	  Tsirou	  2019:	  48).	  Once	  the	  decision	  became	  final,	  the	  applicant	  
could	  refer	  to	  the	  registrar	  offices	  with	  the	  decision	  and	  ask	  for	  an	  amendment	  of	  
their	  birth	  registration	  act	  that	  would,	  until	  recently,	  maintain,	  a	  clear	  trace	  of	  the	  
corrections,	  the	  reason	  for	  it	  	  and	  the	  relevant	  court	  decision	  (Tsirou	  2019:	  48).178	  
As	  noted	  in	  chapter	  six,	  by	  the	  change	  of	  the	  century,	  court	  decisions	  on	  such	  
applications	  had	  become	  rather	  codified	  in	  their	  decisions	  and	  reasoning,	  creating	  
an	  unofficial	  standardisation	  of	  the	  procedure	  for	  both	  applicants	  and	  judges	  
(Decision	  6843/2007	  First	  Instance	  Court	  of	  Athens,	  Decision	  430/2013	  First	  
Instance	  Court	  of	  Patras,	  Decision	  175/2006	  First	  Instance	  Court	  of	  Rethymno).	  	  
In	  2016,	  a	  radical	  shift	  in	  judicial	  practice	  began	  with	  decision	  418/2016	  of	  the	  
Athens	  District	  Court	  which	  allowed	  the	  amendment	  of	  a	  trans	  man’s	  legal	  gender	  
without	  genital	  surgeries.179	  Following	  this	  case,	  more	  applications	  were	  brought	  in	  
court,	  creating	  a	  body	  of	  judgements	  with	  various	  positive	  outcomes	  (Kati	  2017;	  
Leleki	  2017;	  Sotiropoulos	  2018;	  Tsirou	  2019).180	  By	  winter	  of	  2017,	  there	  were	  
approximately	  twenty	  similar	  applications	  that	  had	  been	  accepted	  in	  courts	  across	  
the	  country	  [Interview	  with	  Legal	  Professional	  1	  in	  2017].	  These	  cases	  marked	  a	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  After	  the	  corrections	  are	  made	  official,	  the	  amendment	  of	  various	  official	  documents	  can	  be	  
pursued	  by	  separate	  applications	  to	  the	  competent	  authorities	  (Galanou	  2016:	  50).	  
179
	  Vassilis	  Sotiropoulos,	  the	  lawyer	  who	  represented	  the	  applicant,	  summarises	  the	  case	  as	  such:	  
This	  is	  the	  first	  judgment	  on	  a	  trans	  man	  case	  (female	  to	  male)	  who	  had	  undergone	  mastectomy	  and	  
hormone	  treatment,	  without	  reassignment	  of	  female	  genitals.	  The	  court	  found	  that	  the	  obligatory	  
sterilisation	  consists	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  right	  to	  respect	  private	  life	  (article	  8	  to	  ECHR)	  and	  the	  rights	  to	  
equal	  treatments	  and	  non-­‐discrimination	  (articles	  2	  and	  26	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  
Political	  Rights)	  (Sotiropoulos	  2018,	  online).	  	  
180
	  Other	  examples	  include	  decision	  572/2017	  of	  the	  Athens	  District	  Court	  wherein	  a	  trans	  woman,	  
which	  had	  undergone	  only	  hormone	  treatment,	  corrected	  her	  legal	  gender	  as	  well	  as	  decision	  
604/2017	  of	  the	  Athens	  District	  Court	  concerning	  another	  trans	  woman,	  which	  had	  not	  undergone	  
hormone	  treatment	  or	  surgery.	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crucial	  shift	  in	  judicial	  practise	  even	  though	  they	  had	  to	  be	  supported	  by	  “proof”	  
such	  as	  childhood	  pictures	  and	  mental	  health	  opinions.181	  Decision	  418/2016	  that	  
marked	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  change	  in	  judicial	  practice	  is	  hailed	  as	  “a	  pioneer	  ruling	  
for	  trans	  people’s	  rights	  in	  Greece”,	  especially	  considering	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  preceded	  
by	  a	  whole	  year	  the	  relevant	  shift	  in	  ECHR	  practice	  reflected	  in	  A.P.,	  Garçon	  and	  
Nicot	  v.	  France	  in	  2017	  (Tsirou	  2019:	  51).	  	  
The	  centrality	  of	  post-­‐surgical	  genital	  anatomy	  within	  the	  legal	  process	  and	  the	  
difficulties	  of	  the	  above-­‐described	  procedure	  have	  framed	  for	  many	  years	  the	  
interaction	  of	  trans	  people	  with	  the	  law.	  Moreover,	  what	  needs	  to	  be	  noted	  here	  is	  
not	  only	  the	  effect	  of	  surgical	  preconditions	  as	  an	  overall	  principle	  but	  also	  the	  
amplification	  of	  adversity	  by	  the	  inaccessibility	  of	  transition-­‐related	  information	  and	  
the	  severe	  lack	  of	  infrastructure.	  Until	  2016	  and	  the	  change	  in	  judicial	  practice,	  
those	  who	  did	  not	  want	  or	  could	  not	  access	  (due	  to	  financial,	  age,	  citizenship	  status	  
or	  other	  reasons)	  the	  required	  operations	  were	  presented	  with	  a	  legal	  impasse.	  As	  
Hector	  described	  it	  in	  2014:	  	  
First	  of	  all	  you	  need	  to	  go	  there	  and	  justify	  all	  this…I	  mean,	  ok	  […]	  I	  consider	  
it	  tragic	  that	  they	  expect	  when	  someone	  refers	  to	  a	  sex	  change	  that	  it	  
should	  mean	  you	  have	  gone	  through	  phalloplasty	  or	  the	  
equivalent…depending	  on	  the	  gender	  you	  choose	  anyway,	  that	  is	  I	  consider	  
it…I	  mean	  how	  can	  you	  force	  me	  to	  do	  this?	  Even	  the	  hysterectomy,	  it	  
seems	  just	  insane	  to	  me,	  right?	  [Interview	  with	  Hector	  in	  2014].	  	  
Moreover,	  until	  very	  recently,	  accessing	  information	  about	  transition-­‐related	  
medical	  and	  legal	  procedures	  was	  a	  task	  on	  its	  own.	  At	  different	  moments	  we	  have	  
discussed	  with	  my	  interlocutors	  the	  lack	  of	  information	  that	  would	  often	  make	  self-­‐
identification	  seem	  impossible.	  Especially	  for	  trans	  masculine	  people,	  the	  lack	  of	  
any	  representation	  and	  the	  difficulty	  of	  the	  procedure	  often	  lead	  to	  “dead-­‐ends”,	  as	  
Philip	  explained	  to	  me,	  forcing	  them	  to	  abstain	  not	  only	  from	  identifying	  as	  trans	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  For	  a	  brief	  presentation	  of	  such	  cases	  see	  Sotiropoulos’	  article	  (Sotiropoulos	  2018).	  For	  a	  
doctrinal	  analysis	  of	  this	  litigation	  see	  Tsirou	  2019.	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but	  from	  living	  life	  itself.	  It	  has	  been	  through	  unofficial	  networks	  (such	  as	  political	  
groups	  or	  friendship	  circles	  or	  random	  encounters)	  that	  each	  had	  to	  find	  their	  own	  
source	  faced	  with	  a	  lack	  of	  any	  official	  or	  easily	  available	  information.	  
The	  same	  networks	  were	  used	  to	  understand	  and	  navigate	  the	  legal	  process	  as	  the	  
two	  strands	  (medical	  and	  legal)	  were	  completely	  entangled.	  Dimitra	  Giannou	  
accurately	  notes	  in	  her	  research	  about	  LGBT	  health	  inequalities	  in	  Greece	  that	  the	  
networks	  created	  by	  political	  groups	  have	  often	  been	  crucial	  to	  the	  circulation	  of	  
information	  about	  transitioning	  and	  other	  health	  issues	  (Giannou	  2017:	  159-­‐160).	  In	  
addition,	  she	  found	  that	  “the	  trans	  activists	  themselves	  were	  trying	  to	  control	  and	  
limit	  the	  circulation	  of	  inaccurate	  and	  invalid	  health-­‐care	  information	  within	  their	  
groups”	  (Giannou	  2017:	  159).	  Lola	  herself	  was	  informed	  about	  the	  procedure	  she	  
had	  to	  follow	  through	  a	  political	  group:	  	  
Me:	  And	  so…this	  functions	  as	  a	  network	  in	  a	  way…	  
Lola:	  It’s	  an	  infrastructure	  this	  group	  I	  think…	  
Me:	  In	  terms	  of,	  let’s	  say,	  informing	  people…	  
Lola:	  Yes.	  
Me:	  Cause	  you	  said	  it’s	  not	  that	  easy	  to	  figure	  things	  out…	  
Lola:	  Not	  at	  all!	  No,	  no,	  it’s	  not	  easy,	  not	  even	  through	  the	  internet,	  there	  is	  
no	  manual	  of	  sorts…	  
Me:	  Did	  you	  try	  to	  figure	  it	  out	  through	  the	  internet	  first?	  
Lola:	  No,	  I	  found	  myself	  straight	  away	  in	  this	  environment	  and	  got	  all	  the	  
information	  I	  needed	  safely	  and	  everything	  was	  ok	  somehow,	  everything	  
was	  as	  they	  said.	  But	  I	  know	  from	  other	  trans	  people	  who	  come	  to	  the	  
group	  finally	  in	  person	  and	  they	  say	  “I	  have	  been	  searching	  for	  very	  long	  
through	  the	  internet	  and	  until	  I	  found	  the	  forum	  -­‐	  cause	  the	  group	  has	  a	  
forum	  -­‐	  until	  I	  found	  the	  forum	  I	  couldn’t	  act	  with	  safety	  and	  I	  didn’t	  know	  
where	  to	  turn	  to”.	  Like:	  there	  is	  a	  procedure	  that	  says	  that	  in	  order	  to	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proceed	  to	  the	  stage	  of	  hormonotherapy	  you	  need	  to	  be	  monitored	  by	  a	  
psychiatrist	  and	  there	  are	  just	  two	  of	  them	  that	  are	  not	  in	  private	  practice.	  
Until	  you	  get	  there	  you	  need	  to	  wait	  x	  amount	  of	  time	  for	  an	  appointment	  
and	  he	  will	  postpone	  it	  and	  then	  postpone	  it	  again	  etc.	  This	  is	  something	  
that	  someone	  needs	  to	  tell	  you	  how	  it’s	  done,	  to	  describe	  it	  and	  to	  explain	  
what	  the	  reasons	  behind	  it	  are	  etc.	  Because	  the	  psychiatrist	  will	  never	  
explain	  to	  you	  why	  he	  denies	  that	  you	  are	  trans	  and	  why	  he	  needs	  to	  check	  
again	  in	  two	  months…for	  example.	  So	  in	  any	  case	  I,	  for	  one,	  would	  not	  
suggest	  to	  a	  trans	  person	  if	  they	  asked,	  I	  wouldn’t	  say	  check	  the	  internet,	  
it’s	  all	  there.	  I	  wouldn’t	  suggest	  this.	  For	  nothing.	  For	  none	  of	  the	  processes	  
concerning	  transitioning.	  I	  would	  just	  get	  my	  phone	  out	  and	  give	  the	  
numbers	  they	  need	  and	  it	  would	  go	  from	  there.	  [Interview	  with	  Lola	  in	  
2014].	  	  
The	  time	  spent	  to	  find	  the	  necessary	  information,	  the	  time	  required	  for	  the	  entire	  
medical	  process	  that	  was	  demanded	  and,	  in	  addition,	  the	  lengthy	  legal	  process	  all	  
amount	  to	  several	  years	  of	  a	  person’s	  life.	  This	  is	  currently	  changing	  not	  so	  much	  in	  
terms	  of	  institutional	  infrastructure	  but	  more	  so	  in	  terms	  of	  media	  platforms	  that	  
make	  information	  more	  accessible	  and	  allow	  the	  visibility	  of	  various	  trans	  identities	  
and	  experiences.	  	  
Nonetheless,	  the	  costs	  and	  difficulties	  involved	  in	  the	  medical	  and	  legal	  process	  
described	  above	  have	  forced	  many	  trans	  individuals	  to	  live	  without	  proper	  
documentation	  and	  improvise	  their	  own	  legal	  realities.	  The	  next	  section	  focuses	  on	  
aspects	  of	  these	  realities	  as	  they	  came	  up	  in	  discussion	  with	  my	  interlocutors	  in	  
order	  to	  obtain	  an	  intimate	  understanding	  of	  the	  tangible	  experience	  of	  legal	  
(mis)recognition	  within	  a	  specific	  set	  of	  bureaucratic	  systems.	  	  
9.2. The	  Tyranny	  of	  Discretion	  and	  Bureaucratic	  Survival	  Skills	  	  
The	  complications	  and	  impossibilities	  of	  navigating	  a	  bureaucratic	  state	  carrying	  
identification	  documents	  that	  do	  not	  match	  one’s	  gender	  presentation	  have	  been	  
repeatedly	  recorded	  and	  protested	  by	  trans	  writers	  and	  activists	  (Whittle	  2002;	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Namaste	  [2005]	  2011;	  Galanou	  2011).	  Instead	  of	  attempting	  to	  list	  such	  adversities,	  
I	  will	  take	  this	  space	  to	  conceptualise	  some	  aspects	  of	  this	  reality	  as	  they	  came	  up	  
during	  the	  interviews.	  The	  first	  one	  concerns	  the	  tyranny	  of	  discretion,	  meaning	  the	  
power	  that	  lies	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  employees	  across	  the	  administrative	  hierarchical	  
chain	  to	  define	  the	  outcome	  of	  state	  or	  private	  sector	  exchanges,	  especially	  with	  
members	  of	  marginalised	  groups.	  The	  second	  concerns	  the	  improvised	  practices	  
that	  make	  trans	  legal	  lives	  liveable	  even	  when	  the	  legislator	  has	  not	  afforded	  them	  
this	  possibility.	  Both	  points	  hint	  towards	  understandings	  of	  legal	  gendering	  that	  are	  
less	  hung	  up	  on	  reviewing	  the	  script	  of	  the	  law	  and	  more	  open	  to	  a	  critical	  
interrogation	  of	  institutional	  power	  and	  practices.	  
In	  chapter	  three,	  I	  engaged	  with	  critical	  literature	  on	  the	  modern	  state’s	  project	  of	  
identifying	  and	  registering	  citizens	  as	  a	  means	  of	  creating	  legible	  and,	  thus,	  
manageable	  populations.	  Nonetheless,	  although	  problematising	  such	  state	  
functions	  is	  crucial,	  legal	  scholarship	  has	  much	  to	  gain	  by	  acknowledging	  the	  
importance	  of	  different	  scales	  of	  jurisdiction	  and	  their	  intertwining	  (Valverde	  2009;	  
Hubbard	  2013).	  As	  Marianna	  Valverde	  notes:	  	  
Local	  idiosyncrasies,	  modern	  scientific	  facts,	  institutional	  habits,	  ‘common	  
knowledge’,	  and	  situated	  knowledge	  of	  the	  ever-­‐changing	  political	  context	  
are	  all	  part	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  in	  legal	  and	  regulatory	  
governance.	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  highly	  local	  (and	  ‘local’	  not	  just	  in	  the	  
sense	  of	  quantitatively	  small)	  scales	  of	  governance	  persist	  alongside,	  and	  
are	  intertwined	  with,	  national	  and	  international	  scales	  of	  governance	  
(Valverde	  2009:	  143).	  
Moreover,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  read	  this	  point	  complementary	  with	  numerous	  works,	  
which	  indicate	  that	  legibility,	  order	  and	  lawfulness	  are	  to	  be	  read	  as	  the	  imaginary	  
telos	  of	  bureaucratic	  mechanisms	  and	  not	  the	  actual	  reality	  of	  living	  within	  a	  
bureaucratic	  state	  (Lipsky	  1980;	  Handler	  1986;	  Das	  &	  Poole	  2004;	  Cabot	  2014;	  
Rozakou	  2017).	  Indeed,	  Rozakou	  recognises	  irregular	  practices	  within	  bureaucratic	  
mechanisms	  as	  a	  constitutive	  element	  rather	  than	  a	  failure	  of	  state	  functionality	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and	  suggests	  that	  bureaucratic	  ambiguity	  and	  messiness	  is	  perfectly	  compatible	  
with	  modern	  state	  modalities	  (Rozakou	  2017:	  39).	  	  
As	  trans	  writers	  have	  pointed	  out,	  challenging	  the	  normative	  understanding	  of	  the	  
state’s	  coherency	  and	  the	  solidity	  of	  bureaucratic	  practices	  proves	  crucial	  for	  the	  
understanding	  of	  trans	  legal	  and	  administrative	  realities	  (Spade	  2008;	  Currah	  2014).	  
Paisley	  Currah	  has	  rightfully	  noted	  that	  different	  approaches	  to	  legal	  gender	  and	  
sex	  classifications	  usually	  entail	  a	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  state	  as	  “a	  unitary	  thing”,	  
an	  institution	  that	  is	  rationally	  organised	  and	  characterised	  by	  coherence	  in	  its	  
politics	  and	  practices	  (Currah	  2014:	  197).	  In	  reality,	  state-­‐individual	  interaction	  is	  
governed	  by	  numerous	  “intertwined	  and	  sprawling	  apparatuses”	  such	  as	  
“legislatures,	  courts,	  departments,	  agencies,	  elected	  officials,	  political	  appointees,	  
public	  servants,	  constitutions,	  laws,	  regulations,	  administrative	  rules,	  and	  informal	  
norms	  and	  practices”	  (Currah	  2014:	  198).182	  	  
In	  this	  framework,	  authors	  writing	  about	  legal	  apparatuses,	  bureaucracy	  and	  state	  
power	  have	  repeatedly	  pointed	  out	  “the	  role	  of	  discretion	  of	  low-­‐level	  bureaucrats	  
in	  enforcing	  a	  set	  of	  policies	  that	  are	  often	  associated	  with	  an	  unpopular	  group”	  
(Spade	  2008:	  73).	  It	  is	  precisely	  this	  quality	  that	  is	  pointed	  out	  as	  the	  decisive	  factor	  
in	  casual	  exchanges	  with	  state	  apparatuses	  but	  also	  other	  institutions	  and	  private	  
entities.	  Even	  more	  so,	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  substantial	  legal	  framework	  concerning	  trans	  
legal	  issues	  and	  their	  administrative	  management	  as	  well	  as	  the	  central	  position	  of	  
informal	  or	  “irregular”	  (Rozakou	  2017)	  practices	  within	  Greek	  administrative	  
mechanisms	  have	  given	  prominence	  to	  a	  tyranny	  of	  discretion.	  That	  is,	  an	  
uncontrolled	  power	  of	  the	  individual	  employee	  over	  the	  outcome	  of	  some	  
exchanges	  which	  renders	  irrelevant	  an	  imaging	  of	  an	  over-­‐arching	  philosophy,	  let	  
alone	  constitutional	  or	  Civil	  law	  principle,	  concerning	  legal	  gender	  and	  its	  
management	  by	  employees	  of	  public	  and	  private	  services.	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  Moreover,	  as	  I	  have	  suggested	  in	  previous	  chapters,	  state	  law	  is	  translated	  in	  legal	  reality	  
through	  constant	  re-­‐readings	  of	  the	  law	  by	  its	  competent	  executors.	  In	  that	  sense,	  I	  examined	  the	  
interpretation	  process	  within	  these	  re-­‐readings	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  power	  that	  is	  inscribed	  with	  social	  
norms.	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“I	  will	  tell	  you	  two	  things	  that	  have	  happened	  to	  me,”	  Hector	  told	  me	  in	  2014,	  while	  
discussing	  daily	  exchanges	  without	  gender-­‐appropriate	  documentation.	  He	  
proceeded	  to	  describe	  two	  instances	  of	  identity	  authentication	  with	  polar	  opposite	  
outcomes	  depending	  on	  the	  employee.	  In	  the	  first	  one,	  the	  employee	  recognised	  
Hector’s	  connection	  with	  the	  ID	  card	  he	  carried:	  
Hector:	  (…)	  and	  he	  said	  to	  me	  “sorry	  to	  ask	  an	  indiscrete	  question,”	  he	  says,	  
“if	  this	  is	  not	  yours	  [the	  ID	  card]	  there	  will	  be	  trouble	  for	  you	  and	  for	  me.”	  
So	  I	  say	  “it’s	  mine	  but	  I’m	  in	  the	  process	  of	  changing	  it”	  and	  such,	  and	  he	  
said	  “ok,	  cool,	  no	  problem,	  sorry	  if	  I	  put	  you	  in	  a	  difficult	  position,	  I	  
understand	  what	  you	  are	  saying	  but	  I	  needed	  to	  ask”	  he	  says.	  “I	  take	  your	  
word	  for	  this	  and	  I	  believe	  it’s	  yours”	  (…)	  and	  I	  was	  just	  shocked,	  right?	  
[Interview	  with	  Hector	  in	  2014].	  	  
On	  the	  contrary,	  in	  the	  second	  story	  he	  was	  faced	  with	  an	  intense	  reaction	  and	  a	  
complete	  denial	  on	  part	  of	  the	  employee.	  	  
Hector:	  (…)	  I’m	  talking	  about	  a	  complete	  black	  out,	  like	  he	  just	  wouldn’t	  let	  
me	  sign!	  He	  says,	  “You	  are	  kidding	  us,	  this	  is	  forgery”	  (…)	  he	  says,	  “No,	  he	  
will	  not	  sign.”	  Nothing!	  He	  just	  couldn’t	  handle	  it	  in	  his	  own	  mind.	  	  
Me:	  And	  what	  happened?	  	  
Hector:	  Nothing,	  I	  didn’t	  sign.	  I	  mean	  I	  signed	  and	  they	  annulled	  it.	  
[Interview	  with	  Hector	  2014].	  	  
In	  these	  types	  of	  narratives,	  that	  were	  common	  in	  every	  single	  discussion	  I	  had	  on	  
this	  issue,	  what	  is	  reflected	  is	  the	  extent	  of	  this	  unofficial	  margin	  of	  appreciation	  
which	  lower-­‐level	  employees	  (in	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sector)	  have,	  especially	  over	  
underprivileged	  populations.	  Each	  employee	  appears	  to	  be	  in	  power	  when	  it	  comes	  
to	  deciding	  over	  the	  authenticity	  of	  identification	  documents	  without	  following	  a	  
typified	  procedure	  and,	  thus,	  without	  a	  predictable	  outcome.	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Eleni:	  Mike	  is	  registered	  in	  OAED	  and	  he	  has	  to	  go	  every	  three	  months	  to	  
renew	  his	  card.	  Well,	  until	  now	  it	  has	  gone	  pretty	  well,	  it’s	  been	  ok,	  he	  is	  a	  
bit	  stiff	  but…	  
Mike:	  I	  have	  managed	  to	  get	  away	  with	  it.	  
Eleni:	  He	  has	  managed	  to	  get	  away	  with	  it,	  he	  will	  casually	  put	  this	  thing	  [a	  
wool	  scarf]	  up	  to	  here	  [the	  nose]	  (…)	  and	  then	  it’s	  a	  matter	  of	  not	  getting	  a	  
dumbass	  on	  your	  case,	  if	  you	  get	  a	  dumbass	  no	  way	  they	  will	  do	  it.	  
[Interview	  with	  Mike	  and	  Eleni	  in	  2014].	  	  	  
This	  level	  of	  unpredictability	  for	  casual	  exchanges	  in	  reality	  does	  not	  allow	  any	  
exchange	  to	  be	  experienced	  as	  “casual.”	  In	  that	  sense,	  Currah’s	  (2014)	  call	  to	  not	  
assume	  absolute	  coherence	  within	  and	  among	  state	  institutions	  governing	  legal	  
gender	  but	  rather	  to	  tap	  into	  a	  more	  chaotic	  and	  messy	  perception	  of	  state	  power	  
seems	  highly	  relevant.	  Although	  Currah	  refers	  mostly	  to	  the	  fragmentation	  by	  
different	  jurisdiction-­‐levels	  and	  state	  agencies,	  my	  analysis	  focuses	  more	  on	  the	  
informality	  and	  individual	  agency	  within	  Greek	  bureaucratic	  processes	  (whether	  
public	  or	  private	  sector).	  	  
As	  analysed	  in	  chapter	  four,	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  my	  research,	  I	  had	  chosen	  to	  
follow	  Jacob	  Hale’s	  suggested	  rules	  for	  writing	  about	  trans	  people.	  One	  of	  these	  
rules	  states:	  
Start	  with	  the	  following	  as,	  minimally,	  a	  working	  hypothesis	  that	  you	  would	  
be	  loathe	  to	  abandon:	  "Transsexual	  lives	  are	  lived,	  hence	  livable"	  (as	  
Naomi	  Scheman	  put	  it	  in	  "Queering	  the	  Center	  by	  Centering	  the	  Queer")	  
(Hale	  1997b,	  online,	  page	  n/a).	  	  
Regardless	  of	  having	  read	  this,	  I	  initially	  failed	  to	  understand	  how	  it	  transfers	  into	  
the	  legal	  terrain.	  As	  I	  have	  hinted	  in	  chapter	  four,	  in	  the	  field	  of	  legal	  theory	  and	  
lobbying,	  it	  is	  often	  assumed	  or	  strategically	  suggested	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  framework	  
translates	  inevitably	  to	  a	  complete	  absence	  of	  possibilities.	  This	  initiates	  from	  the	  
common	  perception	  that	  whatever	  the	  law	  has	  not	  allowed,	  predicted	  or	  provided	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for	  is	  simply	  not	  conceivable.	  An	  approach,	  which	  implies	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  trans-­‐
specific	  provisions	  (e.g.	  for	  parenting,	  marriage	  or	  various	  state-­‐individual	  
interactions)	  inexorably	  precluded	  trans	  individuals	  from	  the	  practices	  that	  have	  
not	  been	  legislated	  for	  them.	  	  
Subsequently,	  when	  I	  entered	  my	  first	  interview	  in	  2014,	  I	  unwillingly	  held	  several	  
underlying	  assumptions	  about	  what	  it	  means	  to	  live	  in	  a	  bureaucratic	  state	  without	  
proper	  documentation	  and	  a	  legal	  framework	  that	  provides	  for	  your	  existence.	  
Discussing	  with	  Lola	  about	  bureaucratic	  misrecognition	  and	  the	  impossibilities	  it	  
entails,	  she	  noted	  in	  her	  own	  way	  the	  flaw	  in	  my	  initial	  positioning	  that	  was	  
revealed	  through	  the	  wording	  of	  my	  questions:	  
Lola:	  I	  guess	  this	  is	  a	  huge	  ((she	  laughs)),	  a	  huge	  contradiction,	  that	  is,	  the	  
moment	  when	  they	  say	  “is	  that	  you?,”	  and	  I	  need	  to	  prove	  that	  yes…it	  is	  
very	  ((she	  laughs))	  it	  is	  indeed	  almost	  funny	  that	  I	  need	  to	  convince	  them	  it	  
is	  me	  when	  in	  every	  other	  sense	  I	  have	  tried	  so	  much	  to	  convince	  people	  I	  
am	  not	  that	  person,	  right?	  (…)	  	  it	  is	  just	  that	  I	  feel	  that	  being	  trans	  I	  have	  in	  
a	  way	  experienced	  in	  the	  maximum	  degree	  conditions	  that,	  in	  a	  “normal”	  
life,	  would	  easily	  shake	  things	  up.	  That	  is,	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  this	  
reality	  wherein	  these	  things	  are	  imposed	  on	  me	  I	  need	  to	  find	  a	  way	  
according	  to	  my	  own	  perspective	  (…)	  to	  do	  things,	  do	  them	  well	  and	  have	  a	  
good	  outcome.	  
Me:	  Yes,	  but	  the	  way	  you	  are	  registered	  forces	  you	  also	  to	  relate	  with	  this	  
person	  you	  are	  recognised	  as,	  this	  position	  etc.	  Basically	  it	  implies	  that	  in	  
letter	  only	  this	  person	  exists	  and…	  
Lola:	  “…and	  who	  on	  earth	  am	  I	  after	  all?”	  ((she	  laughs))	  No,	  look	  I	  cannot	  
say	  that	  I	  have	  it	  in	  my	  mind	  as	  such…the	  way	  you	  said	  it	  now	  sounds	  a	  lot	  
heavier	  than	  what	  I	  have	  in	  my	  mind.	  I	  think,	  and	  maybe	  I	  protect	  myself	  
this	  way,	  that	  it	  is	  something	  technical	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  done,	  I	  need	  to	  do	  
it	  in	  a	  few	  minutes	  and	  get	  on	  with	  my	  day.	  (…)	  But	  I	  don’t…I	  would	  rather	  
not	  see	  it	  this	  way	  because	  as	  you	  say	  it,	  it	  just	  sounds	  far	  too	  heavy,	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girlfriend.	  I	  won’t	  go	  home	  and	  dwell	  on	  how	  unfair	  it	  is	  that	  I	  am	  not	  
registered	  and	  how	  humiliating	  it	  is	  for	  me	  to	  have	  to	  do	  this…maybe	  I	  am	  
used	  to	  such	  procedures,	  meaning	  that	  some	  things	  need	  to	  be	  done	  and	  
they	  will	  be	  done,	  because	  there	  is	  no	  other	  way,	  so	  then,	  I	  too,	  will	  go	  and	  
do	  them,	  one	  way	  or	  the	  other,	  and	  get	  over	  it	  [Interview	  with	  Lola	  2014].	  
Lola’s	  observation,	  in	  this	  very	  first	  interview,	  steered	  me	  towards	  a	  more	  open	  
approach	  that	  would	  allow	  a	  variety	  of	  informal	  and	  uncharted	  practices	  to	  emerge	  
within	  the	  course	  of	  my	  research.	  Methodologically	  then,	  following	  the	  hypothesis	  
that	  trans	  legal	  lives	  are	  lived	  hence	  liveable	  within	  the	  modern	  bureaucratic	  state,	  
even	  when	  this	  has	  not	  been	  regulated,	  this	  creates	  a	  different	  space	  for	  discussion.	  
Although	  there	  are	  many	  impasses	  and	  impossibilities,	  some	  of	  which	  have	  been	  
thoroughly	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters,	  there	  is	  also	  a	  variety	  of	  unofficial	  
practices	  and	  tactics	  of	  survival	  that	  fly	  under	  the	  radar	  of	  the	  legislator	  and	  often	  
the	  legal	  researcher.	  
By	  assuming	  this	  approach,	  I	  have	  come	  to	  understand	  through	  interviews	  and	  off-­‐
the-­‐record	  discussions,	  that,	  in	  recent	  years,	  there	  have	  been	  Christian	  Orthodox	  
weddings,	  joint	  parenting	  of	  children	  and	  even	  ID	  card	  amendments	  without	  the	  
legal	  preconditions,	  all	  achieved	  through	  informal	  routes.	  I	  do	  not	  discuss	  events	  of	  
such	  importance	  here	  due	  to	  ethical	  implications	  but	  there	  are	  numerous	  less	  grave	  
instances	  that	  are	  enabled	  by	  the	  same	  dynamic	  engagement	  with	  what	  are	  
presumed	  to	  be	  monolithic	  and	  unfragmented	  systems	  of	  (mis)recognition.	  For	  
example,	  Lola	  mentioned	  how	  she	  managed	  to	  be	  admitted	  and	  treated	  in	  a	  public	  
hospital	  “as	  who	  she	  is”	  without	  providing	  any	  documentation	  and,	  thus,	  remaining	  
undetected	  as	  trans.	  Mike	  and	  his	  partner	  Eleni	  told	  me	  a	  story	  wherein	  Eleni	  
appeared	  at	  a	  public	  service	  to	  collect	  a	  document	  posing	  as	  Mike	  because	  she	  
resembled	  more	  the	  person	  pictured	  on	  Mike’s	  ID	  than	  he	  did.	  Valeria	  and	  Sandra,	  
both	  second	  generation	  migrants,	  narrated	  a	  kind	  of	  “administrative	  passing”	  
thanks	  to	  their	  foreign	  names	  that	  are	  not	  immediately	  read	  as	  not-­‐female	  by	  Greek	  
functionaries,	  thus,	  allowing	  both	  women	  to	  navigate	  recognition	  systems	  without	  
being	  read	  as	  trans.	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Sandra:	  Yes	  I	  am	  in	  OAED	  and	  I	  have	  been	  to	  several	  public	  services	  but	  I	  
never	  had	  a	  problem	  there.	  Even	  if	  they	  ask	  for	  my	  ID	  I	  just	  give	  it	  and	  in	  
the	  ID...I	  look	  like	  that	  in	  the	  photo,	  I	  am	  like	  that...I	  am	  not,	  you	  
know...and	  no	  one	  understands	  my	  name	  because	  it’s	  foreign.	  (...)	  There	  is	  
an	  ‘M’	  in	  my	  passport,	  but	  it	  hasn’t	  happened	  to	  me...	  Now	  there	  was	  an	  
issue	  when	  I	  went	  to	  get	  my	  Greek	  papers	  done	  with	  this	  registration	  
something,	  I	  don’t	  know	  how	  it’s	  called,	  because	  it	  said	  I	  belong	  with	  the	  
males	  and	  then	  the	  guy	  said	  -­‐	  I	  was	  there	  with	  my	  mum	  -­‐	  so	  he	  said	  “this	  
must	  be	  corrected	  because	  there	  must	  be	  some	  mistake.”	  And	  there	  I	  had	  
to	  explain…I	  was	  very	  close	  to	  saying	  “yes	  let’s	  just	  correct	  it	  now”	  but	  my	  
mum	  wouldn’t	  let	  me	  cause	  she	  said	  there	  will	  for	  sure	  be	  some	  mix	  up	  
later.	  [Interview	  with	  Sandra	  2017].	  
Furthermore,	  Nataly	  told	  me	  that	  she	  asked	  the	  Head	  of	  the	  Institute	  of	  Vocational	  
Training	  she	  attends	  to	  amend	  her	  name	  in	  the	  register	  but	  was	  denied	  on	  the	  self-­‐
explanatory	  grounds	  of	  it	  being	  an	  official	  public	  document	  that	  cannot	  be	  altered	  
at	  will.	  Her	  reaction	  was	  to	  manually	  change	  it	  (“smudge	  it”)	  herself,	  a	  practice	  that	  
was	  then	  followed	  by	  her	  professors	  who	  ignored	  the	  Director’s	  denial	  and	  
manually	  corrected	  her	  name	  on	  their	  lists.	  Philip	  described	  a	  similar	  process	  in	  the	  
higher	  education	  public	  institution	  he	  attended:	  
Philip:	  (…)	  Well,	  I	  for	  one	  went	  to	  the	  secretariat	  of	  my	  university	  and	  I	  
asked	  it	  [changing	  his	  name	  in	  the	  student	  register],	  and	  I	  told	  them	  
without	  having	  any	  document	  “could	  you	  change	  this	  for	  me?”	  And	  she	  did.	  
Me:	  Oh	  she	  did!	  I	  have	  heard	  some	  other	  people	  having	  done	  this.	  
Philip:	  Yes,	  she	  changed	  it	  and…she	  talked	  to	  the	  professors	  and	  they	  
changed	  the	  student	  lists	  in	  their	  own	  classes,	  which	  cannot	  be	  done	  by	  the	  
secretariat	  and	  so	  about	  ten	  professors	  knew	  about	  it.	  
Me:	  Without	  you	  having	  papers	  and	  such.	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Philip:	  Without	  having	  papers,	  no.	  It	  was	  a	  matter…it	  depended	  on	  the	  
person	  let’s	  say.	  	  
Me:	  And	  you	  haven’t	  had	  any	  problems?	  
Philip:	  Well,	  I	  used	  to	  have	  before	  I	  changed	  my	  documents,	  but	  I	  was	  still	  
ok	  with	  it.	  I	  mean	  even	  if	  I	  had	  to	  provide	  documents	  before	  I	  changed	  my	  
ID	  card	  and	  I	  had	  to	  say	  “yes,	  it’s	  me,	  read	  here”,	  I	  still	  didn’t	  have	  a	  
problem	  with	  it.	  I	  told	  you	  about	  when	  I	  went	  to	  the	  revenue	  and	  the	  lady	  
there	  said	  “well,	  and	  you	  are	  a	  good-­‐looking	  youngster	  too”	  ((we	  laugh)).	  
Because	  it	  depends	  on	  how	  each	  person	  is	  going	  to	  take	  it.	  [Interview	  with	  
Philip	  2014].	  	  
The	  procedure	  described	  by	  Philip	  and	  Nataly	  is	  far	  from	  being	  a	  proper	  protocol.	  
Not	  only	  because	  there	  was	  no	  relevant	  provision	  in	  place	  but	  also,	  and	  more	  
importantly,	  because	  university	  catalogues	  and	  degrees	  are	  public	  documents	  that	  
cannot	  just	  be	  amended	  at	  an	  employee’s	  discretion.	  Nonetheless,	  especially	  
before	  the	  recent	  legislation,	  most	  of	  the	  administrative	  procedures	  had	  to	  be	  
improvised	  to	  a	  certain	  degree.	  	  	  
That	  said,	  especially	  in	  eras	  of	  complete	  lack	  of	  legislation	  and	  valid	  information	  on	  
legal	  issues	  of	  gender	  non-­‐conformity,	  individual	  agency	  makes	  this	  terrain	  a	  two-­‐
way	  street	  adding	  to	  the	  unpredictability	  and,	  thus,	  the	  messiness	  of	  the	  formal	  
management	  of	  trans	  legal	  issues.	  Throughout	  this	  section,	  I	  have	  used	  the	  word	  
“tyranny”	  in	  reference	  to	  low-­‐level	  employees’	  unofficial	  margins	  of	  discretion	  in	  
order	  to	  convey	  a	  power	  that	  does	  not	  necessarily	  listen	  to	  reason	  and	  cannot	  be	  
disputed,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  order	  to	  communicate	  some	  of	  the	  affective	  elements	  
produced	  such	  as	  fear	  and	  uncertainty.	  Nonetheless,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  this	  
informality	  and	  messiness	  presents	  possibilities	  that	  are	  not	  provided	  by	  or	  are	  
against	  the	  law.	  Judith	  Butler,	  in	  discussion	  with	  Athena	  Athanasiou,	  makes	  a	  point	  
similar	  to	  Currah’s	  argument	  about	  considering	  the	  incoherency	  of	  state	  regulatory	  
frameworks.	  “In	  such	  matters,”	  Butler	  notes,	  “the	  ‘state’	  is	  not	  a	  single	  monolith,	  
but	  a	  field	  of	  conflicting	  trends”	  adding	  also	  that	  “we	  probably	  should	  be	  glad	  for	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that	  lack	  of	  conformity	  and	  consistency,	  since	  it	  produces	  more	  opportunities	  to	  
deploy	  the	  law	  against	  itself”	  (Butler	  &	  Athanasiou	  2013:	  85).	  
As	  my	  interlocutors’	  attitudes	  exemplify,	  there	  are	  different	  routes	  to	  achieving	  the	  
desired	  outcome	  within	  a	  hostile	  legal	  environment.	  In	  that	  sense,	  in	  light	  of	  the	  
lack	  of	  typified	  protocols	  and	  policies	  and	  the	  increased	  informality	  within	  Greek	  
bureaucratic	  systems,	  individual	  agency	  has	  been	  central	  in	  the	  unfolding	  of	  legal	  
realities.	  At	  this	  point,	  what	  needs	  to	  be	  clarified	  is	  that	  the	  discussion	  of	  these	  
practices	  does	  not	  indicate	  an	  intention	  to	  conceptualise	  them	  as	  the	  optimistic	  
counterweight	  to	  exclusion	  or	  violence	  but	  rather	  to	  align	  with	  what	  Aren	  Aizura	  
has	  called	  “a	  realist	  call	  to	  honour	  the	  zones	  of	  alternative	  trans	  being	  emerging	  
under	  the	  duress	  of	  impossibility	  and	  to	  remain	  open	  to	  not	  knowing	  what	  they	  
look	  like	  in	  advance”	  (Aizura	  2014:	  143).	  That	  is,	  I	  do	  not	  suggest,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  legal	  
and	  overall	  systemic	  perpetuation	  of	  social	  hierarchies,	  “taking	  refuge	  in	  a	  narrative	  
of	  empowered	  agency	  as	  antidote”	  (Aizura	  2014:	  143).	  Rather,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  
instrumentalisation	  of	  the	  incoherency	  of	  bureaucratic	  protocols	  needs	  to	  be	  
conceptualised	  within	  a	  broader	  toolkit	  of	  survival	  tactics	  employed	  by	  trans	  
individuals	  in	  the	  daily	  interaction	  with	  service	  providers	  and	  state	  functionaries.	  
Understanding	  how	  such	  tactics	  function	  is	  crucial	  in	  understanding	  the	  reality	  of	  
trans	  engagement	  with	  the	  law.	  	  
In	  this	  vein,	  even	  though	  broader	  political	  imperatives	  can	  be	  written	  into	  main	  
legislative	  pieces	  concerning	  gender	  classification	  and	  other	  trans	  legal	  issues,	  the	  
daily	  practices	  might	  perplex	  or	  contradict	  these	  imperatives.	  As	  Currah	  (2014)	  
notes:	  	  
Fetishizing	  a	  generalized	  idea	  of	  the	  state	  and	  its	  terrifying	  or	  redemptive	  
power	  (depending	  on	  one's	  perspective)	  can	  obscure	  what	  is	  actually	  
happening	  in	  the	  local,	  micro,	  particular	  sites	  where	  most	  public	  authority	  
is	  exercised.	  While	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  theorize	  the	  singular	  finality	  of	  state	  
violence,	  neglecting	  to	  examine	  the	  messiness	  of	  actually	  existing	  and	  
potentially	  incommensurate	  policies,	  practices,	  rules,	  and	  norms	  risks	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substituting	  the	  conceptual	  for	  the	  concrete	  and	  gets	  in	  the	  way	  of	  
understanding	  what	  might	  actually	  be	  going	  on	  (Currah	  2014:	  199).	  	  
As	  seen	  in	  chapters	  seven	  and	  eight,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  present	  one,	  the	  individuals	  
affected	  by	  the	  examined	  legislation	  often	  prioritise	  this	  understanding	  of	  the	  legal	  
order	  [“what	  is	  actually	  happening	  in	  the	  local,	  micro,	  particular	  sites	  where	  most	  
public	  authority	  is	  exercised”	  (Currah	  2014:	  199)]	  rather	  than	  the	  official	  version	  
wherein	  the	  existence	  of	  state	  regulations	  supposedly	  defines	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  
management	  of	  legal	  and	  administrative	  issues.	  
In	  this	  section,	  gender	  identity	  (mis)recognition	  was	  analysed	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  
informality	  and	  incoherence	  within	  state	  and	  private	  mechanisms	  of	  recognition.	  
Under	  the	  previous	  legislative	  framework,	  which	  was	  briefly	  discussed	  in	  the	  
previous	  section,	  the	  ambiguity	  and	  lack	  of	  protocols	  and	  infrastructure	  was	  
conceptualised	  as	  a	  terrain	  of	  arbitrary	  power	  for	  low-­‐level	  employees	  wherein	  the	  
fate	  of	  trans	  claims	  relies	  on	  the	  random,	  the	  individual,	  the	  unpredictable.	  At	  the	  
same	  time,	  by	  assuming	  an	  approach	  that	  acknowledges	  and	  values	  the	  multiplicity	  
of	  survival	  tactics	  employed	  by	  underprivileged	  groups,	  the	  same	  ambiguity	  has	  also	  
been	  presented	  as	  a	  field	  of	  negotiation.	  Having	  composed	  an	  image	  of	  the	  ways	  
gender	  identity	  (mis)recognition	  has	  been	  managed	  under	  the	  previous	  legal	  
framework,	  the	  next	  section	  follows	  the	  introduction	  of	  new	  legislation	  concerning	  
gender	  identity	  recognition.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  Law	  4491/2017	  on	  gender	  identity	  
recognition	  is	  situated	  in	  context	  and	  presented	  as	  a	  legislative	  text	  that	  marks	  an	  
unprecedented	  paradigm-­‐shift	  in	  the	  legal	  regulation	  of	  gender	  non-­‐conformity	  
and,	  more	  specifically,	  trans	  identities.	  	  
9.3. The	  New	  Legislation	  on	  Gender	  Identity	  Legal	  
Recognition	  
9.3.a. Introducing	  the	  Bill	  on	  Gender	  Identity	  
By	  2015,	  the	  continuous	  deepening	  of	  austerity,	  the	  repression	  towards	  political	  
movements,	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  far	  right	  in	  Greece	  and	  internationally	  had	  fostered	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a	  sense	  of	  broader	  political	  disillusionment.	  This	  translated	  to	  a	  complete	  collapse	  
of	  the	  ruling	  political	  regime	  and	  the	  election	  of	  SYRIZA,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  brought	  a	  
momentary	  eruption	  of	  short-­‐lived	  political	  optimism.183	  After	  the	  2015	  
referendum	  and	  the	  shift	  of	  SYRIZA’s	  orientation	  (from	  full-­‐heartedly	  “anti-­‐
memorandum”	  to	  proceeding	  with	  negotiations	  on	  the	  fiscal	  restructuring),	  the	  
political	  sentiment	  changed	  once	  more	  (Brekke,	  Filippidis	  &	  Vradis	  2018;	  Roufos	  
2018).	  It	  became	  evident	  that	  the	  SYRIZA	  government	  not	  only	  would	  not	  reject	  the	  
harsh	  negotiation	  terms	  set	  for	  Greece	  but	  would	  also	  be	  able	  to	  enforce	  policies	  
that	  normally	  would	  have	  been	  met	  with	  great	  political	  resistance	  by	  the	  local	  Left	  
(Roufos	  2018).	  Moreover,	  the	  arrivals	  of	  migrants	  at	  the	  Greek	  borders	  dramatically	  
increased	  during	  2015,	  which	  marked	  the	  peak	  of	  what	  is	  called	  the	  “refugee	  crisis”	  
and	  its	  biopolitical	  management,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  new	  political	  reality	  in	  
Greece	  (Rozakou	  2015;	  Carastathis,	  Spathopoulou	  &	  Tsilimpounidi	  2018;	  
Carastathis	  2018c).	  	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  position	  of	  LGBTI+	  (and	  other	  minority)	  rights	  discourses	  
became	  more	  central	  within	  the	  mainstream	  political	  agenda.	  Many	  parameters	  led	  
to	  this	  change,	  such	  as	  the	  mainstreaming	  of	  anti-­‐bullying	  discourses	  (Giovanoglou	  
2015),	  the	  international	  currency	  of	  LGBTI+	  politics	  and	  cultures,	  and	  the	  
channeling	  of	  European	  funds	  towards	  such	  politics,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  NGO-­‐isation	  of	  
minority	  rights	  politics	  on	  a	  national	  level.	  Especially	  the	  latter	  in	  combination	  with	  
the	  election	  of	  the	  SYRIZA-­‐coalition	  in	  power	  brought	  a	  change	  not	  only	  in	  the	  
mainstream	  political	  discourses	  that	  now	  came	  to	  adopt	  a	  minority	  rights	  political	  
lexicon	  but	  also	  in	  the	  position	  of	  LGBTI+	  activism	  within	  the	  institutional	  sphere.	  	  
In	  2015,	  the	  newly	  elected	  government	  of	  SYRIZA	  committed	  to	  grant	  central	  legal	  
claims	  of	  LGBTI+	  communities,	  such	  as	  the	  extension	  of	  civil	  union	  to	  same-­‐sex	  
couples	  and	  gender	  identity	  recognition	  on	  better	  terms	  (Papantoniou	  2015;	  
Kostopoulou	  2015;	  Antonopoulos	  2015).	  A	  new	  era	  was,	  thus,	  initiated	  as	  shown	  by	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  This	  was	  exemplified	  by	  the	  SYRIZA	  campaign	  motto	  “hope	  is	  coming,”	  which	  also	  spoke	  to	  the	  
centrality	  of	  futurity	  in	  the	  given	  political	  climate	  and	  the	  understanding	  of	  Greece	  as	  a	  precursor	  for	  
European	  futures	  (Bratsis	  2016).	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the	  employment	  of	  LGBTI+	  rights	  language	  by	  the	  government	  itself.	  Terms	  such	  as	  
“gender	  identity”	  (ταυτότητα	  φύλου),	  “transphobia”	  (τρανσφοβία)	  and	  
LGBT/LGBTQI	  (ΛΟΑΤ/ΛΟΑΤΚΙ)	  were	  introduced	  in	  mainstream	  political	  vocabularies	  
and	  were	  later	  on	  (during	  the	  voting	  of	  the	  bill	  on	  gender	  identity)	  circulated	  in	  
media	  debates	  and	  broader	  social	  circles.	  After	  introducing	  a	  bill	  on	  same-­‐sex	  
cohabitation	  contract,	  a	  special	  law-­‐drafting	  committee	  was	  created	  in	  April	  
2015184	  to	  work	  on	  introducing	  a	  new	  bill	  on	  gender	  identity	  recognition	  
(Ministerial	  Decision	  No.	  20692/7.4.2015).185	  The	  main	  points	  of	  the	  submitted	  bill	  
were	  a	  declaratory	  definition	  of	  gender	  identity	  aligning	  with	  the	  Yogyakarta	  
Principles	  and	  the	  explicit	  detachment	  of	  official	  gender	  from	  strict	  anatomic	  
topologies	  by	  suggesting	  a	  procedure	  without	  any	  medical	  precondition.	  
Nonetheless,	  when	  the	  bill	  on	  gender	  identity	  recognition	  was	  finally	  uploaded	  to	  
the	  Ministry’s	  site	  for	  public	  consultation,	  it	  was	  met	  with	  wide	  criticism.	  As	  pointed	  
out	  by	  trans	  lobbying	  groups	  and	  legal	  professionals	  working	  with	  them,	  the	  bill	  was	  
problematic	  in	  more	  than	  one	  way	  (Sotiropoulos	  2017;	  HuffPost	  Greece	  2017b;	  
GTSA	  2017d;	  Alexandris	  2017;	  GTSA	  et	  al	  2017).	  	  
The	  main	  point	  of	  the	  criticism	  from	  LGBTI+	  activists	  concerned	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  bill	  
maintained	  a	  judicial	  procedure	  which	  was	  still	  far	  from	  the	  “quick,	  transparent	  and	  
accessible	  procedures”	  that	  the	  PACE	  Resolution	  on	  the	  Discrimination	  against	  
Transgender	  People	  in	  Europe	  suggested	  (PACE	  Resolution	  2048/2015:	  6.2.1).	  More	  
importantly,	  the	  new	  bill	  introduced	  limitations	  for	  amending	  legal	  gender	  that	  did	  
not	  exist	  under	  the	  previous	  framework	  (Sotiropoulos	  2017;	  GTSA	  2017d).	  Last,	  the	  
bill	  had	  also	  serious	  shortcomings	  such	  as	  not	  including	  a	  provision	  for	  migrants,	  
refugees	  or	  people	  in	  the	  process	  of	  seeking	  international	  protection	  at	  a	  time	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  Additionally,	  on	  September	  of	  the	  same	  year	  the	  Greek	  National	  Committee	  for	  Human	  Rights	  
published	  a	  detailed	  text	  of	  recommendations	  under	  the	  title	  of	  “Transgender	  People	  and	  Legal	  
Recognition	  of	  Gender	  Identity”,	  that	  suggested	  legal	  improvements	  covering	  a	  variety	  of	  aspects	  
such	  as	  health,	  employment	  etc.	  (GNCHR	  2015).	  
185
	  Nonetheless,	  it	  would	  be	  approximately	  two	  years	  until	  the	  bill	  reached	  the	  parliament,	  despite	  
pressures	  on	  part	  of	  LGBT	  lobbying	  groups	  who	  protested	  the	  unjustifiable	  delay	  (The	  Greek	  
Ombudsman	  2017;	  GTSA	  2017c).	  As	  Katerina	  Fountedaki,	  who	  was	  part	  of	  the	  law-­‐drafting	  
committee	  explains,	  the	  draft	  of	  the	  bill	  had	  been	  submitted	  by	  the	  committee	  a	  year	  and	  a	  half	  
before	  coming	  to	  parliament;	  “It	  was	  left	  in	  a	  drawer,	  no	  one	  examined	  it	  and	  then	  at	  some	  point	  
they	  remembered	  it”	  (Fountedaki	  in	  Georgiou	  2017a).	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when	  the	  issue	  of	  LGBTI+	  people	  seeking	  asylum	  in	  Greece	  had	  been	  stressed	  by	  
lobbying	  and	  other	  political	  groups	  as	  crucial	  (GTSA	  2016b;	  Galanou	  2018).	  	  
These	  were	  the	  main	  points	  of	  disagreement	  that	  were	  pushed	  forward	  by	  the	  
NGOs	  and	  organisations	  that	  were	  heard	  during	  the	  parliamentary	  discussions	  
(Hellenic	  Parliament,	  17th	  Term,	  Plenary	  B,	  Standing	  Committee	  on	  Public	  
Administration,	  Public	  Order	  and	  Justice	  27.09.2017	  meeting	  minutes).	  
Nonetheless,	  the	  only	  one	  that	  the	  Ministry	  showed	  willingness	  to	  re-­‐negotiate	  was	  
the	  age	  limit,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  as	  we	  will	  see	  in	  the	  following	  sections,	  monopolised	  a	  
large	  part	  of	  the	  public	  and	  parliamentary	  debates.	  The	  final	  text	  of	  Law	  4491/2017,	  
which	  is	  reviewed	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  was	  voted	  in	  with	  a	  comfortable	  majority	  and	  
includes	  seven	  articles	  that	  comprise	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  law	  while	  the	  second	  part	  
of	  the	  law	  regulates	  unrelated	  issues	  such	  as	  the	  institution	  of	  a	  National	  
Mechanism	  for	  Development,	  Monitoring	  and	  Assessment	  of	  Action	  Plans	  for	  the	  
Rights	  of	  the	  Child.186	  	  
9.3.b. Law	  4491/2017	  On	  the	  Legal	  Recognition	  of	  Gender	  Identity	  
Article	  1	  (“Rights	  of	  a	  person	  based	  on	  gender	  identity	  and	  characteristics”)	  of	  
Law/4491/2017	  has	  a	  declaratory	  character	  establishing	  the	  right	  to	  the	  recognition	  
of	  a	  person’s	  gender	  identity	  as	  part	  of	  their	  personality.	  Moreover,	  it	  declares	  the	  
right	  to	  the	  respect	  of	  a	  person’s	  personality	  in	  view	  of	  their	  gender	  
characteristics.187	  This	  provision	  does	  not	  have	  the	  capability	  of	  legal	  enforcement	  
but	  rather	  an	  abstract	  enunciatory	  value.	  Article	  2	  (“Definitions”)	  defines	  gender	  
identity	  as:	  	  
The	  internal	  and	  personal	  way	  in	  which	  a	  person	  experiences	  their	  gender,	  
regardless	  of	  the	  gender	  that	  was	  registered	  in	  birth	  based	  on	  biological	  
characteristics.	  Gender	  identity	  includes	  the	  personal	  sense	  of	  the	  body,	  as	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  The	  regulation	  of	  different,	  often	  completely	  irrelevant,	  issues	  in	  the	  same	  text	  is	  common	  
practice	  in	  the	  Hellenic	  Parliament	  legislative	  process.	  
187
	  Additionally,	  it	  categorises	  gender	  characteristics	  (chromosomal,	  gonadal	  and	  anatomical)	  in	  
primary,	  i.e.	  reproductive	  organs,	  and	  secondary,	  i.e.	  muscle	  mass,	  development	  of	  mammary	  tissue	  
and	  hair	  growth	  (para.	  2	  art.	  2	  Law	  4491/2017).	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well	  as	  the	  social	  and	  external	  gender	  expression,	  which	  correspond	  to	  the	  
person’s	  will.	  The	  personal	  sense	  of	  the	  body	  might	  also	  be	  connected	  with	  
changes	  due	  to	  medical	  treatment	  or	  other	  freely	  chosen	  medical	  
operations	  (para.	  1	  art.	  2	  Law	  4491/2017,	  my	  translation).	  	  
Although	  the	  wording	  differs	  slightly,	  the	  text	  follows	  the	  definition	  given	  in	  the	  
Yogyakarta	  Principles	  on	  the	  Application	  of	  International	  Human	  Rights	  Law	  in	  
relation	  to	  Sexual	  Orientation	  and	  Gender	  Identity	  (Yogyakarta	  Principles	  2006).	  On	  
a	  doctrinal	  level,	  the	  shift	  compared	  to	  all	  relative	  texts	  that	  have	  attempted	  to	  
manage	  gender	  variance	  within	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order	  is	  rather	  obvious.	  That	  is,	  
from	  the	  self-­‐evident	  character	  of	  sex	  that	  is	  given	  by	  nature	  (assisted	  by	  science)	  
and	  mirrored	  in	  legal	  gender,	  this	  provision	  moves	  onto	  a	  fundamentally	  different	  
paradigm	  wherein	  the	  will	  of	  the	  person	  has	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  
gender	  identity.	  Although	  this	  definition	  remains	  within	  the	  boundaries	  of	  a	  binary	  
understanding	  of	  two	  mutually	  excluding	  genders,	  nonetheless,	  the	  departing	  from	  
bodily	  characteristics	  and	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  person’s	  will	  as	  a	  central	  
component	  mark	  an	  immense	  shift	  from	  previous	  national	  legal	  texts.	  	  
The	  most	  substantial	  part	  of	  the	  law	  lies	  in	  Articles	  3	  and	  4	  which	  regulate	  the	  
preconditions	  and	  procedure	  for	  the	  correction	  of	  registered	  gender.	  Article	  3	  
states	  that,	  “in	  case	  of	  discordance	  between	  [a	  person’s]	  gender	  and	  the	  registered	  
gender,	  the	  person	  can	  request	  the	  correction	  of	  their	  registered	  gender	  in	  order	  to	  
correspond	  to	  the	  person’s	  will,	  personal	  sense	  of	  the	  body	  and	  external	  
appearance”	  (para	  1	  art.	  3	  Law	  4491/2017).	  The	  conflicting	  decisive	  criteria	  of	  the	  
personal	  will	  and	  bodily	  sense,	  on	  one	  side,	  and	  physical	  appearance,	  on	  the	  other,	  
leave	  open	  to	  criticism	  the	  safeguarding	  of	  the	  law’s	  own	  definition	  of	  gender	  
identity.188	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  Although,	  before	  the	  voting	  of	  the	  bill,	  the	  Scientific	  Service	  of	  the	  Hellenic	  Parliament	  had	  
suggested	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  “gender	  expression”	  in	  order	  to	  imply	  a	  broader	  spectrum	  of	  ways	  in	  
which	  people	  perceive	  and	  express	  their	  gender,	  the	  final	  text	  followed	  the	  original	  wording	  
referring	  to	  external	  appearance	  (Scientific	  Service	  of	  the	  Hellenic	  Parliament	  2017:	  5).	  This	  wording	  
becomes	  further	  problematic	  in	  light	  of	  the	  introduced	  procedural	  “detail”	  of	  the	  required	  presence	  
of	  the	  applicant	  during	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  case	  (para.	  2	  art.	  4	  Law	  4491/2017).	  That	  is,	  although	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The	  legal	  preconditions	  for	  the	  correction	  are	  the	  full	  capacity	  to	  perform	  legal	  acts	  
and	  the	  unmarried	  status	  of	  the	  applicant	  (para.	  2	  &	  3	  art.	  3	  Law	  4491/2017).	  The	  
full	  capacity	  clause	  initially	  would	  have	  entirely	  excluded	  minors	  from	  the	  purview	  
of	  this	  law.	  After	  the	  re-­‐negotiation	  of	  this	  part	  during	  parliamentary	  debates,	  the	  
final	  text	  exempts	  from	  the	  legal	  capacity	  clause	  minors	  who	  are	  at	  least	  17	  years	  
old	  and	  have	  parental	  consent	  for	  the	  amendment	  (para.	  2	  art.	  3	  Law	  4491/2017).	  
Moreover,	  for	  minors	  of	  at	  least	  15	  years	  of	  age,	  other	  than	  parental	  consent,	  a	  
different	  procedure	  is	  to	  be	  followed	  requiring	  the	  positive	  opinion	  of	  an	  
interdisciplinary	  committee	  established	  by	  the	  Ministries	  of	  Justice	  and	  Health.	  This	  
committee	  is	  required	  to	  include	  a	  child-­‐psychiatrist,	  a	  psychiatrist,	  an	  
endocrinologist,	  a	  child-­‐surgeon,	  a	  psychologist,	  a	  social	  worker	  and	  a	  paediatrician	  
as	  committee	  President,	  all	  of	  whom	  are	  required	  to	  be	  specialists	  on	  the	  issue	  
(para.	  2	  art.	  3	  Law	  4491/2017).	  
Discussing	  the	  new	  legislation	  with	  one	  of	  the	  legal	  professionals	  I	  interviewed,	  who	  
has	  represented	  trans	  clients	  in	  the	  past,	  she	  notes:	  
L.	  P.	  1:	  I	  think	  that	  the	  other	  issue	  is	  how	  the	  law	  will	  be	  interpreted	  
concerning	  minors.	  There	  we’ll	  see…	  This,	  for	  me,	  is	  basically	  inapplicable.	  
That	  is,	  a	  child	  going	  ahead	  with	  this	  process	  with	  the	  committee	  -­‐	  
whenever	  this	  committee	  is	  created,	  because	  they	  need	  to	  issue	  a	  
presidential	  decree	  to	  institute	  the	  committee,	  who	  are	  the	  members	  going	  
to	  be?	  It	  then	  needs	  to	  convene;	  they	  each	  need	  to	  see	  the	  kid	  individually	  
as	  members	  of	  the	  committee	  and	  then	  reach	  a	  verdict.	  This	  is	  
very…ponderous...and	  it	  was	  simply	  a	  way	  to	  basically	  say	  yes,	  we	  accept	  it	  
but...well…	  
Me:	  …	  but	  it	  won’t	  be	  applied.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the	  bill’s	  explanatory	  memorandum	  declared	  that	  “gender	  identity	  is	  an	  issue	  of	  self-­‐definition”	  (Law	  
4491/2017	  Explanatory	  Memorandum,	  p.	  2),	  this	  paragraph	  allows	  for	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  
application	  to	  depend,	  in	  a	  sense,	  on	  the	  person’s	  physical	  appearance	  and	  its	  judicial	  appraisal	  
(GTSA	  2017d,	  Amnesty	  International	  EUR	  25/6692/2017).	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L.	  P.	  1:	  Yes.	  And	  this	  was	  not	  in	  the	  draft	  that	  was	  submitted	  by	  the	  law-­‐
drafting	  committee,	  it	  came	  as	  an	  amendment	  in	  the	  parliament.	  
[Interview	  with	  Legal	  Professional	  1	  in	  2017].	  
Indeed	  -­‐	  even	  if	  one	  disregards	  the	  lack	  of	  specialists	  to	  create	  such	  a	  committee	  -­‐	  	  
practically,	  and	  in	  light	  of	  how	  lengthy	  such	  processes	  are,	  it	  seems	  more	  feasible	  
for	  a	  trans	  minor	  to	  wait	  two	  years	  (from	  15	  until	  17)	  and	  avoid	  going	  through	  such	  
a	  committee.	  It	  is	  rather	  obvious,	  as	  noted	  in	  the	  excerpt	  above,	  that	  this	  provision	  
was	  added	  to	  show	  a	  positive	  disposition	  towards	  trans	  lobbying	  groups	  in	  light	  of	  
the	  dismissal	  of	  all	  their	  other	  points	  of	  critique	  (concerning	  the	  judicial	  process,	  the	  
unmarried	  status	  precondition	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  provision	  for	  non-­‐Greek	  citizens).	  
This	  exception	  more	  likely	  came	  to	  bridge	  the	  claim	  of	  lobbying	  groups	  about	  the	  
age	  limitation	  being	  harmful	  for	  trans	  minors	  and	  the	  general	  call	  to	  protect	  
children	  that	  escalated	  into	  a	  widespread	  moral	  panic	  fuelled	  by	  the	  media,	  
politicians	  and	  the	  clergy	  (Galanou	  2017).	  	  
The	  second	  positive	  precondition,	  that	  is,	  the	  single	  status	  of	  the	  applicant,	  was	  also	  
a	  point	  of	  contestation.	  The	  rationale	  behind	  this	  provision	  is	  avoiding	  de-­‐facto	  
legitimising	  same-­‐sex	  marriages	  against	  the	  will	  of	  the	  Greek	  legislator	  (Law	  
4491/2017	  Explanatory	  Memorandum,	  p.	  2).	  The	  Scientific	  Service	  of	  the	  Hellenic	  
Parliament	  expressed	  concerns	  about	  the	  possible	  incompatibility	  of	  such	  a	  
limitation	  with	  Article	  8	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  which	  
provides	  a	  right	  to	  respect	  for	  one's	  private	  and	  family	  life	  (Scientific	  Service	  of	  the	  
Hellenic	  Parliament	  2017:	  6).	  Additionally,	  the	  Scientific	  Service	  suggested	  the	  
discordance	  of	  this	  provision	  with	  Article	  6.2.3	  of	  the	  PACE	  Resolution	  on	  the	  
Discrimination	  against	  Transgender	  People	  in	  Europe	  (PACE	  Resolution	  2048/2015),	  
which	  explicitly	  advises	  against	  such	  a	  limitation	  (Scientific	  Service	  of	  the	  Hellenic	  
Parliament	  2017:	  6).	  Nonetheless,	  the	  Ministry	  concluded	  that,	  since	  a	  same-­‐sex	  
cohabitation	  contract	  is	  an	  available	  option	  in	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order	  which	  produces	  
“almost	  all	  the	  rights	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  marriage”,	  the	  provision	  is	  aligned	  with	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the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  as	  well	  as	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  
Rights	  jurisprudence	  (Law	  4491/2017	  Explanatory	  Memorandum,	  p.	  2).189	  	  
Lastly,	  article	  3	  adds	  a	  negative	  precondition	  to	  underline	  the	  legislator’s	  intention	  
behind	  this	  text.	  Paragraph	  2	  of	  the	  article	  reads:	  
For	  the	  correction	  of	  the	  registered	  gender,	  it	  is	  not	  required	  to	  establish	  
that	  the	  person	  has	  undergone	  any	  kind	  of	  operation.	  Additionally,	  no	  
previous	  examination	  or	  medical	  treatment	  concerning	  physical	  or	  mental	  
health	  is	  required	  (para.	  2	  art.	  3	  Law	  4491/2017,	  my	  translation).	  	  
This	  paragraph	  came	  to	  solidify	  the	  judicial	  practice	  that	  had	  already	  started	  to	  
develop	  since	  2016,	  taking	  it	  one	  step	  further	  by	  not	  requiring	  a	  mental	  specialist	  
diagnosis	  and	  placing	  Greece	  among	  the	  very	  few	  countries	  in	  Europe	  that	  have	  
accepted	  such	  a	  non-­‐medical	  procedure	  in	  their	  legal	  order.190	  In	  this	  sense,	  this	  
can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  core	  of	  the	  text,	  since	  it	  explicitly	  (and	  not	  by	  omission)	  declares	  
the	  separation	  of	  the	  legal	  process	  from	  any	  medical	  process	  of	  gender	  
confirmation.	  Obviously,	  this	  was	  a	  central	  point	  of	  contestation	  for	  those	  opposing	  
the	  new	  legislation	  and	  the	  separation	  of	  legal	  gender	  recognition	  from	  a	  mental	  
health	  professional	  diagnosis	  (see	  indicatively	  Hellenic	  Parliament	  17th	  Term,	  
Plenary	  C,	  6th	  Meeting	  Minutes:	  321,	  324,	  329,	  350).	  
Regarding	  the	  procedure,	  Article	  4	  dictates	  that	  the	  application	  to	  correct	  the	  
registered	  gender	  follows	  the	  process	  of	  voluntary	  jurisdiction	  regulated	  by	  article	  
782	  of	  Code	  of	  Civil	  Procedure	  (para.	  1	  art.	  4	  Law	  4491/2017).	  That	  means,	  in	  short,	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  Indeed,	  the	  ECtHR	  has	  ruled	  that	  “it	  is	  not	  disproportionate	  to	  require,	  as	  a	  precondition	  to	  legal	  
recognition	  of	  an	  acquired	  gender,	  that	  the	  applicant’s	  marriage	  be	  converted	  into	  a	  registered	  
partnership	  as	  that	  is	  a	  genuine	  option	  which	  provides	  legal	  protection	  for	  same-­‐sex	  couples	  that	  is	  
almost	  identical	  to	  that	  of	  marriage”	  (Hämäläinen	  v	  Finland,	  2014).	  Nonetheless,	  this	  precondition	  
not	  only	  has	  been	  criticised	  in	  the	  aforementioned	  PACE	  Resolution,	  but	  also	  it	  has	  been	  recently	  
rejected	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  in	  MB	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Work	  and	  
Pensions	  (C-­‐451/16)	  and	  the	  Views	  adopted	  in	  28.06.2017	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  Human	  Rights	  
Committee	  (CCPR/C/119/D/2172/2012).	  Moreover,	  various	  national	  judicial	  bodies	  (such	  as	  the	  
constitutional	  courts	  of	  Austria,	  Germany	  and	  Italy)	  have	  considered	  similar	  clauses	  as	  amounting	  to	  
unequal	  treatment	  (GTSA	  30.3.2019).	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  According	  to	  TGEU’s	  2018	  data,	  these	  countries	  are	  Denmark,	  Greece,	  France,	  Ireland,	  Malta	  and	  
Norway	  (TGEU	  2018).	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that	  the	  judicial	  character	  of	  the	  process	  is	  maintained	  and	  the	  same	  courts	  as	  
previously	  retain	  competence	  to	  examine	  such	  an	  application.	  This	  was	  a	  key-­‐point	  
of	  critique	  on	  the	  side	  of	  both	  those	  opposing	  the	  legislation	  as	  well	  as	  the	  lobbying	  
groups.	  On	  the	  part	  of	  the	  former,	  it	  was	  suggested	  that	  the	  procedure	  does	  not	  
seem	  to	  provide	  the	  judge	  with	  any	  tangible	  criteria	  (given	  the	  lack	  of	  all	  diagnoses)	  
in	  order	  to	  adjudicate	  and,	  in	  doing	  so,	  it	  does	  not	  provide	  him	  with	  any	  grounds	  in	  
order	  to	  reject	  the	  application.191	  On	  the	  other	  side,	  on	  part	  of	  the	  LGBTI+	  and	  ally	  
groups,	  the	  critique	  concerned	  the	  core	  of	  the	  judicial	  process,	  that	  is,	  the	  way	  in	  
which	  the	  orientation	  of	  the	  bill	  towards	  self-­‐determination	  seemed	  to	  be	  
contradicted	  by	  maintaining	  the	  judge’s	  role	  in	  deciding	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  
application	  (Hellenic	  Parliament,	  17th	  Term,	  Plenary	  B,	  Standing	  Committee	  on	  
Public	  Administration,	  Public	  Order	  and	  Justice	  27.09.2017	  meeting	  minutes).	  	  
Moreover,	  this	  way,	  the	  difficulties	  caused	  by	  the	  lengthiness	  and	  financial	  cost	  of	  
the	  process	  were	  disregarded	  in	  light	  of	  the	  safeguards	  provided	  by	  a	  judicial	  
decision.	  The	  Explanatory	  Memorandum	  noted	  to	  that	  end:	  
It	  is	  a	  short,	  simple	  procedure,	  with	  low	  cost	  and	  with	  legal	  certainty	  
guarantees	  for	  the	  citizen	  as	  well	  as	  the	  legal	  order	  as	  it	  coheres	  with	  the	  
procedure	  followed	  for	  changing	  name.	  The	  legal	  recognition	  of	  gender	  
identity	  is,	  primary,	  an	  issue	  of	  self-­‐definition.	  Nonetheless,	  it	  could	  not	  be	  
overlooked	  that	  identity	  information	  of	  the	  person	  is	  of	  interest	  to	  the	  state	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  Since	  the	  person’s	  will	  is	  recognised	  as	  the	  central	  criterion,	  those	  opposing	  this	  part	  of	  the	  bill	  
suggested	  this	  constitutes	  a	  stripping	  down	  of	  judicial	  authority	  and	  eventually	  a	  parody	  of	  a	  trial.	  	  
Moreover,	  for	  gender	  reassignment	  it	  is	  required	  and	  has	  been	  a	  constantly	  considered	  by	  courts,	  as	  
a	  necessary	  substantial	  precondition,	  a	  medical	  opinion	  that	  proves	  what	  is	  called	  a	  “persistent	  
gender	  dysphoria”	  of	  the	  applicants.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  judge	  considers	  the	  crucial	  evidence	  of	  a	  
medical	  opinion	  or	  psychiatric	  examination	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  a	  substantial	  judgement.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  
in	  thirty-­‐six	  out	  of	  forty-­‐one	  counties	  of	  the	  European	  Union.	  You,	  with	  the	  present	  bill,	  come	  to	  turn	  
the	  judge,	  by	  removing	  the	  precondition	  of	  a	  diagnosis,	  into	  a	  perfunctory	  administrative	  instrument,	  
since	  he	  can	  only	  accept	  the	  applicant’s	  will.	  This	  is	  wrong	  and	  we	  disagree	  with	  that	  (Nea	  
Dimokratia	  MP	  Panayiotopoulos	  in	  Hellenic	  Parliament	  17th	  Term,	  Plenary	  C,	  6th	  Meeting	  Minutes:	  
321,	  my	  translation)	  
This	  excerpt	  is	  from	  the	  speech	  of	  the	  rapporteur	  of	  Nea	  Dimokratia	  during	  the	  Plenum	  session,	  who	  
was	  one	  of	  the	  several	  MP’s	  of	  this	  party	  to	  object	  the	  bill	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  provision.	  The	  same	  
objection	  was	  expressed	  by	  representatives	  of	  Golden	  Dawn	  (Hellenic	  Parliament	  17th	  Term,	  Plenary	  
C,	  6th	  Meeting	  Minutes:	  335,	  340)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Communist	  Party	  (Hellenic	  Parliament	  17th	  Term,	  
Plenary	  C,	  6th	  Meeting	  Minutes:	  328).	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and	  society	  as	  a	  whole	  (Law	  4491/2017	  Explanatory	  Memorandum,	  p.	  3,	  
my	  translation).	  
Although	  there	  have	  been	  suggested	  legal	  manoeuvres	  to	  escape	  the	  impasse	  of	  
article	  782	  of	  Code	  of	  Civil	  Procedure,	  which	  requires	  a	  court	  decision	  for	  
substantial	  changes	  in	  register	  acts	  (Sotiropoulos	  2017),	  the	  Explanatory	  
Memorandum	  leaves	  no	  doubt	  that	  this	  is	  just	  not	  a	  procedural	  issue	  even	  if	  it	  was	  
presented	  as	  such	  by	  some	  members	  of	  the	  government	  (Alexandris	  2017).	  	  
Article	  4	  also	  brought	  a	  few	  differentiations	  compared	  to	  the	  process	  followed	  until	  
now.	  First,	  the	  applicant	  is	  required	  to	  be	  present	  in	  person	  while,	  until	  then,	  they	  
could	  be	  represented	  by	  a	  lawyer	  (para.	  2	  art.	  4	  Law	  4491/2017).	  Secondly,	  the	  
process	  is	  required	  to	  take	  place	  in	  a	  private	  office	  and	  not	  in	  the	  courtroom	  in	  
order	  to	  provide	  privacy	  (para.	  2	  art.	  4	  Law	  4491/2017).	  This	  is	  an	  important	  
differentiation	  compared	  to	  the	  previous	  practice	  of	  conducting	  the	  hearing	  within	  
usually	  overcrowded	  courtrooms.	  As	  the	  president	  of	  GTSA	  notes,	  and	  tapping	  into	  
what	  was	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  during	  the	  first	  year	  of	  the	  law’s	  
application,	  several	  judges	  have	  ignored	  this	  provision,	  conducting	  public	  hearings	  
regardless	  of	  the	  applicants’	  objections	  (Galanou	  2018).	  	  
Another	  important	  procedural	  change	  is	  the	  secrecy	  of	  the	  amendment	  of	  legal	  
gender.	  To	  that	  end,	  the	  court	  judgement	  is	  submitted	  to	  the	  competent	  registrar’s	  
office	  and	  a	  new	  copy	  of	  the	  birth	  register	  act	  is	  issued	  incorporating	  the	  correction	  
and	  becoming	  the	  primary	  document	  for	  the	  issuing	  of	  new	  informed	  documents	  
from	  all	  other	  services	  (para	  2	  art.	  4	  Law	  4491/2017).	  Law	  4491/2017	  dictates	  (in	  
two	  separate	  articles)	  that	  the	  whole	  procedure	  guarantees	  secrecy	  and	  the	  new	  
documents	  bear	  no	  trace	  of	  the	  correction	  that	  has	  occurred	  (para	  2	  art.	  4	  &	  art.	  6	  
Law	  4491/2017).	  Nonetheless,	  it	  is	  still	  the	  person’s	  responsibility	  to	  oversee	  the	  
correction	  of	  their	  information	  for	  every	  single	  service,	  a	  process	  that,	  in	  itself,	  is	  
lengthy	  and	  difficult	  to	  navigate	  (Galanou	  2018).	  	  
Article	  5	  (“Results	  of	  the	  correction	  of	  the	  registered	  gender”)	  dictates	  that	  the	  
rights	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  the	  person	  that	  were	  created	  before	  this	  process	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remain	  the	  same	  after	  the	  correction	  of	  legal	  gender	  (para	  1	  art.	  5	  Law	  4491/2017).	  
In	  practice,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  on	  at	  least	  one	  occasion,	  since,	  in	  Greece,	  military	  
service	  is	  compulsory	  for	  male	  citizens	  who	  are	  drafted	  from	  a	  separate	  male	  
register	  (μητρώο	  αρρένων)	  (Law	  2119/1993,	  OGG	  Α΄	  23/4.3.1993).	  This	  issue	  was	  
repeatedly	  brought	  up	  in	  parliamentary	  debates,	  mainly	  by	  those	  opposing	  the	  bill,	  
as	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  points	  with	  multiple	  implications	  for	  potential	  fraud	  (see	  
indicatively	  Hellenic	  Parliament	  17th	  Term,	  Plenary	  C,	  6th	  Meeting	  Minutes:	  348,	  
356,	  373).192	  In	  this	  case,	  what	  is	  suggested	  is	  a	  supposed	  risk	  of	  men	  changing	  legal	  
gender	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  military	  service.	  Although	  I	  will	  not	  entertain	  this	  hostile	  
and	  unrealistic	  argument,	  the	  fact	  remains	  that	  military	  service	  is	  a	  significant	  
differentiation	  between	  male	  and	  female	  citizens	  in	  Greece.193	  Obviously,	  the	  lack	  
of	  any	  reference	  to	  this	  issue	  in	  the	  new	  legislation	  is	  a	  remarkable	  omission.	  As	  a	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  Fraudulence	  is	  a	  common	  axis	  around	  which	  anti-­‐trans	  argumentation	  is	  often	  organised	  
(Bettcher	  2007;	  Sharpe	  2018).	  Indeed,	  during	  the	  Parliamentary	  Debates	  the	  scenarios	  concerning	  
various	  possibilities	  of	  committing	  fraud	  by	  amending	  legal	  gender	  were	  entertained	  (see	  
indicatively	  Hellenic	  Parliament	  17th	  Term,	  Plenary	  C,	  6th	  Meeting	  Minutes:	  322,	  350,	  381).	  The	  lack	  
of	  preconditions	  along	  with	  the	  secrecy	  granted	  by	  the	  law	  and	  the	  possibility	  to	  repeat	  the	  process	  
were	  thought	  to	  create	  a	  tool	  for	  all	  sorts	  of	  fraudulent	  behaviour,	  from	  economic	  crime	  to	  terrorism	  
(Fountedaki	  in	  Georgiou	  2017a).	  The	  general	  concern	  about	  fraud	  was	  indirectly	  addressed	  by	  a	  
provision,	  which	  states	  that	  after	  the	  correction	  of	  legal	  gender	  the	  entire	  process	  can	  be	  repeated	  
only	  once	  more	  (para	  4	  art.	  4	  Law	  4491/2017).	  Although	  there	  is	  no	  literature	  or	  practice	  of	  people	  
engaging	  in	  multiple	  legal	  corrections,	  this	  provision	  came	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  articulated	  anti-­‐trans	  
demands	  for	  “safety”	  against	  not	  only	  fraud	  but	  also	  a	  dreaded	  instability.	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  There	  have	  been	  different	  practices	  on	  the	  part	  of	  trans	  individuals	  concerning	  military	  service.	  
Trans	  women,	  for	  example,	  who	  have	  not	  amended	  their	  documents	  and	  have	  not	  completed	  their	  
military	  obligations	  can	  request	  a	  permanent	  deferment	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  having	  mental	  health	  
issues.	  The	  procedural	  part	  of	  such	  an	  a	  application	  is	  long	  and	  hostile,	  as	  it	  requires	  being	  drafted	  
and	  appearing	  in	  person	  to	  be	  examined	  by	  a	  committee	  of	  medical	  (in	  this	  case	  mental	  health)	  
professionals	  within	  (all-­‐male)	  military	  compounds	  (Article	  13	  Law	  3421/2005	  as	  amended	  by	  Law	  
3883/2010;	  Presidential	  Decree	  112014).	  	  
In	  cases	  of	  female	  to	  male	  legal	  change,	  the	  male	  legal	  gender	  entails	  the	  person’s	  registration	  at	  the	  
male	  registers.	  Since	  men	  are	  drafted	  for	  the	  first	  time	  when	  they	  turn	  eighteen,	  appearing	  at	  the	  
male	  catalogues	  at	  a	  later	  age	  and	  without	  having	  already	  presented	  to	  the	  army,	  automatically,	  
raises	  a	  flag	  in	  the	  system.	  For	  example,	  as	  Philip	  explained	  to	  me	  in	  2014,	  after	  he	  changed	  his	  
documents	  he	  received	  a	  letter	  from	  the	  military	  court	  that	  he	  was	  being	  charged	  with	  draft	  evasion,	  
as	  he	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  25-­‐year	  old	  male	  citizen	  who	  had	  not	  appeared	  to	  serve	  in	  the	  army	  or	  to	  
request	  a	  postpone	  of	  his	  service.	  He,	  thus,	  presented	  in	  court	  with	  all	  the	  medical	  and	  legal	  
documents	  and	  was	  cleared	  of	  both	  the	  accusation	  and	  the	  obligation	  to	  serve.	  Nonetheless,	  as	  I	  
discussed	  with	  both	  Philip	  and	  Mike,	  the	  lack	  of	  protocol	  can	  also	  mean	  that	  if	  the	  person	  wants,	  
they	  could	  actually	  serve.	  Mike	  did	  note	  that	  he	  thought	  about	  serving	  but	  he	  was	  discouraged	  by	  
the	  army	  staff	  who	  were	  rather	  worried	  and	  considered	  this	  a	  risky	  move	  for	  him	  [Interview	  with	  
Mike	  in	  2017].	  There	  have	  been	  cases	  of	  trans	  individuals	  both	  trans	  women	  (still	  registered	  as	  male	  
citizens)	  and	  trans	  men	  (registered	  as	  male	  citizens	  after	  the	  amendment)	  serving	  in	  the	  army	  but	  
there	  are	  no	  protocols	  in	  place	  and	  no	  officials	  records	  that	  establish	  this.	  
Part	  C	   	   Chapter	  9	  
	   273	   	  
government	  representative	  noted	  with	  regards	  to	  this	  lack,	  it	  “is	  better	  if	  we	  don’t	  
open	  it	  [this	  issue]	  right	  now,	  not	  everything	  is	  that	  easy”	  (Giannakaki	  quoted	  in	  
Alexandris	  2017).	  This	  hints	  to	  the	  contestation	  attached	  to	  the	  core	  of	  ethno-­‐
sexual	  values	  that	  were	  mobilised	  during	  the	  public	  debate	  as	  we	  will	  see	  in	  the	  
next	  part.	  
The	  last	  important	  point	  is	  located	  in	  paragraph	  2	  of	  the	  same	  article,	  which	  notes	  
that	  any	  existing	  parental	  rights	  and	  responsibilities	  are	  not	  affected	  but	  also	  that	  
the	  name	  and	  identity	  information	  on	  the	  children’s	  birth	  registration	  act	  (and	  thus	  
all	  identity	  documents	  that	  are	  issued	  based	  on	  this)	  cannot	  be	  amended	  (para	  2	  
art.	  5	  Law	  4491/2017).	  Obviously,	  this	  directly	  conflicts	  with	  the	  rule	  of	  secrecy	  that	  
is	  so	  much	  emphasised	  (by	  unnecessarily	  being	  repeated	  in	  two	  articles)	  by	  the	  law.	  
That	  is,	  in	  practice,	  the	  person	  will	  have	  to	  reveal	  the	  correction	  and	  the	  previous	  
information	  in	  every	  instance	  that	  kinship	  needs	  to	  be	  established	  with	  children	  
born	  before	  the	  correction	  (Sotiropoulos	  2017).194	  
Overall,	  the	  new	  law	  was	  advertised	  by	  the	  government	  as	  a	  legal	  breakthrough	  of	  
immense	  proportions.	  Although	  Law	  4491/2017	  did	  mark	  a	  new	  era	  for	  trans	  lives	  
and	  politics	  in	  Greece,	  on	  the	  level	  of	  legal	  practice,	  its	  results	  are	  controversial.	  
That	  is,	  securing	  the	  separation	  of	  legal	  gender	  from	  post-­‐operative	  anatomy,	  
through	  a	  legislative	  text,	  is	  undoubtedly	  a	  crucial	  development.	  Detaching	  not	  just	  
surgical	  intervention,	  but	  all	  diagnoses	  from	  the	  amendment	  of	  legal	  gender	  
removes	  a	  significant	  barrier	  for	  trans	  lives	  and	  their	  interaction	  with	  the	  law.	  
Nonetheless,	  as	  noted	  by	  commentators	  with	  an	  in-­‐depth	  understanding	  of	  legal	  
practice	  and	  the	  character	  of	  this	  reform,	  in	  light	  of	  the	  pro-­‐existing	  shift	  in	  judicial	  
practice,	  this	  development	  came	  at	  a	  disproportionate	  price	  (Sotiropoulos	  in	  Kati	  
2017).	  	  
The	  positive	  outcome	  came	  to	  secure	  and	  broaden	  this	  judicial	  practice	  but,	  in	  the	  
same	  gesture,	  introduced	  significant	  limitations	  that	  were	  not	  in	  place.	  In	  this	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  For	  a	  detailed	  and	  comprehensive	  description	  of	  the	  entire	  legal	  procedure	  and	  its	  practical	  
pitfalls	  see	  Sotiropoulos’	  presentation	  in	  the	  Athens	  Bar	  Association	  seminar	  “Legal	  protection	  of	  
gender	  identity”	  (Sotiropoulos	  2019).	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sense,	  it	  left	  lobbying	  groups	  with	  the	  impression	  of	  taking	  steps	  forward	  and	  
backwards	  at	  the	  same	  time	  (Galanou	  in	  Nini	  2017).	  Moreover,	  although	  the	  
introduction	  of	  the	  law	  was	  made	  into	  a	  large	  operation	  in	  executional	  terms,	  it	  did	  
not	  alter	  the	  procedural	  core	  of	  the	  existing	  legislation	  (that	  is,	  the	  requirement	  for	  
judicial	  judgement	  itself),	  thus,	  losing	  the	  momentum	  for	  such	  a	  reform	  
(Papadopoulou	  in	  Georgiou	  2017b).	  The	  question	  of	  whether	  it	  is	  preferable	  to	  have	  
a	  generic	  and	  vague	  law	  that	  allows	  anything	  it	  does	  not	  forbid	  or	  more	  
comprehensive	  legislation	  that	  brings	  stricter	  control	  and	  regulation	  resulting	  in	  
stricter	  limitations	  begs	  further	  critical	  thought	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  voting	  for	  
the	  law.	  195	  	  
It	  also	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  neither	  the	  addition	  of	  “sex-­‐change”	  as	  a	  possible	  
ground	  for	  amending	  legal	  documents	  in	  1997,	  nor	  the	  recent	  significant	  shift	  in	  
case	  law,	  triggered	  such	  a	  wide	  political	  debate	  and	  media	  frenzy	  as	  the	  new	  
legislation	  did.	  That	  is,	  the	  communicational	  management	  of	  the	  issue	  was	  a	  
political	  choice	  in	  itself,	  and	  had	  less	  to	  do	  with	  the	  legal	  changes	  that	  occurred	  and	  
more	  with	  the	  socio-­‐political	  implications	  of	  this	  initiative.	  Indeed,	  a	  whole	  new	  
communicational	  terrain	  was	  formed	  through	  the	  parallel	  processes	  of	  
parliamentary	  discussions	  and	  the	  explosion	  of	  the	  issue	  in	  the	  media	  and	  the	  
opposing	  discourses	  left	  their	  imprint	  on	  the	  public	  opinion	  and	  the	  conditions	  of	  
trans	  life.	  	  
In	  this	  vein,	  after	  having	  contextualised	  and	  presented	  Law	  4491/2017,	  the	  next	  
section	  explores	  some	  of	  the	  ideological	  premises	  that	  constituted	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  
opposition	  to	  its	  introduction.	  Although	  the	  public	  and	  media	  debate	  is	  worthy	  of	  a	  
thorough	  study	  on	  its	  own,	  due	  to	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  present	  chapter	  on	  the	  
legislative	  process,	  I	  want	  to	  draw	  attention	  to	  the	  parliamentary	  debates	  on	  the	  
issue.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  analyse	  the	  dominant	  anti-­‐trans	  rhetoric	  as	  it	  was	  
developed	  initially	  by	  the	  Orthodox	  Church	  of	  Greece	  and	  later	  transferred	  and	  
amplified	  by	  the	  right-­‐wing	  in	  the	  parliamentary	  debates	  before	  the	  voting.	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  This	  point	  was	  made	  by	  Sotiropoulos	  in	  the	  event	  “Legal	  Recognition	  of	  Gender	  Identity”	  was	  
organised	  by	  the	  Centre	  for	  European	  Constitutional	  Law	  in	  18.10.2017.	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9.3.c. Defending	  Sex,	  Defending	  the	  Nation:	  	  
The	  Orthodox	  Church	  and	  Far-­‐Right	  Common	  Front	  
The	  introduction	  of	  the	  bill	  on	  gender	  identity	  recognition	  triggered	  an	  intense	  
political	  debate	  within	  the	  Greek	  Parliament.196	  The	  parliamentary	  discussions	  that	  
took	  place	  in	  late	  September	  and	  early	  October	  of	  2017	  included	  a	  variety	  of	  
arguments	  opposing	  the	  bill,	  from	  religio-­‐ethical	  and	  ideological	  to	  purely	  technico-­‐
legal,	  and	  everything	  in	  between.	  In	  the	  previous	  section,	  alongside	  the	  reading	  of	  
the	  final	  text,	  I	  pointed	  out	  the	  main	  legal	  objections	  that	  were	  raised	  during	  these	  
discussions	  on	  different	  sides	  (including	  LGBTI+	  lobbying	  groups).	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  
will	  entertain	  some	  of	  the	  broader	  ideological	  arguments	  that	  framed	  the	  
opposition	  to	  the	  bill	  within	  the	  parliament	  and	  were	  reflected	  in	  a	  large	  part	  of	  the	  
public	  debate	  on	  the	  issue.	  	  
Although	  the	  bill	  was	  opposed	  on	  many	  grounds	  by	  political	  forces	  across	  the	  
political	  spectrum,	  the	  strongest	  opposition,	  as	  expected,	  came	  from	  right-­‐wing	  
political	  forces,	  with	  Golden	  Dawn	  setting	  the	  pace.	  Specifically,	  this	  section	  
examines	  the	  core	  of	  the	  direct	  opposition	  to	  the	  bill	  as	  it	  was	  often	  exemplified	  in	  
the	  speeches	  of	  Golden	  Dawn	  representatives.	  It	  also	  sets	  out	  to	  explore	  the	  central	  
ideological	  notions	  of	  this	  opposition	  in	  order	  to	  comprehend	  their	  rooting	  within	  
Greek	  political	  culture.197	  Religious	  values	  and	  the	  “anti-­‐Orthodox”	  character	  of	  the	  
bill	  were	  structural	  for	  the	  anti-­‐trans	  discourse	  articulated	  by	  far	  right	  wing	  
representatives	  in	  the	  parliamentary	  debates.	  Forming	  a	  common	  front	  with	  the	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  Even	  before	  the	  discussion	  on	  the	  content	  of	  the	  bill	  started,	  a	  political	  crisis	  rapidly	  formed	  
around	  its	  introduction.	  The	  governing	  coalition	  of	  SYRIZA	  and	  ANEL	  (a	  small	  right-­‐wing	  populist	  
party	  that	  was	  the	  junior	  coalition	  partner)	  seemed	  to	  be	  testing	  its	  limits	  on	  this	  law.	  With	  ANEL	  
struggling	  to	  compromise	  its	  ideological	  basis	  with	  anything	  other	  than	  traditional	  gender	  values,	  
other	  political	  forces,	  which	  had	  already	  declared	  they	  would	  support	  the	  bill,	  threatened	  not	  to	  
vote	  it	  unless	  both	  coalition	  parties	  do	  (Chrysopoulos	  2017).	  Their	  rationale	  was	  that	  the	  governing	  
coalition	  appeared	  coherent	  in	  some	  issues	  (such	  as	  austerity	  measures)	  while	  relying	  on	  opposing	  
political	  forces	  to	  achieve	  majority	  for	  issues	  that	  create	  internal	  tensions	  (such	  as	  issues	  or	  national	  
sovereignty	  and	  LGBTI+	  rights).	  Although	  this	  crisis	  was	  overcome,	  it	  marked	  from	  the	  beginning	  this	  
legislation	  as	  intensely	  contested	  and	  destabilising	  (ekathimerini	  27.09.2017).	  	  
197
	  Methodologically	  I	  have	  chosen	  not	  to	  engage	  with	  some	  extreme	  parts	  of	  these	  discourse	  	  
because	  I	  hold	  that	  the	  overall	  analysis	  does	  not	  necessitate	  the	  reproduction	  of	  such	  level	  of	  hostile	  
arguments.	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Orthodox	  Church	  of	  Greece,	  whose	  ideological	  presence	  in	  the	  parliamentary	  
debates	  far	  exceeded	  its	  official	  representation,198	  the	  main	  opposition	  of	  the	  far-­‐
right,	  was	  based,	  as	  I	  will	  suggest,	  on	  a	  juxtaposition	  between	  LGBTI+	  claims	  and	  
Helleno-­‐Orthodoxy,	  state	  sovereignty	  and	  heteronormative	  futurity.	  In	  this	  sense,	  
the	  characterisation	  of	  sexual	  and	  gender	  “deviance”	  as	  an	  anti-­‐Orthodox	  and	  
especially	  anti-­‐Hellenic	  attribute	  constituted	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  opposition	  to	  
the	  law	  on	  gender	  identity	  recognition	  
i. Nation,	  Orthodoxy	  and	  the	  Future	  under	  Attack	  	  
A	  few	  months	  prior	  to	  the	  voting	  relating	  to	  the	  bill,	  an	  educational	  program	  
introduced	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Education	  Research	  and	  Religious	  Affairs	  gave	  way	  to	  
an	  anti-­‐trans	  campaign	  whose	  content	  transferred	  in	  toto	  into	  the	  following	  
discussions	  about	  the	  bill	  on	  gender	  identity.199	  During	  this	  outburst	  of	  the	  OCG	  
against	  the	  programme’s	  stream	  titled	  “gendered	  identities,”	  which	  actually	  had	  
very	  little	  to	  do	  with	  trans	  identities,	  a	  variety	  of	  texts	  was	  produced	  by	  the	  clergy,	  
the	  religious	  media,	  academics	  and	  politicians.	  Invoking	  a	  system	  of	  notions	  that	  are	  
threatened	  simultaneously	  by	  gender/sexual	  transgression	  and	  create	  a	  porous	  
schema	  of	  moral/social/religious	  values,	  the	  Orthodox	  front	  repeatedly	  depicted	  
gender	  and	  sexual	  non-­‐conformity	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  nation’s	  survival	  (Holy	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  Populist	  right-­‐wing	  parties	  with	  conservative	  agendas	  have	  been	  traditionally	  connected	  with	  
the	  OCG	  on	  many	  levels.	  Nonetheless,	  far-­‐right	  ultranationalist	  strands	  (such	  as	  the	  Golden	  Dawn)	  
with	  their	  anti-­‐systemic	  discourse	  have	  been,	  at	  times,	  politically	  estranged	  from	  the	  socio-­‐political	  
stance	  of	  the	  OCG	  (Papastathis	  2015).	  Nonetheless,	  during	  these	  parliamentary	  discussions	  they	  
made	  an	  explicit	  point	  in	  forming	  an	  alliance	  with	  sections	  of	  the	  Orthodox	  leaders.	  
199
	  This	  campaign	  targeted	  a	  new	  educational	  program,	  known	  as	  “Thematic	  Week”	  about	  “Body	  
and	  Identity”,	  which	  was	  introduced	  in	  high-­‐schools	  across	  the	  country	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Education,	  
Research	  and	  Religious	  Affairs	  (Ministry	  of	  Education,	  Research	  and	  Religious	  Affairs,	  Document	  n.	  
Φ/20.1/220482/Δ2).	  The	  three	  streams	  of	  the	  programme	  were	  “food	  and	  quality	  of	  life”,	  
“prevention	  of	  addiction	  and	  dependence”,	  and	  “gendered	  identities”.	  	  
Although	  the	  content	  and	  necessity	  of	  the	  first	  two	  streams	  have	  barely	  been	  debated	  publicly,	  the	  
third	  stream	  created	  an	  outcry	  especially	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  OCG.	  The	  actual	  focus	  of	  the	  gendered	  
identities’	  stream	  was	  gender	  stereotypes,	  women’s	  rights	  and	  gender	  based	  violence.	  There	  was	  
only	  one	  mentioning	  of	  “homophobia	  and	  transphobia	  in	  school	  and	  society”	  among	  its	  non-­‐
mandatory	  points	  for	  discussion	  (Institute	  of	  Educational	  Policy	  website,	  Thematic	  Week	  section).	  
This	  was	  enough	  to	  spark	  a	  campaign	  on	  part	  of	  the	  OCG	  against	  what	  a	  segment	  of	  the	  press	  
depicted	  as	  “transsexual	  lessons,”	  which	  supposedly	  propagated	  trans-­‐ness,	  gender	  fluidity	  and	  
sexual	  perversity	  (HuffPost	  Greece	  2017a).	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Metropolis	  of	  Corfu	  2017;	  Holy	  Metropolis	  of	  Glyfada	  2017;	  Holy	  Metropolis	  of	  
Aetolia	  2017;	  Panhellenic	  Union	  of	  Theology	  Professors	  –	  Corinthian	  Division	  2017).	  
For	  example	  “health”	  and	  “nature”	  as	  synonyms	  to	  moral	  values	  of	  Hellenism	  are	  
opposed	  to	  a	  complex	  notion	  of	  “deviance”	  or	  “anomaly,”	  which	  contradicts	  
simultaneously	  “nature,	  health,	  law	  and	  national	  ideology”	  (Apostolidou	  2014:	  240).	  	  
“Sin”,	  here,	  is	  not	  contained	  in	  divine	  metaphysics	  but	  overspills	  in	  other	  terrains,	  
achieving	  a	  complementary	  synthesis	  of	  the	  social,	  the	  religious,	  and	  the	  legal	  
terrain,	  which	  renders	  them	  inseparable.	  Such	  synthetic	  discourses,	  were	  
thoroughly	  exploited	  in	  the	  anti-­‐trans	  campaign	  of	  the	  OCG	  wherein	  religious	  and	  
moral	  principles	  overlapped	  with	  physical	  attributes	  and	  secular	  scientific	  authority.	  
Invocations	  of	  scientific	  authority	  run	  through	  the	  produced	  texts	  and	  led	  to	  the	  
organisation	  of	  various	  conferences	  and	  events	  by	  local	  religious	  unions	  (sometimes	  
with	  the	  support	  of	  the	  local	  municipal	  authorities).	  These	  hybrid	  events	  have	  a	  
semi-­‐religious	  and	  semi-­‐scientific	  character	  bringing	  together	  speakers	  from	  various	  
fields	  (educators,	  medical	  professionals,	  sociologists	  etc.),	  which	  use	  arguments	  
from	  those	  fields	  to	  support	  the	  position	  of	  the	  Church	  (and,	  later,	  of	  Golden	  
Dawn).	  Through	  various	  combinations	  of	  history,	  biology,	  psychology,	  sociology	  and	  
legal	  science,	  the	  values	  promoted	  by	  the	  Helleno-­‐Orthodox	  Church	  are	  re-­‐
positioned	  on	  a	  new	  base	  of	  not	  only	  moral	  but	  also	  scientific	  superiority.	  200	  	  
The	  Parliamentary	  right	  and	  far-­‐right	  transfused	  the	  these	  discourses	  into	  the	  
parliamentary	  discussions,	  using	  the	  merging	  of	  nation	  and	  Orthodoxy	  as	  the	  
backbone	  of	  its	  nationalist	  rhetorics	  (Stavrakakis	  2003:	  165-­‐166).	  Accordingly,	  the	  
main	  opposition	  to	  the	  bill	  on	  gender	  identity	  was	  organised	  within	  the	  Parliament	  
around	  a	  defense	  of	  Greek	  national	  identity	  as	  it	  has	  been	  constructed	  throughout	  
modern	  Greek	  history	  based	  on	  the	  emotionally	  invested	  triptych	  of	  “motherland-­‐
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  Examples	  of	  such	  events	  include	  one-­‐day	  conferences	  and	  speeches	  such	  as	  “Gendered	  
Identities	  as	  teaching	  material	  for	  our	  children”	  (Giorgos	  Papadopoulos	  2017);	  “From	  the	  
deconstruction	  of	  the	  biological	  sex	  of	  teenagers	  to	  the	  manipulation	  of	  a	  will-­‐less	  society”	  (Trapeza	  
Ideon	  2017);	  “Helleno-­‐Orthodox	  education	  or	  atheist	  lessons?”	  (Iera	  Mitropolis	  Thessalonikis	  2017);	  
“Gender	  Identity:	  An	  interdisciplinary	  approach”	  (Acheloos	  Tileorasi	  2017).	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religion-­‐family”	  (patris-­‐thriskeia-­‐oikogeneia)	  (Gazi	  2013).	  Note	  how	  this	  is	  mirrored	  
in	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  gender	  identity	  bill:	  	  
No	  matter	  how	  many	  laws	  you	  vote	  in,	  you	  know	  none	  of	  what	  you	  bring	  is	  
normal.	  You	  are	  trying	  to	  destroy	  the	  holy	  triptych	  of	  “motherland-­‐religion-­‐
family,”	  but	  because	  God	  has	  done	  a	  good	  job,	  he	  created	  man	  and	  woman	  
and	  is	  the	  only	  one	  all-­‐powerful	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  Earth,	  no	  matter	  what	  
you	  do,	  you	  will	  fail	  (Golden	  Dawn	  MP	  Panayiotaros,	  Hellenic	  Parliament	  
17th	  Term,	  Plenary	  C,	  6th	  Meeting	  Minutes	  348,	  my	  translation).	  	  
Golden	  Dawn	  fanatically,	  with	  perfect	  awareness	  of	  its	  place	  and	  
responsibility	  towards	  the	  Greek	  people,	  votes	  against	  the	  new-­‐age	  
acrobatisms	  of	  the	  coalition	  government,	  who,	  by	  such	  bills,	  dynamites	  the	  
foundations	  of	  the	  Greek	  nation;	  foundations	  to	  which	  we	  pledge	  absolute	  
adherence;	  they	  are	  the	  pillars	  of	  our	  national	  life	  and	  are	  expressed	  
specifically	  in	  the	  triptych:	  motherland-­‐religion-­‐family.	  This	  is	  what	  has	  
supported	  us	  for	  thousands	  of	  years	  and	  we	  shall	  not	  renounce	  this	  in	  favor	  
of	  no	  fixation	  (ιδεοληψία)	  or	  adaptation	  to	  the	  new-­‐world-­‐order	  European	  
Union.	  Above	  God,	  our	  motherland	  and	  our	  familia	  (φαμίλια),	  we,	  the	  
nationalists,	  will	  put	  no	  European	  Court	  -­‐	  of	  supposed	  -­‐	  Human	  Rights.	  (…)	  
Ladies	  and	  gentlemen	  family	  means	  man	  and	  woman.	  Family	  means	  union	  
with	  the	  holy	  mystery	  of	  matrimony,	  which	  stands	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  
Greek	  people.	  End	  of	  story.	  Anything	  else	  is	  anti-­‐natural,	  stupid	  and	  most	  of	  
all	  anti-­‐national	  (Golden	  Dawn	  MP	  Pappas,	  Hellenic	  Parliament	  17th	  Term,	  
Plenary	  C,	  7th	  Meeting	  Minutes	  201-­‐202,	  my	  translation)	  
As	  this	  set	  of	  values	  has	  been	  constructed	  throughout	  the	  decades,201	  the	  
positioning	  of	  traditional	  family	  values	  at	  the	  core	  of	  national	  identity	  translates	  
into	  a	  tight	  weaving	  of	  specific	  sexual	  and	  gender	  norms	  in	  the	  epicentre	  of	  modern	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  The	  inseparable	  triplet	  of	  “motherland-­‐religion-­‐family”	  along	  with	  the	  motto	  “Greece	  of	  
Christian	  Greeks”	  were	  adopted	  by	  the	  colonel	  dictatorship	  (1967-­‐1974),	  whose	  amalgamation	  of	  
religio-­‐militaristic	  nationalism	  still	  echoes	  in	  the	  current	  political	  debates	  (Fokas	  2006:	  45-­‐46;	  
Makrides	  2010;	  Papastathis	  2015;	  Roudometof	  2011:	  98).	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Greek	  political	  culture.	  In	  this	  vein,	  national(ist)	  politics,	  Orthodox	  tradition	  and	  
heteronormative	  gender/sexual	  imperatives	  constitute	  communicating	  vessels	  both	  
ideologically	  and	  institutionally	  (Canakis	  2013;	  Chalkidou	  2018).202	  This	  is	  precisely	  
the	  schema	  activated	  against	  any	  practice	  or	  identity,	  which	  deviates	  from	  
traditional	  family	  (thus,	  heterosexual)	  values	  and	  becomes	  a	  danger	  for	  the	  nation	  
or	  even	  for	  Helleno-­‐Christian	  civilisation	  as	  a	  whole	  (Apostolidou	  2014).	  	  
Another	  way	  of	  connecting	  nationalist	  ideology	  with	  gender-­‐normative	  
heterosexuality	  in	  both	  Golden	  Dawn’s	  and	  the	  OCG’s	  discourse	  was	  the	  notorious	  
concept	  of	  the	  “demographic	  problem”	  (Golden	  Dawn	  MP	  Panayiotaros,	  Hellenic	  
Parliament	  17th	  Term,	  Plenary	  C,	  6th	  Meeting	  Minutes:	  347).	  The	  “demographic	  
problem”	  -­‐	  meaning	  the	  low	  birth	  rate	  and	  high	  percentage	  of	  abortions,	  which	  
initiated	  an	  intense	  debate	  during	  the	  1990	  -­‐	  as	  a	  national	  threat	  has	  proven	  a	  
privileged	  site	  for	  the	  encounter	  of	  Greek	  nationalism,	  Orthodoxy	  and	  the	  
(heterosexual	  nuclear)	  family	  (Halkias	  2004;	  Athanasiou	  2007).	  	  
Alexandra	  Halkias	  (2004),	  studying	  the	  intersections	  of	  sex,	  abortion	  and	  
nationalism	  in	  Greece,	  points	  out	  the	  centrality	  of	  national	  ideology	  in	  the	  
construction	  of	  Greek	  heterosexuality	  (Halkias	  2004).	  The	  “demographic	  problem”,	  
thus,	  becomes	  a	  synonym	  for	  “legitimate”	  concerns	  over	  bodies,	  genders	  and	  
sexualities	  which	  are	  thought	  traitorous	  and	  harmful	  for	  both	  the	  nation	  and	  the	  
family	  (Halkias	  2004).	  Athena	  Athanasiou	  (2007)	  analyses	  the	  discourse	  concerning	  
the	  “demographic	  problem”	  as	  a	  means	  of	  biopolitical	  regulation	  and	  discipline	  in	  
modern	  Greece.	  Through	  the	  assemblage	  of	  “gender-­‐sexuality-­‐reproduction-­‐
kinship”	  the	  cultural	  legitimacy	  of	  national	  tropes	  of	  citizenship	  and	  humanity	  is	  
normatively	  constituted	  along	  the	  inherent	  temporality	  of	  such	  national	  politics	  
(Athanasiou	  2007).	  The	  monumental	  national	  past	  becomes	  the	  background	  for	  the	  
articulation	  of	  the	  ultimate	  political	  agony	  of	  the	  nation’s	  endangered	  future	  
(Athanasiou	  2007:	  82).	  In	  this	  political	  imperative	  of	  national	  futurity,	  non-­‐
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  Although	  I	  examine	  the	  OCG	  discourse	  in	  particular	  here	  there	  are	  similarities	  with	  other	  official	  
Churches	  and	  their	  reaction	  to	  trans	  identities	  (e.g.	  McElwee	  2019).	  Nonetheless,	  every	  creed	  has	  
very	  specific	  legacies	  and	  traditions,	  even	  on	  a	  national	  level,	  and	  should	  thus	  be	  studied	  
accordingly.	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reproductive	  bodies	  become	  not	  only	  unnatural	  but	  also	  morally	  questionable	  
members	  of	  the	  Greek	  family	  and	  nation	  due	  to	  their	  unpatriotic	  negation	  to	  
procreate	  (Apostolidou	  2014:	  240).	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  discussed	  legislation,	  this	  tied	  in	  with	  the	  overarching	  futurity	  that	  
marked	  the	  entire	  debate.	  Firstly,	  the	  unfortunate	  choice	  of	  the	  government	  to	  
legislate	  in	  the	  same	  text	  the	  recognition	  of	  legal	  gender	  identity	  and	  the	  institution	  
of	  the	  national	  mechanism	  for	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  children	  contributed	  to	  such	  an	  
effect	  from	  the	  start.	  Although	  it	  is	  common	  practice	  to	  include	  in	  a	  single	  
legislative	  piece	  various	  provisions	  for	  reasons	  of	  procedural	  economy,	  the	  two	  
parts	  of	  the	  bill	  were	  seen,	  by	  many,	  as	  competing	  and,	  specifically,	  the	  provisions	  
about	  gender	  identity	  were	  perceived	  a	  threat	  to	  children’s	  rights	  in	  principle.	  	  
In	  the	  name	  of	  protecting	  human	  rights,	  in	  the	  name	  of	  a	  so-­‐called	  
progressivity,	  you	  proceed	  to	  a	  dangerous	  ideological	  fluidisation	  of	  the	  
biological	  sex	  of	  the	  human	  kind,	  with	  uncertain	  and	  incalculable	  
consequences	  for	  the	  family	  and	  the	  parenting	  models	  and	  for	  children’s	  
rights,	  which,	  in	  a	  paradoxical	  manner,	  you	  come	  to	  regulate	  in	  the	  second	  
part	  of	  the	  bill	  (…).	  This	  could	  bring	  fatal	  damage	  upon	  the	  fabric	  of	  society	  
(Nea	  Dimokratia	  MP	  Panayiotopoulos	  as	  rapporteur,	  Hellenic	  Parliament	  
17th	  Term,	  Plenary	  C,	  6th	  Meeting	  Minutes:	  322,	  my	  translation).	  
Lee	  Edelman	  has	  problematised	  the	  figure	  of	  the	  child	  as	  “the	  perpetual	  horizon	  of	  
every	  acknowledged	  politics,	  the	  fantasmatic	  beneficiary	  of	  every	  political	  
intervention”	  (Edelman	  2004:	  3).	  Indeed,	  the	  child,	  as	  a	  metonymy	  of	  the	  future,	  
was	  depicted	  as	  the	  victim	  par	  excellence	  of	  the	  moral	  undoing	  achieved	  by	  the	  law	  
regulating	  gender	  identity.	  	  
With	  these	  bills	  you	  strike	  the	  core	  of	  the	  family,	  the	  pillar	  of	  our	  nation.	  It	  
is	  very	  convenient	  for	  you	  having	  degenerate	  youths,	  who	  supposedly	  have	  
a	  problem	  with	  their	  own	  gender.	  They	  cannot	  revolt,	  they	  cannot	  keep	  
their	  head	  up	  high	  to	  see	  the	  superior	  ideals	  of	  Hellenism,	  of	  the	  nation,	  of	  
our	  race.	  You	  have	  pushed	  these	  children	  -­‐	  because	  I	  will	  say	  it	  again,	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nature	  needs	  no	  corrections	  -­‐	  with	  the	  role	  models	  you	  have	  given	  them	  
through	  television,	  to	  want,	  supposedly,	  to	  change	  sex.	  These	  individuals,	  
hence,	  cannot	  defend	  our	  motherland.	  Is	  this	  how	  you	  will	  solve	  the	  
demographic	  [problem]?	  Of	  course	  not	  (Golden	  Dawn	  MP	  Iliopoulos,	  
Hellenic	  Parliament	  17th	  Term,	  Plenary	  C,	  6th	  Meeting	  Minutes:	  381,	  my	  
translation).	  	  
The	  discussions	  within	  the	  parliament	  revolved	  around	  the	  figure	  of	  the	  child	  in	  
more	  than	  one	  way.	  The	  most	  prominent	  was	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  age	  limit,	  which,	  
along	  with	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  mental	  health	  diagnosis,	  became	  the	  red	  line	  for	  
many	  MPs	  who	  voted	  against	  this	  article	  (Hellenic	  Parliament	  17th	  Term,	  Plenary	  C,	  
7th	  Meeting	  Minutes).	  If	  this	  debate	  was	  in	  any	  case	  bound	  to	  have	  a	  tint	  of	  the	  
“reproductive	  futurity”	  (Edelman	  2004)	  protecting	  non-­‐heteronormative	  practices,	  
the	  discussion	  concerning	  the	  age	  limit	  for	  legal	  gender	  amendment	  and	  its	  
reduction	  to	  the	  age	  of	  fifteen	  amplified	  this	  aspect	  to	  the	  superlative.	  	  
The	  media	  produced	  one	  spectacular	  title	  after	  another	  about	  “changing	  sex203	  at	  
the	  age	  of	  15”,	  leading	  a	  moral	  panic	  with	  the	  contribution	  of	  the	  OCG	  and	  other	  
socio-­‐political	  actors	  (Galanou	  2017).204	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  which	  brought	  the	  
protection	  of	  the	  child	  to	  the	  centre	  of	  most	  speeches,	  a	  variety	  of	  scenarios	  was	  
entertained	  during	  the	  discussions,	  with	  a	  special	  emphasis	  on	  parenting	  issues.	  
Let	  us	  take	  the	  scenario	  wherein	  someone	  has	  children	  and	  proceeds	  to	  
change	  sex.	  How	  can	  the	  rights	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  parental	  care	  be	  
secured	  with	  regards	  to	  this	  person,	  [or	  the]	  mental	  health	  of	  the	  child,	  
which	  suddenly	  might	  see	  one	  of	  its	  parents	  proceeding	  to	  a	  sex	  change?	  
How	  is	  the	  emotional	  world	  of	  a	  child	  affected	  by	  such	  a	  cosmogonic	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  Note	  that,	  as	  it	  becomes	  obvious	  in	  the	  excerpts,	  the	  hostile	  discourses	  towards	  the	  bill	  make	  
use	  of	  the	  term	  “sex	  change,”	  thus,	  insidiously	  reframing	  the	  issue	  to	  imply	  that	  surgical	  intervention	  
can	  be	  accessed	  “with	  just	  an	  application”	  by	  minors,	  while	  what	  was	  discussed	  was	  the	  possibility	  
to	  amendment	  their	  documents.	  	  
204
	  In	  light	  of	  the	  discussion	  for	  lowering	  age	  limit	  for	  applying	  for	  legal	  gender	  amendment,	  another	  
resolution	  of	  the	  Holy	  Synod	  came	  to	  demand	  the	  complete	  withdrawal	  of	  the	  bill	  (Karamanou	  
2017).	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change?	  Maybe	  there	  should	  have	  been	  a	  provision	  that	  exempts	  people	  
who	  have	  children	  and	  want	  to	  change	  sex.	  What	  about	  children’s	  rights,	  
as	  you	  are	  concerned	  with	  human	  rights,	  whose	  safety	  networks	  will	  
suddenly	  collapse	  as	  well	  as	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  roles	  with	  whom	  they	  will	  
have	  been	  raised	  and	  bred?	  We	  suggest	  that	  the	  bill	  on	  gender	  identity	  
should	  be	  withdrawn	  (Enosi	  Kentroon	  MP	  Kavadellas,	  Hellenic	  Parliament	  
17th	  Term,	  Plenary	  C,	  6th	  Meeting	  Minutes:	  380,	  my	  translation).	  
That	  is,	  children	  were	  not	  considered	  to	  be	  endangered	  only	  by	  the	  low	  age	  limit,	  
which	  supposedly	  allows	  them	  to	  assume	  catastrophically	  wrong	  decisions	  but	  also	  
by	  the	  proximity	  to	  a	  trans	  parent.205	  These	  scenarios	  of	  “danger”	  for	  children	  were	  
complementary	  to	  the	  broader	  perceived	  effects	  of	  recognition	  of	  gender	  identity	  
such	  as	  the	  promotion	  of	  wrong	  (meaning	  non-­‐heteronormative)	  role-­‐models,	  the	  
destruction	  of	  national	  values	  and,	  of	  course,	  the	  deconstruction	  of	  the	  family.	  	  
(…)	  we	  say	  a	  big	  “no”	  to	  this	  abomination	  and	  we	  call	  the	  Greek	  people	  to	  
stand	  with	  us	  in	  this	  struggle.	  It	  is	  the	  greatest	  right	  of	  children	  to	  be	  raised	  
and	  to	  develop	  in	  a	  normal	  family	  and,	  in	  their	  turn,	  to	  become	  parents	  and	  
to	  raise	  normal	  children.	  Pseudo-­‐progressivists	  and	  supposed	  democrats:	  
hands	  off	  the	  children,	  hands	  off	  the	  institutions	  and	  values	  of	  our	  nation!	  
(Golden	  Dawn	  party	  leader	  Michaloliakos,	  Hellenic	  Parliament	  17th	  Term,	  
Plenary	  C,	  6th	  Meeting	  Minute:	  357,	  my	  translation).	  
As	  seen	  above,	  the	  protection	  of	  not	  only	  children	  themselves	  but	  also	  the	  figure	  of	  
the	  Child	  as	  the	  nation’s	  future	  and	  endangered	  sovereignty	  is	  perceived	  as	  the	  
opposite	  of	  non-­‐heteronormative	  life	  and	  its	  legitimisation.206	  The	  interplay	  
between	  child	  and	  family,	  family	  and	  nation	  and,	  subsequently,	  child	  and	  nation	  is	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  Not	  just	  a	  biological	  parent,	  but	  also	  by	  “same-­‐sex	  couples”	  that	  will	  supposedly	  use	  this	  law	  to	  
present	  as	  heterosexual	  and	  adopt	  children.	  
206
	  Returning	  to	  Edelman’s	  argument	  this	  is	  not	  uncommon	  as	  he	  notes:	  
We	  encounter	  this	  image	  on	  every	  side	  as	  the	  lives,	  the	  speech,	  and	  the	  freedoms	  of	  adults	  face	  
constant	  threat	  of	  legal	  curtailment	  out	  of	  deference	  to	  imaginary	  Children	  whose	  futures,	  as	  if	  
they	  were	  permitted	  to	  have	  them	  except	  as	  they	  consist	  in	  the	  prospect	  of	  passing	  them	  on	  to	  
Children	  of	  their	  own,	  are	  construed	  as	  endangered	  by	  the	  social	  disease	  as	  which	  queer	  
sexualities	  register	  (Edelman	  2004:	  19).	  
Part	  C	   	   Chapter	  9	  
	   283	   	  
emblematic	  in	  these	  discourses.	  Equally	  clear	  is	  the	  affinity	  between	  nature,	  
morality	  and	  ideas	  of	  national	  belonging.	  These	  excerpts	  exemplify	  the	  structural	  
intersection	  of	  gender/sexuality	  politics	  and	  the	  (Helleno-­‐Orthodox)	  nation-­‐under-­‐
threat,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  as	  I	  will	  suggest	  next,	  requires	  and	  enables	  racist,	  and	  
xenophobic,	  as	  well	  as	  anti-­‐migrant	  imperatives.	  	  
ii. Defending	  All	  Borders	  
As	  seen	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  the	  opposition	  towards	  the	  bill	  drew	  from	  
discussions	  concerning	  the	  “decay”	  of	  gender	  and	  family	  values.	  Athena	  Athanasiou	  
noted	  in	  2012	  the	  centrality,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  crisis,	  “of	  the	  familial	  bond	  as	  a	  pillar	  
of	  the	  national	  body,	  or,	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  racist	  discourses,	  as	  the	  guardian	  of	  racial	  
purity”	  (Athanasiou	  2012:	  30,	  my	  translation).	  Indeed,	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  following	  
excerpts,	  the	  opposition	  to	  the	  bill	  connected	  the	  debate	  on	  gender	  and	  sexual	  
non-­‐conformity	  with	  broader	  debates	  concerning	  the	  safeguarding	  of	  national	  
sovereignty	  and	  ethno-­‐religious	  homogeneity.	  	  
In	  a	  society,	  thus,	  that	  is	  being	  demolished,	  how	  selfish	  and	  devastating	  is	  it	  
to	  lose	  everything,	  to	  lose	  our	  relationship	  with	  religion,	  with	  our	  
Orthodoxy,	  to	  have	  individuals	  saying	  “I	  might	  have	  been	  born	  a	  man	  but	  I	  
would	  like	  to	  be	  a	  woman”	  or	  the	  contrary	  and	  in	  turn	  have	  us	  saying	  that	  
their	  body	  belongs	  to	  them	  and	  they	  can	  do	  with	  it	  as	  they	  will.	  Imagine	  the	  
kind	  of	  psychological	  disorder	  these	  people	  have	  that	  they	  don’t	  want	  to	  be	  
the	  sex	  that	  nature	  gave	  them.	  Imagine	  this	  person,	  who	  cares	  about	  
nothing	  other	  than	  -­‐	  to	  say	  it	  in	  a	  pedestrian	  way	  -­‐	  doing	  their	  own	  thing.	  
What	  is	  he	  going	  to	  defend	  in	  his	  life	  from	  now	  on?	  Will	  he	  defend	  
principles,	  values,	  ideals?	  But	  he	  cares	  about	  nothing.	  Not	  even	  the	  sex	  he	  
was	  born	  with.	  Is	  it	  possible	  to	  be	  interested	  in	  other	  ideals?	  To	  be	  
interested	  in	  the	  common	  interest?	  Is	  it	  possible	  to	  be	  interested	  in	  the	  
homeland	  and	  the	  nation?	  Of	  course	  not!	  (Golden	  Dawn	  MP	  Lagos,	  Hellenic	  
Parliament	  17th	  Term,	  Plenary	  C,	  6th	  Meeting	  Minutes:	  339,	  my	  translation).	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In	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  Golden	  Dawn	  representatives’	  speeches,	  the	  issue	  of	  gender	  
identity	  was	  seen	  as	  connected	  through	  a	  direct	  line	  with	  the	  “threat”	  of	  migration	  
and	  the	  controversial	  issue	  of	  building	  an	  official	  mosque	  in	  Athens	  (Hellenic	  
Parliament	  17th	  Term,	  Plenary	  C,	  6th	  and	  7th	  Meeting	  Minutes).	  	  
It	  is	  you	  who	  voted	  along	  with	  Nea	  Dimokratia	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  parties	  of	  
the	  “constitutional	  arch,”	  as	  you	  claim,	  the	  naturalisation	  of	  anyone	  who	  
comes	  into	  our	  motherland,	  you	  voted	  for	  the	  mosques,	  you	  voted	  for	  the	  
co-­‐habitation	  contracts,	  you	  voted,	  you	  voted	  and	  today	  again	  you	  are	  
voting	  regardless	  of	  the	  shouting	  and	  bickering	  among	  you.	  (Golden	  Dawn	  
MP	  Panayiotaros,	  Hellenic	  Parliament	  17th	  Term,	  Plenary	  C,	  6th	  Meeting	  
Minutes:	  347,	  my	  translation).	  
It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that,	  in	  the	  same	  legislative	  process,	  a	  contested	  amendment	  was	  
discussed,	  concerning	  the	  status	  of	  state	  recognised	  unions.	  This	  amendment	  came	  
to	  regulate	  the	  legal	  impasses	  created	  by	  the	  outlawing	  by	  Greek	  courts	  of	  specific	  
national	  minority	  unions	  (such	  as	  the	  Turkish	  Union	  of	  Xanthi)	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  public	  
order;	  a	  practice	  for	  which	  Greece,	  in	  2008,	  was	  found	  by	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  
Human	  Rights	  to	  be	  in	  violation	  of	  Article	  11	  (freedom	  of	  assembly	  and	  association)	  
and	  Article	  6	  §	  1	  (right	  to	  a	  fair	  hearing	  within	  a	  reasonable	  time)	  of	  the	  European	  
Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  (Tourkiki	  Enosi	  Xanthis	  and	  others	  vs	  Greece).	  The	  
provision	  that	  was	  included	  in	  Law	  4491/2017	  (art.	  29	  &	  30)	  could	  potentially	  allow	  
the	  re-­‐legalisation	  of	  this	  union	  as	  well	  as	  other	  minorities’	  unions.	  As	  many	  others,	  
Ilias	  Kasidiaris,	  one	  of	  Golden	  Dawn’s	  most	  prominent	  MPs	  and	  press	  
representative	  of	  the	  party	  with	  a	  notorious	  legacy	  of	  street	  violence,	  connected	  
these	  points,	  mapping	  out	  the	  threat	  towards	  the	  nation	  as	  such:	  	  
Hellas,	  therefore,	  is	  under	  attack	  today.	  It	  is	  under	  attack	  because	  it	  has	  
committed	  the	  crime	  of	  being	  98%	  homogenous	  on	  a	  national	  and	  religious	  
basis.	  In	  this	  state	  we	  are	  homogenous,	  we	  are	  98%	  Greek	  and	  Orthodox	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Christian.207	  They	  strike,	  then,	  Hellenism,	  through	  the	  illegal	  pro-­‐
memorandum	  governments,	  on	  its	  three	  pillars:	  motherland,	  religion	  and	  
family.	  The	  motherland	  is	  driven	  to	  a	  high	  level	  of	  corruption,	  ethno-­‐racial	  
corruption,	  through	  the	  flood	  of	  illegal	  immigrants	  in	  favor	  of	  which	  you	  
also	  legislate	  illegal	  laws	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  the	  anti-­‐racist	  law.	  (…)	  In	  
addition,	  motherland	  is	  under	  attack	  on	  a	  territorial	  level.	  The	  composition	  
of	  today’s	  disgraceful	  ethno-­‐traitorous	  amendment,	  which	  aims	  to	  obstruct	  
the	  fair,	  scientifically	  and	  legally	  sound	  rulings	  of	  Areios	  Pagos	  [the	  Greek	  
superior	  administrative	  court]	  that	  ban	  the	  illegal	  action	  of	  Turk-­‐unions	  
(τουρκοενώσεων)	  on	  Greek	  ground,	  has	  one	  concrete	  aim:	  the	  fall	  (άλωση)	  
of	  Hellenism,	  the	  fall	  of	  motherland	  on	  a	  territorial	  level.	  	  
(…)	  Other	  than	  the	  motherland,	  religion	  is	  clearly	  also	  under	  attack.	  All	  the	  
parties	  came	  together	  to	  vote	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  Islamic	  mosque.	  	  
(…)	  Of	  course,	  the	  Greek	  family	  is	  under	  attack	  through	  the	  notorious	  
[same-­‐sex]	  co-­‐habitation	  contract	  (Golden	  Dawn	  MP	  Kasidiaris,	  Hellenic	  
Parliament	  17th	  Term,	  Plenary	  C,	  6th	  Meeting	  Minutes:	  352,	  my	  translation).	  
The	  inclusion	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  “union	  of	  Xanthi	  amendment”	  in	  the	  body	  of	  this	  law	  
became	  an	  ideal	  occasion	  to	  draw	  direct	  connections	  between	  the	  disruption	  of	  
traditional	  gender/family	  values	  and	  the	  invasion	  of	  national	  borders	  through	  the	  
enforcement	  of	  anti-­‐Turkish/islamophobic/anti-­‐migrant	  rhetorics.	  Those	  who	  have	  
discounted	  natural	  bodily	  frontiers	  contribute	  to	  the	  dissolution	  of	  moral	  values	  
and	  circle	  back	  to	  a	  physical	  incapacity	  to	  protect	  the	  state’s	  actual	  borders.	  
Last,	  following	  the	  rationale	  of	  the	  OCG,	  this	  synthetic	  anti-­‐trans	  discourse,	  which	  
combines	  the	  legal	  with	  the	  moral	  and	  the	  dogmatic	  with	  the	  political,	  was	  used	  to	  
lead	  to	  a	  final	  imperative	  expressed	  as	  a	  dramatic	  call	  for	  resistance.	  The	  discourses	  
of	  Golden	  Dawn	  and	  the	  OCG	  moved	  parallel,	  touching	  upon	  common	  points	  only	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  The	  meticulously	  planned	  sameness	  of	  the	  population	  of	  the	  modern	  Greek	  State	  has	  been	  
thoroughly	  naturalised	  in	  the	  Greek	  nation’s	  self-­‐narration,	  thus,	  intensifying	  the	  connection	  
between	  Orthodoxy	  and	  national	  identity	  (Stavrakakis	  2003;	  Rasku	  2007).	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to	  converge	  in	  a	  populist	  summoning	  for	  transforming	  their	  rhetoric	  into	  action	  
through	  the	  political	  vehicle	  of	  resistance.	  Resistance	  as	  a	  national	  form	  of	  action	  is	  
deeply	  embedded	  in	  the	  Greek	  political	  discourse	  and	  is	  used	  to	  appeal	  to	  a	  
patriotic	  resilient	  spirit,	  both	  right-­‐wing,	  nationalist	  and	  left-­‐wing,	  anti-­‐capitalist	  
(Kyparissis	  2016:	  94).	  This	  Greek	  “heroic”	  spirit	  of	  resistance	  supposedly	  remains	  
combative	  from	  the	  Ottoman	  period,	  throughout	  the	  Balkan	  wars,	  the	  German	  
occupation,	  and	  the	  colonel	  junta	  and	  reaches	  its	  way	  to	  modern	  Greece	  and	  the	  
European	  “occupation”	  of	  the	  IMF.	  	  
Such	  a	  romantic	  notion	  of	  national	  and	  cultural	  resistance	  is	  adopted	  by	  discourses	  
across	  the	  political	  spectrum	  as	  a	  response	  to	  Western	  and	  European	  financial	  and	  
cultural	  “invasion”.208	  Michalis	  Kyparissis	  (2016)	  analyses	  the	  invocation	  of	  
historical	  tales	  of	  national	  betrayal	  and	  struggle	  in	  the	  public	  discourse	  about	  the	  
Greek	  crisis	  and	  suggests	  the	  centrality	  of	  resistance	  as	  a	  concept	  in	  the	  current	  
political	  debates.	  It	  seems	  that	  every	  time	  national	  and	  gender	  betrayals	  threaten	  
the	  ethnically,	  culturally,	  sexually	  and	  morally	  pure	  body	  of	  the	  nation,	  resistance	  is	  
marked	  not	  only	  as	  a	  duty	  and	  an	  expectation	  but	  also	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  inter-­‐temporal	  
fate	  that	  forges	  the	  Greek	  national	  identity	  (Kyparissis	  2016).	  Golden	  Dawn	  eagerly	  
picked	  up	  this	  line	  of	  political	  rhetoric:	  	  
There	  is	  also,	  of	  course,	  a	  very	  important	  point	  on	  which	  we	  need	  to	  insist	  
and	  this	  is	  no	  other	  than	  the	  mobilisation	  of	  the	  Church,	  no	  other	  from	  the	  
words	  of	  the	  monks	  of	  the	  Holy	  Mountain	  (Αγιορείτες),209	  who	  called	  upon	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208
	  The	  saga	  of	  cultural	  invasion	  as	  a	  national	  threat	  has	  intensified	  during	  the	  last	  years	  in	  the	  midst	  
of	  financial	  recession,	  the	  IMF	  intervention	  and	  the	  arrival	  of	  thousands	  of	  migrants	  through	  mostly	  
the	  Aegean	  Sea	  borders	  favoring	  patriotic	  narratives	  of	  resistance	  (Kyparissis	  2016).	  Within	  the	  anti-­‐
trans	  mobilisation	  of	  the	  OCG,	  the	  concept	  of	  resistance	  ran	  across	  and	  connected	  the	  various	  forms	  
of	  reaction,	  translating	  the	  ideological	  schemata	  outlined	  above	  into	  action.	  Whether	  it	  is	  legal	  
activism	  of	  OCG	  representatives,	  individual	  engagement	  (such	  as	  participation	  in	  public	  events),	  the	  
refusal	  to	  abide	  to	  state	  policies	  and	  legislation	  or	  other	  symbolic	  acts	  (such	  as	  funeral	  bell	  tolling	  
after	  LGBT	  legislation	  is	  passed),	  the	  proposed	  response	  was	  a	  “calm	  resistance”	  to	  (post)modernist	  
social	  values	  (Holy	  Metropolis	  of	  Corfu).	  
209
	  Article	  105	  of	  the	  Greek	  Constitution	  legally	  recognises	  the	  entire	  peninsula	  of	  Mount	  Athos	  
(called	  Aghion	  Oros,	  which	  means	  Holy	  Mountain)	  in	  North	  Greece	  as	  a	  self-­‐governed	  part	  of	  the	  
Greek	  State.	  This	  autonomous	  polity	  consists	  of	  20	  sovereign	  monasteries	  under	  the	  rule	  of	  the	  
Ecumenical	  Patriarch	  of	  Constantinople	  and	  is	  populated	  by	  monks,	  clergy	  and	  periodical	  visitors,	  
which	  all	  have	  acquired	  a	  special	  permission	  before	  entering	  the	  peninsula	  (Statutory	  Instrument	  
Part	  C	   	   Chapter	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us	  to	  resist.	  And	  we	  will	  abide	  by	  this	  summoning,	  we	  will	  abide	  by	  their	  
exhortation	  and	  we	  will	  resist,	  because,	  as	  the	  Holy	  Mountain	  monks,	  the	  
sacred	  community	  of	  the	  Holy	  Mountain,	  rightfully	  said,	  if	  we	  do	  not	  resist	  
today	  that	  Greece	  is	  under	  attack	  then	  our	  ancestors	  will	  rise	  from	  their	  
graves	  (Golden	  Dawn	  MP	  Kasidiaris,	  Hellenic	  Parliament	  17th	  Term,	  Plenary	  
C,	  6th	  Meeting	  Minutes:	  352,	  my	  translation).	  	  
The	  invocation	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  resistance	  not	  only	  served	  to	  re-­‐inscribe	  the	  word	  
of	  the	  OCG	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  parliamentary	  debates	  but	  was	  also	  used	  broadly	  by	  
Golden	  Dawn	  to	  proclaim	  itself	  as	  a	  power	  of	  “national	  resistance”210	  (Hellenic	  
Parliament	  17th	  Term,	  Plenary	  C,	  6th	  Meeting	  Minutes:	  326,	  341,	  356).	  	  
Using	  vocabulary	  and	  metaphors	  that	  draw	  parallels	  between	  the	  present	  and	  
highly	  symbolic	  moments	  in	  national	  history,	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  bill	  (among	  
other	  “traitorous”	  legislative	  pieces	  as	  we	  saw	  earlier)	  was	  niched	  as	  another	  
attempt	  against	  Helleno-­‐Orthodoxy.	  Such	  tales	  of	  treason	  and	  heroic	  resistance	  
carry	  at	  every	  step	  of	  their	  formation/synthesis/reproduction,	  gender	  and	  sexual	  
connotations	  which	  establish	  heterosexual	  masculinity	  as	  the	  only	  potential	  
position	  of	  bravery	  -­‐	  and,	  thus,	  resistance	  -­‐	  against	  national	  threats	  (Kyparissis	  
2016).	  Gender	  and	  sexual	  deviance	  on	  the	  other	  side	  become	  a	  condition	  in	  
opposition	  to	  which	  the	  prima	  materia	  of	  patriotic	  sentiment	  is	  constituted	  and	  
realised	  through	  the	  act	  of	  resistance.211	  Within	  such	  accounts,	  it	  is	  often	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10/1926).	  Among	  other	  provisions	  of	  the	  Statutory	  Charter	  of	  Aghion	  Oros,	  the	  most	  well-­‐known	  
and	  strictly	  applied	  one	  is	  the	  prohibition	  of	  “any	  living	  female”	  to	  enter	  the	  entire	  peninsula,	  a	  
crime	  punished	  with	  imprisonment	  from	  2	  months	  to	  a	  year.	  This	  rule	  is	  known	  in	  Greek	  as	  avaton	  
and	  remains	  active	  regardless	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament’s	  declaration	  that	  it	  violates	  international	  
conventions	  on	  gender	  equality	  and	  non-­‐discrimination	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  gender	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
provisions	  relating	  to	  free	  movement	  of	  persons	  within	  the	  EU	  (European	  Parliament	  Report	  2002,	  
para	  90).	  
210
	  This	  is	  a	  politically	  dense	  term	  that	  traditionally	  is	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  armed	  struggle	  during	  
WWII	  and	  is	  mostly	  affiliated	  with	  Greek	  Communist	  and	  other	  left-­‐wing	  guerrilla	  groups	  that	  fought	  
against	  German,	  Italian,	  Bulgarian	  and	  later	  British	  forces.	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  Chalkidou	  (2013)	  explores	  sexual	  (ab)normality	  -­‐and	  specifically	  BDSM	  practices-­‐	  as	  a	  metaphor	  
used	  in	  the	  Greek	  crisis	  discourse	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  (political,	  financial,	  ideological)	  threats	  against	  the	  
nation’s	  sovereignty	  and	  dignity.	  Relating	  sexual	  perversity	  with	  political	  perversity,	  this	  discourse,	  
formulates	  an	  intense	  depiction	  of	  sexual	  nationalism,	  which	  carries	  an	  abundance	  of	  historico-­‐
political	  layers	  of	  meaning	  (Chalkidou	  2013).	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concept	  of	  resistance	  that	  becomes	  the	  discursive	  vehicle,	  through	  which	  the	  
national	  subject	  is	  narrated	  into	  existence:	  honest,	  brave	  and	  always	  already	  
gendered.	  	  
Overall,	  it	  has	  been	  showcased	  in	  this	  section	  that	  the	  main	  pillars	  of	  Greek	  
national(ist)	  identity	  (that	  is,	  motherland-­‐religion-­‐family)	  served	  as	  the	  main	  axis	  
around	  which	  anti-­‐trans	  discourses	  were	  organised.	  Imperatives	  of	  national	  
belonging	  and	  state	  sovereignty	  entangled	  with	  religious	  canons	  and	  ethics	  of	  
reproductive	  futurity,	  creating	  an	  eruptive	  alloy	  of	  ethno-­‐sexual	  morals	  meant	  to	  be	  
secured	  by	  all	  means	  necessary.	  Greek	  nationalist	  discourses	  have	  been	  analysed	  in	  
this	  section	  of	  the	  chapter	  as	  a	  heavily	  gendered	  terrain,	  focused	  on	  the	  need	  to	  
defend	  the	  nation-­‐under-­‐threat	  or	  the	  Child	  as	  a	  metonymy	  of	  the	  nation’s	  future,	  
by	  defending	  the	  gender	  and	  sexual	  status	  quo.	  	  
Nonetheless,	  unfortunately,	  this	  set	  of	  polemic	  discourses	  within	  the	  parliamentary	  
discussions	  constitutes	  only	  one	  part	  of	  the	  public	  anti-­‐trans	  discourse	  during	  that	  
era.	  The	  entirety	  of	  the	  reaction	  included	  a	  vast	  reproduction	  of	  anti-­‐trans	  
sentiment	  in	  the	  media,	  social	  media,	  internet	  platforms	  and	  other	  fora.	  In	  this	  
light,	  as	  was	  established	  earlier	  in	  the	  chapter,	  the	  communicational	  management	  
of	  the	  bill	  should	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  political	  choice	  in	  itself,	  which,	  as	  partially	  
shown	  in	  the	  present	  section,	  exposed	  trans	  individuals	  to	  immense	  transphobic	  
discourse-­‐production.	  The	  last	  section	  of	  the	  chapter	  opens	  up	  for	  discussion	  this	  
frame	  of	  erupting	  visibility	  and	  its	  effects	  on	  different	  levels.	  	  	  
9.3.a. In	  the	  Spotlight	  
Given	  the	  prior	  shift	  in	  judicial	  practice,	  which	  enabled	  gender	  identity	  recognition	  
without	  genital	  surgeries	  since	  2016,	  and	  the	  central	  disadvantages	  of	  Law	  
4491/2017,	  the	  legal	  changes	  brought	  by	  this	  law,	  although	  significant,	  were	  less	  
spectacular	  than	  the	  echo	  of	  the	  introduced	  legislation	  in	  the	  media	  and	  political	  
discussions.	  This	  section	  looks	  at	  this	  conflicting	  outcome	  of	  the	  publicity	  of	  the	  
debate	  as	  it	  was	  discussed	  by	  my	  interlocutors	  and	  its	  connection	  with	  government-­‐
level	  political	  projects.	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As	  noted	  earlier,	  the	  term	  “gender	  identity”	  became,	  overnight,	  a	  buzzword	  in	  the	  
media	  and	  political	  discussions	  that	  lasted	  several	  weeks.	  Media,	  internet	  platforms	  
and	  newspapers	  were	  flooded	  by	  articles,	  interviews	  and	  discussions	  on	  the	  issue.	  
This	  sudden	  and	  accelerated	  visibility	  was	  described	  by	  my	  interlocutors	  with	  mixed	  
feelings.	  On	  one	  hand,	  it	  was	  marked	  as	  a	  turning	  point	  for	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  
acknowledgement	  of	  trans	  existence	  within	  Greek	  society.	  	  
Me:	  (…)	  it’s	  not	  just	  that	  the	  debate	  took	  place	  in	  public	  but	  it	  was	  basically	  
front	  page	  news	  every	  day	  for	  a	  while…	  
Hector:	  Do	  you	  know	  what	  man,	  I	  kind	  of…how	  can	  I	  say	  this,	  that	  was	  the	  
main	  reason	  that	  I	  was	  happy	  about	  this	  whole	  thing.	  The	  fact	  that	  there	  
was	  all	  this	  publicity	  and	  it	  was	  discussed,	  that…you	  know…there	  is…there	  
are	  trans	  people	  everywhere!	  ((he	  laughs))	  That	  was…yeah…amazing.	  
Me:	  So	  you	  were	  into	  all	  this	  publicity	  of	  the	  issue.	  
Hector:	  Hell	  yeah!	  Definitely.	  [Interview	  with	  Hector	  in	  2017].	  
More	  than	  a	  legal	  victory,	  the	  introduction	  of	  Law	  4491/2017	  is	  marked	  here	  as	  a	  
paradigm-­‐shift	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  social	  visibility.	  	  
Nonetheless,	  the	  eruption	  of	  trans-­‐related	  discussions	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  also	  
translated	  into	  a	  variety	  of	  anti-­‐trans	  discourses	  and	  imagery,	  which	  ranged	  from	  
anonymous	  internet	  comments	  up	  to	  statements	  of	  public	  figures	  and,	  as	  seen	  in	  
the	  previous	  section,	  parliamentarians	  and	  other	  institutional	  representatives	  
(Galanou	  2017;	  GTSA	  2017b).	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  antipode	  of	  what	  Hector	  describes,	  
was	  a	  feeling	  of	  being	  exposed	  by	  this	  sudden	  hyper-­‐visibility	  to	  an	  intensified	  
transphobia	  and	  unwanted	  scrutiny.	  For	  example,	  although	  Lola	  made	  clear	  in	  our	  
discussion	  that	  she	  considered	  the	  bill	  itself	  as	  a	  significant	  legal	  asset	  for	  trans	  
lives,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  she	  had	  serious	  objections	  to	  some	  of	  the	  political	  and	  
communicational	  aspects:	  
Lola:	  Also,	  another	  thing	  that	  I	  have	  been	  discussing	  about	  and	  I	  wanted	  to	  
say	  is	  that	  in	  the	  days	  when	  the	  bill	  was	  being	  discussed,	  any	  of	  us	  who	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were	  passing,	  basically	  stopped	  passing.	  That	  is…I	  remember	  people	  talking	  
about	  it	  on	  the	  street,	  I	  remember	  people	  talking	  to	  me	  in	  the	  area	  where	  I	  
work…people	  who	  hadn’t	  talked	  to	  me	  before	  coming	  up	  to	  ask	  me	  if	  it	  was	  
me	  on	  the	  news	  last	  night	  and	  I	  would	  say	  that	  it	  wasn’t	  me	  and	  they	  
would	  be	  like	  “it	  was	  you	  and	  good	  job	  for	  telling	  it	  like	  it	  is.”	  I	  remember	  
people’s	  looks	  changing	  and	  I	  remember	  seeing	  both	  more	  supportive	  looks	  
and	  more	  hostile	  looks.	  That	  is,	  I	  remember	  that	  the	  days	  of	  these	  
discussions	  whatever	  feeling	  people	  had,	  it	  was	  underlined	  in	  a	  way	  with	  
their	  attitude,	  with	  the	  excuse	  that	  now	  we	  are	  talking	  about	  this	  daily.	  
Me:	  So	  this	  public	  debate,	  what	  did	  it	  bring…	  
Lola:	  The	  thing	  about	  the	  public	  debate	  is	  that	  it	  brought	  an	  immense	  trans	  
visibility	  in	  the	  media...	  
Me:	  What	  do	  you	  think	  about	  that?	  
Lola:	  I	  personally	  did	  not	  like	  it,	  I	  never	  like	  this.	  (...)	  Because	  I	  felt	  more	  
pressure	  and	  I	  already	  feel	  enough	  pressure	  as	  a	  trans	  woman	  goes	  
around,	  uses	  public	  transportation,	  works...goes	  around,	  you	  know,	  to	  the	  
supermarket,	  for	  a	  coffee.	  (...)	  I	  didn’t	  like	  this	  trans...I	  didn’t	  want	  it,	  I	  
didn’t	  need	  in	  these	  days	  such	  an	  underlining.	  (...)	  and,	  look,	  the	  fact	  that	  
the	  average	  person	  is	  talking	  about	  this	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  good	  thing	  and	  
anyway...this	  incredible	  unconditional	  trans	  visibility	  never	  agreed	  with	  me.	  
(...)	  So	  the	  bill	  itself	  I	  found	  it	  very	  positive	  for	  all	  of	  us,	  but	  its	  management	  
by	  SYRIZA	  and	  everyone	  was	  tragic	  [Interview	  with	  Lola	  in	  2017].	  	  
Valeria	  had	  her	  own	  concerns	  about	  the	  communicational	  management	  of	  the	  new	  
legislation:	  
Me:	  Did	  you	  follow	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  bill	  in	  the	  news?	  
Valeria:	  I	  did,	  through	  the	  internet.	  Well	  I	  am	  under	  the	  impression,	  I	  
believe….well	  I	  am	  not	  very	  knowledgeable	  about	  these	  things	  but	  I	  don’t	  
think	  it	  was	  voted	  in	  because…well,	  it’s	  not	  that	  SYRIZA	  suddenly	  said	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“oooohhh…those	  poor	  trans	  women,	  what	  are	  they	  going	  through.”	  It’s	  not	  
that	  it	  just	  dawned	  on	  them	  now	  and	  they	  said	  that.	  I	  think	  it’s	  some	  kind	  
of	  European	  thing	  that	  Greece	  has	  to	  vote	  in	  or	  maybe	  it	  will	  be	  fined	  or	  
something.	  Maybe	  not	  fined,	  but	  you	  get	  what	  I	  mean.	  (...)	  Although	  to	  be	  
honest	  they	  did	  talk	  about	  how	  gender	  identity	  makes	  things	  difficult	  in	  
social	  interaction	  and	  finding	  a	  house,	  a	  job	  etc.…they	  did	  say	  that.	  I	  
followed	  this.	  
Me:	  Did	  you	  also	  follow	  it	  in	  the	  parliament	  and	  such?	  
Valeria:	  I	  did!	  I	  went	  online	  and	  saw!	  Golden	  Dawn	  had	  objections	  ((she	  
laughs)).	  	  
Me:	  Yes,	  what	  did	  you	  think	  of	  all	  that?	  
Valeria:	  Well…ehm…I	  felt	  tremendous…anger.	  I	  was	  angry…and	  most	  of	  all,	  
I	  think	  I	  was	  more	  saddened	  than	  angry…because	  it	  was…you	  know	  they	  
were	  threatening	  people’s	  lives?	  People	  wrote	  many	  things	  online,	  they	  
compared	  it	  to	  pedophilia,	  to	  bestiality,	  they	  said	  it’s	  a	  mental	  illness…and	  
all	  the	  comments	  under	  the	  articles	  were…abusive.	  And	  it	  wasn’t	  one,	  it	  
was	  hundreds.	  (…)	  
Me:	  Don’t	  you	  think	  it	  helped	  that	  it	  was	  first	  thing	  in	  the	  news	  all	  this	  
time?	  
Valeria:	  No,	  look…I	  believe	  first	  of	  all	  that	  they	  all	  wanted	  to	  sell.	  They	  sold	  
it	  as	  a	  new	  thing.	  I	  believe	  that	  they	  sold	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  was	  abusive.	  And	  
after	  they	  bombarded	  us	  with	  the	  bill	  (…)	  after,	  that	  is,	  they	  dropped	  the	  
bomb	  of	  gender	  identity	  then	  they	  started	  picking	  up	  stories…this	  person	  
that	  changed	  to	  that,	  this	  trans	  model	  etc.	  I	  mean	  they	  reproduced	  it	  in	  
every	  possible	  way	  towards	  any	  direction	  just	  so	  that	  it	  won’t	  die	  away.	  (…)	  
It	  was	  set	  up	  like	  that	  on	  purpose,	  you	  know,	  suddenly	  like	  a	  bubble	  that	  
already…it’s	  over.	  Simply	  over.	  We	  went	  through	  all	  this	  abuse	  for	  a	  couple	  
of	  weeks	  -­‐	  they	  even	  made	  memes!	  -­‐	  people	  heard	  all	  the	  wrong	  things	  (…)	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that	  their	  kids	  will	  be	  snatched	  and	  turn	  to	  demons…turned	  trans.	  (…)	  No,	  I	  
think	  there	  should	  have	  been	  some	  preparation.	  (…)	  I	  was	  extremely	  upset,	  
yes…	  
Me:	  Didn’t	  you	  feel	  like	  “here	  it	  is,	  they	  are	  finally	  talking	  about	  this.”	  
Valeria:	  I	  did	  feel	  it…wait,	  no,	  what	  I	  felt	  was	  that	  no	  matter	  what…the	  bill	  
passed	  you	  jerks!	  You	  can	  drop	  dead,	  say	  whatever…yes.	  But	  when	  I	  think	  
how	  many	  people	  think	  like	  that,	  like	  “the	  perverts,	  the	  circus	  freaks…”	  it’s	  
very	  upsetting.	  [Interview	  with	  Valeria	  2017].	  
As	  seen	  in	  both	  excerpts,	  visibility	  per	  se	  was	  not	  experienced	  as	  solely	  positive	  or	  
desirable	  but	  pertained	  to	  conflicting	  affective	  and	  practical	  components.	  At	  the	  
same	  time,	  the	  lack	  of	  significant	  preparation	  and	  engagement	  before-­‐hand	  on	  part	  
of	  the	  governing	  parties	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  communicational	  and	  political	  
exploitation	  of	  the	  issue	  created	  an	  explosive	  set	  of	  hostile	  discourses	  and	  
increased	  scrutiny.	  	  
Moreover,	  Valeria	  hints	  here	  towards	  a	  critical	  understanding	  of	  the	  political	  work	  
performed	  by	  such	  legislation.	  That	  is,	  her	  suspicion	  towards	  the	  reasons	  that	  
motivated	  the	  government	  to	  legislate	  on	  such	  a	  controversial	  issue	  encourages	  us,	  
as	  in	  previous	  chapters,	  to	  think	  about	  the	  implicit	  connections	  between	  the	  
introduction	  of	  LGBTI-­‐related	  legislation	  and	  different	  state	  projects.	  Although	  
Valeria	  brings	  up	  the	  connection	  of	  such	  legislative	  pieces	  with	  Europeanisation	  
processes,	  which	  has	  deep	  roots,	  as	  established	  in	  my	  analysis	  in	  previous	  chapters,	  
I	  suggest	  that	  the	  fast	  changing	  political	  landscape	  of	  the	  era	  adds	  new	  nuances	  to	  
such	  governmental	  initiatives.	  Unlike	  what	  was	  described	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  in	  
this	  case,	  the	  political	  imperatives	  of	  this	  legislation	  do	  not	  sit	  oddly	  within	  the	  
official	  platform	  of	  the	  government	  introducing	  it.	  Therefore,	  I	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  the	  
communicational	  exploitation	  of	  the	  endeavor	  and	  not	  the	  legislation	  itself	  that	  can	  
be	  seen	  to	  perform	  its	  own	  work	  on	  a	  government	  level.	  
Taking	  into	  account	  the	  context	  in	  which	  Law	  4491/2017	  was	  introduced,	  it	  can	  be	  
considered	  as	  part	  of	  the	  government’s	  effort	  to	  retain	  its	  left-­‐wing	  and	  progressive	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profile.	  That	  is,	  although	  having	  been	  elected	  mainly	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  its	  anti-­‐
austerity	  (“anti-­‐memorandum”)	  agenda,	  SYRIZA	  embraced	  the	  language	  and	  
practices	  of	  austerity	  as	  the	  only	  possibility	  and,	  interestingly,	  proved	  “more	  
resilient	  in	  implementing	  austerity	  even	  in	  areas	  that	  all	  previous	  authorities	  
avoided	  or	  miserably	  failed”	  (Roufos	  2018:	  156).	  The	  implementation	  of	  austerity	  
politics	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  SYRIZA	  collaborated	  with	  a	  traditionalist	  right-­‐wing	  party	  
(ANEL)	  to	  form	  a	  government	  coalition	  brought	  about	  a	  wide	  disillusionment	  in	  the	  
left-­‐wing	  electoral	  base	  (Carastathis	  2018c;	  Roufos	  2018).	  The	  political	  identity-­‐
crisis	  caused	  by	  this	  shift	  called	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  new	  terrain	  that	  would	  
allow	  SYRIZA	  to	  reinforce	  its	  differentiation	  from	  the	  “pro-­‐memorandum”	  parties.	  
Carastathis	  (2018c)	  accurately	  suggests	  that	  migration	  politics	  constituted	  
momentarily	  this	  terrain:	  
In	  this	  context,	  as	  the	  ‘refugee	  crisis’	  is	  declared	  throughout	  Europe	  in	  the	  
summer	  of	  2015,	  and	  in	  Greece	  resistance	  to	  austerity	  politics	  falters	  
behind	  Tsipras'	  inglorious	  capitulation,	  migration	  politics	  becomes	  an	  index	  
for	  what	  is	  left,	  or	  for	  what	  is	  left	  of	  the	  left.	  Indeed,	  Tsipras	  and	  his	  
supporters	  increasingly	  use	  his	  government's	  approach	  to	  migration	  to	  
differentiate	  SYRIZA	  from	  the	  centrist	  and	  right-­‐wing	  pro-­‐austerity	  parties	  
with	  which	  it	  has,	  now,	  much	  in	  common	  (Carastathis	  2018c:	  144).	  	  
Regardless	  of	  the	  government’s	  promises	  concerning	  the	  abolition	  or	  improvement	  
of	  anti-­‐migrant	  policies	  and	  practices,	  “these	  promises	  went	  unfulfilled	  and	  the	  
country's	  detention	  capacity	  increased	  markedly	  under	  SYRIZA	  leadership”	  
(Carastathis	  2018c:	  144).	  Although	  I	  will	  not	  analyse	  the	  “refugee	  crisis’”	  
management	  under	  the	  SYRIZA-­‐ANEL	  regime,	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  loss	  of	  this	  
traditionally	  privileged-­‐for-­‐the-­‐left	  political	  terrain	  embedded	  the	  spectacular	  
introduction	  of	  sexual	  minority	  rights	  with	  a	  different	  weight.	  	  
From	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  SYRIZA-­‐ANEL	  administration,	  the	  LGBT-­‐related	  legislation	  
proved	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  few	  fronts	  wherein	  the	  government	  fulfilled,	  to	  some	  
extent,	  its	  promises.	  Having	  reneged	  on	  almost	  of	  all	  its	  pre-­‐election	  commitments	  
and	  with	  its	  pro-­‐migrant	  and	  anti-­‐memorandum	  profile	  shattered,	  the	  government	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was	  invested	  in	  such	  gestures	  in	  order	  to	  recuperate	  part	  of	  its	  ideological	  
characteristics	  in	  the	  public	  eye.	  Indeed,	  the	  framing	  of	  LGBTI+	  and	  other	  minority	  
rights	  as	  counterweight	  to	  devastating	  fiscal	  and	  social	  policies	  can	  be	  traced	  within	  
governmental	  discourses.	  Minister	  of	  Finance,	  E.	  Tsakalotos,	  wrote	  in	  a	  much-­‐
discussed	  article:	  
This	  is	  a	  purely	  liberal	  bill,	  for	  those	  who	  desire	  the	  reassignment	  of	  their	  
gender.	  	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  one	  of	  those	  bills,	  which	  prove	  that	  the	  government	  
can	  manage	  the	  memorandum,	  while,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  leaving	  a	  
progressive	  imprint	  (Tsakalotos	  08.10.2017,	  kathimerini.gr).	  
In	  this	  vein,	  in	  a	  moment	  of	  deepening	  austerity	  and	  general	  disillusion	  with	  the	  
shift	  in	  SYRIZA’s	  political	  imperatives,	  sexual	  minority	  rights	  functioned	  as	  “an	  index	  
of	  the	  radicality	  and	  progressiveness”	  of	  the	  government’s	  politics	  (Under	  Secretary	  
of	  Internal	  Affairs	  Y.	  Balafas	  quoted	  in	  Kostopoulou	  2015).	  	  
Through	  this	  prism,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  why	  a	  legislative	  change	  with	  such	  backlash	  
and	  political	  cost	  became	  the	  forefront	  of	  a	  communicational	  strategy.	  In	  the	  face	  
of	  the	  complete	  shift	  of	  the	  government’s	  stance,	  sexual	  minority	  rights	  legislation	  
was	  used	  as	  a	  means	  to	  re-­‐connect	  the	  government	  with	  its	  left-­‐wing	  base.	  
Specifically,	  the	  gesture	  of	  dropping	  “the	  gender	  identity	  bomb”	  within	  this	  hostile	  
political	  climate	  might	  have	  favoured	  SYRIZA	  and	  other	  parties’	  efforts	  to	  present	  
themselves	  as	  progressive	  and	  humanitarian	  forces	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  solid	  Helleno-­‐
Orthodox	  nationalist	  front.212	  Nevertheless,	  as	  discussed	  above,	  this	  gesture	  of	  
sudden	  hyper-­‐visibility	  not	  only	  exposed	  trans	  communities	  to	  a	  renewed	  kind	  of	  
transphobia	  in	  the	  public	  discourse,	  but	  also	  intensified	  the	  daily	  scrutiny	  of	  trans	  
bodies.	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  It	  would	  also	  be	  interesting	  to	  discuss	  the	  discourses	  in	  favor	  of	  gender	  identity	  recognition	  and	  
the	  new	  modes	  of	  Greekness	  that	  emerge	  and	  gravitate	  towards	  European	  models	  of	  defending	  
sexual	  minorities	  from	  traditionalist	  societies.	  This	  becomes	  possible	  only	  by	  welcoming	  LGBTI+	  
issues	  on	  the	  mainstream	  political	  agenda	  and	  finding	  a	  new	  national	  pride	  enabled	  by	  them.	  Such	  a	  
shift	  is	  very	  new	  and	  of	  little	  political	  clout	  in	  Greece	  but	  rapidly	  evolving	  as	  seen	  by	  the	  increased	  
embracement	  of	  LGBTI+	  issues	  by	  major	  political	  institutions.	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As	  has	  been	  established	  in	  this	  section,	  the	  communicational	  endeavour	  of	  the	  
government	  to	  centralise	  in	  the	  public	  eye	  the	  introduction	  of	  Law	  4491/2017	  has	  
left	  a	  conflicting	  legacy.	  The	  increased	  visibility	  that	  the	  publicity	  surrounding	  the	  
legislation	  brought	  was	  experienced	  by	  some	  as	  an	  empowering	  instance	  of	  social	  
recognition	  but	  by	  others	  as	  an	  	  (unnecessary)	  exposure	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  hostile	  
discourses.	  Nonetheless,	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  hyper-­‐visibility	  of	  the	  
introduction	  of	  sexual	  minority	  rights	  was	  central	  in	  the	  government	  project	  of	  
recuperating	  a	  wounded	  left-­‐wing	  appeal	  -­‐	  an	  appeal	  that	  had	  been	  damaged	  by	  
the	  very	  policies	  that	  worsen	  the	  life-­‐conditions	  of	  vulnerable	  populations	  such	  as	  
often	  are	  the	  beneficiaries-­‐to-­‐be	  of	  trans-­‐related	  legislation.	  	  
Overall,	  as	  established	  in	  this	  chapter,	  the	  encounter	  between	  emerging	  modes	  of	  
institutional	  LGBTI+	  politics	  and	  political	  apparatuses	  of	  both	  the	  left	  and	  the	  right	  
in	  Greece	  constitutes	  an	  evolving	  field	  of	  political	  contestation.	  The	  coming	  years	  
will	  require	  new	  analytical	  tools	  in	  order	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  outcome	  of	  this	  
encounter	  on	  the	  socio-­‐political	  and	  legal	  terrain.	  As	  the	  cards	  of	  political	  power	  are	  
currently	  reshuffling	  once	  again	  with	  right-­‐wing	  Nea	  Dimokratia	  back	  in	  power,	  the	  
direction	  of	  this	  critique	  will	  largely	  depend	  on	  the	  coming	  political	  developments	  
and	  their	  effect	  on	  trans	  politics	  and	  legislation.
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Closing	  Part	  C	  
The	  third	  and	  last	  part	  of	  the	  thesis	  is	  concluded	  here	  having	  offered	  a	  critical	  
appraisal	  of	  contemporary	  trans-­‐related	  legislation	  in	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order.	  In	  
alignment	  with	  one	  of	  the	  main	  premises	  of	  the	  present	  thesis,	  this	  part	  
underscored	  the	  connection	  of	  trans-­‐related	  legislation	  with	  other,	  often	  seemingly	  
irrelevant,	  state	  projects,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  influence	  of	  informal	  practices	  in	  the	  
manner	  this	  legislation	  translates	  into	  reality.	  As	  it	  was	  anticipated	  in	  the	  
introduction	  chapter,	  this	  constitutes	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  twofold	  contribution	  of	  
the	  thesis.	  That	  is,	  a	  context-­‐specific	  appraisal	  of	  these	  pieces	  of	  legislation	  in	  
relation	  to	  the	  workings	  each	  one	  performed	  on	  a	  state-­‐level	  and	  on	  a	  ground	  level.	  	  
Anti-­‐discrimination	  in	  employment	  (chapter	  seven)	  was	  discussed	  in	  parallel	  with	  
processes	  of	  Europeanisation	  through	  fiscal	  and	  political	  routes	  and	  the	  self-­‐
narration	  of	  the	  Greek	  state	  as	  European.	  In	  this	  vein,	  the	  import	  of	  this	  legislation	  
from	  the	  European	  legal	  order	  was	  demystified	  and	  its	  understanding	  as	  a	  “success”	  
was	  juxtaposed	  with	  the	  narratives	  that	  depict	  the	  conditioning	  of	  trans	  
employability	  as	  an	  impossibility.	  Continuing,	  anti-­‐racist	  legislation	  (chapter	  eight)	  
was	  situated	  within	  the	  obscure	  context	  of	  right-­‐wing	  governance	  of	  the	  Crisis	  era	  
and	  its	  investment	  in	  the	  targeting	  of	  the	  nation’s	  racial,	  sexual	  and	  gendered	  
Others.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  anti-­‐racist	  legislation	  performed	  a	  mainly	  symbolic	  
function	  on	  the	  ground	  while,	  on	  a	  broader	  level,	  it	  contributed	  crucially	  to	  the	  re-­‐
naming	  and	  legitimation	  of	  government	  and	  European	  practices	  as	  non-­‐racist,	  non-­‐
discriminatory	  and	  non-­‐violent.	  Finally,	  chapter	  nine	  reads	  the	  new	  legislation	  on	  
gender	  identity	  recognition	  within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  left-­‐wing	  government	  that,	  
having	  retreated	  from	  its	  original	  positions	  on	  all	  other	  issues,	  was	  largely	  invested	  
in	  the	  introduction	  of	  legislation	  that	  can	  be	  marked	  as	  “progressive.”	  Hence,	  the	  
over-­‐the-­‐top	  publicity	  of	  the	  whole	  endeavor,	  which	  nonetheless	  was	  an	  important	  
legal	  shift,	  unnecessarily	  exposed	  trans	  people	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  hostile	  discourses	  as	  
became	  evident	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  parliamentary	  opposition	  to	  the	  bill.	  	  
Overall,	  the	  tempo	  of	  this	  part	  of	  the	  thesis	  included	  a	  continuing	  interplay	  
between	  the	  micro	  and	  the	  macro,	  ground-­‐level	  and	  state-­‐level,	  government	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politics	  and	  individual	  agency.	  This	  way,	  the	  appraisal	  of	  the	  legislation	  in	  hand	  is	  
informed	  by	  trans	  experience	  but	  also	  remains	  aware	  of	  the	  broader	  political	  goals	  
served	  by	  granted	  rights	  within	  a	  specific	  context.	  None	  of	  the	  legislation	  pieces	  
discussed	  is	  celebrated	  or	  rejected	  in	  principle.	  Instead,	  by	  weaving	  a	  complex	  
critique	  that	  includes	  positive	  and	  negative	  aspects	  simultaneously,	  this	  analysis	  can	  
account	  for	  the	  complexity	  of	  rights	  politics,	  the	  conflicting	  outcome	  of	  supposedly	  
progressive	  legislation,	  the	  bittersweet	  taste	  of	  such	  legal	  “successes”	  and	  the	  
ambivalence	  in	  my	  interlocutors’	  narratives.	  The	  next	  and	  last	  chapter	  of	  the	  thesis	  
is	  an	  epilogue	  that	  brings	  together	  all	  these	  threads	  of	  critique,	  re-­‐articulates	  them	  
as	  a	  whole,	  and	  attempts	  to	  suggest	  ways	  to	  negotiate	  them	  without	  leaving	  
anything	  and	  anyone	  behind.
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Chapter	  10. Conclusion	  
The	  departing	  point	  of	  this	  study	  has	  been	  a	  desire	  to	  critically	  interrogate	  the	  ways	  
in	  which	  the	  Greek	  state	  has	  managed	  legal	  issues	  of	  gender	  variance	  and,	  more	  
specifically,	  trans	  legal	  issues.	  This	  question	  proved	  to	  be	  rather	  complex	  or,	  more	  
precisely,	  it	  unfolded	  into	  a	  constellation	  of	  questions	  and	  problematics,	  thus	  
resulting	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  partial	  inquiries.	  This	  epilogue	  brings	  together	  all	  these	  
partial	  inquiries	  that	  have	  been	  visited	  throughout	  my	  analysis,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  main	  
arguments	  they	  lead	  to.	  Following	  this,	  a	  set	  of	  suggestions	  that	  have	  organically	  
emerged	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  text	  is	  compiled,	  thus	  utilising	  the	  rationale	  of	  the	  
thesis	  in	  order	  to	  think	  about	  the	  issues	  discussed	  along	  and	  from	  within	  this	  
specific	  context.	  	  
The	  main	  premise	  of	  the	  thesis,	  which	  connects	  the	  different	  threads	  of	  analyses	  
within	  it,	  is	  that	  the	  legal	  management	  of	  gender	  (and	  sexual)	  variance	  by	  the	  state	  
does	  not	  follow	  a	  strict,	  coherent	  and	  pre-­‐determined	  set	  of	  principles	  that	  is	  
merely	  codified	  in	  the	  word	  of	  the	  legislator.	  What	  is	  argued	  is	  that	  the	  legal	  
management	  of	  gender	  identity	  by	  the	  state	  adheres,	  on	  a	  macro	  level,	  to	  different	  
state-­‐level	  or	  larger	  transnational	  political	  projects	  while,	  on	  a	  ground	  level,	  it	  is	  
materialised	  through	  patterns	  of	  bureaucratic	  informality,	  improvised	  protocols	  and	  
individual	  survival	  strategies.	  Hence,	  the	  main	  understanding	  underpinning	  the	  text	  
is	  that	  a	  critical	  appraisal	  of	  any	  LGBTI-­‐related	  legislation	  needs	  to	  rely	  on	  an	  
analysis	  that	  includes	  both	  these	  aspects	  within	  a	  broader	  insistence	  on	  complexity	  
and	  of	  context-­‐specificity.	  Otherwise	  it	  remains	  a	  hollow	  engagement	  with	  the	  
surface	  of	  legislative	  texts	  that	  might	  have	  very	  little	  to	  do	  with	  their	  effects	  or	  their	  
actual	  purposes.	  	  
To	  that	  end,	  the	  main	  contribution	  of	  the	  present	  thesis	  lays	  in	  the	  utilisation	  of	  this	  
point	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  such	  an	  analysis	  regarding	  gender	  variance	  and	  trans	  
issues	  within	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order.	  That	  is,	  an	  analysis	  that	  embeds	  this	  debate	  
within	  a	  critical	  historical	  depth	  and	  draws	  connections	  with	  parallel	  political	  
processes,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  lived	  experience	  of	  trans	  legal	  issues.	  In	  this	  vein,	  I	  focused	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less	  on	  the	  declared	  intention	  of	  the	  legislator	  and	  more	  on	  the	  workings	  of	  trans-­‐
related	  legislation	  in	  the	  historico-­‐political	  context	  it	  is	  situated	  in.	  	  
Overall,	  the	  present	  study	  employed	  elements,	  tools	  and	  analytical	  gestures	  from	  
various	  fields	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  issues	  it	  touched	  upon.	  
Accordingly,	  it	  presented	  an	  original	  piece	  of	  research	  that	  can	  be	  of	  value	  to	  
readers	  and	  scholars	  across	  different	  fields,	  especially	  in	  the	  intersections	  of	  Socio-­‐
Legal	  studies,	  Trans	  Studies	  and	  Political	  Science.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  contribution	  of	  
this	  thesis	  -­‐that	  is,	  the	  critical	  genealogy	  of	  legal	  gender	  classification	  in	  Greece	  and	  
the	  multilevel	  appraisal	  of	  the	  contemporary	  legislation	  on	  gender	  identity-­‐	  goes	  
further	  than	  laying	  the	  groundwork	  for	  emerging	  Trans	  studies	  in	  Greece.	  It	  also	  
showcases	  how	  essential	  the	  interdisciplinary	  character	  of	  such	  endeavors	  might	  be	  
for	  the	  production	  of	  meaningful	  knowledge.	  	  
Such	  interdisciplinarity	  lays	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  critical	  epistemologies	  and	  their	  
tendency	  to	  exceed	  strict	  disciplinary	  boundaries	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  synthetic	  
approaches	  that	  can	  better	  hold	  our	  complex	  and	  nuanced	  realities.	  Specifically,	  the	  
present	  study	  was	  grafted	  with	  elements	  of	  Queer,	  LGBT	  and	  Feminist	  research	  and	  
theory	  and	  could	  claim	  space	  both	  in	  Socio-­‐Legal	  and/or	  Critical	  Legal	  Studies.	  
Moreover,	  it	  undertook	  both	  the	  task	  of	  doing	  Legal	  History	  and	  the	  task	  of	  
attempting	  a	  contemporary	  legal	  critique	  informed	  by	  empirical	  elements	  and	  
following	  analytical	  pathways	  found	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  Political	  Philosophy	  and	  Political	  
Science.	  Last,	  the	  interdisciplinary	  character	  of	  the	  study	  was	  also	  accentuated	  by	  
the	  participation	  in	  debates	  positioned	  within	  overlapping	  fields	  of	  regional	  studies,	  
such	  as	  the	  fields	  of	  Balkan,	  South-­‐East	  European	  and	  Modern	  Greek	  Studies.	  In	  this	  
disciplinary	  environment	  it	  offered	  a	  take	  on	  how	  the	  work	  performed	  by	  LGBT	  
rights	  can	  be	  read	  in	  relation	  to	  European	  integration	  discourses,	  Balkan	  
nationalisms	  and	  austerity	  politics.	  More	  specifically,	  over	  the	  preceding	  parts,	  my	  
analysis	  unfolded	  as	  follows.	  	  
Part	  A	  builds	  the	  conceptual	  backbone	  of	  the	  text	  and	  presents	  its	  methodological	  
path.	  It	  offers	  a	  review	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  trans	  studies	  and	  its	  contested	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relationship	  with	  queer	  theories,	  opting	  to	  align	  with	  writers	  who	  suggest	  that	  
framework-­‐multiplicity	  and	  polyvocality	  are	  necessary	  in	  trans	  theorising.	  
Moreover,	  it	  positions	  from	  the	  very	  beginning	  the	  aspect	  of	  context-­‐specificity	  at	  
the	  core	  of	  the	  approach	  to	  the	  thesis	  by	  discussing	  the	  problematics	  of	  assuming	  a	  
universalised	  and	  linear	  narrative	  of	  progress	  concerning	  gender	  and	  sexual	  politics,	  
practices	  and	  legislation.	  	  
Following	  that,	  Part	  A	  proceeds	  to	  engage	  with	  theories	  and	  concepts	  regarding	  the	  
management	  of	  gender	  variance	  by	  the	  legislator	  and	  the	  modern	  state.	  Discussing	  
some	  of	  the	  debates	  that	  have	  taken	  place	  regarding	  trans	  rights,	  the	  present	  
research	  adopts	  the	  stance	  that	  dictates	  a	  complex	  appraisal	  of	  rights	  in	  their	  
context	  instead	  of	  an	  overall	  acceptance	  or	  rejection	  of	  them	  in	  principle.	  
Nonetheless,	  preceding	  gender	  identity	  or	  trans	  rights	  as	  concepts,	  gender	  variance	  
was	  discussed	  in	  legal	  fields	  mainly	  in	  relation	  to	  sex	  classification	  and	  in	  dialogue	  
with	  medical	  authorities.	  For	  this	  reason,	  in	  Part	  A,	  by	  combining	  analyses	  of	  
modern	  state-­‐standardisation	  processes	  (specifically	  civil	  registration)	  and	  critiques	  
of	  classical	  theories	  of	  categorisation	  and	  interpretation,	  I	  tease	  out	  the	  relationship	  
such	  processes	  have	  to	  gender-­‐normative	  categories	  and	  to	  their	  legal	  constitution	  
through	  medico-­‐legal	  taxonomies.	  
Last,	  in	  the	  final	  chapter	  of	  Part	  A	  I	  give	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  methodological	  
setup	  of	  the	  thesis.	  The	  sources,	  the	  methods	  of	  research	  and	  analysis,	  as	  well	  as	  
my	  own	  position	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  research	  are	  discussed	  within	  a	  feminist	  
epistemological	  framework	  that	  dictates	  processes	  of	  accountable	  knowledge	  
production.	  Archival	  material	  from	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  a	  variety	  of	  
contemporary	  texts	  (laws,	  case-­‐law,	  parliamentary	  minutes,	  press	  releases	  etc.)	  and	  
a	  set	  of	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  are	  combined,	  each	  serving	  different	  purposes	  
and	  utilised	  accordingly.	  Overall,	  Part	  A	  presents	  the	  theoretical,	  epistemological	  
and	  methodological	  environment	  of	  the	  thesis	  and	  familiarises	  the	  reader	  with	  the	  
theories,	  concepts	  and	  routes	  that	  will	  be	  used	  in	  Parts	  B	  and	  C	  that	  discuss	  gender	  
variance	  and	  trans	  issues	  in	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order.	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Initially,	  in	  order	  to	  engage	  with	  contemporary	  notions	  of	  gender	  identity	  in	  the	  law	  
and	  trans	  issues	  specifically,	  it	  was	  crucial	  to	  acquire	  an	  in-­‐depth	  understanding	  of	  
the	  historicity	  of	  gender	  variance	  issues	  in	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order.	  Nonetheless,	  
looking	  at	  recent	  engagements	  of	  legal	  scholarship	  with	  trans	  issues,	  I	  argue	  that	  
their	  approach	  to	  the	  historicity	  of	  gender	  identity	  in	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order	  often	  
lacks	  in	  complexity.	  That	  is,	  it	  tends	  to	  side-­‐step	  past	  encounters	  of	  gender	  variance	  
with	  the	  law	  that	  do	  not	  fit	  into	  the	  progressivist	  narrative	  of	  a	  linear	  succession	  of	  
legal	  concepts.	  In	  a	  sense,	  I	  had	  to	  engage	  with	  part	  of	  what	  Dimitris	  Papanikolaou	  
has	  called	  archive	  trouble	  (Papanikolaou	  2011;	  2018a),	  meaning	  the	  attempt	  to	  do	  
history	  as	  a	  way	  to	  connect	  with	  the	  present	  by	  taking	  “into	  account	  diverse	  
temporalities	  and	  contours,	  survivals	  and	  moments	  of	  emergence	  in	  histories	  of	  
resilience”	  (Papanikolaou	  2018b:	  52.25’’).	  For	  this	  reason,	  what	  needed	  to	  be	  
established	  was	  a	  historiographical	  view	  of	  the	  legal	  past	  that	  would	  enable	  an	  
understanding	  of	  the	  management	  of	  legal	  gender	  and	  its	  seemingly	  
incomprehensible	  motifs	  before	  the	  emergence	  of	  gender	  and	  sexual	  minority	  
rights.	  	  
In	  this	  vein,	  Part	  B	  (made	  up	  of	  chapters	  five	  and	  six)	  composes	  a	  genealogy	  of	  a	  
phantasmatic	  legal	  category	  or,	  rather,	  a	  genealogy	  of	  the	  regulatory	  frames	  that	  
strived	  to	  re-­‐normalise,	  through	  sex	  classification	  in	  the	  law,	  specific	  kinds	  of	  
gender	  variance.	  Both	  chapters	  together,	  using	  shared	  methodology	  and	  sources,	  
drew	  out	  the	  role	  of	  classification	  and	  interpretation,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  shifting	  frames	  
of	  sex,	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  and	  their	  legal	  management	  throughout	  the	  previous	  
century.	  As	  I	  showcase	  in	  chapter	  six,	  critical	  projects	  which	  overlook	  this	  entangled	  
history	  of	  legal	  gender/sexual	  categories	  are	  bound	  to	  mystify	  or	  misread	  the	  way	  
sex	  classification	  has	  functioned	  historically.	  Accordingly,	  the	  composed	  genealogy,	  
and	  the	  individual	  points	  it	  makes,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  combination	  of	  sources,	  constitute	  
an	  important	  contribution	  to	  the	  contemporary	  debate	  on	  legal	  gender	  in	  Greece,	  
offering	  an	  essential	  complement	  to	  current	  legal	  narratives	  that	  obscure	  this	  
important	  aspect	  of	  Greek	  legal	  history.	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Specifically,	  by	  re-­‐reading	  legal	  texts	  collected	  during	  research	  visits	  to	  the	  Athens	  
Bar	  Association	  Library,	  as	  well	  as	  texts	  found	  in	  the	  digital	  archives	  of	  the	  Hellenic	  
Police	  periodicals,	  I	  created	  my	  own	  archive	  of	  dominant	  legal	  discourses	  which	  
includes	  a	  variety	  of	  connections	  between	  different	  gender	  categories	  and	  their	  
interpretative	  grounding	  within	  this	  legal	  tradition.	  Through	  these	  texts,	  I	  explored	  
the	  judicial	  practice	  concerning	  sex	  recognition	  and	  (re)classification	  within	  the	  
Greek	  context,	  which	  has	  been	  defined	  for	  decades	  not	  by	  legislative	  provisions	  but	  
by	  the	  (re)interpretation	  of	  already	  existing	  legal	  texts	  and	  case-­‐law	  -­‐	  a	  process	  that	  
often	  manifested	  as	  the	  anchoring	  of	  (legal)	  text	  onto	  underlying	  norms	  that	  can	  
either	  be	  invoked	  as	  self-­‐evident	  or	  function	  as	  self-­‐evident	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  their	  
invocation.	  	  
Moreover,	  throughout	  these	  two	  chapters,	  I	  have	  offered	  an	  analysis,	  which	  
actually	  follows	  the	  path	  of	  specificity,	  complexity	  and	  interconnectedness	  of	  legal	  
gender	  categories.	  The	  text	  dives	  into	  the	  Civil	  law	  debate	  on	  sex	  classification	  
within	  civil	  registration	  and,	  especially,	  the	  discussion	  of	  cases	  of	  
“hermaphroditism”	  and	  their	  instrumentalisation	  to	  (re)naturalise	  the	  gender	  
order.	  I	  have	  argued,	  based	  on	  this	  analysis,	  that	  the	  Civil	  law	  debate	  on	  legal	  
gender	  during	  the	  previous	  century	  has	  largely	  ignored	  the	  existence	  of	  
transsexuals	  and,	  even	  more	  so,	  the	  need	  to	  negotiate	  their	  civil	  status	  as	  such.	  
Indeed,	  regardless	  of	  the	  fascination	  of	  other	  scientific	  fields	  with	  the	  sensational	  
“phenomenon	  of	  transsexuality”	  and	  regardless	  of	  the	  social	  legibility	  of	  certain	  
categories	  of	  gender	  variance,	  Civil	  law	  scholars	  systematically	  refused	  the	  
substantiation	  of	  such	  subjectivities	  in	  law.	  To	  further	  ground	  this	  argument,	  I	  
departed	  from	  the	  strict	  area	  of	  civil	  registration	  utilising	  other	  areas	  of	  Civil	  law,	  as	  
well	  as	  Criminal	  law.	  Through	  this	  diversion,	  I	  depicted	  the	  familiarity	  of	  gender	  
variant	  individuals	  of	  that	  era	  with	  legal	  apparatuses,	  police	  authorities	  and	  other	  
state	  institutions.	  
Furthermore,	  both	  chapters	  claimed	  that,	  regardless	  of	  the	  engagement	  of	  Civil	  law	  
scholars	  with	  sex	  re-­‐classification,	  the	  subject	  of	  this	  process	  was	  either	  placed	  in	  
the	  all-­‐subsuming	  category	  of	  hermaphroditism	  or,	  more	  recently,	  evaded	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recognition	  through	  the	  use	  of	  “the-­‐person-­‐who-­‐had-­‐a-­‐sex-­‐change”	  in	  place	  of	  any	  
gender	  category.	  This	  way	  Civil	  law	  scholars	  managed	  to	  manoeuvre	  around	  not	  
only	  the	  social	  presence	  of	  trans	  individuals	  but	  even	  around	  the	  relative	  debates	  of	  
their	  fellow	  “men	  of	  science”	  in	  other	  fields,	  internationally	  and	  in	  Greece.	  I	  have	  
suggested,	  that	  is,	  that	  the	  transsexual	  became	  invisible	  in	  Civil	  law	  texts,	  not	  
because	  the	  authors	  did	  not	  “know”	  her/him	  but	  because	  they	  refused	  to	  
acknowledge	  her/him.	  To	  establish	  this,	  I	  also	  provided	  evidence	  of	  the	  way	  foreign	  
trans	  case-­‐law	  was	  re-­‐iterated	  as	  hermaphroditism	  litigation	  in	  order	  to	  be	  
introduced	  into	  the	  Greek	  debate	  and	  to	  be	  analysed	  as	  such.	  This	  confirms	  my	  
claims	  both	  about	  the	  erasure	  of	  transsexuality	  and	  about	  the	  taxonomic	  
conflations,	  with	  significant	  effects,	  between	  different	  gender	  categories	  in	  the	  
realm	  of	  Civil	  law.	  Overall,	  I	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  porousness	  between	  
hermaphroditism,	  transsexuality	  and	  homosexuality	  gave	  way	  to	  seemingly	  
paradoxical	  judicial	  practices	  and	  legal	  realities	  that	  often	  flew	  under	  the	  radar	  of	  
legal	  scholars	  and	  legislators	  or	  were	  persistently	  erased	  by	  them.	  	  
In	  my	  analysis,	  these	  motifs	  (erasure	  of	  transsexuality	  and	  the	  taxonomic	  
conflations	  of	  specific	  categories)	  were	  read	  both	  as	  a	  part	  the	  Civil	  law	  project	  to	  
present	  a	  simplified	  and	  fully	  legible	  image	  of	  society	  and	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  
ideological	  investment	  of	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order	  in	  specific	  ethno-­‐sexual	  values.	  This	  
critical	  reading	  is	  the	  thread	  that	  connects	  the	  analyses	  of	  different	  legislation	  
pieces	  throughout	  the	  entire	  thesis.	  Specifically,	  it	  ties-­‐in	  with	  the	  overarching	  
argument	  in	  my	  text	  that	  legal	  regulation	  of	  sex/gender	  issues	  does	  not	  follow	  a	  
monolithic	  and	  coherent	  pattern	  but	  adheres	  to	  the	  commands	  of	  varying	  state	  (or	  
other	  institutional)	  projects	  (Currah	  2014).	  This	  is	  the	  core	  of	  my	  approach	  and	  the	  
main	  task	  of	  my	  thesis,	  that	  is,	  an	  attempt	  to	  attend	  to	  the	  different	  questions	  
articulated	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  thesis	  through	  a	  critical	  reading	  not	  limited	  in	  
and	  by	  the	  legal	  texts	  that	  compose	  the	  legal	  framework	  on	  gender	  variance.	  
Instead,	  it	  is	  rather	  a	  reading	  of	  these	  texts	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  texts	  hidden	  behind	  
them,	  the	  different	  contexts	  around	  them,	  the	  realities	  enabled	  by	  or	  regardless	  of	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them,	  the	  workings	  performed	  by	  them	  on	  different	  levels	  and,	  finally,	  the	  
ideological	  elements	  mirrored	  in	  them.	  
In	  this	  vein,	  the	  rest	  of	  my	  analysis	  focused	  on	  current	  trans-­‐related	  legislation	  
resulting	  in	  a	  modular	  part	  Part	  C	  consisting	  of	  three	  chapters	  that	  discuss	  three	  
different	  legislative	  pieces.	  Part	  C,	  overall,	  exemplifies	  the	  significance	  and	  value	  of	  
the	  connection	  between	  gender	  identity	  regulation	  and	  various	  state	  projects.	  
Running	  with	  this	  argument,	  it	  offers	  a	  critical	  reading	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  trans-­‐
related	  legislative	  pieces	  through	  this	  lens.	  Legislation	  concerning	  discrimination	  in	  
employment	  (chapter	  seven),	  racist	  crime	  (chapter	  eight)	  and	  the	  legal	  recognition	  
of	  gender	  identity	  (chapter	  nine)	  are	  carefully	  contextualised	  and	  discussed	  in	  
proximity	  to	  the	  state	  political	  agenda	  of	  their	  era.	  	  
This	  reading	  is	  complemented	  by	  the	  insights	  offered	  by	  a	  set	  of	  semi-­‐structured	  
interviews	  with	  trans	  individuals	  and	  legal	  professionals.	  Following	  lessons	  from	  
feminist,	  queer	  and	  trans	  research,	  discussed	  in	  Part	  A,	  I	  allowed	  the	  intimate	  
knowledge	  of	  my	  interlocutors	  on	  trans	  issues	  to	  guide	  my	  attempt	  “to	  interrogate	  
the	  law	  as	  a	  set	  of	  imagined	  and	  actualised	  relationalities	  apart	  from	  their	  strict	  
legality”	  (West	  2013:	  19).	  These	  conversations	  were	  imperative	  in	  order	  to	  analyse	  
and	  make	  sense	  of	  all	  other	  sources	  used	  in	  the	  text,	  whether	  primary	  or	  
secondary.	  Moving	  from	  the	  macro	  to	  the	  micro	  level	  and	  vice	  versa,	  such	  a	  double	  
appraisal,	  on	  a	  state	  level	  and	  a	  molecular	  level,	  was	  the	  aim	  of	  all	  three	  chapters	  of	  
Part	  C.	  Refusing	  to	  take	  the	  letter	  of	  the	  law	  at	  face	  value,	  the	  three	  chapters	  in	  this	  
part	  came	  together	  to	  compose,	  at	  a	  moment	  of	  structural	  change,	  a	  view	  of	  the	  
main	  practical,	  legal	  and	  political	  aspects	  of	  the	  Greek	  legal	  framework	  concerning	  
gender	  identity.	  	  
Legislation	  against	  discrimination	  in	  matters	  of	  employment,	  which	  is	  discussed	  in	  
chapter	  seven,	  is	  considered	  internationally	  one	  of	  the	  markers	  in	  establishing	  how	  
“advanced”	  a	  country	  is	  in	  LGBTI+	  issues	  and,	  thus,	  a	  signifier	  of	  “progress”	  (Puar	  
2013).	  Nonetheless,	  the	  introduction	  of	  such	  legislation	  in	  Greece	  came	  during	  an	  
era	  in	  which	  LGBTI+	  issues	  were	  ignored	  in	  the	  mainstream	  political	  debates	  and,	  
also,	  in	  which	  multiple	  intersecting	  discriminations	  were	  accepted	  and	  normalised	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on	  all	  social	  and	  institutional	  terrains.	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  I	  proceeded	  to	  interrogate	  
the	  workings	  of	  a	  provision	  that	  announces	  the	  unacceptability	  of	  discrimination	  on	  
several	  grounds	  (among	  which	  gender	  identity)	  in	  such	  a	  context.	  	  
I	  suggest	  that	  these	  workings	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  in	  connection	  to	  a	  larger	  state	  
project	  within	  which	  the	  adaptation	  of	  the	  European	  directives	  regarding	  equality	  in	  
employment	  functioned	  as	  a	  means	  to	  achieve	  the	  Greek	  state’s	  goals	  on	  a	  fiscal	  
and	  political	  level.	  That	  is,	  the	  Greek	  state	  in	  one	  gesture	  fulfilled	  its	  international	  
obligations	  in	  a	  period	  of	  conditionality	  regarding	  European	  funds	  and	  advanced	  its	  
ideological	  trope	  of	  becoming	  a	  modern,	  meaning	  European,	  state.	  At	  the	  same	  
time,	  no	  administrative	  or	  social	  changes	  that	  could	  shift	  the	  existing	  national	  
paradigm	  of	  gender/sexual	  values	  were	  promoted.	  That	  constitutes,	  as	  mentioned	  
earlier,	  a	  win-­‐win	  scenario	  wherein	  both	  wins	  are	  for	  the	  Greek	  state.	  In	  this	  light,	  
introducing	  a	  European	  piece	  of	  legislation	  only	  to	  be	  completely	  ignored	  by	  the	  
national	  legal	  order	  can	  be	  understood.	  	  
Moreover,	  its	  disconnection	  from	  trans	  employability	  issues	  on	  the	  ground	  
accounts	  for	  the	  scepticism	  of	  my	  interlocutors	  towards	  this	  legislation	  and	  its	  
potential.	  Its	  declaratory	  value	  proved	  irrelevant	  in	  a	  context	  wherein	  normalised	  
transphobia	  often	  prevents	  the	  premises	  of	  discrimination	  to	  even	  unfold.	  Trans	  
activists	  describe	  a	  total	  exclusion	  of	  trans	  people	  from	  the	  employment	  market	  
that	  functions	  on	  a	  fundamental	  level,	  meaning	  as	  a	  disadvantage	  concerning	  the	  
distribution	  of	  life	  chances,	  such	  as	  support	  networks,	  financial	  stability,	  education	  
etc.	  (Galanou	  2011).	  Moreover,	  as	  my	  interlocutors	  suggested,	  such	  levels	  of	  
normalisation	  of	  transphobia	  translates	  to	  a	  pre-­‐emptive	  pause,	  a	  survival	  tactic	  of	  
avoiding	  situations,	  such	  as	  the	  quest	  for	  employment,	  that	  will	  guarantee	  exposure	  
to	  anti-­‐trans	  practices.	  Overall,	  the	  adaptation	  of	  the	  European	  legislation	  against	  
discrimination	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  gender	  identity	  proved	  useful	  for	  the	  
(re)legitimation	  of	  the	  Greek	  state	  as	  European	  but	  not	  for	  much	  other	  than	  that.	  	  
In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  chapter	  eight	  poses	  questions	  concerning	  the	  protection	  of	  gender	  
identity	  within	  the	  frame	  of	  a	  new	  anti-­‐racist	  legislation	  in	  criminal	  law	  (the	  Greek	  
equivalent	  of	  hate-­‐crime	  legislation),	  whose	  introduction	  during	  a	  particularly	  dark	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era	  of	  governance	  in	  Greece	  appears	  paradoxical	  at	  first	  glance.	  Under	  the	  regime	  
of	  crisis	  management	  by	  a	  right-­‐wing	  government,	  which	  largely	  relied	  on	  rhetorics	  
of	  national	  and	  ethno-­‐sexual	  purity,	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  legislation	  against	  racist	  
crime	  emerged	  as	  rather	  insidious.	  	  
Initially,	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  legislation’s	  applicability	  were	  established	  not	  only	  
based	  on	  the	  institutionalised	  character	  of	  the	  violence	  it	  was	  set	  to	  combat	  but	  
also	  on	  its	  atmospheric	  qualities.	  The	  discussions	  with	  my	  interlocutors	  offered	  an	  
understanding	  of	  the	  hostility	  that	  sprawls	  across	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  trans	  experience	  
rather	  than	  solely	  in	  the	  occurrence	  of	  spectacular	  incidents	  of	  transphobic	  
discrimination	  or	  violence.	  This	  understanding	  was	  furthered	  by	  utilising	  feminist	  
conceptualisations	  of	  gendered	  violence	  as	  atmospheric	  (Ahmed	  2014;	  Carastathis	  
2018a).	  For	  trans	  people,	  reality	  was	  described	  as	  organised	  not	  only	  by	  (the	  threat	  
of)	  transphobic	  violence	  but	  also	  by	  a	  constellation	  of	  expressions	  of	  gender	  and	  
sexuality-­‐based	  hostility.	  And	  although	  an	  event	  of	  explosive	  violence	  might	  never	  
occur,	  the	  banalised	  scrutiny,	  aggressiveness	  and	  fetishisation	  make	  up	  an	  everyday	  
experience	  that	  is	  entirely	  misrepresented	  by	  an	  approach	  of	  transphobic	  violence	  
as	  incidental.	  Moreover,	  focusing	  on	  incidental/interpersonal	  violence	  not	  only	  
does	  very	  little	  to	  undo	  the	  structural	  conditions	  that	  reproduce	  social	  hierarchies	  
but	  also	  relies	  on	  institutions	  that	  are	  integral	  to	  the	  management	  and	  subjugation	  
of	  marginalised	  groups.	  Admittedly,	  this	  conceptualisation	  of	  anti-­‐trans	  violence	  
and	  hostility	  as	  atmospheric	  revealed	  not	  only	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  anti-­‐racist	  legal	  
framework	  but	  also	  its	  indirect	  effect	  to	  conceptualise	  whatever	  lies	  beyond	  
concrete	  isolatable	  incidents	  as	  a	  non-­‐violent/racist/transphobic	  reality.	  	  
Nonetheless,	  the	  announcement	  of	  a	  marginalised	  group	  as	  protection-­‐worthy,	  
even	  if	  only	  on	  a	  discursive	  level,	  produces	  an	  undeniable	  effect.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  
change	  produced	  by	  anti-­‐racist	  legislation	  was	  mainly	  on	  a	  symbolic	  level	  since,	  as	  
discussed	  in	  chapter	  eight,	  the	  competent	  authorities	  continue	  to	  function	  on	  their	  
own	  value-­‐system.	  The	  continuing	  atmospheric	  violence	  and	  systemic	  inequality	  
combined	  with	  the	  symbolic	  weight	  of	  such	  legislative	  recognition	  resulted	  in	  an	  
ambivalent	  engagement	  with	  this	  framework	  at	  ground	  level.	  Indeed,	  my	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interlocutors	  struggled	  between	  an	  appreciation	  of	  the	  value	  of	  such	  legal	  
protection	  and	  the	  simultaneous	  intimate	  knowledge	  of	  its	  futility.	  This	  echoes	  
discussions	  explored	  in	  Part	  A	  of	  the	  thesis,	  concerning	  trans	  rights	  as	  they	  have	  
been	  conceptualised	  in	  broader	  debates	  about	  rights	  politics	  and	  the	  neoliberal	  
state	  (Duggan	  2003;	  Beger	  2011;	  Spade	  [2009]	  2015).	  In	  a	  sense,	  it	  aligns	  with	  
synthetic	  lines	  of	  critique	  that	  neither	  unproblematically	  embrace	  nor	  dismiss	  the	  
value	  of	  trans	  rights	  but	  engage	  in	  complex	  interrogations	  of	  both	  the	  limitations	  
and	  the	  transformative	  potential	  of	  rights	  politics	  (Currah	  2009,	  2013).	  
Other	  than	  the	  limitations	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  crime	  legislation	  as	  such,	  the	  most	  pressing	  
point	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  interrogated	  was	  its	  introduction	  within	  a	  context	  of	  
absolute	  legitimation	  of	  state	  racism	  and	  violence.	  In	  this	  vein,	  the	  last	  section	  of	  
chapter	  eight	  followed	  the	  threads	  of	  the	  seemingly	  paradoxical,	  at	  this	  political	  
juncture,	  introduction	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  legislation	  by	  the	  right-­‐wing	  governing	  regime.	  
Following	  Benjamin’s	  thought	  on	  the	  tautological	  formula	  that	  legitimises	  legal	  
violence	  (because	  it	  is	  legal),	  I	  suggested	  that	  both	  the	  Greek	  state’s	  massive	  
operations	  against	  the	  country’s	  ethno-­‐sexual	  Others	  and	  the	  materialisation	  of	  the	  
European	  imperatives	  of	  “fortress	  Europe”	  relied	  heavily	  on	  the	  process	  of	  re-­‐
naming	  their	  own	  racist	  violence	  as	  justifiable	  coercion.	  Through	  a	  parallel	  reading	  
of	  government	  documents,	  articles	  and	  commentary,	  I	  traced	  how	  the	  Greek	  state	  
used	  a	  conceptualisation	  of	  Golden	  Dawn’s	  practices	  as	  the	  sole	  definition	  of	  racist	  
and	  overall	  discriminatory	  violence.	  Through	  this	  gesture	  of	  constructing	  an	  image	  
of	  irrational,	  hate-­‐instigated,	  fascist	  racism	  as	  racism,	  the	  state	  proceeded	  to	  re-­‐
name	  its	  own	  calculated	  institutional	  racism	  and	  violence	  as	  non-­‐racist	  and	  non-­‐
violent.	  In	  the	  process	  of	  systematic	  ethno-­‐sexual	  persecution	  and	  systemic	  cruelty	  
of	  that	  era,	  the	  anti-­‐racist	  legislation	  worked	  in	  the	  most	  insidious	  way	  against	  the	  
marginalised	  populations	  it	  was	  supposedly	  designed	  to	  protect.	  
It	  is	  only	  within	  such	  a	  framework	  that	  one	  can	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  formal	  
protection	  from	  transphobic	  violence	  which	  is	  established	  simultaneously	  with	  the	  
persecution	  of	  trans	  women,	  migrants	  and	  sex-­‐workers.	  That	  is,	  by	  the	  exact	  same	  
regime	  that	  arbitrarily	  hunted	  down,	  detained	  and	  harassed	  trans	  women	  “to	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enhance	  citizens’	  feeling	  of	  safety	  and	  to	  improve	  the	  image”	  of	  certain	  areas	  in	  
Thessaloniki	  and	  by	  the	  same	  regime	  that	  materialised	  the	  horrifying	  HIV	  witch-­‐
hunt	  against	  female	  sex-­‐workers	  and	  substance	  users	  in	  Athens	  (Dendias	  quoted	  in	  
TGEU	  12.07.2013;	  Mavroudi	  2013).	  And	  it	  is	  only	  in	  such	  a	  framework	  that	  my	  
interlocutors’	  impasses	  can	  be	  appreciated	  in-­‐depth	  and	  not	  glossed	  over	  as	  
practical	  issues	  that	  require	  simple	  legislative	  solutions.	  For	  this	  precise	  reason,	  I	  
have	  engaged	  at	  length	  with	  their	  ambivalence	  towards	  these	  laws.	  Because	  
admittedly,	  this	  type	  of	  surge	  of	  systemic	  gender	  and	  racialised	  violence	  in	  parallel	  
with	  legal	  “victories”	  demands	  a	  re-­‐working	  of	  theoretical,	  as	  well	  as	  political	  
critical	  vocabularies	  that	  allow	  us	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  such	  complex	  and	  contradicting	  
realities	  (Papanikolaou	  2018c).	  In	  this	  case,	  just	  a	  few	  years	  apart,	  employment	  
anti-­‐discrimination	  and	  anti-­‐racist	  legislation	  have	  come	  to	  serve	  different	  state	  
goals,	  which,	  in	  themselves,	  have	  to	  different	  extents	  promoted	  further	  
precarisation	  of	  marginalised	  populations	  -­‐	  the	  very	  same	  populations	  they	  
allegedly	  protect.	  	  
The	  last	  chapter	  of	  Part	  C	  concludes	  the	  task	  of	  following	  the	  connections	  between	  
different	  trans-­‐related	  legislative	  pieces	  and	  the	  broader	  political	  projects	  that	  
these	  laws	  enable.	  Chapter	  nine	  focuses	  on	  the	  most	  specialised	  of	  these	  laws,	  that	  
is,	  Law	  4491/2017	  on	  the	  legal	  recognition	  of	  gender	  identity,	  which	  was	  introduced	  
by	  the	  governing	  coalition	  of	  SYRIZA-­‐ANEL.	  Before	  engaging	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  
the	  bill	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  its	  passing,	  I	  describe	  the	  previously	  existing	  framework	  
for	  the	  amendment	  of	  legal	  gender.	  Given	  the	  complete	  lack	  of	  protocols,	  other	  
than	  a	  vague	  provision	  that	  established	  the	  possibility	  of	  correcting	  a	  person’s	  birth	  
registration	  act	  in	  case	  of	  “sex-­‐change,”	  I	  turn	  to	  an	  empirically-­‐grounded	  
discussion	  of	  trans	  legal	  realities	  in	  Greece.	  	  
Describing	  the	  process	  on	  a	  practical	  level,	  I	  also	  gave	  space	  to	  an	  aspect	  of	  trans	  
legal	  reality,	  which	  repeatedly	  emerged	  in	  discussion	  with	  my	  interlocutors.	  That	  is,	  
the	  disproportionate	  level	  of	  control	  over	  the	  outcome	  of	  casual	  exchanges	  that	  lies	  
with	  low-­‐level	  bureaucrats	  of	  the	  public/private	  sector,	  especially	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
marginalised	  groups.	  This	  discussion	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  broader	  argument	  that	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state	  and	  private	  systems	  of	  gender	  identity	  recognition	  are	  not	  materialised	  in	  
complete	  coherence,	  formality	  and	  predictability.	  That	  might	  be	  the	  imaginary	  telos	  
of	  bureaucratic	  systems	  but	  not	  their	  actuality	  (Rozakou	  2017).	  	  
Indeed,	  the	  understanding	  of	  bureaucratic	  rules	  as	  static	  and	  monolithic	  is	  
challenged	  throughout	  the	  text	  as	  my	  interlocutors’	  narratives	  bear	  testament	  to	  a	  
dynamic	  engagement	  with	  systems	  of	  recognition	  in	  which	  the	  law	  is	  stretched,	  
bent,	  side-­‐stepped	  or	  even	  ignored.	  Trans	  legal	  realities	  in	  Greece	  appear	  to	  be	  
composed	  of	  numerous	  such	  instances	  of	  legal	  improvisation,	  spontaneity	  and	  
informality	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  contradicting	  outcomes.	  This,	  in	  its	  turn,	  reveals	  
something	  often	  misunderstood	  in	  legal	  sciences:	  that,	  even	  when	  placed	  outside	  of	  
conceivability	  frames	  in	  a	  legal	  order,	  the	  “law’s	  outer	  space”,	  as	  Whittle	  (2002)	  
calls	  it,	  people	  develop	  practices	  that	  allow	  them	  to	  survive	  and	  navigate	  hostile	  
administrative	  systems	  (Whittle	  2002:	  13).	  	  
That	  said,	  certainly	  this	  acknowledgement	  of	  trans	  individuals	  by	  the	  legislator	  in	  
2017,	  inaugurates,	  even	  if	  initially	  on	  a	  discursive	  or	  symbolic	  level,	  a	  new	  era	  for	  
gender	  recognition	  within	  the	  national	  legal	  order.	  As	  my	  analysis	  hints	  though,	  the	  
symbolic	  or	  declaratory	  function	  of	  the	  law	  is	  often	  not	  prioritised	  by	  trans	  
individuals	  in	  their	  daily	  interaction	  with	  recognition	  systems.	  This	  level	  might	  be	  
understood	  by	  legislators,	  politicians	  and	  researchers	  as	  of	  primary	  focus	  but	  
remains	  peripheral	  when	  we	  move	  from	  trans	  politics	  to	  trans	  legal	  reality.	  To	  be	  
clear,	  the	  passing	  of	  Law	  4491/2017	  was	  generally	  welcomed	  by	  my	  interlocutors	  
but,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  was	  not	  necessarily	  assigned	  with	  the	  significance	  that	  
politicians,	  activists	  and	  the	  media	  recognised	  in	  it.	  
In	  any	  case,	  gender	  identity	  recognition	  without	  medical	  preconditions	  has	  been	  a	  
central	  claim	  for	  trans	  communities	  not	  only	  in	  Greece	  but	  internationally	  and,	  in	  
this	  sense,	  Law	  4491/2017	  has	  been	  long	  anticipated.	  During	  the	  parliamentary	  
discussions	  the	  bill	  was	  met	  with	  strong	  opposition.	  As	  described	  in	  chapter	  nine,	  
the	  strictest	  opposition	  came	  from	  the	  side	  of	  Golden	  Dawn,	  whose	  
parliamentarians’	  discourse	  engendered	  a	  structural	  ideological	  clash	  with	  the	  
proposed	  legislation.	  Golden	  Dawn’s	  line	  also	  drew	  arguments	  from	  an	  anti-­‐trans	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campaign	  of	  the	  Orthodox	  Church	  of	  Greece,	  thus,	  not	  only	  forming	  vocally	  a	  
religio-­‐political	  common	  front	  against	  the	  bill	  but	  also	  transfusing	  the	  discourse	  of	  
the	  Church	  into	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  parliamentary	  debates.	  
The	  ideological	  backbone	  of	  the	  parliamentary	  opposition	  to	  the	  bill	  revolved	  
around	  the	  need	  to	  defend	  Greek	  national	  identity	  and	  its	  core	  triptych,	  that	  is,	  
motherland-­‐religion-­‐family.	  The	  political	  argumentation	  explored	  in	  chapter	  nine	  
reveals	  the	  ideological	  notions	  mobilised	  on	  a	  socio-­‐political	  level	  and	  the	  
interconnection	  of	  gender/sexual	  normativity	  with	  national	  belonging,	  reproductive	  
futurity	  and	  xenophobic	  (as	  well	  as	  Islamophobic)	  sentiment.	  The	  porousness	  of	  
these	  overlapping	  hostile	  discourses	  on	  grounds	  of	  gender,	  sexual,	  religious	  and	  
national	  belonging	  exemplifies	  the	  fabric	  of	  transphobia	  and	  homophobia	  within	  
the	  Greek	  context.	  It	  also	  offers	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  deeply	  rooted	  ethno-­‐
sexual	  imperatives	  that	  form	  the	  social	  and	  institutional	  context	  within	  which	  the	  
power	  of	  LGBT-­‐related	  legislation,	  as	  shown	  also	  in	  previous	  chapters,	  has	  proven	  
limited.	  
Regardless	  of	  the	  opposition,	  the	  SYRIZA-­‐ANEL	  governing	  coalition	  delivered	  Law	  
4491/2017	  “On	  Gender	  Identity	  Legal	  Recognition”	  which	  marked	  undoubtedly	  a	  
decisive	  moment	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  interaction	  of	  trans	  lives	  and	  the	  law	  in	  
Greece.	  Nonetheless,	  since	  the	  most	  crucial	  shift	  (legal	  gender	  amendment	  without	  
surgical	  preconditions)	  had	  already	  been	  achieved	  through	  judicial	  practice	  in	  2016,	  
the	  several	  downsides	  of	  this	  law	  beg	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  it	  was	  in	  favour	  of	  
trans	  communities	  to	  introduce	  a	  specialised	  law	  only	  to	  bring	  about	  changes	  that	  
could	  have	  been	  accomplished	  with	  a	  simple	  addition	  to	  the	  existing	  legislation.	  	  
Other	  than	  the	  newly	  added	  legal	  restrictions	  (age	  limit,	  marital	  status),	  one	  of	  the	  
most	  controversial	  points	  to	  consider	  was	  the	  sudden	  hyper-­‐visibility	  brought	  by	  
the	  government’s	  communicational	  management	  of	  the	  issue.	  The	  introduction	  of	  
Law	  4491/2017	  became	  a	  major	  publicity	  operation	  and	  monopolised	  the	  media	  for	  
several	  days	  while	  its	  sensation	  lingered	  far	  longer.	  To	  one	  extent,	  and	  by	  many	  
people,	  this	  was	  experienced	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  legitimisation	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  which	  
carried	  elements	  of	  empowerment	  (Apergi	  in	  Nini	  2017).	  On	  the	  flipside,	  as	  some	  of	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my	  interlocutors	  explained,	  it	  triggered	  a	  variety	  of	  hostile	  discourses	  and	  exposed	  
trans	  individuals	  to	  increased	  levels	  of	  unconditional	  visibility	  and	  scrutiny.	  	  
This	  legacy,	  while	  celebrated	  by	  many,	  for	  others	  counterweighs	  part	  of	  the	  work	  
performed	  by	  legislative	  recognition.	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  communicational	  
management	  of	  the	  bill’s	  introduction	  and	  the	  investment	  of	  the	  government	  with	  
regards	  to	  its	  publicity	  were	  largely	  criticised.	  Specifically,	  it	  was	  suggested	  the	  left-­‐
wing	  governing	  party	  used	  this	  accelerated	  visibility	  of	  LGBT-­‐related	  rights	  in	  order	  
to	  recuperate	  its	  radical	  left-­‐ness	  that	  was	  injured	  in	  public	  view	  by	  the	  introduction	  
of	  austerity	  measures	  and	  the	  “management”	  of	  migrant	  populations.	  Such	  
capitalising	  on	  the	  introduction	  of	  LGBT-­‐related	  legislation,	  by	  a	  party	  that	  had	  
these	  issues	  on	  its	  agenda	  before	  its	  election,	  cannot	  be	  equated	  with	  the	  insidious	  
work	  performed	  by	  the	  introduction	  of	  anti-­‐racist	  legislation	  by	  the	  right-­‐wing	  
government	  in	  2012.	  Nonetheless,	  it	  still	  remains	  in	  the	  broader	  frame	  described	  
across	  the	  thesis	  concerning	  the	  utilisation	  of	  legal	  gender	  regulation	  and	  
management	  for	  various	  stated	  projects.	  	  
More	  importantly,	  Part	  C	  overall,	  exemplified	  how	  this	  argument	  can	  become	  a	  
starting	  point	  for	  an	  analysis	  that	  can	  account	  for	  the	  complex	  and	  often	  
contradictory	  effects	  of	  legislation	  concerning	  gender	  identity.	  An	  analysis	  that	  is	  
informed	  both	  by	  broader	  socio-­‐political	  critiques	  of	  nationalist	  imperatives	  and,	  at	  
the	  same	  time,	  by	  the	  material	  and	  affective	  components	  involved	  in	  the	  appraisal	  
of	  the	  legislation	  on	  a	  molecular	  level.	  Overall,	  the	  parallel	  reading	  of	  these	  
legislative	  pieces	  and	  of	  the	  different	  work	  they	  have	  performed	  within	  their	  
historico-­‐political	  context	  suggests	  an	  understanding	  of	  LGBT-­‐related	  legislation	  
beyond	  the	  schema	  of	  “victory”	  or	  “progress”	  -­‐	  beyond	  also,	  for	  that	  matter,	  their	  
complete	  dismissal	  as	  symptoms	  of	  homonationalism	  (Currah	  2013).	  	  
As	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  three,	  similar	  critiques	  have	  also	  emerged	  in	  the	  U.S.	  
context,	  wherein	  Currah	  (2013)	  suggested	  that	  the	  right	  to	  same-­‐sex	  marriage	  can	  
neither	  be	  overall	  dismissed	  nor	  unproblematically	  celebrated	  as	  a	  victory	  “in	  this	  
moment	  of	  extreme	  income	  inequality,	  of	  the	  erosion	  if	  not	  gradual	  dismantling	  of	  
the	  social	  safety	  net,	  of	  the	  ‘hyper-­‐incarceration’	  of	  the	  prison	  industrial	  complex,	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and	  of	  record-­‐high	  rates	  of	  deportation”	  (Currah	  2013:	  3).	  Although	  the	  U.S.	  and	  
the	  Greece-­‐of-­‐Crisis	  bear	  little	  resemblance	  as	  contexts,	  they	  share	  this	  paradoxical	  
collusion,	  which	  is	  symptomatic	  of	  a	  broader	  tendency	  of	  LGBTI+	  legal	  victories	  that	  
are	  achieved	  within	  a	  setting	  of	  increasing	  social	  inequality.	  Remember	  
Papanikolaou’s	  (2018c)	  note	  on	  this	  tendency:	  
Risky	  and	  overgeneralizing	  as	  it	  may	  be,	  it	  is	  also	  analytically	  productive	  to	  
keep	  in	  mind	  a	  global	  political	  economy	  of	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  where	  
legislation	  and	  public	  recognition	  make	  advances	  celebrated	  as	  ‘progress’	  
in	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  and	  in	  the	  global	  public	  sphere	  of	  new	  media.	  
Yet,	  in	  a	  parallel	  development,	  and	  often	  in	  the	  very	  same	  ‘locations’,	  
homophobic,	  ethnophallocentric	  and	  homonationalist	  apparatuses	  work	  to	  
undo,	  sometimes	  in	  spectacular	  ways,	  these	  achievements	  (Papanikolaou	  
2018c:	  170).	  	  
In	  this	  sense,	  there	  are	  common	  threads	  between	  these	  analyses	  stemming	  from	  
contexts	  that	  are	  so	  far	  (in	  spatial	  and	  socio-­‐political	  terms)	  apart.	  In	  a	  similar	  vein	  
to	  Currah	  (2013),	  although	  writing	  within	  different	  fields,	  Papanikolaou	  (2018c)	  
traces	  such	  contradictions	  in	  current	  Greek	  reality,	  not	  to	  underestimate	  the	  
indispensability	  of	  such	  legislation,	  but	  to	  enable	  more	  complex	  readings	  that	  can	  
allow	  us	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  an	  otherwise	  incomprehensible	  reality.	  	  
Accordingly,	  in	  this	  text,	  I	  have	  attempted	  to	  dive	  into	  this	  complexity	  and	  suggest	  
alternative	  readings	  of	  the	  Greek	  legislator’s	  engagement	  with	  issues	  of	  gender	  
variance	  and	  gender	  identity	  recognition.	  In	  Part	  B,	  I	  have	  dissected	  early	  attempts	  
of	  Greek	  jurists	  to	  systematise	  sex	  (re)classification	  and	  have	  correlated	  them	  with	  
processes	  of	  state	  standardisation,	  civil	  registration,	  and	  citizen	  legibility.	  In	  Part	  C,	  I	  
have	  brought	  to	  the	  surface	  the	  interconnection	  between	  gender	  identity	  in	  the	  law	  
and	  contemporary	  government-­‐level	  political	  projects.	  I	  have	  showed	  how,	  at	  
different	  moments,	  legislation	  concerning	  gender	  identity	  and	  sexuality	  have	  
enabled	  different	  narratives	  of	  the	  Greek	  state	  for	  itself.	  Last,	  I	  have	  offered	  an	  
analysis	  of	  sex/gender	  legal	  management	  that	  can	  be	  perceived	  as	  part	  of	  broader	  
socio-­‐political	  commentary	  falling	  in	  line	  with	  Greek	  feminist	  authors’	  claims	  of	  a	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complex	  enabling	  relationship	  between	  crisis	  politics	  and	  the	  intensification	  of	  
ethno-­‐sexual	  tensions	  (Athanasiou	  2012;	  2014;	  Vaiou	  2014a,	  2014b;	  Carastathis	  
2015;	  2018).	  	  
Suggestions:	  Reserving	  the	  right	  to	  be	  complex	  
The	  way	  my	  analysis	  unfolded	  over	  the	  preceding	  chapters,	  outlined	  some	  of	  the	  
modalities	  that	  can	  accommodate	  a	  critical	  discussion	  of	  tangible	  issues	  of	  gender	  
variance	  and	  trans	  identities	  while	  reserving	  their	  right	  to	  complexity.	  In	  this	  last	  
section,	  I	  articulate	  those	  modalities	  into	  suggestions.	  That	  is,	  the	  following	  
suggestions	  are	  crystallised	  expressions	  of	  overarching	  motifs	  that	  organically	  
emerged	  from	  the	  thesis,	  such	  as	  the	  importance	  of	  epistemological	  openness	  and	  
context-­‐specificity	  and	  the	  critique	  towards	  linear	  and	  progressivist	  understandings	  
of	  gender	  and	  sexual	  practices,	  and	  politics	  and	  legislation.	  In	  this	  sense,	  althought	  
they	  are	  articulated	  here	  as	  distinct,	  as	  it	  has	  become	  obvious	  throughout	  the	  
thesis,	  they	  feed	  into	  each	  other	  and	  largely	  correlate.	  	  
Ø Firstly,	  the	  epistemological	  and	  methodological	  path	  of	  Part	  B	  explicitly	  
articulates	  an	  argument	  in	  support	  of	  the	  use	  of	  legal	  research	  modalities	  that	  can	  
recuperate	  the	  complexity	  of	  past	  modes	  of	  gender	  identification	  and	  their	  
relationship	  with	  the	  law.	  What	  is	  suggested,	  then,	  is	  to	  revisit	  the	  legal	  past	  with	  
an	  epistemological	  openness	  that	  allows	  the	  emergence	  of	  alternative	  gender	  and	  
sexual	  historicities	  regardless	  of	  their	  alignment	  with	  a	  linear	  understanding	  of	  legal	  
progress.	  Such	  a	  direction	  facilitates	  a	  context-­‐specific	  understanding	  of	  nuanced	  
negotiations	  concerning	  legal	  regulation	  and	  recognition	  before,	  or	  beyond,	  the	  
frame	  of	  LGBTI+	  rights.	  	  
Moreover,	  the	  call	  for	  epistemological	  openness	  also	  refers	  to	  the	  complexity	  and	  
porousness	  among	  and	  within	  gender	  and	  sexual	  identification	  categories.	  As	  has	  
been	  thoroughly	  explained	  throughout	  the	  thesis,	  the	  interconnection	  between	  
dominant	  frames	  of	  classifying	  gender	  variance	  has	  resulted	  in	  multiple	  overlaps	  
between	  hermaphroditism,	  transsexuality	  and	  homosexuality.	  Invoking	  such	  
overlapping	  genealogies	  might	  not	  agree	  with	  current	  stricter	  boundaries	  between	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these	  categories	  but	  still	  remains	  crucial.	  For	  example,	  Halberstam	  (1998a)	  has	  
argued	  in	  the	  past	  that	  “future	  studies	  of	  transsexuality	  and	  lesbianism	  must	  
attempt	  to	  account	  for	  historical	  moments	  when	  the	  difference	  between	  gender	  
variance	  and	  sexual	  deviance	  is	  hard	  to	  discern”	  (Halberstam	  1998a:	  161).	  	  
Accordingly,	  in	  my	  research,	  I	  felt	  debilitated	  by	  an	  analysis	  that	  assumes	  a	  strict	  
differentiation	  between	  individuals	  that	  are	  now	  identified	  as	  intersex,	  trans	  and	  
homosexual.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  viewing	  taxonomic	  categories	  as	  communicating	  
vessels	  allowed	  me	  to	  “solve”	  the	  mysteries	  of	  gender	  identity	  regulation	  in	  
twentieth	  century	  Greece.	  It	  also	  brought	  to	  the	  epicentre	  of	  this	  discussion	  the	  
management	  of	  individuals	  that	  now	  would	  be	  recognised	  as	  intersex.213	  As	  I	  
exemplified	  in	  Part	  B,	  intersex,	  trans	  and	  homosexual	  (according	  to	  current	  
nomenclature)	  characteristics	  fused	  under	  the	  categories	  of	  “inversion”	  and	  
“hermaphroditism”	  in	  twentieth	  century	  legal	  theories	  and	  practice.	  I	  suggest	  that	  
this	  complex	  set	  of	  discourses,	  which	  I	  started	  to	  trace	  in	  the	  present	  thesis,	  needs	  
to	  be	  further	  explored,	  and	  more	  versions	  of	  these	  histories	  need	  to	  be	  compiled	  in	  
order	  to	  understand	  the	  nuanced	  relationship	  of	  current	  gender/sexual	  
identifications	  and	  the	  law.	  
Ø The	  second	  suggestion	  concerns	  the	  articulation	  of	  legal	  claims	  for	  reform,	  
inclusion,	  protection	  and	  recognition.	  Having	  discussed	  in	  detail	  the	  different	  
workings	  that	  such	  legislation	  can	  perform,	  regardless	  of	  its	  declared	  intention,	  it	  
follows	  that	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  appraise	  legal	  reforms	  in	  the	  specific	  context	  they	  are	  
introduced	  in.	  Without	  such	  a	  critical	  and	  broad	  interrogation	  of	  introduced	  
legislation,	  what	  might	  be	  side-­‐stepped	  is	  its	  role	  in	  the	  orchestration	  of	  state	  
practices,	  which	  can	  result	  -­‐	  as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  eight	  -­‐	  in	  the	  further	  
precarisation	  of	  marginalised	  populations.	  It	  is	  a	  suggestion	  that	  attunes	  with	  
feminist	  and	  queer	  critiques	  from	  Greece,	  which	  note	  “that	  the	  common	  thread	  of	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  A	  fact	  that	  should	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  current	  debates	  that	  struggle	  to	  include	  the	  
underrepresented	  “I”,	  for	  intersex,	  when	  articulating	  legal	  claims.	  Exemplary,	  was	  the	  complete	  
omission,	  regardless	  of	  the	  lobbying	  groups’	  persistence,	  of	  any	  intersex-­‐related	  provisions	  in	  the	  
recent	  legislation	  on	  the	  recognition	  of	  gender	  identity	  (Galanou	  2018).	  Nonetheless,	  the	  “I”	  has	  
always	  been	  there	  and,	  as	  shown	  in	  Part	  B,	  this	  played	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  legal	  gender	  regulation.	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precarity	  and	  vulnerability	  can	  make	  us	  not	  only	  organise	  resistance	  but	  also	  rework	  
our	  theoretical,	  political	  and	  historiographical	  agendas	  to	  include	  the	  constant	  
haunting	  by	  that	  Other	  who	  is	  denied	  a	  place,	  at	  the	  very	  moment	  one	  is	  finally	  
allowed	  one”	  (Papanikolaou	  2018c:	  173).	  	  
Keeping	  such	  a	  critique	  at	  the	  core	  of	  legal	  analysis	  on	  gender	  and	  sexual	  regulation	  
is	  not	  just	  dictated	  by	  this	  exclusion	  (of	  the	  one	  who	  did	  not	  make	  it	  to	  the	  
“inside”),	  which	  lies	  within	  every	  inclusion.	  It	  is,	  furthermore,	  rendered	  necessary	  
due	  to	  the	  multiple	  axes	  along	  which,	  as	  I	  have	  showed	  in	  my	  analysis,	  gender	  and	  
sexuality	  are	  debated	  on	  the	  national	  political	  agenda.	  The	  current	  context	  of	  
increased	  racism,	  austerity	  and	  gender	  violence	  demands	  careful	  articulations	  that	  
are	  informed	  by	  critiques	  against	  nationalist,	  xenophobic	  and	  other	  similar,	  
ideological	  elements	  which	  are	  utilised	  in	  the	  discursive	  construction	  of	  certain	  
populations	  as	  dangerous,	  infectious	  and	  superfluous.	  Such	  a	  critique,	  as	  Jasbir	  Puar	  
notes,	  “may	  not	  mean	  abandoning	  rights	  based	  legal	  interventions”	  but	  it	  does	  
“highlight	  the	  need	  to	  attend	  to	  the	  unprogressive	  consequences	  of	  progressive	  
legislation”	  (Puar	  2013:	  24).	  In	  this	  vein,	  legal	  and	  political	  analyses,	  which	  are	  
trained	  to	  recognise	  the	  concealed,	  or	  less	  concealed,	  state	  projects	  served	  by	  
introduced	  legislation	  and	  are	  more	  keen	  to	  problematise	  the	  connections	  between	  
state	  imperatives,	  hostile	  ideological	  apparatuses	  and	  specific	  legal	  reforms.	  	  
Ø Furthermore,	  following	  the	  discussions	  with	  my	  interlocutors,	  another	  
suggestion	  that	  emerged	  relates	  once	  more	  to	  the	  critique	  towards	  perceiving	  
LGBTI+	  legislation	  as	  a	  linear	  tale	  of	  success	  and	  progress.	  Undoubtedly,	  following	  
blindly	  the	  path	  of,	  what	  are	  considered	  internationally,	  milestones	  in	  LGBTI+	  rights	  
offers	  the	  advantage	  of	  having	  a	  significant	  pressure	  leverage.	  Indeed,	  as	  shown	  in	  
chapter	  seven,	  the	  adaptation	  of	  European	  anti-­‐discrimination	  directives	  at	  a	  
moment	  in	  which	  such	  claims	  did	  not	  have	  momentum	  in	  the	  national	  order	  was	  
accomplished	  due	  to	  institutional	  European	  leverage.	  Nonetheless,	  it	  was	  also	  
established	  that	  this	  legislation	  remained	  unnoticed	  and	  did	  not,	  in	  any	  way,	  
produce	  results	  in	  relation	  to	  trans	  employability	  issues.	  In	  this	  sense,	  I	  argue	  that	  
legal	  and	  political	  claims	  in	  different	  contexts	  might	  limit	  themselves	  in	  their	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attempt	  to	  replicate	  past	  successes	  from	  other	  environments.	  	  
The	  success	  of	  international	  LGBTI+	  claims	  in	  the	  legal	  arena	  privileges	  the	  tendency	  
to	  ignore	  different	  paths	  that	  may	  not	  have	  led	  to	  successful,	  in	  the	  same	  terms,	  
outcomes.	  Nonetheless,	  as	  feminist	  historian	  Eleni	  Varikas	  suggests,	  looking	  at	  the	  
past	  “blurred	  by	  what	  we	  already	  know,	  the	  lens	  of	  ‘success’,	  which	  is	  the	  same	  
time	  the	  lens	  of	  the	  obvious,	  conceals	  from	  our	  vision	  any	  trace	  in	  which	  the	  
unexpected	  breaks	  open	  our	  understanding	  of	  historical	  possibility”	  (Varikas	  2002:	  
102,	  emphasis	  in	  the	  original).214	  Accordingly,	  utilising	  such	  a	  perspective	  in	  the	  
reading	  of	  past	  politico-­‐legal	  articulations	  reveals	  the	  rigidness	  of	  LGBTI+	  
progressivist	  timelines,	  which	  assume	  a	  universal	  linear	  unfolding	  of	  LGBTI+	  claims	  
in	  the	  social	  and	  legal	  arena.	  In	  this	  vein,	  what	  is	  suggested	  is	  to	  allow	  legal	  claims	  
and	  struggles	  to	  unfold	  even	  if	  they	  are	  not	  necessarily	  surrounded	  with	  the	  
prestigious	  aura	  of	  internationally	  successful	  milestones.	  	  
Ø Finally,	  a	  suggestion	  for	  legal	  research	  and	  theorising	  is	  to	  retain	  a	  stance	  of	  
epistemological	  humility	  and	  openness	  towards	  trans	  expertise	  and	  experience.	  
Indeed,	  trans	  activists	  that	  lobby	  for	  legal	  reform	  have	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  
the	  debate	  concerning	  gender	  identity	  legal	  recognition	  and	  have	  introduced	  many	  
critical	  elements	  in	  the	  dominant	  debate.	  Nonetheless,	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  trans	  
expertise	  about	  the	  practical	  navigation	  of	  legal	  and	  other	  bureaucratic	  systems	  
lays	  with	  trans	  individuals,	  regardless	  of	  their	  involvement	  in	  activism	  and	  lobbying.	  
Choosing	  to	  conduct	  interviews,	  as	  well,	  with	  individuals	  that	  were	  not	  necessarily	  
experts	  in	  this	  sense	  allowed	  for	  more	  aspects	  of	  trans	  reality	  to	  emerge,	  such	  as	  
the	  aporetic	  and	  ambivalent	  engagement	  with	  main	  pieces	  of	  trans	  legislation	  and	  
the	  low	  investment	  in	  high-­‐level	  declaratory	  legislation.	  	  
Additionally,	  through	  epistemological	  openness	  and	  reflexivity,	  legal	  research	  can	  
move	  beyond	  the	  standard	  format	  of	  extracting	  empirical	  data	  to	  confirm	  already	  
existing	  theoretical	  schemata	  and	  pre-­‐determined	  legal	  suggestions.	  Indeed,	  as	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  Varikas’	  text	  refers	  to	  the	  movements	  of	  1968	  attempting	  a	  critical	  historical	  appraisal	  of	  their	  
“utopian	  surplus”	  (Varikas	  2002).	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feminist	  epistemologies,	  but	  also	  my	  interlocutors	  themselves,	  have	  taught	  me,	  
such	  an	  approach	  allows	  nuanced	  conceptualisations,	  informal	  practices	  and	  
conflicting	  affective	  components	  to	  emerge.	  Thanks	  to	  these	  discussions,	  I	  have	  
been	  able	  to	  frame	  some	  of	  the	  dissonances	  between	  the	  legal	  imaginary	  and	  the	  
lived	  reality	  in	  a	  way	  that	  moves	  beyond	  an	  argument	  of	  proper	  application	  of	  the	  
law.	  Trusting	  the	  subtle	  (re)positionings	  of	  my	  conversation	  partners	  during	  our	  
exchanges,	  instead	  of	  insisting	  on	  my	  own	  conceptualisations	  of	  the	  issues	  under	  
discussion	  and	  their	  legal	  imaginary	  solutions,	  I	  was	  led	  by	  their	  analyses	  into	  the	  
complex	  intersections	  of	  gender	  identification,	  ethno-­‐sexual	  belonging,	  
atmospheric	  violence/hostility,	  austerity,	  and	  the	  law.	  Moreover,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  
appreciate	  the	  significance	  of	  improvised	  survival	  strategies	  and	  individual	  agency.	  
Centralising	  these	  aspects	  is	  not	  intended	  as	  an	  optimistic	  remedy	  in	  the	  face	  of	  
marginalisation	  and	  exclusion	  but,	  as	  noted	  in	  chapter	  nine,	  as	  “a	  realist	  call	  to	  
honour	  the	  zones	  of	  alternative	  trans	  being	  emerging	  under	  the	  duress	  of	  
impossibility	  and	  to	  remain	  open	  to	  not	  knowing	  what	  they	  look	  like	  in	  advance”	  
(Aizura	  2014:	  143).	  	  
Implying	  the	  depth	  of	  my	  gratitude	  towards	  my	  interlocutors,	  I	  will	  close	  with	  the	  
suggestion	  that	  such	  openness	  to	  trans	  experience	  as	  part	  of	  the	  research	  
epistemology	  is	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  generate	  valuable	  and	  meaningful	  knowledge.	  
Knowledge	  that	  does	  not	  necessarily	  fit	  neatly	  in	  the	  theoretical	  and	  practical	  
schemata	  the	  researcher	  sets	  out	  with	  but	  has	  a	  unique	  potential	  in	  making	  sense	  
of	  the	  conflicting	  elements	  of	  legal	  realities	  within	  the	  challenging	  environment	  of	  
the	  Greece-­‐of-­‐Crisis.	  It	  was	  through	  this	  prism	  that	  I	  was	  able	  to	  understand	  and	  
conceptualise	  the	  contradicting	  effects	  of	  the	  presented	  legislation,	  as	  well	  as	  my	  
own	  discomfort	  to	  either	  unquestioningly	  embrace	  or	  entirely	  reject	  the	  
significance	  of	  such	  a	  legislative	  framework	  and,	  in	  doing	  so,	  to	  return,	  time	  and	  
again,	  to	  the	  law	  as	  an	  opportunity	  for	  critique,	  rather	  than	  just	  disappointment.
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Appendix	  A	  –	  Terminology	  	  
This	  appendix	  briefly	  explains	  some	  of	  the	  terms	  used	  throughout	  the	  thesis	  and	  
the	  way	  they	  are	  to	  be	  perceived	  in	  a	  specific	  context.	  It	  is	  a	  common	  denominator	  
in	  studies	  on	  gender	  variance	  to	  engage	  with	  detailed	  and	  nuanced	  definitions,	  
especially	  of	  the	  sexual	  and	  gender	  identities	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  individuals	  (Cromwell	  
1999;	  Whittle	  2002;	  Aizura	  2006;	  Valentine	  2007).	  Such	  terminology	  is	  
simultaneously	  transnational215	  and	  context-­‐specific	  (Noble	  2011:	  267).	  For	  this	  
reason,	  the	  issue	  of	  translation	  often	  enters	  the	  conversation	  precisely	  because	  
identification	  terms	  (whether	  dominant	  or	  community-­‐based)	  travel	  across	  borders	  
and	  are	  grafted	  with	  local	  elements	  (Ochoa	  2008;	  Mizielińska	  2011;	  Bilić	  &	  Dioli	  
2016).	  
In	  the	  present	  thesis,	  since	  language	  is	  stretched	  across	  geo-­‐political,	  linguistic	  and	  
historical	  borders,	  I	  opt	  for	  a	  flexible	  and	  forgiving	  utilisation	  of	  the	  available	  English	  
terms,	  even	  if	  they	  do	  not	  always	  capture	  the	  exact	  cultural	  meanings	  involved.	  This	  
also	  requires	  a	  flexible	  and	  forgiving	  stance	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  reader,	  who	  should	  
perceive	  the	  terms	  as	  approximate	  and	  also	  as	  terms	  that	  need	  to	  be	  “got	  across”	  
culturally	  and	  historically-­‐specific	  meanings	  that	  might	  not	  always	  be	  clear-­‐cut.	  
Especially	  in	  Part	  B,	  where	  dominant	  legal	  frames	  of	  the	  previous	  century	  are	  
discussed,	  the	  mobilisation	  of	  terms	  that	  might	  not	  resonate	  with	  contemporary	  
community-­‐based	  terminology	  is	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  trace	  and	  analyse	  the	  
historicity	  of	  gender	  variance	  in	  the	  Greek	  legal	  order.	  	  
a. Sex	  –	  Gender	  	  
Starting	  from	  the	  obvious,	  the	  issue	  to	  be	  clarified	  is	  the	  way	  “sex”	  and	  “gender”	  
are	  used	  in	  the	  text.	  In	  Greek,	  the	  main	  word	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  concepts	  we	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  Indeed,	  as	  in	  other	  non-­‐Anglophone	  contexts	  many	  relevant	  terms	  are	  used	  untranslated.	  Other	  
than	  the	  main	  term	  “trans”,	  which	  will	  be	  further	  discussed	  other	  terms	  that	  where	  used	  
untranslated	  by	  my	  interlocutors	  during	  the	  interviews	  were:	  “ftm”	  (female-­‐to-­‐male),	  “mtf”	  (male-­‐
to-­‐female),	  “non-­‐binary”,	  “transition”,	  “top	  surgery”,	  “bottom	  dysphoria”,	  “post-­‐op”	  and	  “pre-­‐op”.	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have	  related	  with	  both	  sex	  and	  gender	  is	  “fylo”	  (φύλο).	  “Fylo”	  nonetheless	  does	  not	  
mean	  specifically	  either	  sex	  or	  gender.	  Moreover,	  in	  Greek,	  the	  English	  word	  “sex”	  
(σεξ	  )	  is	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  sexual	  acts,	  “not	  properties	  or	  identities	  assigned	  to	  bodies	  
or	  claimed	  by	  embodied	  subjects”	  Carastathis	  2018b:	  293,	  footnote	  36).	  The	  Greek	  
word	  “genos”	  (γένος),	  which	  etymologically	  is	  the	  closest	  translation	  of	  the	  word	  
“gender”,	  has	  a	  variety	  of	  crystallised	  meanings	  such	  as	  grammatical	  gender,	  the	  
lineage	  of	  a	  spouse	  before	  marriage,	  the	  biological	  genus	  or	  even	  a	  nation,	  thus	  
proving	  inappropriate	  to	  assume	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  English	  “gender”	  (Pavlidou	  
2006).	  	  
Therefore,	  in	  Greek,	  the	  sex-­‐gender	  distinction	  has	  been	  made	  by	  the	  use	  of	  the	  
adjectives	  “biological”	  and	  “social”	  before	  the	  broader	  term	  “fylo”	  (Pavlidou	  2006;	  
Carastathis	  2018b).	  This	  means	  that,	  unless	  the	  speaker	  is	  consciously	  making	  this	  
distinction,	  which	  is	  the	  case	  only	  in	  specialised	  discourses,	  the	  word	  “fylo”	  is	  used	  
indiscriminately,	  thus,	  begging	  the	  question	  of	  how	  one	  choses	  to	  translate	  this	  in	  
English,	  especially	  in	  such	  a	  study	  where	  the	  choice	  of	  such	  words	  is	  crucial.	  In	  a	  
nutshell,	  the	  problem	  is	  that,	  although	  the	  distinction	  between	  sex	  and	  gender	  can	  
translate	  into	  Greek,	  the	  concept	  of	  “fylo”,	  which	  is	  broader,	  does	  not	  translate	  into	  
English.	  In	  the	  following	  paragraph,	  I	  explain	  how	  I	  chose	  to	  translate	  it	  in	  different	  
instances	  but,	  overall,	  as	  it	  is	  clear	  this	  can	  only	  be	  a	  translation	  by	  approximation	  
and	  never	  exact.	  	  
In	  the	  parts	  that	  discuss	  the	  legal	  management	  of	  gender	  variance	  in	  the	  previous	  
century,	  I	  use	  almost	  exclusively	  the	  term	  “sex”	  (with	  a	  few	  exceptions),	  whether	  
referring	  to	  legal	  classifications,	  sexological	  diagnoses	  or	  other	  uses	  of	  the	  text.	  The	  
rationale	  behind	  this	  is	  primarily	  that	  the	  texts	  of	  this	  period	  precede	  the	  
theoretical	  sex-­‐gender	  distinction.	  Moreover,	  the	  use	  of	  “sex”	  underscores	  the	  
emphasis	  that	  was	  placed	  in	  this	  era	  on	  the	  anatomy	  of	  the	  body	  within	  these	  
debates	  in	  legal	  and	  medico-­‐legal	  sciences.	  Accordingly,	  for	  contemporary	  debates,	  
I	  predominantly	  use	  the	  term	  “gender”	  as	  it	  is	  the	  common	  practice	  unless	  the	  text	  I	  
translate	  uses	  the	  term	  “fylo”	  in	  a	  way	  that,	  although	  not	  explicitly	  declared,	  is	  
conceptually	  closer	  to	  “sex”.	  Overall,	  because	  the	  translation	  of	  “fylo”	  is	  not	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perfect,	  the	  reader	  is	  encouraged	  to	  understand	  the	  interchange	  between	  the	  use	  
of	  “sex”	  and	  “gender”	  as	  one	  that	  is	  guided	  by	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  text	  and,	  thus,	  
requires	  a	  flexible	  and	  forgiving	  reading.	  	  
b. Gender	  Identification	  terms	  
The	  terms	  regarding	  gender	  identification	  are	  always	  a	  terrain	  of	  discursive	  
negotiation;	  one	  that	  requires	  footnotes,	  asterisks,	  appendices,	  and	  so	  on,	  as	  the	  
terminology	  of	  gender	  identification	  is	  a	  language	  under	  construction	  often	  
constituted	  by	  identities	  under	  erasure	  (Cromwell	  1999;	  Aizura	  2006;	  Noble	  2011;	  
Bhanji	  2012).	  The	  categories	  of	  gender	  identification	  might	  have	  connotations	  of	  
dominant	  pathologising	  frames	  or	  traces	  of	  resistance	  to	  these	  frames	  or	  tints	  of	  
both.	  The	  crucial	  point	  is	  to	  employ	  the	  categories	  that	  are	  meaningful	  in	  different	  
contexts	  (Namaste	  [2005]	  2011).	  	  
The	  first	  term	  that	  requires	  further	  explanation	  is	  “hermaphroditism”,	  which,	  
although	  very	  problematic,	  is	  used	  in	  the	  text	  due	  to	  its	  historicity,	  but	  this	  is	  
thoroughly	  explained.	  The	  Greek	  etymological	  origin	  of	  the	  word	  has	  made	  it	  easily	  
transferrable	  to	  and	  from	  Greek	  texts	  without	  great	  differences	  in	  content.	  Most	  
importantly,	  the	  term	  “hermaphrodite”	  is	  used	  in	  this	  text	  as	  connotative	  of	  a	  
specific	  historical	  category	  formed	  within	  the	  medico-­‐legal	  dominant	  discourse.	  It	  is	  
important	  to	  note	  here	  that	  this	  is	  not	  currently	  a	  preferred	  term	  for	  various	  
communities	  of	  individuals	  that	  would	  have	  fallen	  historically	  within	  its	  purview.	  
The	  term	  intersex	  is	  currently	  used	  as	  a	  more	  acceptable	  category,	  which	  includes	  a	  
variety	  of	  gender	  embodiments	  beyond	  the	  sexual	  dimorphism	  paradigm	  (Sharpe	  
2010:	  4;	  Fausto-­‐Sterling	  1993;	  Dreger	  1998:	  170;	  Kessler	  1998;	  Preves	  2003;	  
Creighton	  et	  al	  2009;	  Greenberg	  2012).	  
Nonetheless,	  I	  retain	  the	  term	  in	  the	  text	  because	  as	  it	  is	  established	  in	  the	  thesis	  
that,	  during	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  it	  included	  various	  embodiments	  and	  
expressions.	  Following	  Alice	  Domurat	  Dreger:	  	  
(…)	  I	  use	  the	  general	  term	  “hermaphrodite”	  for	  all	  so-­‐identified	  subjects	  of	  
anatomically	  double,	  doubtful,	  and/or	  mistaken	  sex	  (that	  is,	  supposedly	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mislabelled	  sex).	  But	  I	  do	  this	  not	  because	  I	  think	  the	  category	  of	  
“hermaphrodite”	  is	  self-­‐evident	  or	  because	  I	  think	  it	  forms	  a	  clearly	  
bounded,	  ontological	  category	  that	  cannot	  be	  disputed.	  (…)	  it	  was	  in	  fact	  
the	  blanket	  term	  commonly	  used	  before	  and	  during	  the	  period	  of	  my	  study	  
for	  persons	  suspected	  of	  being	  subjects	  of	  double,	  doubtful,	  or	  mistaken	  
sex.	  The	  label	  “hermaphrodite”	  was	  sometimes	  also	  given	  to	  people	  we	  
would	  now	  call	  homosexuals,	  transvestites,	  feminists,	  and	  so	  on,	  but	  it	  was,	  
by	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  most	  commonly	  reserved	  for	  the	  anatomically	  
“ambiguous”	  bodies	  on	  which	  I	  focus	  (Dreger	  1998:	  30).	  	  
Accordingly,	  the	  words	  “transsexual”	  (τρανσέξουαλ)	  and	  “travesti”	  (τραβεστί),	  
which	  Carastathis	  (2018)	  describes	  as	  a	  falsification	  of	  the	  French	  word	  for	  
“transvestite,”	  are	  used	  in	  the	  text	  along	  the	  constantly	  shifting	  border	  between	  
dominant	  categorisation	  and	  re-­‐appropriating	  community	  practices	  (Carastathis	  
2018:	  293).	  As	  Papanikolaou	  (2018a)	  accurately	  notes	  “the	  term	  travesti	  has	  a	  
particular	  historicity	  in	  Greece,	  since	  this	  was	  the	  term	  that	  was	  used	  in	  the	  ‘70s	  
and	  ‘80s	  and	  has	  been	  associated	  with	  that	  era’s	  culture,	  with	  its	  traumas”	  
(Papanikolaou	  2018a:	  337,	  footnote	  1,	  my	  translation).	  	  
These	  terms,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  term	  “homosexual”	  (ομοφυλόφιλος),	  were	  used	  not	  
only	  to	  refer	  to	  trans	  women216	  but	  also	  by	  trans	  women	  to	  self-­‐identify	  and	  were	  
(and	  still	  are)	  largely	  associated	  socially	  with	  sex-­‐work.	  Although,	  none	  of	  these	  
terms	  are	  currently	  accepted	  as	  respectful	  within	  many	  contemporary	  trans	  
communities,	  they	  have	  been	  used	  historically	  as	  self-­‐identification	  terms	  around	  
which	  communities	  of	  politicisation	  and	  co-­‐existence	  were	  organised.217	  For	  
reasons	  of	  historical	  accuracy,	  but	  also	  out	  of	  respect	  for	  every	  self-­‐referential	  term	  
that	  has	  been	  chosen	  by	  gender	  variant	  individuals	  throughout	  different	  periods,	  
the	  terms	  “transsexual”	  and	  “travesti”	  are	  occasionally	  used	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  texts	  
from	  past	  decades.	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  None	  of	  these	  terms	  have	  been	  significantly	  associated	  with	  trans	  masculinities.	  	  
217
	  Many	  (usually	  older)	  trans	  women	  still	  informally	  use	  such	  terms	  because	  they	  are	  profoundly	  
meaningful	  in	  their	  socialisation.	  	  
RESERVING	  THE	  RIGHT	  TO	  BE	  COMPLEX	  
	   322	   	  
Many	  similar	  terms	  have	  historically	  been	  absorbed	  into	  Anglophone	  literature	  and	  
politics	  by	  the	  term	  “transgender”,	  which	  has	  been	  used	  broadly	  as	  an	  umbrella	  
term	  to	  describe	  a	  variety	  of	  gender	  identifications	  (Whittle	  2002).	  Although	  I	  
discuss	  the	  concept	  of	  “transgender”	  in	  Part	  A	  in	  which	  mainly	  Anglophone	  
theoretical	  debates	  are	  explored,	  I	  hardly	  use	  it	  as	  a	  term	  in	  my	  analysis.	  This	  is	  
because,	  in	  the	  Greek	  context,	  the	  term	  never	  became	  significant	  in	  its	  full	  English	  
form,	  while	  its	  translation	  in	  Greek	  (διεμφυλικός/ή)	  is	  used	  only	  in	  formal	  contexts	  
such	  as	  academic	  texts,	  legal	  texts	  and	  other	  formal	  discourses	  (Galanou	  2014).	  	  
Instead,	  the	  text	  uses	  widely	  the	  term	  “trans”,	  which	  is	  used	  untranslated	  in	  Greek	  
(τρανς)	  and	  carries	  a	  more	  contemporary	  timbre	  without	  sounding	  alienating.	  In	  
using	  this	  term,	  I	  follow	  my	  own	  empirical	  understanding	  of	  the	  practices	  in	  Greece	  
as	  well	  as	  the	  guidebook	  by	  the	  “Greek	  Transgender	  Support	  Association,”	  which,	  
regardless	  of	  using	  “transgender”	  in	  its	  title,	  notes	  on	  terminology:	  	  
Nonetheless,	  because	  as	  a	  neologism	  the	  term	  transgender	  is	  cumbersome,	  
what	  is	  preferred	  is	  the	  shorter,	  easier	  to	  use	  and	  international	  term	  trans	  
[τρανς],	  which	  is	  accepted	  and	  embraces	  the	  entire	  community	  of	  people	  
whose	  gender	  identity	  or	  expression	  differentiates	  from	  their	  anatomical	  
sex.	  Accordingly,	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  guidebook	  we	  will	  use	  the	  term	  trans218	  
/	  individuals	  /	  people	  /	  women	  /	  men	  as	  more	  simple,	  understandable	  and	  
internationally	  accepted.	  This	  is	  the	  preferred	  terminology	  that	  covers	  our	  
community	  (Galanou	  2014:	  26-­‐27,	  my	  translation,	  emphasis	  in	  the	  
original).	  
The	  use	  of	  the	  term	  “trans”	  here	  as	  a	  term	  that	  describes	  diverse	  gender	  variant	  
identification	  practices	  follows	  trans	  writers,	  which	  have	  used	  it	  as	  “an	  identity	  
category	  under	  erasure”	  while	  insisting	  on	  its	  cultural	  specificity	  (Aizura	  2006;	  
Ochoa	  2011;	  Noble	  2011;	  Bhanji	  2012).	  Departing	  from	  this	  last	  point,	  the	  terms	  
“gender	  variance/gender	  variant	  individual”	  are	  used	  widely	  in	  the	  text	  in	  order	  to	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  I	  use	  the	  term	  mas	  an	  adjective,	  as	  it	  is	  indicated	  here,	  but	  in	  practice	  many	  trans	  women	  (not	  
men)	  use	  the	  term	  as	  a	  noun.	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provide	  an	  openness	  required	  by	  historical	  and	  other	  reasons.	  That	  is,	  by	  using	  the	  
broad	  term	  “gender	  variance”,	  I	  include	  identification	  and	  practices	  that	  historically	  
might	  precede	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  term	  “trans”	  and,	  thus,	  might	  be	  flattened	  by	  
it	  (such	  as	  the	  above-­‐described	  terms)	  and	  keep	  the	  text	  open	  for	  individuals	  that,	  
although	  recognised	  as	  trans,	  might	  not	  necessarily	  conceptualise	  their	  experience	  
in	  the	  terms	  of	  LGBTI+	  and	  queer	  communities.	  	  
Departing	  from	  the	  last	  point,	  it	  is	  my	  understanding	  that	  no	  matter	  how	  careful	  
and	  open	  an	  assigned	  terminology	  attempts	  to	  be,	  there	  is	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  
epistemic	  imposition	  that	  cannot	  be	  wished	  away.	  With	  that	  in	  mind,	  I	  insist	  once	  
more	  on	  a	  flexible	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  terms	  are	  used	  and	  interchanged	  in	  
the	  text.	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Appendix	  B	  –	  Interviewees	  	  
Before	  every	  interview,	  I	  explained	  the	  premises	  of	  the	  research	  to	  all	  interviewees	  
who	  were	  also	  given	  a	  consent	  form	  to	  sign.	  The	  gender-­‐variant	  individuals	  are	  
referred	  to	  with	  pseudonyms	  that	  they	  chose	  for	  themselves	  and	  their	  information	  
is	  described	  vaguely	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  their	  anonymity.	  	  
Interlocutors’	  information:	  
• Hector:	  I	  interviewed	  Hector	  in	  2014	  and	  2017,	  both	  times	  in	  different	  cafes	  in	  
Exarcheia.	  He	  was	  in	  his	  mid-­‐thirties	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  second	  interview.	  Hector	  
has	  undertaken	  higher	  education	  and	  was	  working	  as	  self-­‐employed	  both	  times	  
we	  met.	  He	  was	  raised	  in	  a	  rural	  village	  in	  Southern	  Greece	  and	  is	  living	  with	  his	  
long-­‐term	  female	  partner.	  He	  identified	  as	  a	  trans	  man	  and	  has	  been	  involved	  in	  
trans	  and	  queer	  politics.	  He	  used	  medical	  technologies	  for	  transitioning	  but	  was	  
not	  planning	  to	  amend	  his	  documents	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  a	  state	  allowance	  or	  
otherwise	  he	  would	  struggle	  financially.	  	  
• Lola:	  I	  interviewed	  Lola	  both	  in	  2014	  and	  2017.	  The	  first	  interview	  took	  place	  in	  
a	  café	  in	  Exarcheia	  and	  the	  second	  at	  her	  apartment	  and	  interviews	  were	  
several	  hours	  long.	  Although	  she	  was	  not	  very	  interested	  in	  the	  measures	  of	  
anonymity,	  she	  strictly	  forbid	  me	  to	  discuss	  her	  age	  in	  the	  text.	  Lola	  has	  
undertaken	  higher	  education	  and	  has	  been	  involved	  in	  trans	  and	  queer	  politics	  
and	  activism.	  She	  was	  raised	  by	  her	  mother	  in	  a	  low-­‐income	  household	  in	  
Athens	  and	  had	  to	  work	  from	  an	  early	  age	  in	  various	  positions.	  She	  identified	  as	  
a	  straight	  trans	  woman	  and,	  although	  she	  had	  not	  amended	  her	  documents,	  she	  
was	  using	  medical	  technologies	  for	  transitioning.	  
• Mike:	  I	  interviewed	  Mike	  in	  2014	  and	  2017.	  Our	  first	  interview	  took	  place	  at	  the	  
apartment	  he	  shares	  with	  his	  long-­‐term	  female	  partner	  (now	  spouse)	  Eleni,	  who	  
also	  participated	  in	  the	  hours-­‐long	  interview.	  The	  second	  interview	  took	  place	  
at	  a	  café	  in	  a	  residential	  area	  of	  Athens.	  He	  was	  37	  years	  old	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	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second	  interview.	  Mike	  was	  raised	  in	  a	  rural	  area	  of	  Southern	  Greece	  and	  
worked	  in	  the	  family	  business	  from	  an	  early	  age.	  He	  undertook	  higher	  education	  
and	  was	  self-­‐employed	  at	  the	  time	  of	  our	  interviews.	  He	  was	  using	  medical	  
technologies	  for	  transitioning	  and,	  by	  the	  time	  of	  the	  second	  interview,	  he	  had	  
amended	  his	  documents.	  He	  had	  no	  connection	  with	  trans	  politics	  and	  never	  
used	  such	  terms	  to	  speak	  of	  himself	  and	  specifically	  he	  said:	  “I	  am	  not	  somehow	  
different.	  I	  am	  just	  a	  person	  that	  is	  dealing	  with	  a	  medical	  problem.”	  
• Nataly:	  I	  interviewed	  Nataly	  in	  2017	  at	  the	  apartment	  she	  shared	  with	  her	  
mother	  above	  a	  small	  shop	  that	  the	  two	  of	  them	  were	  trying	  to	  keep	  afloat.	  She	  
was	  21	  years	  old	  at	  the	  time	  and,	  although	  she	  is	  of	  mixed-­‐race	  origin,	  she	  has	  
been	  raised	  in	  Greece	  by	  her	  mother	  who	  is	  Greek	  and	  has	  serious	  health	  
problems.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  our	  interview,	  Nataly	  had	  already	  obtained	  some	  
vocational	  training	  but	  was	  working	  at	  the	  family	  shop.	  She	  identified	  as	  a	  trans	  
woman/girl	  and	  uses	  medical	  technologies	  for	  transitioning.	  She	  had	  not	  
amended	  her	  documents	  at	  the	  time	  but	  she	  had	  initiated	  the	  process,	  which	  
has	  now	  been	  completed.	  Although	  not	  involved	  at	  the	  time	  in	  trans	  activism,	  
she	  has	  socialised	  with	  and	  received	  support	  through	  some	  of	  its	  unofficial	  
networks,	  which	  she	  recognised	  as	  the	  place	  where	  she	  was	  “educated	  about	  
these	  things.”	  	  
• Philip:	  I	  interviewed	  Philip	  in	  2014	  and	  2017,	  both	  times	  in	  cafes	  in	  Thessaloniki	  
where	  he	  lives.	  He	  was	  27	  years	  old	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  second	  interview.	  Phillip	  
has	  undertaken	  higher	  education	  and	  was	  raised	  in	  a	  financially	  comfortable	  
household,	  which	  he	  recognised	  as	  a	  significant	  factor	  in	  his	  experience	  of	  living	  
as	  trans	  in	  Greece.	  He	  was	  living	  with	  his	  family	  and,	  although	  not	  involved	  in	  
trans	  activism	  at	  the	  time,	  he	  has	  socialised	  with	  and	  received	  support	  through	  
some	  of	  its	  unofficial	  networks.	  By	  the	  time	  of	  our	  first	  interview	  (when	  he	  was	  
24	  years	  old	  and	  a	  student)	  he	  had	  already	  amended	  his	  documents	  and	  was	  
using	  medical	  technologies	  for	  transitioning.	  	  
• Sandra:	  I	  interviewed	  Sandra	  at	  a	  café	  in	  Victoria	  in	  2017.	  She	  was	  22	  years	  old	  
at	  the	  time	  and	  living	  with	  her	  parents,	  who	  support	  her.	  She	  was	  raised	  in	  a	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working-­‐class	  migrant	  (although	  white)	  family	  in	  Athens.	  She	  had	  obtained	  
some	  vocational	  training	  and	  was	  in	  the	  process	  of	  completing	  some	  additional	  
training	  in	  order	  to	  find	  a	  job.	  She	  used	  the	  term	  trans	  girls/women	  to	  refer	  to	  
herself	  and	  others	  but	  generally	  prefers	  a	  stealth	  life	  and	  would	  more	  often	  
omit	  the	  term	  “trans.”	  She	  had	  not	  amended	  her	  documents	  but	  was	  using	  
medical	  technologies	  for	  transitioning.	  Although	  not	  involved	  at	  the	  time	  in	  
trans	  activism,	  she	  has	  socialised	  with	  and	  received	  support	  through	  some	  of	  its	  
unofficial	  networks.	  
• Valeria:	  I	  interviewed	  Valeria	  in	  2017	  at	  the	  apartment	  she	  shared	  with	  her	  
brother	  in	  Athens.	  She	  was	  in	  her	  late	  twenties	  at	  the	  time.	  She	  was	  not	  born	  in	  
Greece	  but	  migrated	  at	  a	  very	  young	  age	  and	  was	  raised	  by	  her	  mother	  in	  a	  
small	  Greek	  town	  within	  a	  low-­‐income	  household.	  She	  did	  not	  finish	  high	  school	  
but	  has	  obtained	  vocational	  training	  and	  was	  working	  on	  and	  off	  at	  the	  time.	  
Valeria	  identified	  as	  a	  trans	  woman,	  often	  using	  the	  term	  “trans”	  as	  a	  noun	  
referring	  to	  trans	  women.	  She	  had	  not	  amended	  her	  documents	  but	  was	  using	  
medical	  technologies	  for	  transitioning.	  Although	  not	  involved	  at	  the	  time	  in	  
trans	  activism	  she	  has	  socialised	  with	  and	  received	  support	  through	  some	  of	  its	  
unofficial	  networks.	  
Legal	  Professionals:	  
• Legal	  Professional	  1:	  I	  interviewed	  L.P.1	  in	  2017	  at	  her	  apartment	  in	  
Thessaloniki.	  I	  chose	  her	  for	  her	  experience	  with	  human	  rights	  cases	  and	  her	  
collaboration	  with	  trans	  and	  other	  political	  and	  lobbying	  groups.	  We	  were	  able	  
to	  discuss	  all	  the	  trans-­‐related	  legislation	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  it	  for	  migrant	  
individuals.	  She	  had	  represented	  trans	  (Greek	  and	  migrant)	  clients	  by	  the	  time	  
of	  our	  interview	  and	  was	  aware	  of	  the	  emerging	  legal	  debate	  in	  Greece.	  
• Legal	  Professional	  2:	  I	  interviewed	  L.P.2	  in	  her	  apartment	  in	  Thessaloniki.	  I	  
chose	  her	  for	  her	  experience	  in	  migrant-­‐related	  positions	  during	  the	  ‘refugee	  
crisis’	  of	  2015	  and	  her	  empirical	  knowledge	  of	  the	  issues	  faced	  by	  trans	  LGBT	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individuals.	  Due	  to	  the	  final	  decision	  not	  to	  include	  these	  issues	  in	  the	  thesis,	  
this	  interview	  is	  not	  drawn	  upon	  significantly	  in	  the	  text.	  
• Legal	  Professional	  3:	  I	  interviewed	  L.P.3	  in	  her	  apartment	  in	  Athens.	  I	  chose	  her	  
for	  her	  experience	  in	  migrant-­‐related	  positions	  before	  and	  during	  the	  ‘refugee	  
crisis’	  of	  2015	  and	  her	  detailed	  understanding	  of	  how	  asylum	  services	  and	  other	  
relevant	  infrastructure	  functions.	  Due	  to	  the	  final	  decision	  not	  to	  include	  these	  
issues	  in	  the	  thesis,	  this	  interview	  is	  also	  not	  significantly	  used	  in	  the	  text.
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